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ABSTRACT
THE STICKING POINT:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
LEBRUARY 2007
REBECCA K. ROOT. B.A.. ECKERD COLLEGE
Ph.D.. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda
This dissertation examines change in civil-military relations. Many countries of
Latin America and indeed the world have struggled in recent years to hold their armed
forces accountable for human rights violations they have committed in the past. In Latin
America, there has been a gradual progression towards uncovering the truth about such
crimes and ultimately prosecution of members of the military for them. After examining
competing explanations for and discussing the pattern of that change in Argentina and
Chile. Peru is offered as a recent addition to the list of countries attempting to assert this
authority over the armed forces. While I find that the Peruvian case supports scholarship
that argues that transnational activist networks should be credited with leading states to
adopt and institutionalize the norm of human rights accountability over their armed
forces, I also find that institutional, cultural and rationalist factors ser\ e to limit the
transformation of civil-military relations. Though transnational activist netw orks can
often enjoy moments of powerful influence over policy-making, the return of the
human rights accountability to the realm of normal politics and the weak institution of
the judicial system present formidable obstacles to the consolidation of the rule of law.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the most notable developments in Latin American politics over the last
twenty years has been the military s weakening political power. With few exceptions, the
military has refused to overthrow governments and seize power even in the face of
economic, social or political crisis in the third wave democracies of the region. In fact,
the pattern of military intervention into the realm of politics, once deemed a permanent
feature of the Latin American political landscape, seems now to have been reversed.
Even in countries that have largely avoided outright military control of government,
historically the armed forces of Latin America enjoyed wide latitude to shape defense
policy, veto threats to its control over military budget and personnel matters, and prevent
prosecution and punishment of military officers implicated in grievous human rights
abuses. Yet in the last decade of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-
first century, the military was forced to bargain from a weakened position in an effort to
maintain some of these prerogatives, usually with much greater civilian oversight and
substantial checks on its autonomy, or to concede to new regimes challenges to military
demands in these areas. 1
1 On this trend, see Pion-Berlin Civil-Military Relations 2001; Hunter Eroding Military
Influence in Brazil 1997: Hungtinton Reforming Civil-Military Relations 1995:
Sigmund Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America 1 993; Arceneaux
Bounded Missions 2001 : Bachelet Jeria Los estudios comparados y la relacion civil-
militar 2002: Cruz and Diamint The New Military Autonomy in Latin America 1998.
When the third wave of democratization swept Latin America in the 1980s,
military leaders across the region handed power hack to civilian governments.' However,
their power did not disappear; in many cases, these political transitions were managed by
the armed forces in such a way as to preserve special enclaves of power ( reserve
domains J ) for the military and buffer it from public pressure for accountability for its
past crimes. In Chile, for example, Augusto Pinochet guaranteed continuing political
power for the military by reserving seats in the legislature for representatives of the
military, granting all military officers amnesty for crimes committed during his
authoritarian government, and assuring continuity and stability in internal military
matters by appointing himself head of the armed forces. Even in cases where the military
gave up governmental control in a severely weakened position, as in Argentina, the threat
of military rebellion was strong enough to keep certain protections of military interests in
place even as others were being eliminated. Pacted transition (in which the groups ceding
power to a new regime maintain sufficient strength to negotiate to protect their interests),
such as that of Chile, seem to offer the greatest obstacles to full assertion of civilian
control over the military, and the total collapse of the military regime after Argentina s
defeat in the Falklands War seemed to lower these barriers. Yet in all cases new civilian
regimes found there were very real limitations to their capacity to reform their military
institutions and subject them to democratic forms of oversight and accountability.
' On the third wave of democratization, see Huntington Third Wave 1991.
See Valenzuela Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings 1992.
Such limitations constituted obstacles to what the literature commonly refers to as
democratic consolidation, the state in which democratic norms, institutions and
practices have been fully entrenched in a political system and become the only acceptable
route to power and pattern of governance. That there was nothing inevitable about a state
that had turned away from overtly authoritarian forms of government actually
consolidating democracy became only too obvious as the 1990s progressed. 4 While
electoral democratization assured what O Donnell calls vertical accountability that is.
voters ability to hold their representatives accountable through the ballot box. it did not
inherently imply horizontal accountability. When horizontal accountability exists, it is
due to the presence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and
factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal
sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies
of the state that may be qualified as unlawful. If any agency of the state is exempt from
such accountability, the norms of democratic consolidation remain unattained. Clearly, in
the case of civil-military relations in many of these countries, horizontal accountability
did not exist in that the courts, legislature, and even executive were effectively checked
from holding the armed forces responsible for unlawful actions. Though in many cases
4
For a sense of the vast literature on democratic consolidation, and the recognition that
consolidation w as more elusive than the wave of transitions at first led many scholars
to believe, see Schmitter The Consolidation of Political Democracies 1995: Hagopian
After Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies. Politicial Representation, and the
Democratic Future of South America 1993: Wiarda Dilemmas ofDemocracy in Latin
America: Crises and Opportunity 2005: Linz and Stepan Problems ofDemocratic
Transition and Consolidation 1996: Diamond Developing Democracy: Toward
Consolidation 1999: Mainw aring. O Donnell and Valenzuela Issues in Democratic
Consolidation 1992.
this exemption from democratic control was based in power relations, the institutional
weakness of legislatures, parties and especially the judicial system compounded the lack
of horizontal accountability in such states.'
Gradually, great changes have transformed civil-military relations in the newly
democratic regimes of Latin America. Militaries across the region have been weakened
by considerable cuts in force size and budgets, and the institutionalized power of the
military within government (such as seats in the legislature and control over ministries of
defense) and its influence over explicitly political matters (such as economic policy and
foreign affairs) have in many cases been effectively challenged and minimized. In
Argentina. Chile. Uruguay and Brazil this shift in civil-military relations was
accomplished gradually over the fifteen to twenty years since their return to civilian,
electoral democracy, but the change is nonetheless impressive. Today, as Pion-Berlin
writes, the armed forces generally work not to undermine the state and its institutions, but
to protect the interests of their institutions within the confines of the democratic system/'
These considerations lead us to search for explanations of the evolution of civil-
military relations away from the negotiated or de facto arrangements that prevailed at the
time of these countries transitions to democracy. How strong a determinant of civilian
governments capacity to gain democratic controls over the military is the initial balance
of power between the armed forces and the institutions of the state during the transition?
' On the role of accountability in democratization, see O Donnell. Horizontal
Accountability in New Democracies 1999 and Horizontal Accountability: The Legal
Institutionalization of Mistrust 2003: Diamond Developing Democracy: Toward
Consolidation 1999: Diamond et al. Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America
1999: Mainwaring and Welna Democratic Accountability in Latin America 2003.
Pion-Berlin Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies 1992. p. 86. Huntington
came to a similar conclusion in Reforming Civil-Miliar} - Relations 1995.
4
Under what circumstances is that initial balance changed so that new opportunities are
created for civilians to create military subservience to civilian oversight and
accountability? Perhaps it has been successive rounds of rational and strategic interaction
over civil-military relations that have enabled civilians to exercise a new control over the
military, and for the military to accommodate itself to a new bargaining position. Or it
may be the changed international environment, so clearly less tolerant of military
dominance over political affairs, that has caused this change. Do institutional factors,
including the constraints on military prerogatives imposed by the new institutions of
democratic governance in these states, explain the change over time? Or is it possible that
both the military s perception of its role in society and the perception of civilians of the
role of the military have changed i.e.. has political culture undergone a significant
transformation? In short, we seek a compelling explanation of the change in civil-military
relations that Latin America has witnessed.
Civil-Military Relations over Human Rights
Perhaps the first step toward understanding change is recognizing that it is not a
monolithic phenomenon. In 1992. David Pion-Berlin effectively argued that, while the
balance betw een civilian governments and militaries in South America had clearly tipped
in favor of the civilians since the third wave of democratization, the relative power of
these two groups varied both among states and areas of authority. He examined the
varying levels of autonomy enjoyed by the aimed forces of Argentina. Brazil. Chile.
Uruguay and Peru after their return to democracy in the 1980s. He compared military
autonomy in these states over ten areas: personnel decisions: force levels: military
education and doctrine: military reform: military budgets: arms production and
procurement: defense organization: intelligence gathering: internal security: and human
rights. For each of these areas, he rated the military s autonomy as low, medium or high.
He then arranged these issue areas across a professional-political spectrum. Control by
the military over overtly professional matters (junior level personnel decisions, military
doctrine, military education, and military reform) remained high in these states, with the
important exception of force levels (over which the military enjoyed low autonomy).
Control over those areas which fall between the professional and the political (the
professional-political in Pion-Berlin s spectrum) include arms production procurement,
military budget, defense organization, and senior-level personnel decisions. In this range
of areas, the military enjoyed medium to low autonomy. Finally, in those areas most
clearly political in nature, including human rights, internal security, and intelligence
gathering, the author found that the military maintained high autonomy over human
rights and medium lev els of autonomy in internal security and intelligence gathering
matters.
While Pion-Berlin concluded that the military had managed to preserve its
autonomy over core professional areas by ceding authority over more clearly political
matters, he noted the exceptions of the areas of force levels (a core professional area
which nonetheless was characterized by low military autonomy), internal security (a
political function marked by greatly varied, but overall medium military autonomy), and
human rights (a political matter which nonetheless was ranked as demonstrating
extremely high military autonomy levels). He argued that these exceptions indicated the
fault-lines between civilian government and military conceptions of their respective
6
interests and rights. In the case of human rights, the military continued to perceive
autonomy in this field as both rightfully part of its war powers and as vital to its
institutional survival and strength, despite the civilian government s perception of this
same field as squarely falling under its own jurisdiction and a matter properly belonging
to elements of the executive, legislature, and courts.
In explaining his coding for military autonomy in the field of human rights. Pion-
Berlin explains that.
With the return to democracy, the issue has been whether officers could be
brought to justice in civilian courts for having committed human rights offenses
during times of peace To the extent that the military has successfully
immunized itself from all judicial prosecution, then military autonomy is higher.
Where the armed forces have been initially subject to civilian prosecution but
have subsequently overturned court decision, then autonomy is lower. And
autonomy is lowest where the military has been forced to comply fully with
civilian laws.
In four of the five states examined by Pion-Berlin in this article, the military continued to
enjoy high levels of autonomy over human rights: only Argentina was coded as
displaying a medium level of autonomy here. In the other four cases, the military has
insulated its officer corps from judicial prosecution for past human rights offenses. He
explained:
Typically, the military argues that civilian courts have no jurisdiction over
violations committed during times of war. Legal boundaries aside, the South
American militaries have fiercely resisted the courts because ultimately they fear
that indictments against even a handful of officers could easily implicate others
along the chain of command, dragging the entire institution down in the process.
From this angle of vision, human rights trials constitute attacks on the corporate
integrity of the military. They also represent a repudiation of military practice,
since officers perceive their counterinsurgency campaigns to have been well-
fought and honorable and in the best interest of the nation. The armed forces self-
bestowed immunity from prosecution has weakened the independent powers of
the judiciary and placed armed forces personnel above the law. The failure of
P. 90.
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government to bring officers to justice for human rights violations is perhaps the
single most serious obstacle to full democratic consolidation, because it
effectively immunizes soldiers against prosecution, thus reducing the costs to
repression in the future.
Human rights matters therefore serve as an important indicator of the balance of
influence between the military and new democratic regimes, and in 1992. the military
was clearly still evening its prerogative to control issues in this field. Six years later,
another article by Pion-Berlin (this one co-authored with Craig Arceneaux) added new
insights on the question of evolving civil-military relations over human rights policy. In
this piece", the authors note that human rights issues topped the executive agendas of
many of the newly democratic states in Latin America and that, surprisingly, some of
these states were taking concrete steps to exert control over these issues despite the fact
that the armed forces had refused to cede control over this touchy area in the past.
Perhaps more surprising, however, was the fact that in some cases the military accepted
the new assertiveness over human rights matters at least up to a point, and in
contradiction to the predictions of previous scholarly research on civil-military relations
in this area. Wendy Hunter s research confirmed this assertion: in Argentina. Chile, and
Brazil, the pessimistic assumptions by earlier scholars that the armed forces of Latin
America would go unchallenged by new civilian regimes in a host of areas were
disproven. Nevertheless, she too found that human rights accountability remained the
8
P. 97-98.
' Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux Tipping the Civil-Military Balance 1998. For other
comparative analyses that come to similar conclusions, see Agiiero Las Fuerzas
Armadas en una epoca de transicion: perspectives para el afianzamiento de la democracia
en America Latina 1999: Agiiero and Starks Fault Lines ofDemocracy in Post-
Transition Latin America 1992: Basombrio Iglesias Militares y democracia en la
America Latina de los 90 (Una revision de los condicionantes legales e institucionales
para la subordinacion 1 999.
8
issue which produced the most tension between civilian leadership and the armed forces,
and the area in which the military had most successfully blocked civilian initiatives. The
fact that civilian governments continued to push the human rights accountability agenda
at all. therefore, requires explanation.
1
"
In 2006. it is clear that this trend toward civilian control over human rights issues
even when this means directly challenging entrenched military interests - has continued
and even accelerated. Argentina has overturned amnesties granting members of the armed
forces immunity from prosecution for crimes committed in the past; truth commissions
have been held in many countries of the region and are increasingly being followed by
prosecutions of individuals: the power of military courts has been severely restricted; and
a smattering of prosecutions have gone forward in Chile and Argentina. More
exceptionally, in Peru regime transition was immediately followed by drastic measures to
challenge military autonomy in nearly all fields, but most clearly in the area of human
rights accountability.
Rather than try to explain change in Latin American civil-military relations in its
entirety, this study explores change in the area of human rights accountability. Because
human rights accountability is the political issue over which the armed forces proved
most resistant to ceding control to civilian governments immediately after their countries
transitions to democracy, it is an excellent indicator of change in civil-military relations
since. Focusing on human rights accountability satisfies a worst case scenario logic: by
10
Hunter Eroding Military Influence 1 997.
9
selecting the issue area where imposition of civilian control proved most difficult for
newly democratic states, we can better isolate the factors that have most strongly shaped
civil-military relations to overcome patterns of the past.
Argentina. Chile, and Peru share not only a continent and similar origins as
nation-states, they are also united by their experience of third wave transition from
authoritarian to civilian government in the 1980s. In all these cases, the military
continued to resist civ ilian control of human rights issues after their states transition to
democracy, and by the early years of the twenty-first century, all had made attempts of
varied success at reversing or reducing military control over human rights accountability
for their officers and replacing it with new measures aimed at increasing accountability.
What varies among these cases are the timing, strategies, opportunities, institutions,
sources of pressure for change, and degrees of success characterizing these struggles.
Scholars of transitions to democracy have long recognized the importance of the
accountability question to the consolidation of democracy. When a state transitions
from authoritarianism to democracy, or from civil war to peace, the new regime is faced
with a difficult choice: What should be the fate of those who routinely violated the rights
of this country s citizens before the transition? Decision-makers attempt to anticipate the
reactions their choice will provoke. If those who have committed the violations are held
accountable before a national or international court of law. will the domestic public and
international community view this as victor s justice and authoritarianism? If implicated
individuals are purged from the institutions of state, will they reorganize outside the state
and soon pose a major threat to it? Should they instead be granted a blanket immunity for
their crimes so that they will support the new regime and not attempt to reassert their
10
power, or will such protection simply allow these individuals to continue to amass power
and contravene the rule of law? Will silence from the new government delegitimize it by
provoking public opposition or the appearance or weakness, or will it strengthen it by
demonstrating its willingness to accommodate all parties? And what is a fragile new
democratic regime to do if the implicated parties are nevertheless popular with the
public?
The fate of a new democracy may indeed hinge on the accountability question.
In the 1980s and 1990s. a new branch of democratization scholarship emerged to focus
specifically on the concept of transitional justice
.
which encompasses the choices made
by new democracies in dealing with those responsible for large-scale crimes and
abuses.
1
1
To do anything about former perpetrators in a new democracy is fraught with
complications and risk. Yet as democracy has spread internationally, so too has the
expectation that it requires accountability and the fair application of the law to protect the
citizenry; hence, doing nothing has become an increasingly difficult choice for a new
regime to make. Their choice seems constrained by pressures from all sides. The
international community w ill not tolerate old-fashioned elimination of troublesome
figures by a regime that claims to be democratic. International institutions and a vocal
human rights community (both domestically and abroad) refuses to tolerate inaction or
amnesties. Public opinion must suddenly be satisfied to keep the new government in
power. Yet prosecuting individuals or holding the military accountable will surely
provoke their ire and perhaps their rebellion (whether political or literal).
1
1
This literature examines political choices about how to respond to those who have been
victims as well as those who have been the victimizers, but this dissertation will focus
primarily on the question of dealing w ith perpetrators of political crimes under an
authoritarian regime or during armed conflict.
11
In the last several decades, states have attempted to satisfy this diversity of
demands by several means. In some cases, new democratic regimes have granted the
armed forces the protection from accountability they have demanded, in essence a
negation of transitional justice. In others, prosecutions have gone forward, with both their
pace and reach varying widely. While most such prosecutions proceed within the
domestic judicial system, in the 1990s a host of international courts and tribunals took a
1 *»
leading role in prosecuting human rights abusers. " Most states, however, have responded
by innovating new mechanisms which allow them to pursue some degree of
accountability without immediately resorting to prosecutions or direct confrontations
with still-powerful groups. One such mechanism is the truth commission, a temporary
body, officially sanctioned by the state, focused on uncovering the pattern of abuse which
characterized a period of time under investigation. 1-5 The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission is no doubt the most famous of these bodies. 14 but over thirty
countries have now held official truth commissions. Some, like those in South Africa and
Sierra Leone, involve public hearings of victims before not only judges, but also
l_
See. for example, scholarship on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, including Hazan Justice in a Time ofWar 2004: Hagan Justice in the
Balkans 2003: Kerr The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
2004. On international tribunals more broadly see Bass Stay the Hand of Vengeance
2000.
' On truth commissions generally, see Hayner Unspeakable Truths 2001; Rotberg and
Thompson. The Morality of Truth Commissions 2000.
14 On the South African truth commission, see (among numerous valuable contributions)
Boraine A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission 2000; Krog Country ofMy Skull 1 998: Leebaw Legitimation or
Judgement? South Africa s Restorative Approach to Transitional Justice 2003: Villa-
Vicencio and Verwoerd Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and
Reconcilation Commission ofSouth Africa 2000: Tutu No Future Without Forgiveness
1999.
television cameras and even the accused perpetrators: most others do not. Some, such as
the truth commissions of El Salvador and Chad, explicitly name individuals held
responsible for the perpetration of massive human rights violations: again, most do not.
The stated objectives of these bodies vary from case to case, but the literature on
transitional justice typically cites the following possible objectives: locating victims of
human rights violations and hearing their testimonies, overcoming denials of the truth
and responsibility, identifying violators of rights and/or responsible parties and
institutions, establishing an official history of the country s troubled past. ^ proposing
reforms of the state to prevent future abuses, legitimizing a new democratic regime, and
promoting national healing and reconciliation.
1,1
Other options certainly exist. States may opt to offer reparations or apologies to
the victims of violence either along with or in lieu of confrontations with the perpetrators
of the violence. Purging those responsible for human rights violations from the armed
forces and other institutions of the state holds them accountable, but without producing
the powerful backlash that often results from prosecutions. Prosecutions of state actors
responsible for violations of human rights remains the rarest, most controversial and most
difficult to implement of the options available to a transitioning state, as shall be explored
further in Chapter 2. Though the 1990s witnessed the proliferation of international
tribunals and courts to try violators of human rights, such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and
L
' As Ignatieff puts it. one of the greatest strengths of Truth Commissions may be simply
its ability to narrow the range of permissible lies. Ignatieff Articles of Faith 1996: see
also Chapman and Ball The Truth of Truth Commissions 2001.
16 Desmond Tutu s No Future Without Forgiveness (1999) is probably the best-know n
articulation of the argument in support of national reconciliation and forgiveness.
13
the International Criminal Court, such bodies only exercise jurisdiction over states that
agree to submit themselves to it. and have been the exception to the impunity that
generally reigns in the sphere of international human rights. Typically, those guilty of
human rights violations have faced neither international nor domestic courts for their
crimes.
1
Though much insightful transitional justice literature has been developed over the
last twenty years, many important questions remain unexplored, and assumptions about
the political motives and strategies behind efforts to create accountability for military
violators of human rights have often gone untested. At times, the reputations and survival
of all major political actors are at stake when a state determines how to respond to recent
periods of authoritarianism or violence. One major question motivating this study, then,
is what conditions produce the political opening necessary to institutionalize mechanisms
of human rights accountability over the military?
There are major winners and losers that emerge from these processes. The
military, most obviously, stands to lose greatly from the careful documentation and
moving public testimony of citizens victimized by the state. Samuel Huntington has
argued that the best reason to not settle accounts after a democratic transition is simply
to avoid provoking the military to reassert its power. Similarly, political parties and the
judiciary may be either completely discredited or publicly legitimized by truth
commissions or by their successes and failures in prosecuting those responsible for
abuses. Furthermore, uncovering the truth may. instead of satisfying public demand.
1 On prosecutions of human rights violations by state actors, see especially Nino Juicio
al mal absoluto 1997: Hesse and Post Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg
to Bosnia 1999; Neier War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror and the Struggle for
Justice 1998.
14
further enflame demands for prosecutions of those responsible, even when the political
will to go farther does not exist and when such prosecutions (which may be numerous.
expensive, divisive, etc.) may not serve to promote national reconciliation, economic
18
prosperity, or a return to peace and normalcy.
In such circumstances, truth commissions and/or prosecutions might not even
clearly enhance the legitimacy of democratic governance. In Chile and Argentina, truth
commissions failed to satisfy public anger over the past, and lack of further action against
perpetrators has been a source of criticism of subsequent democratic regimes. In
Argentina, attempts to prosecute the leadership of the political junta for its crimes
unexpectedly provoked the courts and civil society to launch a full-scale attack on junior-
level officers, which in turn lead to a series of military rebellions that only stopped when
the president squelched all future attempts at prosecution of the military. Decades after
Argentina and Chile s return to democracy, accountability for human rights violations
remains an explosive and divisive political question.
The wimiers from successful campaigns for human rights accountability
typically include the victims of the violence in question, as well as their families, and the
national and international organizations which have sprung up to champion their cause.
Because non-state actors that represent neither large numbers of votes nor significant
financial resources are the primary beneficiaries of such efforts, we must ask how such
actors are. at times, able to realize their agendas and influence state behavior in ways that
appear risky to state actors. As explored in Chapter II. understanding the influence of
18 *
Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies 1968 and The Third Wave 1991; on
the political and institutional obstacles to transitional justice see Magarrell and Filippini
La justicia penal y la verdad en la transition democratica 2006; Teitel Transitional
Justice 2000; Minow Between Vengeance and Forgiveness 1998.
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non-state actors in the field of human rights invites us to test the possibilities that these
actors were able to use leverage enhanced by international networks of support and
domestic institutions to bring pressure on the state for behavioral change: that they
altered the normative framework of the national debate and hence helped alter politicians
and the public s perceptions of acceptable behavior: or that they were able to achieve
their goals because politicians rational self-interests coincided with them.
The Research Project
My research draws on both the extensive literature on civil-military relations and
on the wealth of transitional justice literature developed over the last twenty years. 19 At
the intersection of these two bodies of literature an important question presents itself:
What factors shape the outcomes of negotiations over civil -military relations in the area
of human rights accountability during and after regime transitions? Previous literature has
assumed that in these situations the military and new civilian leaders agree to a trade-off:
the military offers support for the new regime (and promises not to use its monopoly on
force) and the civilian politicians agree to protect the military from prosecution and
intrusive civilian oversight. Both the military and the new civilian regime perceive their
self-interest as best served by deferring the question of accountability to a later date. Only
with time, the literature suggests, can the civilian state gain sufficient institutional
controls over the military and reduce its size and threat level enough to risk
1
' In addition to the works cited above, the transitional justice literature includes, for
example. Kritz Transitional Justice 1995: Hayner Unspeakable Truths 2001 : McAdams
Transitional Justice and the Rule ofLaw in New Democracies 1997. The civil-military
relations literature is explored more fully in Chapter II.
16
institutionalizing mechanisms of human rights accountability over the military. Chapter II
assesses the evolution of civil-military relations over human rights matters in Chile and
Argentina and the scholarly literature that has evolved to account for such change.
At the end of Chapter II. I explain how a more recent case of regime change in
South America, that of Peru in 2000. allows us to test the competing arguments scholars
have derived from previous cases in the region and isolate the impact of factors the
Peruvian case does not share with the others. First. I offer the hypothesis that the
Peruvian military was not able to oversee a pacted transition like those of Chile. Brazil
or Uruguay, therefore suggesting the capacity of the new democratic regime to impose
human rights accountability over the military should have been greater than in these
comparative cases and closer to that of Argentina during its transition. Second. I
hypothesize that in Peru, to a greater extent than in Argentina or Chile, a highly
organized sector of civil society with the backing of a transnational activist network2
"
was able to insert itself into the process of negotiating the transition, and that the
influence of this set of actors allow ed the new Peruvian regime to quickly institutionalize
principles of accountability that the Argentine and Chilean governments struggled to
assert in the years after their transitions. In Argentina, the military ultimately resorted to
threatening violence to prevent human rights accountability for its abuses: in Peru, the
military w as no long able or w illing to wield such threats. In other w ords. 1 hypothesize
See Keck and Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders 1998. Youngers Violencia Politico y
Sociedad Civil en el Peru 2003. Keck and Sikkink are credited with identifying
transnational activist networks as important political phenomena. They define such
networks as including those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and
services. The idea of the TAN as key actor in human rights struggles is explored in
more detail in chapters II and IV.
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that the main determinant of whether military institutions are able to successfully
negotiate during a regime transition for protection from accountability for human rights
violations is the relative leverage the military and relevant transnational activist network
enjoy over civilian institutions of government at the moment of the transition of power.
In Peru, the human rights TAN had much greater leverage over the state than did the
military at the time of the regime transition in 2000.
The calculus of civil-military bargaining during transitions is clearly changing,
and analysis of the Peruvian case can bring us much closer to understanding the actors
and strategies that shape the outcomes of these power struggles in the context of high
levels of uncertainty. By building on the literature on transnational activist networks and
the alliances that enable domestic civil society to become increasingly empowered in the
political arena of transitioning states. I also hope to contribute knowledge about the
behavior of these groups, which have been under-studied in the context of regime
transition and democratic consolidation. Chapters III. IV and V offer a detailed case
stud\' of regime change in Peru, specifically focused on changes in civil-military relations
during that transition. Though the Peruvian military peacefully handed political power
over to civilians in 1980. it remained a powerful force in Peruvian politics until 2000.
Each electoral cycle or crisis elicited predictions of a military coup. During the 1990s. the
military served as the backbone of the authoritarian Fujimori regime: its support for the
1992 self-coup carried out by Fujimori underscored the collaboration between the
president and the military. The military acted virtually unchecked by the government in
the area of human rights and control of areas under state of emergency status. Yet when
the collapse of the Fujimori regime came in 2000. not only did the military not rebel, it
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submitted to immediate changes in its high command, reductions in its institutional
powers, direct challenges to the authority over human rights issues it had enjoyed
throughout its history, and prosecutions of numerous military officials.
Chapter IV explores how the transitional administration of President Paniagua
(2000-2001 ) set about dismantling the corruption and impunity that characterized the
armed forces of the 1080s and 1990s. Given the total collapse of public trust in all
institutions of the state, but especially in Congress and the justice system, Paniagua opted
to rely on two institutions outside the traditional state institutions to determine crucial
matters of transitional justice: the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (to decide
whether amnesties for members of the armed forces should be upheld and whether those
convicted under Fujimori s extensive antiterrorism legislation deserved retrials in
civilian, rather than military courts) and a Truth Commission (to assess responsibility for
human rights violations committed during the previous twenty years and recommend
reforms of the state and the armed forces). Relying on these institutions met the demands
of the human rights TAN at w ork in Peru, and in both institutions members of that TAN
held particularly strong influence.
In Chapter V. my case study of Peru concludes w ith an assessment of civil-
military relations and transitional justice efforts during the Toledo administration (2001-
2006). When the regime fell in 2000. the military s bargaining position vis-a-vis other
institutions of the state was greatly w eakened, and a committed network of transnational
activists based in a strong domestic human rights movement did enjoy unprecedented
power to shape the new regime s agenda. The initial outcome of the transition seemed to
include human rights accountability for members of the military, a reversal of the
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impunity under which the military had operated throughout Peruvian history. But I find
that the ability of actors outside the state to affect civil-military relations soon eroded and
that the military was able to maintain many of its traditional sources of protection from
human rights accountability. The Peruvian case helps us to determine the conditions
under which transnational activist networks and their partners in domestic civil society
are able to affect major changes, but also the strong barriers to their sustaining that
influence.
Ultimately, institutional weaknesses, the delegitimization of the state in the eyes
of the public, and the rational choices of politicians served to block greater efforts to end
the military s exemption from accountability for human rights violations in civilian
courts. In particular, the movement of the transitional justice agenda out of the
InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
into the judicial system of the country presented challenges to the legitimacy of that
agenda. The public s trust in the legal system (and indeed in all institutions of the state)
continued to erode over the course of Toledo s presidency, but public trust in the armed
forces rebounded. Transitional justice efforts such as truth commissions focus in large
pan on changing public perceptions, especially in the sense of creating public trust that
the rule of law prevails. Once the work of the truth commission concluded and the courts
took over responsibility for human rights accountability, public distrust in the legal
system may actually have reversed any gains the truth commission might have made in
the development of public trust in the rule of law. This gave the armed forces (with their
much greater public approval) the opportunity to reassert its interests by playing on the
public s distrust of civilian courts in order to return human rights cases to military courts.
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They were also able to recover their power to lobby Congress and the President for
financial, political and institutional supports that had been so severely jeopardized only a
few years before. What is true of democracy in Peru today is even more true of human
rights accountability: it is both the public s sense that the state is corrupt and inept and
the fact that politicians incentives to promote reform have diminished that severely limit
the consolidation of democratic norms and practices.
Finally, in Chapter VI. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of this study
for research on the consolidation of democracy in Latin America. I also suggest that the
proliferation of actors who seek to influence civil-military relations offers rewarding new
avenues of research, as does the military s continued capacity to adapt itself to new
political realities by improvising political tools to protect its most vital interests.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE AND CASES
As we approach the question of human rights accountability in the context of
civil-military relations, it is helpful to keep in mind the variety of actors and causal
factors relevant to this study. First. I will examine the literature on the relationship
between the armed forces, civil society and civilian state leaders in Latin America, and
the theoretical models that help us explain change in human rights policy. Second. I will
offer two brief case studies that highlight the role of human rights debates in the evolving
civil-military relations of two Latin American countries that underwent transitions to
democracy as part of Huntington s third wave . Argentina and Chile. Finally. I will
briefly introduce the case of Peru and suggest how that country s experience with the
struggle traced in this chapter can contribute to theory-testing and theory-building.
I. Evolving Debates about Civil-Military Relations
At first glance, the study of civil-military relations in Latin America looks like an
outdated endeavor. The early literature on civil-military relations established the
traditional pattern of civil-military relations in Latin America, in which the armed forces,
often the most developed institution of the state, enjoyed a privileged status that entitled
them to special rights and endowed them with the responsibility to intervene in affairs of
state whenever government failed to serve the interests of the public. 1 The field then
blossomed in the 1970s as earlier predictions that military modernization would
1
The early literature that established the problematique of civil-military relations in Latin
America includes Johnson The Military and Society in Latin America 1 964: Lieuwen
Arms and Politics in Latin America 1961; McAlister Fuero Militar 1957: Huntington The
Soldier and the State 1 957.
contribute to democratization in developing countries ran up against the hard reality of
military coups d elat and regimes across Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In Latin
America especially scholars produced an embarrassment of research riches as they
explored the causes and characteristics of military power over the state. Many stressed
the continuity provided by the cultural under-pinnings of Latin American society,
including the historic role of the cciudiUo (or man on horseback ) and the armed forces
under his command as the saviors of the state. Some, like Alfred Stepan in his 1978 State
and Society, were able to combine Howard Wiarda s emphasis on corporatist political
thought with McAlister s focus on the Latin American military s institutional inheritance
of the tradition of military7fueros (or special privileges) from its Spanish predecessors.
2
According to these scholars, deep-rooted cultural and institutional legacies constrained
the capacity of Latin America to modernize in the teleological progression toward
Western democracy some of the scholarship of the 1960s suggested.
Others located the causes of Latin America s turn to military authoritarianism in
change rather than continuity. Guillermo O Donnell in particular led the way by offering
the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism (BA). O Donnell, like Samuel Huntington,
argued that military praetorianism could be explained as result of uneven modernization
within the state and increasing volatility in the public sphere as a result of economic
change. While Huntington emphasized the strength of the armed forces relative to other
institutions of the state, most BA scholars narrowed in on military regimes sense of
chaos in the public sphere as demanding their intervention into politics. Growing public
' The literature that cast suspicion on modernization theorists predictions for civil-
military relations included Stepan State and Society 1978 and Military in Politics 1971
;
Wiarda Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change 1973: Finer Man on
Horseback 1976.
demands, spurred on by economic growth and populist politicians from the 1930s to the
1 950s. unleashed the power of the masses and the danger of subversion. The armed
forces of the region, subscribing now to the image of a technocratic bureaucracy rather
than a man on horseback as its ideal of national leadership, imposed BA regimes to
deliver stability and hence insure continued economic growth." The confluence of social
mobilization with the Cold War led to the evolution throughout Latin America of the
national security state . in which military regimes rationalized their power as necessary
given the international Communist threat.
In the 1980s. scholarship on Latin American civil-military relations experienced
another great shake-up. Suddenly, militaries were retreating to the barracks and handing
power over the state back to civilians and electoral systems. Most had suffered disastrous
economic policy failures and internal divisions during their terms in power, and scholars
pointed to a variety of crises of legitimacy to explain their ultimate surrender of power.
Though Karen Remmer lamented the return to the concepts of legitimacy, effectiveness
and performance to explain regime change, few could ignore or avoid these concepts.
They might w ell be slippery concepts, difficult to plug into causal arguments or to
quantify, but they seemed even more relevant to the political context of the 1980s than to
that of the 1950s. when Seymour Martin Lipset first embraced legitimacy as the crucial
variable to explaining the distribution of pow er among state actors. 4
" O Donnell Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism 1973: Huntington
Political Order in Changing Societies 1968.
4 Among the most influential and insightful pieces of the academic literature on military
regime breakdown are Rouquie Military and State in Latin America 1987: Remmer
Military Rule in Latin America 1989 and Newr Wine or Old Bottlenecks? 1991:
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Regardless, by the 1990s the cycle of civil-military relations and its scholarship
appeared to have come full-circle, having dealt with both the rise and demise of military
regimes. Those who sought to make sense of the wave of regime change of the previous
decade divided between triumphalists declaring the decline of authoritarianism
throughout the world as the Cold War ended and electoral democracies multiplied, and
more pessimistic scholars who continued to bemoan the state of both civil-military
relations and democracy in the region. Ultimately, the first group was largely accurate in
predicting an end to military coups as a path to political power in Latin America, but the
latter group provided insights contemporary scholars are continuing to explore. In
particular, those who warned against treating democracy as the natural status of a state
that embraces elections and civilian leadership came to dominate the debate over
democratization. In the area of civil-military relations, such scholars warned that the
military often continued to exert control over domains of influence it reserved to itself in
the course of negotiating the return to civilian leadership. Where the Cold War and the
reality of authoritarian governance in Latin America had promoted a simple dichotomy
between democracy and dictatorship, in the 1 990s scholarship embraced a variety of
approaches to tracking democratic quality and the persistence of power relationships that
failed to reflect principles of liberal democratic governance.'
O Brien and Cammack Generals in Retreat 1985: Danopolous From Military to Chilian
Rule 1992.
" Research that emphasized the military7 s ability to exert considerable political power
includes Stepan Rethinking Military Politics 1 988: Hagopian Democracy by LTnder-
democratic Means? 1990: Cruz and Diamint The New Military Autonomy in Latin
America 1 998. That which emphasized the dramatic decline of military power and
predicted normalization of civil-military affairs includes Huntington Reforming Civil-
Military Relations 1995: Sigmund Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin
A fundamental question that concerned scholars of civil-military relations during
and after the third wave of democratization, then, was how to define civilian, democratic
control of the armed forces and the new ideal of civil-military relations. There were
important antecedents for this debate, certainly, especially in the difference of opinion
between Samuel Huntington, who embraced the notion of the armed forces as a
hermetically sealed institution, cut off from the rest of society because of its hierarchical
nature and incompatibility with liberal ideals, and Morris Janowitz. who envisioned
greater interaction between the armed forces and civil society as vital to the
democratization of civil-military relations. For Huntington, democratic civil-military
relations represented an effect of the professionalization of military institutions, which in
turn required high levels of military autonomy. To Janowitz. on the other hand, the
military s self-seclusion from other democratic institutions and society at large were
roadblocks to the process of democratic consolidation and liberal civil-military relations.
Hence this debate can be cast as one over the appropriateness of modernization vs.
civilianization of the armed forces. 6
The most influential concept to emerge from this debate was Huntington s
articulation of the difference between objective and subjective civilian control of the
aimed forces. Subjective civilian control implies the supremacy of civilian decision-
America 1993. The research that evolved from the insights of both strains of literature,
and on which this project seeks to build, includes Diamint Control civil y Fuerzas
Armadas en las mievas democracias latinoamericanos 1999: Pion-Berlin Civil-Military
Relations in Latin America 2001
.
’ Pedraglio. Tamayo, and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control Civil y Relaciones Civil-
Militares 2004; Hungtinton The Soldier and the State 1957: Janowitz The Professional
Soldier 1971: Feaver The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington. Janowitz, and the
Question of Civilian Control 1996.
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makers over the institutions of the armed forces, but in such a way as to violate the
principles of military professionalization and autonomy. For example, as we shall see. in
Peru civ ilian presidents have enjoyed varying degrees of control over the armed forces
since the return to democracy in 1980. However, this control was most often achieved by
intervening in the promotion of military leadership as to place presidential cronies in
command. While this lent presidents like Alan Garcia (1985-1990) a higher level of
power over the behavior of the armed forces, it also had the effect of de-institutionalizing
the military and damaging its capacity to guarantee national security. Objective civilian
control of the armed forces, on the other hand, utilizes democratic reform of civil-military
relations in order to advance the armed forces capacity for defense while ensuring
civilian supremacy. According to this model, the aim is not simply to minimize the power
of the armed forces relative to civilian regimes, but to maximize military capacity for
defense while eliminating the dynamic of competition between civil ian and military
institutions of the state. Huntington identified four characteristics essential to objective
civilian control:
1 ) a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of
the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the
military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign
and military policy: 3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an
area of professional competence and autonomy for the military: and 4) as a result,
the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention
in the military.
Huntington Stare and Soldier 1957 and Reforming Civil-Military Relations 1995. p.
9-10: on the application of these concepts to the Peruvian case, see Pedraglio. Tamayo
and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control civily relaciones civil-militares 2004. ch. 2:
Rospigliosi Las Fuerzas Armadas y La Democracia 2001 and La frustracion de la
reforma de las fuerzas de seguridad. 2006. For an excellent review of the evolving
debate over civil-military relations, see Tamayo Hacia un control civil democratico de la
fuerza armada en el Peru 2003. on which my treatment of the literature in this chapter
draws upon.
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Subjective control is easier to achieve than objective control, but it can often
diminish the long-term likelihood of objective control and leaves open the possibility of
institutionalist forces within the military reacting against the threat to their
professionalism. Rather than establishing the supremacy of civilian institutions over
military ones, moreover, establishing subjective control merely empowers the particular
group of civilians asserting that power. When the civilians in control of the state change,
the problem of asserting authority arises anew, dependent as the authority was on the will
and ability of previous leaders to coopt or coerce the military to its own ends. To
paraphrase Huntington, there are many paths to diminishing the power of the military
relative to civilian leaders (cuts in budget and force size, elimination of institutional
supports, intervention into command structures, etc) but only one path to objective
civilian control (the auto-professionalization of military personnel and bodies, a working
system of independent democratic institutions that respect the autonomy of the armed
forces, and clearly delineated and accepted norms of civil-military relations).
For twenty years, scholars have employed the concepts of subjective and
objective control in civil-military relations, but have often rejected Huntington s
conclusion that objective control requires less civilian interference in military affairs.
As the brutality of military regimes throughout Latin America made painfully clear, the
problem was not so much a lack of military autonomy as a great excess of it. Few found
in this experience convincing evidence that, left to their own devices, the armed forces of
the region would inevitably develop into highly professionalized institutions accepting of
civilian control and democratic norms of ci\ il-military relations. J. Samuel Fitch and
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Abraham Lowenthal. for example, pointed to abundant evidence that high levels of
military professionalism had generally resulted in military interventions in Latin
America, not objective civilian control.
In the 1990s. the literature on civil-military7 relations reflected the reality, as
suggested in Chapter I of this text and the work of authors such as Pion-Berlin and
Arceneaux. that even years after the return to democracy, the armed forces of Latin
America often held decision-making power over matters that rightly belonged under the
power of civilian governments. Robert Kohn and Rut Diamint. for example, argued that
any country in which decisions about security policy, including the size, organization and
procedures of military operations, resided in military power and barred civilians from
altering such policies, democratic civilian control of the armed forces could not be said to
exist. Often, this problem arose as much from the weakness of civilian politicians to
effectively direct defense policy as from military resistance.
9
Marcela Donadio widened
the debate by reincorporating non-state actors into the discussion, and embracing the role
of ideas as well as power. She argued that three factors should be considered: the
attitudes of members of the military, particularly their acceptance or rejection of the idea
of political intervention on the part of the armed forces: the will and capacity of civilian
politicians to exert effective control over defense policy: and societal attitudes toward the
state and armed forces. Where the armed forces continue to impart to recruits the values
of a tutelary role of the military, or where they fail to impress upon their members the
Fitch and Low enthal Annies and Politics in Latin America 1986: on this point, see also
Agtiero El futuro de las relaciones civil-mi litares en Chile 2001
.
g
Kohn Los Fundamentos Olvidados del Control Civil sobre los Militares en Gobiernos
Democraticos 1997: Diamint Control Civil y Fuerzas Armadas en las nuevas
democracias latinoamericanas 1 999.
principles of civilian supremacy and democratic norms, objective civilian control cannot
be thoroughly consolidated. If the public persists in perceiving the armed forces as a
legitimate alternative to democratically elected leadership, and where democratic
government fails to achieve public legitimacy, civil-military relations remain in peril.
Finally, where civilian leaders lack either the will or the capacity to manage defense
policy, they abdicate their democratic responsibilities to the armed forces and endanger
the consolidation of objective civilian control." 1
In other words, as Paul Sigmund argued, the armed forces had become one more
interest group competing for influence over resources and policy. 1
1
The acceptance of
this notion by many scholars of civil-military relations has tended to tip the field in the
direction of the rationalist paradigm in political science, which emphasizes strategic
action based on self-interest. Groups, organizations, and individuals are treated alike by
rationalists: each are driven by a set of preferences that lead the actors to behave in ways
they believe will help them achieve their goals. Understanding change is a matter of
determining the interests of the political players who exercise control over decision-
making. the varied levels of power amongst these players, and the strategies employed by
them to attain their goals. Because few political actors can simply impose their will,
virtually all decision-making and political change results from interaction among several
111
Donadio Las relaciones civico militates y la construccion de instituciones en America
Latina: enfrentando la crisis de las jovenes democracies 2003: see also Tamayo Hacia
un control civil democratico de la Fuerza Armada en el Peru 2003.
11 Sigmund Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America 1994.
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actors. Given that political actors must take the interests and influence of others into
account to achieve their goals, rationalist explanations often involve analysis of how
coalition building and bargaining strategies affect political outcomes.
Rationalism is an appealing approach to explaining political phenomenon in part
because its few core assumptions lend it a high degree of elegance and a flexibility which
leads to wide applicability. Still, the assumptions clearly represent a simplification of
complex political realities. Critics have pointed out that actors demonstrate only
bounded rationality their preferences may not seem rational at all. for example,
unless one accepts that preferences and perceptions are highly actor-specific. What seems
rational to a suicide bomber depends very much on subjective assumptions others cannot
assume. Similarly, the assumption that interests are fixed renders the approach overly
static: actors do change, after all. Particularly in the context of regime transitions, the
wisdom of engaging overly strict rationalist models of political outcomes seems
questionable. In these situations, the rules of the game are largely unknow n or in a state
of tlux. change is inevitable, and expected outcomes are more difficult to predict.
Yet compelling arguments for the application of rationalist approaches to politics
have been made by many scholars, not least among them those who study large shifts in
politics such as regime change. 1 ' Wendy Hunter s work over the last decade provides
compelling evidence of the applicability of rationalist arguments in explaining changing
civil-military relations.
lj
Hunter, like other rationalists, begins w ith the assumption that
Barbara Geddes Politician s Dilemma 1994 is perhaps the best example.
1
' See Hunter Reason. Culture, or Structure? Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics in
Brazil 200 1 . Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers 1 997.
State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military s Role in Argentina. Brazil
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the main goal of politicians is political survival. In post-authoritarian states, politicians
will see an advantage in challenging the military when the actions of the military
negatively impact the popularity and survival of the politicians. However, in situations of
economic or political crisis, not all politicians will hold the same preferences: legislators
(who generally have little to fear directly from a coup, which typically only replaces the
executive) will continue to challenge the military if this improves their popularity, while
presidents will seek the support of the military, even if this requires sacrificing some
degree of political autonomy to the military (a rational choice meant to optimize the
president s political survival). For presidents, then, challenges to the military are
calculated to win political gains with the public without antagonizing the military to the
extent that they put the regime in danger of a coup.
Typical of rationalist approaches to transitions is a treatment of political change as
occurring in distinct phases or stages. Guillermo 0 Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter. in
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions (1986). are credited with first
popularizing this analytical approach to democratization in Latin America, and numerous
scholars have carried on the tradition. In particular, scholars sought to differentiate the
actors, interests, and conditions prevailing during the stages of authoritarianism s demise,
the formative transition stage, and democratic consolidation or deconsolidation in the
wake of transitions. Adam Przeworski clarified w hat sets these stages apart from one
another most of all: the degree of uncertainty in w hich political actors must make their
calculations and interact to establish new political arrangements. As Terry Lynn Karl
elaborated in her seminal article. Dilemmas of Democratization :
and Chile 1996. and ^Continuidad o Cambio? Las relaciones civico militares en
Argentina. Chile v Peril Democraticos 1998.
The absence of predictable rules of the game during a regime transition expands
the boundaries of contingent choice. Indeed, the dynamics of the transition
revolve about strategic interactions and tentative arrangements between actors
with uncertain power resources aimed at defining who will legitimately be
entitled to play in the political game, what criteria will determine the winners and
losers, and what limits will be placed on the issues at stake. From this perspective,
regime consolidation occurs when contending social classes and political groups
come to accept some set of formal rules or informal understandings that determine
who gets what, where, when, and how from politics. In so doing, the}' settle into
predictable positions and legitimate behaviors by competing according to
mutually acceptable rules.
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For Karl. then, it is this phase where the uncertainty provoked by the previous regime s
collapse is superseded by strategic interactions formulating new rules of the game, the
pivotal transition moment itself that is especially important in determining the type of
successor regime and its level of consolidation.
Karl and Schmitter identify four unique modes of transition: pacted. imposed,
revolutionary, and reformist. The mode of transition is determined by the strategies of
transition employed by key actors and the relative strength each holds. Karl defines
democratic transitions dominated by political pressure from the masses over elites and
employing strategies of compromise as reformist: elite dominated, compromise driven
transitions as pacted: mass ascendant transitions marked by the use of force as
revolutionary: and those controlled by elites wielding force as imposed. Democratization
by the purely revolutionary or imposed routes have been virtually nonexistent in the
history of Latin America, as both tend to be plagued by instability and break down
rapidly and the}' are. in an}' case, not inherent!}’ democratic. Most common to the Latin
14
Karl Dilemmas of Democracy in Latin America 1990. p. 6. This section also draws
on Karl and Schmitter Modes of Transition in Latin America. Southern and Eastern
Europe 1991
. On pacted transitions, see also Linz and Stepan Problems ofDemocratic
Transition and Consolidation 1996: Munck and Skalnik Leff Modes of Transition and
Democratization 1997.
American experience is the pacted transition to democracy, in which strong elites engage
in compromise to protect their own vital interests. Because pacted transitions protect the
interests of the most powerful actors in the regime, and because they have already proven
themselves capable of compromise, they enjoy the greatest chance at consolidation and
survival. Transitions to democracy driven by reformist public pressures, on the other
hand, are weakened by the persistent threat of a reassertion of the power of previously
dominant political actors, such as the military, and the greater degree of uncertainty
inherent to the competitive politics that would emerge. On the other hand, pacted
transitions might well foreshadow great constraints on democratization in the new
regime; initial deals struck by elites may become frozen into place, closing off avenues
of further democratization or the rise of new political contenders (such as parties, civil
society, or any other group left out of the initial pact) in a type of corporatist
arrangement.
Although Karl s focus on the strategic choices and interaction that take place as
political actors seek to maneuver through transitions to democracy seems at first to
situate Dilemmas of Democratization squarely within the rationalist tradition, her
argument is. in fact, heavily weighted towards structuralism. In fact, most rationalist
explanations of change in civil-military affairs embrace concepts beyond power and
interests in their arguments. Structuralists incorporate other factors that influence the
outcomes and context of strategic bargaining among the actors. As Pion-Berlin writes,
structural arguments can include analyses of society, the state, and the global order and
can include everything from social class, to governing institutions, to international
systems. What unites them is attention to the impersonal forces that drive individual
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behavior.
L
" Karl s structuralist bent becomes clear when she writes that, though old
rules, constraints, strategies and power balances are upset during regime transitions, the
political choices before each political actor are nevertheless conditioned by the political
institutions and socioeconomic structures inherited from the past.
One set of structuralist arguments also examines domestic institutions to
determine how the organizations, rules and regimes operating within Latin American
states shape civilian and military behavior in the democratizing states of the region. Such
arguments have often prevailed in scholarship dealing with human rights and civil-
military relations in Latin America. For example, in Tipping the civil-military balance:
institutions and human rights policy in democratic Argentina and Chile . Pion-Berlin and
Arceneux examined the utility of three different approaches to understanding and
predicting the outcome of civil-military bargaining over human rights issues. First they
examine traditional and transitional approaches. Traditional scholarship on the military in
newly democratizing Latin American states assumed the military was powerful enough to
prevent human rights initiatives threatening to their authority or prestige. The transitions
argument, on the other hand, was not willing to take military strength as uniform and
claimed instead that the chances for human rights initiatives in these states to meet with
success depended greatly on the balance of pow er and influence between the military and
other key actors during the transition. While the traditional argument dominated research
on the Latin American military into the early 1990s. a wave of new scholarship argued
that a transitions approach examined the conditions w hich enable the armed forces to
manage the transition to democracy in such a way as to maintain their control of human
L>
Pion-Berlin Civil-Military Relations 2001. p. 14.
rights matters. By honing in on the moment of the hand-over of political power from
military to democratic government and establishing the balance of power between the
power players at that moment, they believed they could predict the course of human
rights agendas in the wake of the transition. They argued that in controlled transitions,
strong armies taint new democracies with restrictions, thus tilting programmatic
outcomes to their favor. In transitions by collapse, weak armies fail to leave their
indelible mark on institutions or on future policy. 16 The transitions approach, in keeping
with the strategic bargaining strain of rationalist arguments, focuses on power as the
explanatory factor shaping civil-military relations.
While acknowledging the contribution of both these approaches. Pion-Berlin and
Arceneaux conclude that evidence shows not only that there were instances of policy
success thereby disproving the traditional argument that the military necessarily
retains veto power over human rights issues but also that these are not fully explained
by the transitional balance of power. Instead they propose an institutional model and
hypothesize that institutional concentration and autonomy in the executive branch are the
most important determinants of outcomes in this conflict. Through analysis of the
comparative case studies of Argentina and Civile, they determine that Human rights
gains occur when policymaking authority is centered in a few hands and where the
president can use institutional channels suitably closed to military influence. Low levels
of concentration and autonomy result in policy setbacks: mixed levels lead to moderate
success. For example, as we shall explore in the case study section of this chapter:
16
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Argentina has been moderately successful in pursuing a human rights agenda,
whereas Chile has experienced more mixed results Not only were Argentine and
Chilean human rights programs proposed in the face of military opposition, but to
varying degrees, they were implemented as well. Notwithstanding their setbacks,
the democratic governments of both these countries accomplished more than
traditional scholarship would have predicted.'
As the incidence of prosecution, punishment and other accountability mechanisms
meant to respond to grievous human rights violations committed by members of the
once-all-powerful militaries of Latin America proliferate, our ability to test the accuracy
of the Pion-Berlin/Arceneaux argument grows. If we accept Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux s
(
argument that the traditional explanation was once rioht. but no longer: that the
transitions argument is partly right, but insufficient: and that an institutional angle gives
us a fuller picture of the long-term likelihood of human rights accountability for these
tl
military actors, we will learn greatly by applying the model to other states in similar
k
• # K
circumstances to those of Chile and Argentina. A better understanding of the impact of
N,
!r
bargaining positions during transitions and the consequences of institutional factors (and 1
Vl
H
what institutions matter) after the dust of transition begins to settle would bring us a fair
wav towards tracing the process of human rishts policv-makine in these states. As Pion- §
3
Berlin concludes in another piece. Civil-Military Circumvention: How Argentine State
^
<
Institutions Compensate for a Weakened Chain of Command
.
powerful actors cannot
automatically translate preferences into policy because their will is mediated by political
institutions. An institutional approach has the advantage of explaining in what areas the
17
P. 633-4.
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military is and is not able to make its presence known. It does so by identifying those
procedural or structural characteristics of governing agencies that either open up or
restrict the military s access to centers of power. 18
Some structuralists focus more on international, rather than domestic, factors. The
rapid and far-reaching changes civil-military relations in Latin America have undergone
recently can. some structuralists argue, largely be explained by changes resulting from
the end of the Cold War: new international pressures for economic cooperation, peaceful
negotiation of inter-state conflicts, and less repressive military tactics (which can no
longer be justified as part of a necessary response to an Communist threat). The
combination of these changes implies changing roles for the military in these states.
However, given that the conflicts that have often most often driven military power in
Latin American are internal rather than international in nature, others have found this
argument less than compelling.
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Structuralists and rationalists alike have run up against the reality that human
rights typically constitute an area of low politics . one in which states are less driven by
self-interest to adopt activist stances, either at home or in the realm of international
affairs. Unlike high politics issues of defense or economics, human rights (like the
P. 155. For similar arguments, see Trinkunas Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina
and Venezuela 2001 and Aguero Institutions. Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians
and the Military in Shaping Post-Authoritarian Regimes 2001
.
|g
For example, Lowenthal Partners in Conflict: The United Stales in Latin America 1987
suggests the end of the Cold War ought to improve civil-military relations in Latin
America; Desch The Changing International Environment and Civil-Military Relations
in Post-Cold War Southern Latin America 1998 rejects this position on the basis of the
internal nature of securin' threats in the region. For another structuralist analysis that
prioritizes the international dimension, see Wendt and Barnett Dependent State
Formation and Third World Militarization 1993.
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environment) offer activist states fewer rewards for intervening in the affairs of other
states. The electoral benefits to be had are few. while the costs of intervention into the
domestic affairs of other states may be high, especially in the sense of creating precedents
for eroding the sovereignty of other states precedents which. Pion-Berlin and
Arceneaux write, might then be applied to the activist state itself. In the absence of
powerful state interests in the low politics realm of human rights, the field is largely left
to the influence of non-state actors, including human rights groups, parts of international
organizations, and social activ ists domestically and abroad. These actors derive influence
by dealing in a commodity vital to the strategic interactions of traditional political actors
(public legitimacy) and by changing the actors perceptions of their own interests
(ideas).""
Hence, the addition of structural factors to rationalist explanations does not
exhaust the potential explanatory approaches. Culturalist, or what Pion-Berlin sometimes
calls Subjective . approaches have received less attention from political scientists
interested in civil-military relations than have rationalist or structuralist approaches. The
paradigm represents a broad array of research interests united by their general concerns
about ideas and more specifically about beliefs, attitudes, and interpretations that guide
political behavior. ' Scholars in this field argue that ideas ideas w hich change and may
not always seem to fit simple rationalist predictions - fundamentally shape the behavior
-»o On the low-high politics distinction and its role in determining which actors will be
drawn to activism on an issue, see Arceneux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Latin
America 2005. ch. 1 and 2. The high-low distinction is based on a long tradition in the
international relations literature, going back to Keohane and Nye Power and
Interdependence 1977.
Pion-Berlin Civil-Military Relations 2001, ch. 1.
of individuals and the organizations of which they form a part. We cannot understand the
interests of a political actor, they would argue, until we understand the ideas and beliefs
that shape that actor s identity, and the ways in which these ideas and beliefs change over
time. The socialization that occurs within organizations turns ideas and beliefs into part
of a political culture such as the political culture of the military. Some culturalist
scholars examine the ways in which organizations incorporate new information and ideas
into their political culture, a process known as political learning. This broad approach
encompasses research that focuses on domestic political culture! s) and on international
norms, the latter of which is often referred to as constructivist scholarship. In essence,
all these scholars are interested in the process through which principled ideas ( beliefs
about right and wrong held by individuals ) become norms ( collective expectations
about proper behavior for a given identity ).
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First, lets consider some of the research
on the role of norms within the state in shaping civil -military affairs; then we will turn to
the role of non-state actors operating outside or across state boundaries in shaping the
norms that govern state actors in the field of human rights.
Clearly, the norms that guide the self-perception of the armed forces themselves is
of central concern here. While scholars like J. Samuel Valenzuela find evidence of
change in the values of military institutions in Latin America, others are deeply skeptical
of any significant change in these norms. 2 ' Brian Loveman argues that even in 1999. for
the Latin American military.
>">
" Risse and Sikkink The socialization of human rights norms 1999. p. 7. quoting
Jepperson. Wendt and Katzenstein 1996. p. 54.
2
' Valenzuela Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America: How Do We
Know If Anything Has Changed? For other literature examining the role of
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Democracy and human rights remained ambiguous terms more instrumental
rhetoric imposed by the United States and its temporary Latin American civilian
allies than inviolable norms. Military institutions continued to press for amnesty
decrees for earlier human rights abuses and to emphasize political stability and
respect for law and order as requisite conditions for development."
Even if military7 attitudes have changed, the question of whether such change is a
cause or an effect of changed power relationships remains open. Jennifer McCoy s edited
volume Political Learning and Redemocratization in Latin America: Do Politicians
Learn from Political Crises? (2000) examines how political actors internalize new
understandings of reality based on evaluations of experience and new information. This
:
work builds on several strains of political analvsis which have developed since the 1960s.
c
.
. !1
including psychological theories of cognitive change among decision-makers.
organizational theories of bureaucratic or corporate behavioral change, and social \
learning theories of policy change. The findings of this varied pool of scholarship,
McCoy argues, remain underspecified, particularly when it comes to learning by groups.
How ever, scholars have persuasively demonstrated some of the conditions which are
conducive to learning, such as high degrees of uncertainty, traumatic experiences, and
h
shifts in personnel."' i
i
3
resocialization ot the armed torces in consolidating democracy, see Kalil Mathias
Pensamiento y papel militar en America Latina en el umbral del siglo XXI 1999: Nunn
The South American Military and (Re)Democratization: Professional Thought and Self-
Perception 1995: Perelli and Rial Changing Military World Views: The Armed Forces
of South America in the 1990s 1996.
~ 4 Loveman For La Patria 1999. p. 274.
"' Ch. 1. For influential literature on the conditions under which political learning occurs,
see. for example. Adler and P. Haas Conclusion: Epistemic Communities. World Order
and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program 1 992: Nve Nuclear Learning and
the United States: Soviet Security Regimes 1987: E. Haas Collective Learning: Some
Theoretical Speculations 1991.
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Political learning can come in two forms, according to McCoy: instrumental
learning results from the valuation of new information because it represents an advantage
for the learner in the struggle to advance its own interests, while normative learning
results from valuation of new norms and rules for their own sake - because they are seen
as right, rather than simply as necessary. So both political actors that develop an
understanding of the changed or changing rules of the game and learn to manipulate those
rules to their own advantage, and political actors whose sense of their own (or their
institutions ) purpose and ends, are engaged in real learning.
Particularly among proponents of culturalist and constructivist models,
scholarship that examines the tension between newly established democratic regimes and
their armed forces over the question of human rights accountability has increasingly
integrated new actors, institutions and forces into its explanatory models. As suggested
earlier, since states typically have little inherent self-interest in addressing issues of
human rights at home or internationally, non-state actors often move to the forefront of
campaigns to address such issues. Foreign states are less likely to intervene in low
politics affairs of other states, giving domestic actors greater control over the issue area,
but within the domestic realm it is often principled networks of individuals who
champion human rights. As Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin write, those individuals are
driven more by principles and norms than by interests. Consequently, the key motivators
for change shift from interests to ideas as we move from high to low politics. Moral
suasion is employed to attempt to override politicians lack of interest or cooperation.
Admittedly, the capacity of non-state actors to effectively use moral suasion to alter state
behavior depends in large part on their ability to change politicians sense of their own
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self-interests, but they do so by embracing a discourse of norms and principles. Though
such principled non-state actors lack the centralized power, coordination, and
enforcement mechanisms necessary to easily turn their convictions into results, they
have at times been successful at changing state behavior by convincing politicians that
failure to adjust their behavior will result in loss of legitimacy at home or in the
international arena, and by convincing other states to bring pressure on the offending
state to alter its behavior.
26
When large numbers of citizens mobilized to pressure their governments to reject
:
impunity in favor ot justice tor the victims ot human rishts violations perpetrated under
c
authoritarian systems, they used the greater ease of communication and travel across
national boundaries to network with activ ists across the region and beyond. With the
publication of Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink s Activists Beyond Borders in 1998,
this new phenomenon of internationalized pressure groups gained a new name:
transnational activist networks (TANs). TANs are networks of activists, distinguishable
largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation.
Keck and Sikkink held up the human rights
America at the end of the twentieth century
movements popping up throughout Latin
as one of their main case studies of the
~
h
Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Latin America 2005. ch. 1 and 2. On the role
ofNGOs and civil society in shaping post-transition civil-military relations, see Diamint
Estado y sociedad civil ante la cuestion civico-militar 1999; Fuentes La respuesta civil
al tema militar 1999: Nanda et al Global Hitman Rights 1981: Khagram et al
Restructuring World Politics 2002. For the related social movement literature see
MeAdam. McCarthy and Zald. eds Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements
1996; Morris and McClurg Mueller Frontiers in Social Movement Theory 1992.
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phenomenon of TAN influence in politics, both domestic and international, and even
began their influential book by highlighting the success of one such TAN in combating
the impunity military perpetrators of massacres had enjoyed in the past."
TANs work by building new links between civil societies, states, and
international organizations in order to multiply the channels of access to the
international system. When a state refuses to respond to pressures from domestic civil
society, activists often turn to building partnerships in other states and in international
organizations in order to gain greater visibility at home and to build new points of
leverage over their own state by building pressure from these international partners. This
the authors term the boomerang effect . Domestic nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). blocked from influencing state policies at home, create linkages with
international partners and use these linkages to build a dense network of information and
resource exchange. The international partners seek ways to bring pressure on the state in
question by calling upon more powerful entities, usually states or international
organizations, to influence the state from without. The domestic groups amplify their
influence by calling upon international partners to exert external pressure on the state at
the same time they maintain internal pressure on it.
2 Keck and Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders 1998. On international networks and
transnational activism, see also Risse. Ropp. and Sikkink The Power ofHuman Rights
1999; Boissevain and Mitchell Network Analysis 1973; Risse-Kappen Bringing
Transnational Relations Back In 1995; McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly Dynamics of
Contention 2001; Tarrow Power in Movement 1998 and The New Transnational
Activism 2005. Parallel to the literature on TANs is that of epistemic communities;
Haas s introduction to Knowledge. Power and International Policy Coordination 1997;
Peterson Whalers. Cetologists, Environmentalists and the International Management of
Whaling 1992. On norms, see Katzenstein Culture ofNational Security 1996;
Kratochwil Rules. Norms and Decisions 1989; Lumsdaine Moral Vision in International
Politics 1993; Koltz Norms in International Relations 1995.
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The actors that make up a TAN can he greatly varied. Keck and Sikkink list the
following possible actors as nodes in a TAN:
{ 1 ) international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy
organizations; (2) local social movements: (3) foundations: (4) the media: (5)
churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; (6) pails of
regional and international intergovernmental organizations: and (7) parts of the
executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments.
But TANs rely above all on the work of nongovernmental organizations, which typically
initiate the effort to organize and campaign around an issue of concern to them. Unlike
traditional interest groups. NGOs and the TANs they help build are not primarily
motivated by monetary or power interests, but by a commitment to a set of principles
they value sufficiently to expend time, energy and resources to protect. When activists
within civil society organize to lobby for changes in state behavior that threaten the
principle in question, they typically form NGOs, who then reach out to the plethora of
partners Keck and Sikkink suggest in order to multiply their (often limited) influence. In
particular, the} build linkages to international NGOs (INGOs). key components of any
advocacy network. Human rights and environmental issues have been the two issue
areas most likely to produce NGOs and TANs over the last 30 years. While human rights
served as the organizing principle for between 22 and 30% of all international NGOs
betw een the 1950s and the 1990s. the number of human rights INGOs quintupled over
that period.
In Latin America, a human rights TAN began to emerge in the 1970s as military
coups and political repression became salient features of the regional political landscape,
energizing a new activism both within affected states and in Europe and the US. Between
1981 and 1990. the number of human rights NGOs in Latin America increased from 220
to 550. considerably more than existed in Africa. Asia, or the Middle East. Within the
human rights movement, powerful examples came from political entrepreneurs . whose
style of networking produced new organizational models copied by activists across the
region in the following years. In particular. Chilean organizations like the Vicaria de
Solidaridad and the Argentine group Madres de la Plaza de Mayo adopted political
strategies of networking with INGOs like Amnesty International, the Washington Office
on Latin America and Human Rights Watch. and using information campaigns and
symbolic protest to pressure the state to end its repression.
Eventually, a powerful Latin American human rights network emerged composed
of INGOs; domestic NGOs; private foundations (like the Ford Foundation, which
supplied crucial resources); pails of some governments (like that of the US when human
rights became a factor in US aid policy); and parts of regional and international
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In particular, the InterAmerican Commission for
Human Rights and the InterAmerican Court for Human Rights (organized under the
Organization of American States), and the LIN Commission on Human Rights and the
UN Committee on Human Rights served as central IGO nodes in the network.
Particularly after Argentine NGOs discovered the usefulness of working with
international organizations with expertise in forensics to aid in the project of
documenting state violence via disappearances and massacres, foreign NGOs like the
American Association for the Advancement of Science played an increasingly important
role in the TAN.
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TANs typically employ four strategies to amplify their influence:
( 1 ) information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically
usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact: (2)
symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make
sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; (3) leverage
politics
,
or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where
weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and (4)
accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously
-) o
stated policies or principles.
-
Information politics has been a central part of human rights campaigns, as domestic
NGOs collect information about human rights violations in order to command
international attention, justify moral arguments, and create incentives for the network to
demand policy change that w ill reduce the threats to human rights. Some have described
this as the human rights methodology . in w hich investigating and then reporting the
facts of human rights violations in order to create a sense of urgency for change. -
"'
Infoimation about human rights abuses allow s TANs to mobilize shame . holding the
violators up before international attention.
In the area of human rights, these new networks focused especially on the
military, the main abuser of human rights in the region at the time. Though domestic
NGOs in countries like Argentina had none of the traditional sources of power
emphasized by realist explanations of political change such as arms or money, groups
like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo found that they w ere able to gain leverage over the
military regime by attacking its legitimacy. Even authoritarian governments rely in part
on domestic and international legitimacy to maintain themselves in power, so domestic
28
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Ibid: see also Thomas Holding Governments Accountable by Public Pressure 1993:
cited by Keck and Sikkink. p. 1 9.
NGOs used symbolic politics at home (such as protesting in the capitol s central plaza
with pictures of their disappeared sons and daughters and using their identity as mothers
to discredit any government attacks against them) and information and leverage politics
with their partnerships in the TAN to convince other states governments to demand
improvements in the human rights situation in Argentina. In an effort to shore up their
legitimacy, the TAN successfully prevailed upon the state to invite investigatory groups
from the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and Amnesty International.
Under the harsh light of international scrutiny, the regime found it advantageous to
reduce its reliance on repression, hence the TAN also successfully employed
accountability politics. Given these successes. Keck and Sikkink write that the classic
boomerang process was executed nowhere more skillfully than in Argentina.
Throughout Latin America, a fluid but dense network of activists on human rights
issues organized campaigns to combat state violations of human rights. These TAN
campaigns were successful when they were able to gain leverage over the state, often by
convincing third parties (other states or international financial institutions) to link the
state s access to funding or international support and legitimacy to improving their
behavior. States that were vulnerable to reputational or financial leverage were good
targets for such campaigns; where the state did not value the legitimacy or financial
support in jeopardy. TANs could expect greater obstacles to successful campaigns.
Keck and Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders 1 998. p. 107; see also Brvsk From Above
and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in
Argentina 1993.
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After the transition to democracy, many of these same groups continued to
pressure the state to respond to demands for accountability over the military. Absent
political pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). transnational activ ists,
judges and lawyers, few politicians seemed likely to directly challenge central military
prerogatives while they still felt vulnerable to the military s ability to intervene in the
state. The human rights TAN which had successfully pressured the Argentine state to
curb its abuses of human rights was deeply involved in the efforts to hold members of the
military accountable before the courts for violations of human rights, supplying much of
the evidence and testimony in court cases against perpetrators. Yet. as we shall see in the
next section, the TAN was unsuccessful in achieving accountability for human rights
violators in the years immediately after the Argentine transition. Within a few years of
the return to democracy, even the convictions of the Argentine junta leadership had been
overturned by a new amnesty, despite the fact that 92% of the public supported such trials
and despite the efforts of what Keck and Sikkink considered one of the most successful
TANs in the human rights world. ' 1
The clearest articulation of the role of TANs in altering state behavior in the area
->
-)
of human rights is the spiral model offered by Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink."'
(See Diagram 1 in Appendix). According to this model. TAN campaigns move through a
series of stages, first. TANs pressure states to alter their repressive behavior by invoking
norms, publicizing information and mobilizing partners in the international community to
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Ibid. p. 109.
Risse and Sikkink The socialization of human rights nonns 1999. On the role of
international law as a source of human rights change in Latin America, see Lutz and
Sikkink International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America 2000.
influence the state in question. The state reacts with denial, spurring greater domestic
opposition and met with sustained pressure from the TAN. Ultimately the state grants
tactical concessions to the TAN; these concessions are followed by a growth in influence
of relevant domestic groups engaged in the human rights campaign, who ultimately
pressure the state into regime change or policy change. As the norms of respect for
human rights takes centerstage in societal discourse the state finally institutionalizes
the norms itself and alters its behavior and discourse to reflect that change.
This model suggests a powerful role for non-state actors in shaping state behavior,
but as others have noted, such actors are likely to face great resistance on the pan of the
state: In the realm of low politics, sovereign states are usually equipped to hold highly
motivated nonstate actors and less motivated state challengers at bay. The spiral model
Risse and Sikkink map implies an inevitability and a causality that, in fact, does not
necessarily exist. An optimist might argue that the model does not indicate the length of
the passage of time each arrow in the flow chan above signifies: if the change has not
occurred yet. a sustained campaign may yet win out. What Risse and Sikkink do argue
about the passage of time is that the existence of human rights institutions, norms, and
networks [have] increased significantly over time. They write of a norms cascade in
which international norms gather strength as they are institutionalized and as a wider
group of actors become socialized into accepting human rights norms. After 1985. a
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norms cascade occurred in the field of human rights: therefore, the}' predict, TAN
campaigns initiated after this point should move through the stages of their model more
quickly than those which began before the cascade occurred.
"
Beyond this the model offers little information as to timing: it may take decades
to move along the arrow connecting Expansion in new political space and Regime
change or Human rights assuming centerstage in societal discourse and Rule
consistent behavior or it might take mere days. The Risse and Sikkink model appears
to suggest that regime change is likely to produce immediate behavioral change in the
area of human rights. Similarly. Arcenaux and Pion-Berlin suggest the concept of
moments can help us understand the phenomenon of change in states understandings
of their own self-interests, moments when low politics gain sudden importance, or when
states that normally protect themselves from foreign influence on low politics issue
suddenly become more permeable to such influence in ways that have a decisive impact
on their behavior. Moments are brief periods of time when windows of opportunity open
for agents who w ould normally be offstage mov e front and center. They are by
definition exceptional situations, in which less powerful actors gain influence, and
traditional interests can be overridden, but they are transitory moments, for the window
of opportunity can close as quickly as it opens.
j4
On norms cascades, see especially Finnemore and Sikkink International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change 1998.
' 4
Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Larin America 2005. ch. 1 and 2. The
concept of moments here complements the more commonly employed concept of
opportunity structures. See. for example. Tarrow Power in Movement: Social
Movements and Contentious Politics 1998.
While this study finds strong evidence of the potential for TANs to effect
dramatic change in human rights matters that deeply challenge the interests of the armed
forces, it also finds that a focus on the moment of transition and its implied
transformation of human rights policy is too simplistic. Though influential human rights
networks have repeatedly accompanied and buttressed other pressures from regime
change in Latin America, they have rarely been the primary7 cause of that regime change
(as. again, those straight-forward arrows of the Risse-Sikkink model suggest). And
though they have ultimately won major changes in human rights policy in the area of
civil-military relations, as the case studies of Chile and Argentina offered below
demonstrate, they have also pushed up against the barriers of politicians rational self-
interests and the institutional structures that limit the transformative capacity of such
moments.
In the following chapters. I will demonstrate the applicability of the Risse-Sikkink
model to major changes in civil-military relations and human rights policy in Latin
America. However. I will also show that, while the model provides an insightful outline
of the process of change, it falls short in several respects. First, it does not integrate the
question of timing into the model. More importantly, it fails to identify the mechanisms
of change. How does a state accept an international norm ? Does it matter how the state
institutionalizes the norm domestically ? Does the way in which the relevant societal
groups expand in a new political space shape the outcome of policy change? Does the
type of transnationalized pressure influence that policy change? This study finds that the
differences in the mechanisms of change have a major impact on the outcome ofhuman
rights policy change. Finally, the Risse-Sikkink model does not tell us enough about the
ways in which institutional structures, political actors rational self-interests and facets of
political culture limit and ultimately may undo human rights policy transformations.
II. Cases: Argentina and Chile
Two inter-related failures of the new democratic regimes of Latin America are
particularly relevant to this study: reserve domains of power controlled by the armed
forces and the failure of the legal systems of these states to create the rule of law . Each
of these weaknesses contributed to the continued difficulty of depoliticizing armed
forces, establishing civilian supremacy, and gaining the public legitimacy necessary to
allow for the consolidation of new regimes. After the return to electoral democracy in
Latin America, most armed forces of the region maintained some forms of political
influence and power over questions normally settled by courts or elected officials in other
advanced democracies. In particular, the} enjoyed immunity from prosecution for human
rights violations, a privilege the}' secured on the way out of office via legal decrees of
amnesty and then protected after the transition through a variety of institutional levers
and. in some cases, by employing their control of the state s coercive power.
The Argentine and Chilean examples offer insights into the formidable power the
armed forces used to protect their legal immunity under new democracies. From 1976 to
1983. Argentina w as governed by a military regime. Human rights violations abounded
during this period as pan of the countersubversive campaign launched by the regime and
" On the importance of integrating rationalist and norms-centered approaches, see the
special edition of International Organization from the Winter of 1998. especially
Finnemore and Sikkink International Norm Dynamics and Political Change 1998.
soon to be known throughout the world as Argentina s dirty war. Estimates of the
number of victims killed or disappeared by the regime hover around thirty thousand,
while cases of other human rights violations, including torture, involved many more. ~ 6
Military control over the country seemed unshakeable until 1982. when economic
mismanagement combined with a conflict with England over the Malvinas/Falkland
Islands resulted in British victory and collapse of military' rule. Deeply discredited and
delegitimized. on its way out of power the military nevertheless published the Documento
Final de la Junta Militar to officially deny complicity in human rights abuses.
Months later, in September 1983. the Ley de Paciftcacion Nacional was passed, granting
amnesty to both subversives and security forces for all repression and violations
committed between May 25 1973 to June 17. 1982. The courts, however, immediately
pronounced the law unconstitutional.
When, in December 1983. Raul Alfonsin assumed office in a return to civilian,
democratic government, he demanded full investigation into human rights abuses
committed under the military regime. At first the investigation w as placed in the hands of
a National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP). The Commission s task
On the Argentine dirty war, see Cohen Salama Tumbas Andnimas 1992: Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights in
Argentina 1980: Verbitsky El Vuelo 1996 and Civiles y militares 1987; Mignone
Derechos humanos y sociedad: el caso argentino 1991: Guest Behind the
Disappearances 1990: Nunca Mas: The Report ofthe Argentine National Commissionfor
the Disappeared 1986; Amnesty International Report ofAn Amnesty International
Mission to Argentina 1 977; Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos Cifras de
la Guerra Sucia 1988. For a longer view of the role of the armed forces in Argentina, see
Potash Army and Politics in Argentina 1 980.
Pion-Berlin and Arceneux Tipping the Civil-Military Balance 1998.
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was to establish the identity of the victims and what violations they had experienced.
CONADEP s final report, Nunca Mas, was based on 50.000 pages of evidence detailing
9.000 disappearances, but did not name the parties responsible for the abuses.
Alfonsin demanded the military courts hold the leadership of the military regime
responsible for the crimes documented by CONADEP. Indeed, the former human rights
lawyer was in part elected on his promises to seek justice for the abuses perpetrated by
the military over the course of their fight against the Montonero guerillas. Alfonsin s
position was that the commanders of the Proceso ought to be tried, as should those who
exceeded their military orders and committed human rights abuses. Alfonsin and his
senior presidential advisors. Jaime Malamud-Goti and Carlos Nino, made impassioned
arguments that criminal trials of implicated officers were essential to Argentina s
transition to democracy. Together they advanced the argument that punishment is a
political tool to raise the consciousness essential to bringing about radical political
change. Impartial allocation of blame to those who trample people s basic liberties will
Q
help restore belief in individual liberties and recreate democratic authority. 3 Malamud-
Goti s Game Without End offers a powerful analysis of the arguments in favor of
prosecution of state criminals, among them that they can contribute to the consolidation
of an authoritative judiciary, the restoration of public trust and confidence in the rule of
law. individuals sense of self-respect, deterrence of future violations, and the creation of
rights-based democracy.
' s
Malamud-Goti Game Without End 1996. p. 4-5. On this phase of the Argentine
transitional justice experience, see Acuna and Smulovitz Adjusting the Armed Forces to
democracy: successes, failures and ambiguities in the Southern Cone 1996: Norden
Military Rebellion in Argentina 1996: Acuna Juicio, castigos y memorias: derechos
humanos yjusticia en la politico argentinct 1 995.
Furthermore, they argued, trials would satisfy the public demands being made by
the nation s human rights movement, which exploded onto the Argentine political scene
in the 1980s. The best known incarnation of the movement, the Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo, was widely respected and took a hardline position on prosecutions: all those,
civilian and military, who participated in the dirty war must be brought to justice/9 The
general public mood was supportive at least ofjustice for members of the military, who
had committed the vast majority of the political violence. Though Alfonsin initially
pushed prosecutions of former ERP and Montonero guerillas, the overwhelming focus of
the transitional justice initiatives under his administration targeted members of the
military. This certainly reflected the public mood. According to several polls conducted
in 1983. the military was the most unpopular institution in the country, followed by the
police.
At first, the Alfonsin administration wanted prosecutions to proceed within
military courts, so as to allow the military to regain public trust by cleansing itself of
human rights violators. The role of military courts. Alfonsin believed, would also
minimize officers fears of a politicized witch-hunt to destroy the institution of the
military as a whole. However, the military courts would serve strictly as trial courts,
whereas civilian federal courts would make final judgments about convictions and
acquittals. In February 1994. Congress approved changes to the military justice code
granting the military courts 180 days to conduct each trial and making appeals to civilian
federal courts mandatory. Within months, it was clear Alfonsin s plan was backfiring: the
“ 9 On the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, see Bouvard Revolutionizing Motherhood 1994:
Fisher Mothers ofthe Disappeared 1995.
4(1
Malamud-Goti Game Without End 1996. p. 58-59.
56
military courts stalled, refusing to pursue cases, and most civilians distrusted the military
courts and directly pursued cases in federal courts instead. In October 1984. after the
Military Supreme Court failed to convict the commanders of the Proceso. the federal
appellate court assumed jurisdiction over human rights trials, thereby reversing a
Supreme Court decision which had affirmed the jurisdiction of the military courts in
these cases. In December 1985. five of the nine commanders of the Proceso were found
guilty of serious violations of human rights and sentenced to serve lengthy prison
sentences. In a decision known as Item 30. the court stated that cases should next proceed
against superior officers in command of the areas where abuses were committed. 41
Members of the military strongly opposed the prosecutions with threats of another
military uprising, and ultimately prevailed upon President Alfonsin to prepare legislation
to stem the tide of new cases being brought against officers and soldiers. The Punto Final
legislation. Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux write, was designed to curb the trials, nullify
military complaints, and thus remove all excuses for provocation in the future. It would,
in effect, place a sixty day limit on the issuance of new indictments. After a tough battle,
the law was passed by the legislature, but instead of cutting off legal action, it provoked a
deluge of new indictments, involving some 300 summonses for alleged perpetrators
within the armed forces to appear in court, as the deadline approached.
Panicked, and unconvinced the Punto Final decision would prevent prosecutions
of lower ranking officers in future, junior officers rebelled against their commanders in
April 1987. The response of President Alfonsin w as to rush a new law through Congress:
the Due Obedience Law protected all officers below the rank of colonel from criminal
prosecution. This massive concession, based on the logic that most of the atrocities
committed in the dirty war were ordered by military commanders and carried out by
lower-ranking officers simply fulfilling their duty to those commanders, still did not
satisfy the armed forces. Three more military rebellions would take place by 1990. each
directly provoked by new revelations of military atrocities and legal procedures against
officers.
The lessons observers drew from the pitched battle waged between the Alfonsin
administration and the military over the question of human rights accountability for
members of the military a battle the military, for the moment, seemed to have won
varied greatly. A right-wing minority continued to defend the military as heroes whose
abuses were the inevitable outcome of fighting subversion. The Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo and their allies in the international human rights community was scathing in their
criticism of Alfonsin for being intimidated into new amnesties. Those who had warned
that prosecution of members of the armed forces would provoke instability saw their
argument vindicated, and feared that military regimes in Chile and Uruguay would
interpret the Argentine experience as good reason not to allow democratic elections. Even
some of those who originally advocated the prosecutions now critically reassessed the
utility of those early policies. Most notably. Jaime Malamud-Goti. one of the two
Alfonsin presidential advisors responsible for formulating the initial transitional justice
policies, argued that, in hindsight, the human rights trials had become a new source of
conflict, rather than a means of deauthoritarianizing the polity. In postdictatorial.
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fragmented societies, there is an indirect, and ironic, consequence of human rights trials:
the trials tend to erode the very democratic authority they are devised to restore It may
be that the negative effects of such trials outweigh the positive.
42
The Argentine case indicates the most important reason to doubt the capacity of
human rights trials to contribute to the transition to democracy and the consolidation of a
rights-based polity: the weakness of the judiciary. Attempts to restore justice and
establish democracy that hinge on trials of guilty parties from the past regime place the
courts in an untenable position. To fulfill these goals, the courts decisions must be
authoritative. Citizens must trust that the courts will act with impartiality and
competence, that they will enforce the law equally for all those who have violated it
without consideration of political consequences, and that their decisions will carry the
full weight of the law. Yet the very question of who to hold responsible for human rights
violations the military only or their civilian counterparts? senior officers only or all
those who committed abuses? etc. is a political one. decided by the president and
Congress as well as the courts. The legal ambiguity created by competing civilian and
military jurisdictions meant that for at least the first three years of human rights trials, no
court decision could be considered authoritative . And. most crucially, most members of
the judiciary were universally condemned as inexperienced, ideologically motivated, or
simply inept. Under such circumstances. Malamud-Goti writes, it may have been
inevitable that the effect of human rights trials was to both judicialize politics (replacing
institutional reform and public debate about the complex nature of Argentine political
A
' Malamud-Goti Game Without End 1996. p. 5-6. On impunity for members of the
armed forces in Argentina, see also Basombrio Iglesias Impunidad y Castigo: Un
Dilema Actual 2001.
violence with prosecutions of one select set of blame-recipients) and politicize the
judiciary (creating the perception and the reality of a legal system driven by personal
opinions, not fair and equal application of the law).
The new protections from prosecution aw arded to the armed forces may have
confirmed Argentines sense of the failure of electoral democracy to advance justice, but
the trials themselves were deeply problematic. Military claims that they were unjustly
targeted as bearing sole responsibility for abuses were more powerful because they
contained a kernel of truth: it was a political choice to use prosecutions of almost
exclusively - members of the military to establish the credentials of the new regime. The
counterargument from civil society that the administration was not going after all those
who had committed abuses, civilian or military, and was therefore weak, arbitrary and
unfair, also reflected the uncomfortable political compromises transitional justice posed.
Malamud-Goti concludes that it is naive, without first resolving the structural
shortcomings that made military regimes and state terrorism possible, to use punishment
as a central means for modifying a political system. 4-1
In Argentina, though the full stop and due obedience laws circumscribed the
possibility of trials for most of the members of the armed forces, the question of legal
accountability for members of the military was hardly settled. In 1995. renewed pressure
for an end to military impunity emerged as a reaction to shocking revelations by former
members of the military about their involvement in gruesome human rights violations.
Congress approved a Constitutional amendment asserting that no statute of limitation
could apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Though Congress was signaling
43
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its willingness to keep the door to future prosecutions open, the law was never ratified by
the executive. Furthermore, opinion was divided over whether the law should apply
retroactively.
44
In this context of legal ambiguity, attempts to construct human rights
accountability in the courts developed an ad hoc and fragmented quality. Some courts
held truth trials based on the argument that no amnesty could be granted for individual
cases until they had been fully investigated. Others pursued justice in cases not explicitly
included in the amnesty laws, such as those involving military officers who had
kidnapped the babies of the disappeared and then put them up for illegal adoption.
General Jorge Videla himself was indicted and tried for such crimes. Not only Argentine
courts, but even European ones entered the fray. Particularly in Spain, trials proceeded
whenever Argentina allowed extradition. This seemed to contribute to a consensus within
the Argentine public: roughly two-thirds of the public were, by 2003. eager to see officers
charged with human rights violations brought to justice, but they wanted them tried in
Argentine, not foreign, courts.
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Meanw hile, reform of the military institutions of Argentina did proceed. The end 5
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ol the Cold War and the National Securitv Doctrine, which identified internal subversion »
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as the most important targets of Latin American militaries and portrayed such subversives
as part of an international Communist netw ork that was battled abroad by the United
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States, contributed to an international context conducive to military reform. Alfonsin
oversaw reductions in military budgets and force size and the passage of the 1988
National Defense Law, which restricted the mission of the armed forces to external
defense. By the end of the 1980s. the Argentine military had been severely weakened;
over the 1990s. their role in security affairs would be radically changed. President Carlos
Menem introduced the Argentine military to a new type of mission: United Nations
peacekeeping operations. The Argentine military would contribute over 1.400 troops to
international peacekeeping operations over the next decade. As Deborah Norden has
pointed out. this new role not only minimized the likelihood of military intervention into
politics, but had the combined benefits of offering the military a new mission, greater
prestige, financial support from the UN, and a vital part in the process of solidifying
alliances in the region and especially with the United States. 4 '’ It had the added benefits of
exposing the Argentine armed forces to greater civilian oversight and to the highly
professional military institutions of advanced industrialized states.
Despite serious economic challenges. Argentine democracy was also being
reestablished over these years. Indeed, if Malamud-Goti was right in arguing that
punishing state criminals before reforming the structural failures that allowed political
violence to proliferate in the first place was the wrong way to rebuild democracy, by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, most Argentines seemed to feel that a major
4
"’ Norden The Transformation of Argentine Security 1 996; for an excellent overview
of the transformation of civil-military relations in Argentina through the mid-1990s see
Norden Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups ancl Consolidation 1996. On
peacekeeping operations as a new area of activity for the armed forces of many third
wave democracies, see Hunter State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the
Military s Role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile 1996; Child Peacekeeping. Confidence
Building 1996.
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obstacle to completing the consolidation of their democratic system was the continuing
impunity of human rights violators in the military. Though civil-military relations had
improved steadily over the 1990s. the key questions of human rights accountability
remained controversial. In the mid-1990s, several former members of the military
admitted to the abusive tactics employed by the armed forces in the past, including the
practice of disposing of drugged victims by throwing them out of aircraft. The
commander of the armed forces had even offered a public apology for the role of the
military institutions in the abuses of the 1970s. yet no motions were made toward
reopening judicial procedures.
When Nestor Kirchner took office as President in 2003. suddenly these questions
were back on the table. In a bold move, he immediately dismissed 52 senior military
officers, an unprecedented purge which, among others, removed the army commander,
who was accused of human rights abuses during the military regime. Though some
criticized Kirchner for using the purge as a means to install military commanders from
his home province of Patagonia, most interpreted the move as wise, as a smaller, weaker
military institution was expected to both save the country money by finally enacting
substantial cuts to the military budget, and establish the authority of the president as the
embodying civilian control of the military. 4
In August 2003. the Argentine Senate voted to annul the full stop and due
obedience law s, fulfilling a campaign promise of President Kirchner. The debate then
proceeded to the Supreme Court. In June 2005. the Supreme Court declared the laws
unconstitutional in a 7-1 majority, launching a new wave ofjudicial procedures and a
4
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deep sense of uncertainty within the military. Estimates of how many soldiers and police
officers might face charges varied wildly, from 400 to thousands. President Kirchner
decided not to annul the pardons granted commanding officers in the past, nor to ask
Congress to do so, but rather to allow the courts to determine the issue. Because this
created a situation where officers could be convicted for crimes for which their
commanding officers enjoyed immunity, the military leadership called upon the courts to
treat senior officers and Montonero guerrillas already protected by pardons and lower-
ranking officers now vulnerable to prosecutions equally. The first human rights trial
48
allowed under the new court decision began in June 2006.
Change towards human rights accountability over the Argentine armed forces w as
achieved gradually over the course of some twenty years. Though a strong transnational
and domestic network of activists maintained a campaign for human rights policy-change
throughout the period, a shift in the balance of political powers within the state and a
slow reduction in the threat of military aggression was necessary before that
accountability could be established. A similar pattern occurred in Chile, though
international actors took on a higher profile there.
In September 1973. the armed forces of Chile staged what became Latin
America s most notorious military coup. The air force bombed the Presidential Palace,
leaving in the rubble the body of President Salvador Allende and the long-established
tradition of civilian government. General Augusto Pinochet promptly established a
military regime technically led by a military junta, but in fact based on the concentration
48
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of power in his own hands. During the seventeen years of the Pinochet regime, at least
three thousand individuals were killed by state security forces, and perhaps hundreds of
thousands were tortured. As in many authoritarian states, repression became the special
responsibility of state intelligence agencies; in Chile. DINA (la Direccion de Inteligencia
Nacional) became synonymous with state terror against the regime s opponents. 4g
In order to protect the members of the armed forces from legal action over the
dirty war . in 1978 Pinochet issued an Amnesty Law preventing the prosecution of
human rights violations committed between September 1 1. 1973 and March 10. 1978.
Though Constitutional order was re-established in 1980. the new Constitution signaled
the continuing authoritarianism of the state system by granting the armed forces
extensive tutelary roles in a limited democracy. The armed forces leadership retained
the power to appoint a number of senators and to fill half the positions on the National
Security Council. The constitution, approved by plebiscite, also made Pinochet a Senator
for life and set an exceptionally high bar for Constitutional amendments (a two-thirds
majority in both houses of Congress and an electoral system w hich virtually guaranteed
no part>’ could gain such a majority).
"""
In 1988. Pinochet held a plebiscite to determine w hether to extend his presidency
for eight more years. The public rejected such an extension, shocking Pinochet and
forcing him to call for open presidential elections for 1989 and a final end to the military
Pion-Berlin and Arceneux Tipping the Civil-Military Balance 1998. On human rights
abuses during the Pinochet regime, see Kornbluh The Pinochet File 2004; Dinges The
Condor Years 2004; Ensalaco Chile Under Pinochet 2000.
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regime. Patricio Aylwin became president in March 1990. but numerous provisions
protected the continuing power and influence of the armed forces over the state. For
example. Pinochet s judicial designees remained in office. The president s right to
remove commanders in chief of the military was revoked by a constitutional organic law.
Other provisions continued to shelter the military and reaffirm its power: service
commanders retained control over retirements, promotions and assignments, a new law
decreed that the military budget could not fall below its 1989 real level, service
commanders controlled their own budgets, and the sendee commanders retained the role
of commanders-in-chief except in wartime. Furthermore, the Armed Forces returned
power to civilian hands at a time when they still enjoyed high levels of popularity and
public support. The Chilean transition, then, was a clearly pacted transition in which
substantial levels of authority remained in the hands of the outgoing military leaders and
the new civilian regime was greatly constrained in its ability to challenge key military
prerogatives, among them immunity from human rights prosecutions. Moreover, as
Claudio Fuentes writes, the influence of the Chilean human rights movement was greatly
limited by the capture of influence by the political parties and by the public s perception
that the movement represented only the narrow interests of the families of the victims of
state violence.'
1
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On the question of legal accountability for abuses perpetrated by state security
forces. Pinochet and General Matthei issued stem warnings against any attempts at
prosecutions of members of the military, citing Argentina as an unacceptable precedent.
In August 1990, the Supreme Court, still filled with Pinochet era appointees, ruled that
the 1978 amnesty decree was constitutional. Military courts claimed exclusive
jurisdiction over any cases brought against members of the military. Though civilians and
human rights groups continued to file human rights cases, the courts simply forwarded
the cases to the military courts, where they were inevitably dropped. Greatly constrained
by the institutional legacies of the Pinochet era. President Aylwin ( 1990-1994 ) chose to
adopt a human rights strategy of truth and possible justice or justice to the extent
possible. This contrasted starkly with the rhetoric of the Concertacion (the political
alliance of the Christian Democrat. Socialist and Pro-Democracy parties that had
effectively challenged the Pinochet regime in 1 989 and have held power since) before the
transition, when they, as Moulian writes made the crimes of the military regime central
to its oppositional discourse.
' 2
In April 1990. Aylwin issued a presidential decree
creating the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (also known as
the Rettig Commission) and selecting its members. Less than a year later, the
Commission released its report on the disappeared, identifying, as Pion-Berlin and
Arceneaux summarize:
2279 deaths and 957 disappearances mostly at the hands of the state security
agents who operated between 1973 and 1989. Although the report omitted the
names of perpetrators, it did send to the courts incriminating information,
enabling some courts to reopen judicial inquiries into human rights infractions.
Moulian A Time of Forgetting: The Myths of the Chilean Transition 1998. p. 1 7.
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The commission s suggestions that victims be morally rehabilitated and that their
survivors receive material compensation was swiftly endorsed by the congress,
which created a national corporation to fulfill those missions/
'
Though the president offered his apologies on behalf of the state to the victims of past
repression, and though the air force acknowledged its responsibility for the patterns of
abuse documented, the navy, army and carabineros refused to do so. They criticized the
report in bitter attacks and found the political parties of the right supportive of their
position. In the wake of the truth commission s report, many regime supporters persisted
in their belief that the disappeared had simply fled the country or gone underground.
Pinochet, who continued as the head of the armed forces until 1998. used his privileged
position to perpetuate military impunity. W hen Pinochet s own power and immunity
from prosecution were challenged, he did not hesitate to call upon members of the
military to stage public demonstrations of power. In both 1990 and 1993 he oversaw
large protest movements by members of the military, first in response to politicians calls
for his removal from the military command and then when his son was threatened w ith
prosecution/ 4
" Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux Tipping the Civil-Military Balance 1998: see Comision
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Chile contains a strong human rights movement, and indeed it was the Chilean
battle for human rights and a return to democracy which is often credited with spawning
the first human rights TAN in Latin America. Human rights organizations throughout
Latin America modeled themselves on the Chilean network of domestic NGOs,
international organizations, and campaigns to mobilize the public and international
pressure. As the Risse-Sikkink model suggest, the TAN that emerged around Chilean
human rights was able to force the Pinochet regime into tactical concessions, and clearly
the desire of Pinochet himself to gain the public legitimacy a referendum might confer
upon his leadership provoked regime transition. Yet despite the continued activism of
human rights groups in Chile, little progress toward holding members of the military
accountable before the courts for human rights violations was achieved in the 1990s.
Then, in 1998. human rights were back in the Chilean headlines in the wake of
Pinochet s arrest in England/" Pinochet spent the next several years in legal limbo, as
Spanish courts attempted to extradite him to face trial for human rights violations against
Chilean as w ell as Spanish citizens. The courts argued that Pinochet s violations of
international human rights nullified the normal immunity from prosecution enjoyed by
heads of state. Eventually. Pinochet w as returned to Chile, and the Chilean Supreme
Court ultimately declared him unfit to stand trial due to senility. He was. however, forced
" On the impact of Pinochet s arrest on questions of transitional justice, see Roht-Arriaza
The Pinochet Effect 2005: Special edition of the Venezuelan journal Nueva Sociedad,
Memoria. Impunidad y Derechos Humanos Mayo-Junio 1999; Montoya and Pereyra El
caso Pinochet y la impunidad en America Latina 2000: Dorfman Exorcising Terror 2002
and Mas alia del miedo: el largo adios a Pinochet 2003; Macedo Universal Jurisdiction
2004: Davis The Pinochet Case 2003: and Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming
Latin America 2005. ch. 5.
to resign his Senate seat, and several other legal cases, including charges of corruption
and tax evasion, proceeded, destroying his already threadbare myth of being an honest
dictator.
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Moreover, the political fallout of Pinochet s arrest included renewed pressure to
prioritize the issue of human rights accountability in Chile once more. A new period of
judicial activism began, with sensitive cases and controversial rulings making regular
headlines. The international attention focused upon the lack of human rights
accountability in Chile provoked by the Pinochet cases effectively shamed the Chilean
courts into reopening what had only years before been politically untouchable cases.
Though, as Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin argue, to claim that the European courts
decisions caused the change in the Chilean courts would be an exaggeration, they
certainly acted as a catalyst. The European courts decisions created a moment of
opportunity for Chilean human rights advocates to more effectively pressure the courts
to hear their cases, and to pressure to the state into altering human rights policy.'
In August 2003. a new initiative was launched to uncover evidence of military
wrongdoing (particularly torture) during the Pinochet era by offering lower-ranking
officers reduced sentences or immunity in exchange for vital information. Furthermore,
courts continued to hear cases related to disappearances, which were not deemed to be
covered by the amnesties. President Lagos argued that, in fact. Chile had made much
greater progress in the field of human rights accountability than it was given credit for:
over 300 cases were open in the courts in 2003. and the power of civilian courts over
Dealing with the Past: That Other September 1
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Economist Sept 6. 2003.
Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin Transforming Latin America 2005. ch. 5.
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members of the military in human rights cases was accepted by the armed forces. Critics
were unimpressed: few members of the military had actually been sentenced, and the
amnesty laws remained in place.
's
If progress in the courts was slow, developments in the legislative sphere
suddenly advanced. In October 2004. a cross-party agreement was struck to reform the
constitution and eliminate many of the vestiges of military power left over from the
Pinochet era. Since the return to democracy, military leaders opposed to reform had
gradually resigned, and even politicians on the right found they had more to gain in terms
of popularity by supporting the constitutional reforms than by blocking them. One-time
supporters of Pinochet ultimately found their political survival depended on their
distancing themselves from the deeply-tainted image of the former dictator.
Denial of military responsibility for massive human rights violations was no
longer a viable political position either, particularly after a December 2004 report of a
Congressional commission released newly collected information about the abuses. After
hearing the testimony of some 35.000 former political detainees, the commission
concluded that torture was a regular practice of the armed forces under Pinochet. As The
Economist reported, the report overturns the myth that torture w as just the work of sick-
minded. over-enthusiastic subordinates. Instead, it is revealed as a systematic policy,
financed by the budget and practiced in more than 1.100 detention centers around the
country. And. even more importantly, not even the armed forces dispute the facts. :
"J
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branches of the armed forces admitted to the charges in the report. The reaction of the
Dealing with the Past: That Other September 1
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armed forces and public to the torture commission s report marked a huge departure from
the response with which the truth commission (which covered disappearances and deaths,
but not torture) report was met. Still, though 27.000 individuals who gave testimony
before the torture commission were promised a pension and certain benefits as reparation,
many made clear that what they ultimately desired was the prosecution of their torturers.
This remained extremely difficult to realize, due to the continued existence of the
amnesty laws and a lack of evidence that would stand up in court.
III. The Peruvian Contribution
A comparative case study which incorporates the Peruvian example offers both
points of similarity and crucial points of departure. Peru, like Chile and Argentina,
enjoyed a shift from military to civilian-led governance as part of the third wave of
democratization, and like the armed forces of nearly all Latin American states, those of
Peru maneuvered to maintain their privileges and power within the state after the
transition. Like the Chilean transition, the Peruvian one featured a political pact that
enabled the military to maintain continuity in its high command, budget, and control of
security policy in the years immediately after the transition.
The crucial difference (for this study) between the Peruvian case and those of
Argentina and Chile relates to the timing of the political violence relative to the transition
to democracy. Whereas Chile and Argentina s armed forces acted as perpetrators of
human rights abuses during military - regimes and new democratic regimes struggled to
assert human rights accountability over the aimed forces for such abuses, in Peru the
controversial state violence took place after the return to civilian, electoral democracy.
72
For at the very hour of Peru s return to the democratic fold, a brutal subversive
movement launched a bloody campaign to destroy the state. In turn, successive
administrations would empower the armed forces to carry out an anti-subversive
campaign that included the systematic violation of human rights. Compared to the cases
of Argentina and Chile, the human rights abuses in Peru took place over a longer period
of time and resulted from both guerrilla and military brutality.
h"
Indeed, the context of internal subversion and national security threats contributed
to Peru s break with democracy under President Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s by
supplying a compelling justification for authoritarian measures. Over the course of the
1990s, a growing literature warned that many democracies of the third wave were at best
partially consolidated democracies, often prone to backsliding into authoritarian or anti-
democratic behavior: Peru under Fujimori stood out as a powerful example of this
phenomenon. Though in truth there were deep failures of democratic governance in Peru
in the 1980s as well. Fujimori s dramatic self-coup of 1992 and his gradual destruction
of the institutions of democracy thereafter provide powerful evidence of the fragility and
uncertainty of regime transitions and the democratization process. Rather than developing
democratic principles of civil-military relations. Peru s return to democracy after 1980
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led a more complex, but only barely less troubling civil-military relationship in the
1990s.
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The dramatic changes that followed the fall of the Fujimori regime are therefore
all the more worthy of study.
Like Chile and Argentina. Peru benefited from a strong, united group of
principled actors who partnered domestic activism and organization with international
ones, took their campaigns to the venues capable of enhancing their leverage over the
Peruvian state, and attempted to construct institutional mechanisms to integrate their
principled positions into state behavior. In the immediate wake of regime change after the
fall of the Fujimori government, Peru s human rights community enjoyed greater success
in advancing the agenda of human rights accountability for members of the armed forces
than any other country in Latin America. Chapter 4 explores the moment of human
rights transformation in Peru, and assesses the factors that contributed to its possibility.
Chapter V. however, indicates the abundant evidence of continuing barriers to
transformation. The armed forces continue to enjoy greater power relative to non-state
actors to lobby the state to protect their own interests, and they benefit in the area of
human rights from the weakness of key state institutions, particularly the judicial system.
Despite the radical changes in the human rights field in Latin America, for now human
rights accountability for the armed forces remains a sticking point in civil-military
relations. While the literature that focuses on how non-state actors in the domestic and
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international realms provides a persuasive model for the moment of transformation I
document here. I ultimately conclude that the ability to effect normative change in this
field is profoundly limited by the institutional weaknesses, imbalances in power and
rational self-interests of actors within the state. As the literature on partial democracies
and unconsolidated democracies suggests, politicians enjoy great capacity to manipulate
the institutions of the state in order to tip the outcomes of transitional processes in their
favor, particularly in the realm of the judiciary, where political interventions continue to
be the norm for sensitive human rights cases. Despite Peru s initial success in promoting
prosecutions of members of the military accused of human rights violations, we should
expect there too that resolution of the issue must await a larger shift in the electoral
incentives of politicians and the consolidation of a judicial system entitled to greater
public legitimacy.
CHAPTER III
PERUVIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 1980-2000
1980-1985: Transition to Democracy and to Internal Conflict
Since the moment it gained its independence. Peru s fate has been tied to civil-
military battles for control of government. The military has typically been the winner in
these battles, as they have governed the country for more than half its history. Even when
out of office, the power of the generals has hung like the sword of Damocles over the
heads of civilians who have sought to guide the destine- of the state. 1 Yet military rule in
Peru has often defied expectations. The military regime which governed Peru from 1968
to 1 980. a period during which most of the continent was trapped under the crushing heel
of bloode- dictatorships, was surprisingly humane. Contrary to the Latin American trend
of the period, in the early years of this regime the military government was decidedly
left-wing. The regime at first sought to incorporate the working class and poor into a
corporatist system, but ultimately came to view the civil society mobilization it had
unleashed a new phenomenon for Peru as a threat to the state. When, in 1980. the
increasingly divided military at last accepted that it was failing to achieve an economic
miracle for the state, it handed power back over to civilians. This sequence supports the
On this broad pattern in Peruvian history, see Masterson Militarism and Politics 1991
and Fuerza Armada y Sociedad en el Peru Moderno 2001 ; Palmer Peru: The
Authoritarian Tradition 1980; Villanueva 100 Ahos del Ejercito Peruano: Frustraciones
y Cambios 1971; and Einaudi The Permian Military: A Summary Political Analysis
1969. For an early and influential treatment of Peruvian politics in scholarly comparative
literature, see Stepan The State and Society 1978.
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literature on authoritarian regime breakdowns that finds that divisions within the ruling
bloc, particularly between hard-line and soft-line groups, are a necessary condition
for regime breakdown.'
The 1980 transition was restorative in more than a figurative sense: the civilian
who became president in Peru s first democratic election in twelve years was the very
man the military had ousted from power in 1968. Fernando Belaunde Terry. The
transition had. however, been dragged out over three years, during which the military’
controlled the transition by forging informal alliances with the American Popular
Revolutionary Party (APRA) and the Popular Christian Party (PPC). forging a pacted
transition. While these parties, representing the center-left and right respectively, were
included in the pact, parties of the left, along with unions and popular organizations, were
excluded.' The new Constitution reflected the consensus between military and APRA and
PPC leaders and Belaunde s Popular Action Party (AP) that the military should maintain
its special prerogatives and privileges and that, given the history of executive-legislative
deadlock typical of civilian government preceding the military regime, it should retain its
' See O Donnell and Schmitter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 1986: Przeworski
Democracy and the Market 1991 : O Donnell Counterpoints 1999. The military regime is
typically referred to as the Docenio. On this period, see Booth and Sorj Military
Reformism and Social Classes 1983: Lowenthal The Peruvian Experiment 1975: Malloy
Authoritarianism. Corporatism and Mobilization in Peru 1974. On corporatism
generally, see Wiarda Toward a Framework 1973 and Corporatism and National
Development 1981: Malloy Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America 1977:
Pike and Stritch The New Corporatism 1974.
' On the 1980 transition, see Cotier Military Interventions and Transfer of Power to
Civilians in Peru 1986: Mauceri The Transition to Democracy and the Failures of
Institution Building 1997.
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right to intervene if government failed to function.
4 As Mauceri and Cameron put it. the
senior of'cers of the Peruvian armed forces who agreed to a negotiated transition to
civilian rule were explicit about the fact that they were leaving government but not
power. ' Still, democracy seemed on the mend in Peru: a mere five years later, the
country passed one widely-accepted litmus test of a democratic transition s consolidation
when it peacefully passed the presidency from Belaunde of the Popular Action party to
Alan Garcia from the APRA party.
Yet all was not well in Peru. At the very moment that the country returned to the
democratic fold, four interconnected phenomena were emerging to threaten the new
democratic regime. First, subversive warfare broke out. with two guerrilla movements
directly challenging the state. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and
the larger Sendero Luminoso. or Shining Path, launched bloody campaigns to undermine
the new electoral democratic system and to terrorize the public.
h
Second, narcotrafficking
4 On pacted transitions, see Karl Dilemmas of Democracy in Latin America 1990; Karl
and Schmitter Modes of Transition 1991 ; Linz and Stepan Problems ofDemocratic
Transition and Consolidation 1996: Munck and Skalnik Left' Modes of Transition and
Democratization 1997. The 1979 Constitution is available online at
http://bvirtual.bnp.gob.pe/libros_titulos.php
' Cameron and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth 1998.
h On Sendero Luminoso. see Palmer Shining Path ofPeru 1 994; Degregori Sendero
Luminoso 1985. One diftcil es Ser Dios 1989. El nacimiento de Sendero Luminoso 1990:
Gorriti Sendero 1990. The Shining Path 1999: Koppel Peru s Shining Path 1993;
McClintock Revolutionary Movements in Latin America 1998: McCormick The Shining
Path and Peruvian Terrorism 1987. The Shining Path and the Future ofPeru 1990. From
the Sierra to the Cities 1992: P. Stern Sendero Luminoso 1995; J. Stern Shining and
Other Paths 1998: Strong Shining Path 1992; Tarazona-Sevillano Sendero Luminoso and
the Threat ofNarcoterrorism 1990. The National Security Archives has organized the
hundreds of documents the LIS government released to the Peruvian Truth Commission
in 2001 . Among the documents are CIA analyses of the evolving Sendero threat. Many of
these are available online at http://\vwrw.g\vu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/
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expanded rapidly in Peru after the 1970s. and soon Sendero Luminoso was cooperating
with narcotraffickers to finance their subversive operations. Third, the 1980s was a period
of serious economic decline for Peru, which exacerbated the fourth problem, growing
corruption within the state. Each of these problems intensified the tensions in civil-
military relations in the 1980s and presented deep challenges to the consolidation of
democracy in Peru.
At first Belaunde failed to recognize Sendero Luminoso as a genuine threat to
security, but the group quickly graduated from hanging dogs in public places to full-scale
armed attacks on military, police, and civilians. Led by Abimael Guzman, or President
Gonzalo
,
the movement espoused Maoist rhetoric and promised to unleash a river of
blood in its revolutionary project. By the time Alan Garcia succeeded Belaunde as
president in 1985. much of the countryside was under a state of emergency, under the
total control of military authorities, and thousands of Peruvians had already fallen victim
to the conflict. While Sendero Luminoso claimed to be fighting on behalf of the
marginalized and impoverished Indian population of the countryside, it was this very
group that became the primary victim of the armed conflict, increasingly caught in the
literal and figurative cross-fire. Civilians w ho w ere suspected of cooperating w ith
military forces in their hunt for Sendero members became easy targets for retribution, yet
if they seemed uncooperative w ith the military they might be considered supporters of
Sendero and therefore enemies of the state.
Obando Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998.
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Belaunde s initial hesitance to promote a military response to the Sendero
Luminoso threat reflected the fact that, at least for the first several years of his
administration, the president and his civilian administration considered the military a
greater threat to the regime than the guerrillas. Belaunde moved to check the military s
political power by cutting the budget of its intelligence units, which had routinely spied
on and intimidated civilian politicians and civil society in the past, and by blocking the
development of the military s new planning system. Though Belaunde attempted to
appease the military by approving virtually all military budget and arms requests, even as
the country slipped further into economic decline, discontent within military ranks
remained high. Among officers and soldiers there was consensus that the armed forces
should replace the police forces responsible for combating the insurgents before 1982.
but the question of how best to respond to the insurgency was more divisive. The old
leftist core within the military favored a comprehensive response to social unrest,
including socioeconomic means to win the hearts and minds of insurgents and their
potential supporters and to respond to the legitimate complaints of poor peasants. But a
growing contingent of the military pressed for a more hard-line response.
After 1982. Belaunde s recognition of the genuine security threat Sendero
represented led him to place the campaign under military responsibility. Under the 1979
Constitution governing the country, doing so necessitated the declaration of a state of
emergency in all those zones in which the military now became active: under a state of
emergency, many constitutional guarantees of the rights of citizens in these zones were
suspended. For example, Article 23 1 of the 1979 Constitution allowed for the suspension
of freedom of association and travel and the inviolability of the home. Most significantly.
80
the state of emergency status meant that the armed forces exercised political control of
the zones. Furthermore. Belaunde favored the hard-line response of military leaders like
General Clemente Noel Moral, whose dirty war policies regularized the practice of
disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture. The socio-economic hearts and
minds strategy. Belaunde found, was too expensive, angered too many of the ascendant
military' leaders, and would create even more avenues for the expansion of military
authority into social and economic aspects of governance. Ironically, this was just what
Sendero Luminoso had hoped for: by provoking the state into a violent response, the
insurgents forced the state to become complicit in its project to destroy the nascent
8
institutions of democracy and the rule of law and to alienate the public further.
International and domestic human rights groups organized to loudly denounce
human rights abuses committed by both Sendero Luminoso and the armed forces fighting
the insurgents/' By 1984. mass graves had been uncovered, and thousands of Peruvians
Q
Ibid; Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome II. p. 247-255;
Tapia Lasfuerzas armadas y Sendero Luminoso: dos estrategias y un final 1996. On the
debate within the government on whether to grant the armed forces this extension of
power, see El Comercio Oct 25. 1980: Aug 22. 1982: Jan 6. 1983. The tradition of
suspension of constitutional guarantees under regimes of exception, see Loveman The
Constitution of Tyranny • 1 993
.
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The situation was accurately summed up by US Ambassador to Peru Anthony Quainton.
who wrote in a December 20. 1990 confidential State Department cable: One cannot
appear neutral and survive. If you are radical right. SL tries to kill you. If you are
terrorist, only the police and military try to kill you. If you are in the middle, both the
terrorists and the soldiers want you dead. See. for overviews of the human rights
situation. Americas Watch Abdicating Democratic Authority 1984: Americas Watch A
ATir Opportunityfor Democratic Authority 1985: Diez Canseco Democracia,
militcirizaciony derechos humanos en el Peru 1985. On August 13. 1984. a classified
U.S. Embassy cable reported that human rights abuses by the military were becoming a
concern to the US and notes that the embassy brought these issues up with the Peruvian
prime minister and the army commanding general. Declassified document available
through the National Security Archives. See also annual State Department reports on
81
had been killed by both sides. Critics claimed Belaunde was incapable or unwilling to
reestablish civilian control over the armed forces, was allowing an Argentine-style dirty
war to emerge, and was only too happy to protect the military from justice. In fact,
protection from legal accountability was part of an explicit deal negotiated by Belaunde
and army commander General Rafael Hoyos Rubio the same military commander who
had ousted Belaunde from office in 1 968. According to Masterson, the agreement
guaranteed the armed forces complete independence on internal and professional
matters and immunity from misdeeds during the Docenio. In exchange, the armed
forces command promised to confine its activities to strictly professional matters. As
Pion-Berlin has argued, this is essentially the same bargain the armed forces of
transitioning states throughout Latin America were soon to strike, exchanging protection
from human rights accountability and maintenance of certain key powers and perks for
respect for civilian control over policy-making. The understanding Belaunde developed
with the armed forces was fortified by Belaunde s continuing defense of the military'
from charges of wrongdoing. And. rather than restrain the military that had only just
given up power. Belaunde encouraged the military in its confrontations with Ecuador in
the latest Hare-up of a centuries-long border dispute. The Perm ian military s decisive
victory in battle with Ecuador strengthened Belaunde s relationship with the military
command, as did his continued support for high military budgets and the acquisition of
human rights in Peru and Conrision de la Verdad y Reconciliation Informe Final 2004
Tome III, p. 23-41
.
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sophisticated new military equipment. According to Masterson, real military expenditures
not reflected in pubic budget accounting were nearly equal to those under the military
regime and accounted for nearly 30% of the national budget."
Belaunde publicly railed against international human rights organizations such as
Amnesty International (which he called a tool for the destruction of Permian
democracy ). when they used human rights abuses committed by the Peruvian military to
dissuade the U.S. Congress from granting Peru military aid. Despite great personal
danger and intimidation. Peruvian nongovernmental organizations, funded in large part
by international nongovernmental organizations and foundations, continued to document
numerous cases of large-scale human rights violations by both the rebels and government
security forces. The transnational activist network that emerged from the collaboration of
Peruvian and international rights organizations was effective at lobbying the U.S.
government; State Department reports on Pern regularly included information these
groups passed to them about incidents such as the 1983 massacre of eight journalists in
Uchuraccay. the execution of over 200 terrorists suspects in the wake of prison riots in
1986. and the 1988 killings of roughly 30 peasants in Cayara.
1
1
Though civil society has
always been considered weak in Peru, labor and peasant unions, church-based
10
Masterson Militarism and Politics in Latin America 1991. p. 271 . See also McClintock
and Valias The United States and Pent 2003. On Pion-Berlin. see Ch. I of this text.
1
1
US State Department annual human rights reports on Peru. McClintock and Valias The
United States and Peru 2003. See also declassified documents available through the
National Security Archives. For a more detailed treatment of the transnational activist
network that grew from the Peruvian human rights crisis, see Chapter IV of this text.
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organizations, neighborhood associations and human rights groups continued to assert
themselves in the early 1980s. By the end of the decade, the growing economic crisis and
both state and insurgent violence would sap much of the strength of civil society. 1 '
Despite the pressure from these groups, the foundations of a dangerous new phase
of civil-military relations had been established over the course of the Belaunde
administration. Military interest in direct command of the state had greatly diminished,
and Belaunde had reduced some of the military s political power over the state. But in the
context of the subversive threat, the power of the military at a local and regional level
was vastly expanded by 1985. with much of the countryside under direct army control.
And. ominously, large-scale human rights abuses committed by the armed forces (in
response to equal brutality by the insurgents) were denied or defended by the president as
vital to national security.
Ij
The military was now less of a threat to civilian government,
but in exchange enjoyed a vast new sphere of power over the Perm ian countryside,
generous arms expenditures, total legal impunity, and virtually unlimited autonomy in the
conduct of its counter-insurgency campaign. Only weeks before leaving office. Belaunde
cemented the new era of military impunity via Law 24150 which placed military
commanders in charge of all officials within state of emergency zones and declared that
12
See Tovar Yelasquismo y Movimiento Popular 1985: Mauceri State Under Seige 1996
and An Authoritarian Presidency 2006.
Ij
See Obando Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998; Desco Violencia
polltica en el Peru: 1980-1988 1989.
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members of the military would henceforth only be subject to the jurisdiction of military
courts. As we shall see. the military justice system would become the principal shield
protecting members of the military accused of human rights violations. 14
1985-1990: Civil-Military Relations at the Boiling Point
Before he became president. Alan Garcia and the Leftist political opposition to
Belaunde had been critical of the abuses perpetrated by the military in the course of their
struggle against Sendero Luntinoso. Yet Garcia, like Belaunde. was desperate to ensure
the loyalty of the military command. APRA and the armed forces had a long and troubled
history, and Garcia s presidency promised renewed tensions in civil-military affairs.
Garcia s strategy was. at least initially, the reverse of Belaunde s. Instead of respecting
the military s institutional integrity. Garcia politicized military promotions in order to fill
the high command with those loyal to him. and cemented that loyalty by corrupting those
commanders with personal privileges and wealth. Instead of granting the armed forces
the resources they demanded to fight the counter-insurgency campaign. Garcia curtailed
military spending and vetoed major purchases of new equipment, including the air force s
purchase of numerous Mirage jets. And. instead of allowing the military autonomy in its
campaign and supporting those members accused of human rights abuses. Garcia
confronted and removed military commanders who embraced dirty war techniques. 1
"
14
See Contision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome II. p. 270-5:
Obando Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998.
15
Ibid.
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The key to Gareia s assertion of control over the armed forces was the removal of
officers he deemed a threat to his administration and their replacement with loyalists. The
military prided itself on the meritocracy of its promotions, so Garcia s interventions
sparked explosive new feuds, within the army in particular. Low-ranking officers lost
respect for their military commanders and rightly interpreted Garcia s targeting of some
members of the military leadership for their human rights policies as a convenient way
for the president to remove his enemies from positions of power. Furthermore. Garcia
argued that, as the armed forces could not be trusted to fight Sendero Luminoso without
violating human rights, it was necessary to re-arm the police forces of the country to take
up the campaign. Because the police formed part of the Ministry of the Interior and hence
were directly under the control of Garcia and APRA. its officers were considered mere
APRA mercenaries by much of the armed forces. When, in 1998. a rightist counter-
subversive group loyal to APRA. the Rodrigo Franco Command, emerged with strong
links to the Ministry of the Interior, the likelihood of armed conflict among the
institutions of the state and their proxies appeared high. Coups and armed uprisings were
it was rumored - being plotted by junior-ranking officers of the army against their
superiors, by military commanders against the state, by the Rodrigo Franco Command
against any challengers to APRA s control of the state, and in all likelihood by others as
well.
|h
Garcia s aggressive new stance had brought civil-military relations to a boiling
point.
16
Ibid.
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As coup plots proliferated, so too did human rights abuses by both Sendero
Luminoso and the armed forces. The insurgent threat continued to grow so that, by 1 990.
Sendero s power and reach began to threaten citizens of Lima as well as the countryside.
In bold displays, it undermined any sense of security via car bombs and by repeatedly
shutting down the power grid in various parts of the city. Suddenly the war was not only
a concern of poor Quechua-speaking Indians in the mountains: now even the middle-class
capital was panicked. From 1989 to 1992. political violence claimed the lives of more
than three thousand Peruvians per year. 1 By 1 990. 32% of Peruvian territory and 49% of
IQ
the population fell within emergency zones and therefore were under military control.
From 1988 to 1991. there were more cases of disappearances of individuals taken into
custody in Peru than in any other country in the world.
19
The growing strength of the insurgency and the sense of crisis throughout the
country meant Garcia was unable to respond to the steadily swelling power of the
military over much of the countryside. It was widely acknowledged, too. that the failure
of the courts to successfully prosecute suspected insurgents rounded up by the military
was encouraging the military to continue to engage in a regular policy of extrajudicial
1
McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003. p. 69: on human rights
abuses during this period, see Desco Violencia politica en el Peru: 1980-1988 1989 and
Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2004.
Degregori Shining Path and Counterinsurgency Strategy 1994. p. 84.
19
Ibid. p. 92. For reports on the human rights situation during the Garcia presidency, see
Mendez A Certain Passivity’ 1987 and Tolerating Abuses 1988: Americas Watch
Derechos hutnanos en el Peru 1986 and "Human Rights Developments" 1989.
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killings and forced disappearances: the military simply considered the state incompetent
to effectively deal with insurgents through the courts and so took matters into their own
hands.'"
As Fernando Rospigliosi and Alfred Stepan each found, this situation resulted in
the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, distrust among the political parties for the
military grew, occasionally erupting into congressional hearings in which members of the
military were dragged before Congress to be questioned. On the other hand, given the
terrible security crisis in the country, with a few politicized exceptions, no legal action
was taken against members of the armed forces suspected of having committed abuses in
the course of the counter-insurgency campaign, and no attempts to fundamentally alter
military procedures were instituted. Mixed messages were being sent by the government
to the military, whose leadership clearly felt outraged and vulnerable when their integrity
was publicly challenged by Congress or the administration and yet continued to carry out
abuses w ithout any effective challenge. Members of the armed forces regularly and
loudly complained that the only effects of congressional challenges to military policy
were to aid the terrorists in their psychological war. The lack of political backing from
the executive stoked discontent within the military.' 1
However. US embassy cables reflect the reality that Garcia acknowledged in
private the necessity of catering to the military s fears of human rights accountability. US
analysts wrote:j
See, for ex. McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003 on this point.
Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Stepan Repensando a los
militares en politica 1988.
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human rights [are] potentially the most explosive issue in government-military
relations. Peruvians armed forces have watched with significant degree of concern
judicial processes in Argentina leading to conviction of top generals for human
rights violations Garcia apparently communicated adequate assurances to army
and navy commanders in this regard A key issue from military s vantage point
is whether trials of military personnel accused of rights violations will take place
within military or civilian systems ofjustice. Human rights groups and important
senators have pressed for cases to be brought to civilian court. Military has
vigorously argued contrary to protect its institutions and individuals Our
understanding is that president understands sensitivity of this issue for military
and plans to weigh in to swing outcome of decision at the appropriate
time Should decision go against military, process could ultimately be
destabilizing Hundreds of Peruvian officers have participated in anti-subversive
actions and could ultimately be called to account for their actions."
In light of civil-military tensions. Garcia backpedaled on his early human rights activism.
After Garcia called for military intervention to suppress prison riots staged by Sendero
Luminoso prisoners, a decision that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of unarmed
prisoners. Garcia blocked efforts to prosecute the military commanders involved. The
early period of Garcia s attempts to reduce the barbarity of the internal conflict came to
an end."
1
The military' did lose certain prerogatives under Garcia, but many of the policy
changes damaged military effectiveness and institutional integrity, democratic civil-
military relations and the rule of law. Recall Huntington s distinction between
objective and subjective civilian control of the armed forces discussed in Chapter II.
Garcia asserted subjective control over the armed forces, attempting to diminish the
power of those institutions to threaten his administration, by intervening in and
politicizing the hierarchy of command and by employing alternative sources of coercive
7 *>
" US Embassy cable. Jan 14. 1986. declassified and available through the National
Security Archives.
" See declassified 1986-7 US embassy cables on this matter: Comision de la Verdad
Informe Final 2004 Tome III. p. 43-66: Ames Informe al Congreso 1989.
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power (the police and paramilitaries). No institutionalized democratization of civil-
military relations had been estaf shed, and the institutional integrity of the arr d forces
was severely diminished. The military was not empowered by the government to institute
a comprehensive and effective counterinsurgency plan, and indeed its capacity to fight
Sendero w as in many ways decimated due to budgetary crises provoked by Garcia s
economic policies.
Garcia s attempts to block the political influence of the armed forces over his
government often faltered. In order to coordinate the air. naval and army branches of the
armed forces and to reduce the political influence of the individual commanders of these
branches in his government. Garcia created the civilian post of Minister of Defense in
April 1987. A military coup w ras staged by air force officers the same month, reflecting
anger over reduced military funds and his new attempts to collar the military politically.
Though the other branches of the armed forces agreed to put down the air force rebellion,
they made their opposition to the idea of a possibly civilian defense minister know n to
-M
the president. In turn. Garcia backpedaled on his plan to appoint a civilian to the post.”
As Obando concludes, the armed forces lost nearly all of their capacity to exert
pressure on the Peruvian state during the Garcia period, except when it came to
protecting its cadres from investigation for human rights violations and corruption.
However, any losses of power at the national level were more than offset by the vast
~ 4
Masterson Militarism and Politics in Latin America 1991, p. 273; see also Obando
Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998.
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expansion of local and regional political power and influence the armed forces were
developing via their direct control over emergency zones. In these areas the only state
authorin' was the army.
~
The rest of the Peruvian government was limping weakly along back in Lima.
All in all. the performance of democratic government in the 1980s was more than
disappointing it was utterly disastrous. Alan Garcia himself deserves much of the blame
for this, as his economic plans, far more even than his corruption in office, led Peru
further and further into economic decay."* The statistics are overwhelming: Peru s GDP
fell by 12.3% in 1989: inflation reached 7.650% the following year. Between 1985 and
1989. white collar salaries fell by 47.6% and real wages for blue-collar workers fell by
55%." For Peru, as for much of Latin America, the 1980s were a lost decade . in which
even the return to electoral democracy could not pull the country back from collapse. In
the midst of hyperinflation and rapidly plummeting standards of living, public support for
the institutions of the state and in particular for political parties buckled. Garcia s
APRA was itself the country s oldest and most popular political party until it was
.
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(temporarily) decimated by association with Garcia s failed presidency." Hence, unlike
most of South America, where the armed forces were adapting themselves to stronger
Obando The Power of Peru s Armed Forces 1994. p. 112-113.
" 6 On the Garcia administration generally, and its economic and political failures
specifically, see Crabtree Peru Under Garcia 1992 and McClintock Prospects for
Democratic Consolidation in a Least Likely Case: Peru 1989.
Taylor From Fujimori to Toledo 2005. p. 567.
On the crisis of the party system, see Graham Peru s APR.4 1 992. Kenney Fujimori s
Coup and the Breakdown ofDemocracy 2003; Tanaka Los espejismos de la democracia
1998.
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state institutions and civilian oversight and far less power, according to Mauceri and
Cameron, the political power of the Peruvian armed forces was dramatically expanding,
and those weak mechanisms of accountability and civilian supremacy that had survived
into the 1980s were diminished.
_g
As the 1990s approached, anticipation of a possible
military coup particularly if the results of the upcoming elections were considered
unsatisfactory to military leadership grew, fueled by frequent minors (later proven
accurate) that the armed forces were already plotting such a venture.
One coup plan, developed by military commanders in conjunction with some
dissatisfied civilians, was completed in October of 1989. The plan (sometimes referred to
as Plan Verde), elaborated over three volumes, was based on the belief frequently
expressed by military leadership that democracy could not survive in the context of a
violent subversive threat to the state. Democratic norms and codes of conduct had to be
dropped in order to allow the armed forces of Peru, like those of the Southern Cone in
their campaigns against subversive in years before, to inflict total defeat upon the
rebels."
11
Though the military had been critical of the civilian government s capacity to
effectively fight Sendero Luminoso since 1980. until the late 1980s most members of the
military felt constrained to openly challenge the government due to their own recent
failure in power during the previous military regime. By 1988. enough of the public, and
particularly the business community, loathed the Garcia government to make a new
military adventure in politics look worthwhile to some. The idea that the military was the
Mauceri and Cameron Unholy Alliance: Drugs. Corruption, and the Peruvian Military
During the Fujimori Administration 1998.
h
See Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1 . Parts of the Plan del
Golpe were published in Oiga in 1993: see also Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion
Informe Final 2004 Tome II. p. 327-333.
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only institution efficient, organized, and nationalistic enough to protect the national
interest (rather than the narrow self-interest which they saw as motivating all elected
politicians) had never been uprooted from the culture of the armed forces. Indeed the
authoritarian and corporatist tendencies underpinning military opinion had grown
stronger over the course of the 80s. The plan advocated long-term military control of the
state, suppression of the free press, neoliberal economic policies, and a detailed plan for
defeating Sendero. Only two things seem to have prevented the plan from being put into
action: the anticipation that the conservative, neoliberal Mario Vargas Llosa might win
the upcoming elections and put many of these policies into place himself, and clear
messages from the international community, including directly from the U.S. embassy,
that no military intervention against the electoral process in Peru would be tolerated.
'
1
Civil-military relations had reached a perilous new low-point. Institutionally, the
armed forces were divided and weakened by Garcia s intrusions into and manipulation of
the promotions process. They once more perceived civilian government as an enemy,
corrupt, incompetent and threatening, a force to be controlled or defeated. Left to fight a
losing battle against Sendero Luminoso with few er resources and no political support,
officers and soldiers perceived attempts to hold them accountable for human rights
abuses as an unwarranted restraint and a tool of political attack wielded against them.
Peruvians, ever more threatened and insecure, were increasingly likely to accept this
view.
Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1.. McClintock and Valias
The United States and Peru 2003. p. 133.
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The Rise of Fujimori s Hybrid Regime
In the world of Peruvian politics, the 1 990s will forever be synonymous with the
name Fujimori. An anti-system, anti-party, come-from-nowhere candidate in the 1990
elections. Fujimori was able to capitalize on the national security and economic crises to
catapult himself into the presidency and then remain there for a decade. Both his
electoral success and ten years in office can. in large part, be explained by the success of
the political strategy of neopopulism. Unlike the populism that typified Latin American
presidencies of the 1930s and 1950s. neopopulism relies on a leader s ability to appeal to
unorganized sectors of society; rather than the middle classes and unions, neopopulists
reach out to the poor and members of the informal economy. They do so with charisma
and by promising to effectively respond to the problems plaguing those audiences, but
(again, in opposition to classical populists) they also do so by attacking rather than
building and strengthening the institutions of the state and of governance.
The Peruvian public hated political parties, and Fujimori had none: they hated the
political class, and he was an outsider : they did not trust the courts or Congress, and
Fujimori promised he would not allow them to stand in his way as he acted in the name
of the will of the people. The strategy of neopopulism is conducive to delegative
democracy, a government in which a personalistic, plebiscitarian leader rules based on a
quasi-direct. largely unmediated relationship to a heterogeneous, mostly unorganized
mass of people. This was what Fujimori offered the people of Peru: their response was
overwhelming. That the Peruvian state had. like those of the rest of Latin America, long
exhibited a tendency toward excessive presidentialism made the turn to neopopulism
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seem almost inevitable. (For example. Planas points out that half the legislation passed
during the Belaunde administration and 60% of that passed during the Garcia
administration were laws decreed by the president. Y~
Scholars of neopopulism point to the presence of crisis and vital to the success of
neopopulism and as electoral strategy. As Kurt Weyland writes.
While institutional weaknesses, especially inchoate, fragmented party systems,
provide important permissive conditions for the emergence of personalistic
leaders, grave, urgent problems confronting a country trigger [the neopopulist s]
often dramatic rise to prominence and power Fujimori unexpectedly emerged
out of total obscurity in a country that had suffered hyperinflation as w ell as brutal
insurrectionary violence and equally brutal military repression. Thus, crises bring
forth neopopulist leadership: they delegitimize the established political class and
pave the way for outsiders: weaken intermediary organizations, especially parties
and interest groups, and thus upon up opportunities for personalistic leaders: and
induce many citizens to run considerable risks by supporting untested newcomers
who lack a promising track record and whose promises of salvation are therefore
shrouded in uncertainty.'"
Of course, the big promises neopopulists make to get elected make them vulnerable: they
must be shown to achieve at least some of the dramatic results they ve promised in the
face of crisis, or else be booted out of office quickly. With no part} to protect him and no
Quote from Weyland The Rise and Decline of Fujimori s Neopopulist Leadership
2006. On neopopulism and delegative democracy, see Crabtree Populisms Old and
New 2000: Roberts Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism 1995:
Weyland Neopopulism and Neoliberalism 1996. Clarifying a Contested Concept
2001. Rise and Decline of Fujimori s Neopopulist Leadership 2006: O Donnell
Delegative Democracy 1994. On presidentialism in Latin American politics, see
Mainwaring and Shugart Presidentialism and Democracy 1997: Linz and Valenzuela
Failure of Presidential Democracy 1994: in Peru see Planas El Fujimorato 1999 and
Mauceri An Authoritarian Presidency 2006.
"" Weyland The Rise and Decline of Fujimori s Neopopulist Leadership 2006. p. 13-
14.
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ideology to uphold. Fujimori s presidency would be vulnerable if he were not able to
deliver on his promise to bypass the institutional morass of the state to fix the security
and hyperinflation crises.
Fujimori took bold action on both fronts. Though he had campaigned against the
neoliberal policies and austerity measures advocated by Mario Vargas Llosa. he
immediately reversed course upon winning office. The success of Fujimori 's attempts to
control inflation and stabilize the economy through his economic shock programs (which
came to be known as the Fujishock ) early in his administration were vital to his
consolidation of power. Then, in September 1991 . the president introduced to the
legislature a series of 126 new hardline antiterrorism laws aimed at defeating Sendero
Luminoso. Congress, in which Fujimori s supporters held minority status along with
many other small parties, raised objections, despite the public s approval of the tough
new measures which they hoped might end the conflict. Among the proposed laws they
refused to act on was decree 01 7-90-JUS which would grant all members of the armed
forces legal amnesty for any human rights abuse accusations, though when Fujimori s
supporters in Congress allied with those of Alan Garcia, they were able to muster enough
votes to grant ex-president Garcia immunity from charges of human rights violations in
the Lurigancho and El Fronton cases. Fujimori railed against legislators and the courts
alike as traitors, jackals, and weak on security.’ 4 The confrontation Fujimori s
neopopulism had promised was quickly coming to a head.
4
Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome II. p. 336.
96
Once again. Peru bucked the trends sweeping Latin America. As democratic
regimes were strengthening in Chile. Argentina. Brazil and Uruguay. Peru s journey to
full consolidation which had seemed (at least to outside observers) to be moving
smoothly through three elections hit a major roadblock. In 1992. Fujimori executed a
self-coup (cmtogolpe ) by dismissing Congress, essentially eliminating local
government offices only recently established as mechanisms of decentralization of
government, suspending the Constitution, dissolving several ministries and much of the
legal system, and declaring a state of emergency during which he ruled by decree.
Meanwhile, the armed forces and national police occupied Congress, the Palace of
Justice, and the offices of newspapers and TV stations. They rounded up political
opponents and potential critics of the autogolpe. That night, the Joint Command of the
Armed Forces issued a statement strongly supporting Fujimori s actions. When
Fujimori s public message to the country was videotaped. General fJermoza was by his
side."
0
Coups were already part of the Peruvian political reality, but this one was unique,
not only for having been led by a popularly elected president, but also for that president s
ability to maintain public approval throughout the majority of his tenure in office. The
Among the most frequently advanced explanations for the autogolpe are Fujimori s
frustration with Congress, where his coalition s lack of a majority meant he could not
unilaterally impose his agenda. There are numerous insightful and often competing
scholarly accounts of the autogolpe. See. among others. Kenney Fujimori s Coup and the
Breakdown ofDemocracy in Latin America 2004: Institute de Estudios Peruanos Peru
1992: La democracia en cuestion 1992: McClintock and Valias The United States and
Peru 2003: Cameron and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth 1997: Conaghan Fujimori s
Peru 2005: Ferrero Costa Peru s Presidential Coup 1993: Klaren Peru: Society and
Nationhood in the Andes 2000: Tulchin and Bland Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or
Democracy? 1994: Mauceri The Transition to Democracy and the Failures of
Institution Building 1997: Cameron Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru 1994 and
Self Coups: Peru. Guatemala. Russia 1998.
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autogolpe itself proved exceptionally popular, with surveys indicating that 88% of the
public approved of his dismissal of Congress and 94% approved his plan to restructure
the judiciary. 16 Even years later, for many, Fujimori s decision to single-handedly destroy
and then recreate government was considered proof of their former head of state 's
democratic credentials, rather than as signs of authoritarianism. To his apologists.
Fujimori was exactly what the Perm ian labyrinth demands a strong leader who gets
things done and is not fooled by the corrupt and ineffective system of political parties and
patronage. The popularity of Fujimori s autogolpe indicated the strength of anti-politics
sentiments among the public, exhausted and disappointed by the failures of their leaders
in the 1980s and angry over the corruption and fecklessness of political elites. Fujimori
had. since becoming president, done all he could to encourage and profit from the
public s distaste for government by issuing scathing attacks upon the palace of injustice
(as he referred to the judiciary) and the partydocracy of Congress (by which he meant
the corrupt and divisive system of parties that used Congress as a means to sen e
politician s rather than Peru s interests). Fujimori went out of his way to depict the
judiciary as corrupt and Congress as refusing to cooperate with the president on the
national agenda.
’ 7
'
Ferrero Costa Peru s Presidential Coup 1993. p. 33. See also Ames. Bernales. et al
Situation de la Democracia en el Peru (2000-2001
)
2001: Weyland A Paradox of
Success? 2000.
Degregori La Decada de la Antipolitica 2000: Cotier and Grompone El Fujimorismo:
Ascensoy Caida de an Regimen Autoritario 2000; Ames. Bernales. et al Situacion de la
Democracia en el Peru 2001 : Seligson and Carrion Political Support. Political
Skepticism, and Political Stability in New Democracies 2002. On the fate of political
parties under Fujimori, see Tanaka Los espejismos de la democracia 1 998. Kenney The
Death and Rebirth of a Party System. Peru 1978-2001 2003. Levitsky and Cameron
Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori s Peru
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The public was further elated in September 1992. Abimael Guzman, the architect
and icon of the guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso, was captured amid a massive
bombing campaign in Lima at a time when he claimed that the Shining Path was on the
edge of victory, shocking and thrilling the nation. Guzman was put in a cage, tried by a
military court and sentenced to life in jail.
s
His capture was followed by a dramatic
drop in confrontations between the armed forces and Sendero Luminoso. which, without
its leader, quickly fell apart. Ironically, though Fujimori capitalized on the capture to
enhance his popularity, it was the result of inspired police and investigative work by
DINCOTE. a small unit not tied to or influenced by Fujimori but benefiting from
intelligence cooperation with U.S. allies. ' Nevertheless. Guzman s capture contributed
to Fujimori s ability to conduct a self-coup, dismiss Congress, declare a state of
emergency and rule by decree while maintaining high levels of public approval.
2003. On public opinion reflecting attitudes of distrust toward the institutions of the state
in Latin America, see Lagos Public Opinion 2003. Latinobarometro polling data, and
June 23. 1991 polling data in La Republica and National citing Institute de Economia
Aplicade polls that found 71% of the public diapproved of the performance of Congress.
76% supported a reduction in the number of its members, and 47% supported the idea of
creating a unicameral Congress . For Fujimori s public statements attacking the courts.
Congress and political parties, see Expreso Oct 14. 1990. Dec 10. 1990. Feb 24. 1991.
April 18. 1995. La Republica July 28. 1990 April 10. 1995.
' s
Peru s Terrorism Trials The Economist October 30. 2004.
' g On economic policy under Fujimori, see Mauceri State under Siege 1996. Cameron
and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth 1997. Crabtree and Thomas Fujimori s Peru: The
Political Economy 1998. Roberts Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism
1995. Weyland Neopopulism and Neoliberalism 1996. Kay Fujipopulism and the
Liberal State in Peru 1996: Wise Against the Odds 2006: Sheahan Redirection of
Peruvian Economic Strategies in the 1990s 2006. On the impact of economic policy on
support for the autogolpe. see Weyland A Paradox of Success? 2000.
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Fernando Rospigliosi. Carlos Ivan Degregori, Enrique Obando. Carlos Rivera.
Henry Pease Garcia and others have argued that the role of the military is central to
understanding the events of 1992.
4(1
In a sense, it is misleading to call the 1992
interruption of Peruvian democracy a self coup, for in fact it was the product of
cooperation between the executive, the military, and the national intelligence agency.
Factions within the military had grown impatient with the bumbling and recurrent crises
of the Belaunde and Garcia governments, and when Fujimori shot to electoral victory in
1990. he faced the immediate possibility of a military overthrow. The likelihood of a
military uprising reflected not only frustration within military ranks over political
corruption and ineptitude, but also the fact that Peruvian troops operated under conditions
NeM’sw'eek described as downright pitiable. Facing constant shortages of food and
equipment, and paid a mere $23 a month, troop morale was so low before 1 992 that
desertion had become rampant. After the autogolpe. reporters warned that the Peruvian
military is so badly off it may not be able to defeat terrorism even now that the generals
are running the country with President Alberto Fujimori. In fact, some military analysts
argued that Fujimori s decision to stage the autogolpe was influenced by the need to head
off an uprising of underpaid officers against their high command, including General
Hermoza. who had been jeered by officers in a meeting just two w eeks before the coup.
4,1
Degregori and Rivera Peru 1980-1990: Fuerzas armadas, subversion y democracia
1993. Rospigliosi Montes inos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Obando The Power of
Peru s Armed Forces 1994. Pease Garcia Los anos de la langosta 1994.
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The autogolpe allowed Fujimori to dampen divisiveness within the armed forces by
opening new avenues to empower the military. And, to cement military cooperativeness
among the rank-and-file. Fujimori issued an emergency pay hike for soldiers. 41
The loyalty of the armed forces commanders had already been guaranteed. Hours
after Fujimori s election to the presidency, he retreated to the Circulo Militar to negotiate
with the armed forces commanders, relying heavily during this process on Vladimiro
Montesinos. a shadowy aide who would soon come to play the key role in his
administration.
42 Though the details of these negotiations may never be fully known, it is
clear that what emerged from them was the consolidation of power in the hands of
Fujimori. Montesinos. and the head of a reorganized arm}'. Fujimori and Montesinos
shrewdly moved to remove military' commanders perceived as a threat to the new regime
and elevated powerful new actors to the military command. In 1991 they installed a new
President of the Joint Command of the armed forces. General Nicolas Hermoza. These
decisive interventions into the military command structure ensured Fujimori the support
of the armed forces for his attack on the institutions of the Peruvian state and were in
essence a continuation of Garcia s tactics to assert civilian control over the militar} -
.
albeit in a manner ill-suited to democratic reform. In exchange for loyalty to Fujimori, the
armed forces would receive more than Garcia ever offered, including wide-ranging
41
Lane with Larmer and Schmidt The Soldiers Story 1992. p. 44. Corroborated by
declassified US embassy cables available through the National Security Archives.
4
*>
‘ On Montesinos. see Bowen and Holligan El espia imperfecto 2003, Michnik The
Montesinos Virus 2001 : Degregori La Decada de la Antipolitica 2000: Montesinos.
Toda la historia 2001
.
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protections for military prerogatives, effective immunity from prosecution, new
limitations on press reporting on military operations, and further expansion of military
43
powers.
Fujimori s moves to check the threat of a challenge from the barracks and to
instead coopt the military into supporting him provided the main axis of the civil-
military alliance [that] underpinned the regime.
44
Politicians and analysts realized the
nature of this alliance within the first few months of Fujimori s presidency and regularly
decried Fujimori s militarization of the state. While the president attacked all other
institutions of the state, he held up the military and the presidency as the two state powers
capable of responding to the demands of the public. The president remained in the
Circulo Militar for weeks after his election, establishing his cabinet and calling
politicians to meet with him there to initiate planning for his government. He also chose
an active military officer to fill the position of Minister of the Interior. Hence even before
his election, many sensed the militarization of the new administration and w arned that
Fujimori might eventually attempt his own version of bordaberrization. by which
military control w ould be consolidated under the guise of a civilian, elected presidency.
Fujimori encouraged such rumors when he referred to the armed forces as the
4
' Mauceri and Cameron Unholy Alliance 1998. Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005
Obando Fujimori and the Military: A Marriage of Convenience 1996. For Hermoza s
own account of plotting the 1 992 coup, see his Fuerzas Armadas del Peru 1 996. Due to
limitations of space. I w ill not directly address the question of the relationship between
the press and the armed forces in Peru. On this topic, see Rospigliosi El arte del engaiio:
las relaciones entre los militaresy la prensa 2000 and Instituto Prensa y Sociedad Prensa
y militares: treinta anos de relaciones tormentosas en el Peru 2002.
44
Obando refers to this relationship as a presidential-led symbiosis with the armed
forces. Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998. p. 379. See also Pease Garcia
Los anos de la langosta 1994.
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fundamental pillar of his government. Others simply worried that the confrontation
Fujimori was provoking between the institutions of the state would likely result in a coup
d etat. whatever its form.
4 '
The early consolidation of the executive-military alliance would have been
impossible without the third element of the new pow er triumvirate. Vladimiro
Montesinos. Fujimori s most important political advisor. Montesinos also became de
facto head of the national intelligence agency. SIN. Also a former lawyer for Colombian
drug dealers, he had been a Peruvian army officer in the 1970s. but had been expelled on
charges of selling secret documents to the United States. As Umberto Jara explains.
Montesinos used his connections in the military to position himself as a bridge betw een
the military and the executive. Montesinos proved to be the nexus capable of uniting
two weaknesses: an army that had lost its prestige because of subversion and human
rights violations, and a political unknown, absolutely solitary, w ithout a political
organization or a social base. Montesinos relationship w ith powerful members of the
military depended in pail on his past efforts to protect them from prosecution for human
rights abuses. The triumvirate of pow er he now helped construct enabled Fujimori to
carry out the audacious overthrow' of his own government with the certainty that he could
maintain a monopoly on the use of force.
4
' Quote is from Gestion Oct 12. 1991. See also El Comercio and La Republica Aug 24.
1990 and Jan 29. 1992. El Universal Sept 17. 1990. Expreso Oct 14. 1990 and Feb 24.
1991
. Warnings to this effect were so common that Henry Pease Garcia referred to his
own account of the 1992 autogolpe a Chronicle of a Death Foretold (Los alios de la
langosta 1994).
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In essence. Montesinos had brokered the following deal: Fujimori would sen e as
the legitimate democratic face of a regime that would in fact put in place the coup plan
developed in 1989 by members of the military (working in conjunction with civilians
disgusted by Garcia s presidential disasters). The 1992 autogolpe followed the earlier
plan in great detail, except for the key difference that, rather than the armed forces
overseeing the new regime, the elected President would preside over the remaking of the
state. (Plan Verde envisioned a puppet presidency with the armed forces wielding real
power; Fujimori and Montesinos managed to coopt this plan to fit their own goals.)
Military leadership involved in negotiating the transition with Montesinos and Fujimori
no doubt recognized the benefit of this democratic veneer, as. since the end of the Cold
War. they could no longer count on the international community to tolerate military
authoritarianism.
In exchange for sharing power with Fujimori and his right-hand man. Montesinos.
the military would receive something more fundamental to their interests, anyhow: their
counter-subversive strategy would now be put in place. It was a widely held belief within
military circles that the reason Sendero continued to thrive was because the Peruvian
state of the 1980s had held the armed forces back from prosecuting the conflict w ith their
full force and capacity. Congress had. in the months before the autogolpe. blocked
several provisions of Fujimori s counter-insurgency plan, including those w hich granted
the Political-Military Command in each emergency zone control over civilian sectors
of the state. The autogolpe allowed the president to enact the counter-insurgency plan in
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its entirety, with the added bonus that the problem ofjudges failing to convict suspected
terrorists could be solved by removing the overwhelming majority of them from their
positions and replacing them with regime supporters.
4h
To Fujimori and his allies apparent surprise, the autogolpe met with immediate
and concerted pressure from the Organization of American States, many of its member
states, including the United States, and in some cases international financial institutions,
to hold new elections. Fujimori more concerned about the economic damage the
international community might inflict upon Peru than about his image in their eyes -
agreed to hold elections for the presidency and to establish first a temporary legislative
body to write a new constitution and finally a new Congress. 4 Rather than end
Fujimori s adventures in authoritarianism, however, he had simply changed strategies.
For one thing, the new constitution meant Fujimori could run for office anew, while the
4h
See Obando Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998: Rospigliosi
Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. C'h. 1. Institutionalist factions unwilling to
bargain within Montesinos and those opposed to the idea of any interruption of the
constitutional order had been, or would soon be. purged from the armed forces and
replaced with leaders amenable to the plan. Some of these institutionalists w arned the US
as early as 1990 about Montesinos pow er and the growing control of his intelligence
agency over the country, and others staged a failed counter-coup against Fujimori in Nov
1992. These officers were soon pardoned by Fujimori in order to reduce tensions with
these factions within the armed forces. See Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis
Center. Counterintelligence Periodic Summary. Who is Controlling Whom? Oct 23. 1990:
Peru Military Unease Growing. Dec 23. 1992. Declassified, available through National
Security Archives; and Robles Persecution Contra Militares Institucionalistas Gaceta
del Peril (Argentina) Aho 4. No. 44. May 1995 (reprinted in Crimen e Impunidad 1996).
4
The 1993 Constitution is available at http://bviilual.bnp.gob.pe/libros_titulos.php: see
also Comision Andina de Juristas La Constitucion de 1993: Analisis y comentarios 1994.
On the question of the role of the armed forces in the new Constitution, see Obando
Seguridad. defensa nacional v fuerza en la constitucion de 1993 Analisis Internacional
1993 and Fuerzas armadas y constitucion 1993: on the role of Congress in contributing
to the pattern of violence and state failure from 1980-2000. see Comision de la Verdad
Informe Final 2004 Tome III. p. 205-246.
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previous constitution had banned consecutive presidencies by the same individual. (This
change foreshadowed a trend soon to sweep South America and end the long-standing
tradition of banning immediate presidential reelection. )
4S New elections to replace the
bicameral Congress with a single 80-member chamber tasked with writing a new
Constitution granted an overwhelming majority of these seats to members of his political
coalition: similarly, when the 1995 legislative elections were held. Fujimori s allies held
a strong majority in the new unicameral. 120-member Congress. (The president himself
won a resounding victory in the presidential elections.) The president would use this bloc
to force his agenda upon the country, and secured the regime from legal scrutiny by
dismissing 80% of the magistrates in the legal system and replacing them with
provisional magistrates whose appointments were granted and revoked directly by his
administration.
In the meantime. Fujimori ruled alone, without any restraints, for nine months
(from April 1992 to January 1993). He used this time to immediately and vastly
strengthen the hand of the military, his main and crucial allies in government, by putting
in place the reforms the armed forces demanded as necessary to successfully defeat
Sendero Luminoso. Many of these reforms had formed part of a packet of 126 special
48
In 1994. President Menem of Argentina would persuade Congress to allow his
reelection in exchange for a shortening of the presidential term. In 1996. a year after
Menem successfully returned to the Argentine presidency. Brazil s President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso won the Congressional votes needed to amend the Constitution to
allow reelection. And in 1999. President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was granted the
opportunity to stay in office for as many as twelve more years when the Constituent
Assembly he had called introduced a reelection provision into the Constitution. See
Conaghan. Making and Unmaking 2001 . For US reaction to the autogolpe. see .Yen'
York Times , April 7 and 1 1. 1992 and declassified document President Bush s Call to
Fujimori 22 April. 1992 available through the National Security Archives; for OAS
reaction, see Ferrero Costa Proceso de retorno 1992. in which the OAS resolution on
Peru is reprinted.
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legislative decrees expedited by the executive in 1991. but continued Congressional
wrangling, Fujimori argued, had prevented their full implementation until after the
autogolpe.
4
" The Ministries of the Interior and Defense were consolidated under the
control of hard-line factions from the armed forces, meaning that even the police force
would be under the control of the army, the strongest of the individual armed forces.
Fujimori extended the political control of the military over zones in a state of emergency.
He passed tough new anti -terrorist laws allowing military tribunals for suspected
terrorists to be tried by anonymous, hooded judges: such courts helped assure the low
conviction rates for alleged insurgents, long a source of military outrage, would be
reversed. Between 95 and 97% of the cases tried by the new military tribunals resulted in
conviction."" In addition. Fujimori s majority in Congress routinely blocked attempts by
political opponents to investigate suspected abuses of power by members of the military.
As Taylor writes, executive intervention in cases concerning human rights abuses
became standard, critics being accused of supporting terrorism and subjected to
harassment by the security services, who operated their own death squad. The new
4
" See El Comercio Sept 28. 1991. Relevant Legislative Decrees include No. 726. 734
and 738 related to the entry of the armed forces into universities, prisons, and regions not
under a state of emergency, published in El Pemcmo Nov 12. 1991. Also published in the
same issue were Laws 740 and 741 related to the rondas campesinos and self-defense
committees, which could now receive arms from the military: No. 734. 749 and 752
related to the organization of the System of National Defense, the fundamental military
codes, and establishing Miliary-Political Command establishing the authority of the
military over all civilian government in zones under state of emergency; and others.
Ml
Years later, it would be proved that thousands of individuals were wrongly convicted
by these military tribunals and set free. Youngers Violencia Politico y Socieclad Civil en
el Peru 2003. p. 255: for earlier criticisms see especially Colegio de Abogados de Lima
Proyecto de reforma de la legislacion antiterrorista 1994 and Hurtado Pozo
Comentario al proyecto de reforma de la legislacion antiterrorista 1994.
107
laws also gave the military the power to arm and organize rondas campesinos (civilian
self-defense groups) throughout the countryside/' Though these groups had been in
existence for years, the armed forces now effectively exercised control over large
numbers of armed civilians in the countryside.
In particular, the changes reflected military preoccupation with protecting their
officers from charges of human rights violations, either in the press or more crucially
in the courts. Many officers acknowledged in private that When the army does fight, it
often resorts to brutality :
A former member of an elite Peruvian antiterrorist unit told Newsweek that
government troops routinely used electric shock and other torture on suspected
terrorists. He said soldiers were frequently ordered to carry out extra-judicial
executions of suspects and were instructed to cover up the killings by burning
bodies or throwing them into lakes and rivers. The army officially denies such
reports. But many military men say privately that it is pointless to take prisoners,
given a corrupt and intimidated judicial system that has released 85 percent of the
7.000 terror suspects arrested since 1982/ J
In fact, the new counterinsurgency plan developed after 1989 emphasized a reduction in
large-scale human rights abuses, relying instead on fewer and more selective
assassinations and covert operations based on better intelligence.''4
31
Taylor From Fujimori to Toledo 2005. p. 569.
~ 2
Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1. On the rondas
campesinos . see Degregori Las rondas campesinas y la derrotci de Sendero Luminoso
1996; Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2004; Starn Hablan los Ronderos 1993; US
Southern Command cable September 8. 1992. declassified and available through the
National Security Archives.
Lane with Larmer and Schmidt The Soldiers Story 1992. p. 44.
M On this change, enshrined in Directive 01-PE-DI-JUN86JUL90 of the Joint Command
of the Armed Forces, see Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004
Tome II. p. 285-306.
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This disastrous situation did reflect a genuine failure of the legal system to send
those arrested on charges of terrorism to jail, due to a combination of factors, including
general incapacity, threats by terrorist groups to seek revenge, and corruption. This
reality of large scale human rights abuses perpetrated by the armed forces in response to a
failure of the legal system to hold terrorists legally accountable, and the ensuing
vulnerability of members of the armed forces to charges of human rights violations,
created two demands by the armed forces. First, they demanded and received tough new
anti-terrorist laws to ensure that those indiv iduals they seized as collaborators with
Sendero Luminoso would remain in jail and not be set free by intimidated judges. As
noted, virtually all those brought before the new military tribunals on charges of terrorism
were convicted: in exchange, the military showed a marked trend towards employing
official detention of suspected terrorists rather than large scale disappearances or killings.
While arrest and imprisonment of alleged terrorists represented a genuine improvement
over the disappearances of the past decade, the Peruvian truth commission would later
argue that these policies too constituted violations of the basic rights of the people,
including violations of due process. Hence, though less numerous, human rights
violations became a more and more premeditated and systematic element of
counterinsurgency strategy, and the legal system became more directly involved in the
limitation of citizen s abilities to protect themselves from arbitrary state action.
“
" The best and most comprehensive treatment of the issue of the pattern of arrest and
imprisonment since 1980 can be found in De la .Tara Basombrio Memoriay Batallas en
Sombre de los Inocentes: Peril 1992-2001 2001. See also Comision de la Verdad informe
Final 2004.
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Second, the armed forces demanded and received Fujimori s support for
strengthening the tradition of special military fueros. in this case via a parallel legal
system under the control of the armed forces, to ensure the military s demands for
juridical security y ' would be protected. Separate military courts were granted expanded
rights to exercise jurisdiction over any case involving a member of the military, including
cases of human rights violations, despite the fact that such courts failed to meet standards
of due process. In essence, these new reforms ensured that alleged terrorists would go
to jail even when evidence against them was weak, while members of the military would
not be punished even if weighty evidence existed of their direct involvement in massive
human rights violations. Military courts could and would accomplish both
objectives.' 7
Human rights groups critical of the new legislation under Fujimori and the
mounting evidence of impunity for military abuses became principal targets of Fujimori s
wrath: he regularly referred to them as the legal arms of subversion, accomplices of
Vl
Rospigliosi Democracy s Bleak Prospects 1994. p. 45.
One rare case of conviction of a military officer for human rights violations is
indicative of the role of military courts in minimizing accountability for human rights
violations. Telmo Hurtado w as convicted by a military court in 1992 for involvement in
the 1985 Accomarca. Ayacucho massacre. However, in 1993, Telmo Hurtado was
discovered to not only have been released from prison years earlier under the orders of
Army Commander General Villanueva Valdivia, but then to have been promoted from
Lieutenant to Captain. He remained in active duty in the Peruvian army despite the
conviction. All together. Hurtado s role in an incident that resulted in the deaths of at
least 69 civilians, many of them women and children earned him less than tw o years in
prison for abuses of authority. US Defense Intelligence Agency cable. Dec 21. 1993.
Declassified and available through the National Security Archives. On the overall
contribution of the court system both military and civilian to the pattern of human
rights abuses from 1980-2000. see Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2004 Tome III.
p. 247-280.
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terror, and front organizations for terrorists.' 8 Similarly, Fujimori strengthened tools
to insulate the military from critical press reports. In 1990. Fujimori responded to press
reports linking specific military officers with the 1987 killing of a reporter by issuing a
presidential decree making the naming of military and police officers serving in
emergency zones illegal. As Conaghan writes, both civilian and military officials were
hostile to any reporting that focused on human rights violations by government security
forces. When horrific cases did come to light, they were usually covered up or remanded
to the military justice system and quickly dismissed In the conduct of the war. impunity
reigned. The lengths to which Fujimori and his congressional allies were willing to go
in order to protect the military from charges of human rights violations were soon to be
demonstrated.
Another new measure of the antiterrorist laws allowed the armed forces access to
university campuses, believed to be strongholds of the insurgency s supporters/
1
During
1992, Lima s La Cantuta University was placed under military control. In July, nine
students and a professor were abducted from the campus. The perpetrators w ere part of a
paramilitary group called Grupo C’olina. an elite military squad working under
>,s
NlcClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003. p. 135.
Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 24. See also Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas
Armadas 2000. Ch. 1 . The press media did regularly report on human rights cases both
before and after the autogolpe. Among hundreds of examples, see El Comercio July 6.
1991. Expreso Dec 26. 1991, El grupo colina anda suelto Oiga June 19, 1995.
Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1. See Legislative Decree
726 published in El Peruano Nov 12. 1991.
1 1
1
supervision of the army intelligence service
hl
widely believed to be orchestrated by
Montesinos. Grupo Colina was also suspected in the disappearance of 35 university
students from the Universidad del Centro in Huancayo and a November 1991 massacre of
seventeen people in the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima. Family members of the La
Cantuta victims initiated legal investigations into the case, but attempts to force officers
documented to have been on the campus the night of the disappearances were blocked by
General Flermoza. who cited security reasons and accused the investigating legislators of
being in collusions with the terrorists. The Supreme Court upheld lower courts
arguments that the families had provided insufficient evidence that the La Cantuta
students had ever existed; their bodies had not been found/'
Opposition politicians were moved to hold hearings on the matter, during which a
congressman revealed that he had received a letter from a renegade group of
Commanders. Majors and Captains (COMACA) confirming suspicions that army
intelligence agents had participated in the La Cantuta disappearances and that both
Montesinos and Hermoza had overseen the operation. Hermoza appeared before the
committee to deny the allegations and to charge members of Congress with attempting to
injure the reputation of the army. The following day the army issued an incendiary
61 Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 67. For chilling accounts of military and
intelligence officers in human rights abuses, see US embassy cable Systematic Human
Rights Violations Under Fujimori June 30. 1994. Declassified and available through the
National Security Archives; on Grupo Colina generally see Comision de la Verdad y
Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome III. p. 141-164.
Ibid. On the La Cantuta case, see also US Embassy cable. Sept 22. 1993. declassified
and available through the National Security Archives: Hermoza Rios quoted in Burt
Unsettled accounts: militarization and memory in postwar Peru 1998 and Aprodeh De
la tierra broto la verdad 1994. On the overall pattern of human rights abuses during the
Fujimori government, see Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2004 Tome III. p. 68-
164.
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statement accusing opposition Congressmen of supporting a terrorist conspiracy against
the state with their investigation. More threateningly. Hermoza ordered tanks to roll
through downtown Lima for the next two days. Conaghan writes: The event was not just
for opposition consumption. It was a reminder to Fujimori and [his congressional bloc]
that the armed forces would not tolerate any attempt to blame them for human rights
abuses. Apparently getting the message from the tank parades. Fujimori denounced
z:
efforts at tarnishing the image of the military.
Though Minister of Defense General Victor Malca attempted to downplay these
events by pledging the military s full cooperation with the investigation, tension
continued to mount. General Rodolfo Robles, the third highest ranking member of the
Army, sought protection in a foreign embassy as he went public to confirm the
COMACA charges. Within days, the military s highest court (the Consejo Supremo de
Jusiticia Militar. or CS.TM) issued multiple charges against Robles for making false
statements, insubordination, and insulting the armed forces. A CSJM judge appeared on
television saying Robles statements were the result of mental problems and his anger
over not moving up military ranks faster. The judge went so far as to suggest that Robles
ought to kill himself. More than fifty army generals echoed the judge s outrage by issuing
a statement calling Robles a felon and coward. Fujimori affirmed his confidence that
Montesinos w as innocent of any connection to the disappearances or to a death squad.
6
' Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. 68-9. See also reporting in Oiga April 26. 1993 and
Obando Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996 1998. COMACA, like the group
Leon Dormido first organized during the Garcia administration to criticize the corrupt,
co-opted leadership.
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Public opinion polls, however, showed that 38% of respondents believed the La Cantuta
disappearances were the work of an army death squad: among those aware of Robles
denunciations. 52% believed him and 73% backed the congressional investigation. 64
Congressionalfujimoristas, two ofwhom now took seats on the investigative
commission, sought to block its power even as the opposition members of Congress who
spearheaded the investigation were receiving regular death threats. Martha Chavez and
Victor Joy Way, the members of Congress considered most loyal to Fujimori, introduced
a successful resolution to limit military officer appearances before the commission to
only high-ranking officers, thereby ensuring that low-ranking officers could not offer
testimony damaging to those higher up in the chain of command. Opposition
congressmembers walked out of the investigations, decrying the treatment of the military
as, in Congressman Henry Pease s words, a separate state within the state. The CSJM
issued rulings preventing Montesinos from being called before the commission and
allowing Hennoza to limit his testimony. 6 " The congressional investigation split along
fujimorista/opposition lines, with the two groups issuing findings diametrically opposed.
Fujimori s supporters knew their minority report, which found no grounds to suspect
wrongdoing on the part of any officers, would be the version approved by their majority
congressional bloc.
64
Ibid. General Picon dice que General Robles deberia quitarse la vida La Republica
May 16. 1993. See also Robles Crimen e Impunidad 1996. which includes articles
relevant to Robles accusations and the state s response, such as Gustavo Gorriti El
Svengali de Fujimori. Montesinos. El Traidor de la Democracia Peruana La Republica
Julv 4. 1994: Robles Denuncia Violacion de Derechos Humanos Por el SEC v el CGE
(reprinted; covered in all major Peruvian daily papers May 6-8. 1993); Robles Basta
Ya! Oiga May 10. 1993; etc.
Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 70.
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When the bodies of the victims were found, several of them with bullet holes
through their skulls, a special prosecutor opened the case anyway. He was warned to stop
his investigation in light of the CS.TM s decision to open its own proceedings on the
casef
h
International attention was again focused on Peru s human rights situation, and
domestic outrage was reaching a fever pitch, leaving Fujimori with little choice but to
attempt to save face by announcing the arrest of four military officers, among them a
major, for the La Cantuta murders. These four officers were portrayed as sick individuals
acting without the knowledge of the rest of the military command. The families of the
victims and the special prosecutor continued to pursue officers they charged with
involvement in the case and to seek trial in the civilian court system. When, finally, the
question of civilian vs. military jurisdiction over the case came before the Supreme
Court, one of the judges who seemed to be leaning in favor of the civilian courts was
nearly killed when a briefcase full of dynamite exploded at his home. Cynically.
Fujimori s supporters in Congress used the incident as grounds to change Supreme Court
voting procedures, arguing that because placing a judge in the position of casting the
determinant vote clearly endangered the judge s life, a simple majority should be
sufficient to rule on jurisdictional questions. With the new law in place, the necessary
majority on the Supreme Court was assembled and ruled in favor of the military courts.
The officers and several others now charged with involvement were convicted by the
military courts only ten days later. Shortly thereafter. Fujimori reconfirmed General
M
' Ibid. For another scholars analysis of these incidents, see Rospigliosi Montesinos y
Las Faerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1 . For US embassy and intelligence reports related to
Grupo Colina. La Cantuta. and Barrios Altos, see numerous declassified documents from
1994 to 1996 available through the National Security Archives.
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Hermoza as the head of the armed forces command. After the fall of the Fujimori regime,
the Perm ian truth commission and prosecutors found evidence that the Grupo Colina had
answered to both Hermoza and Montesinos.
h
The 1991 Barrios Altos case was reopened by prosecutors in 1995. but military
officers were again able to respond with CSJM rulings that they did not have to testify
before civilian courts or any investigations. Then, in the early morning hours of June 14.
an oficialista acting at the behest of Fujimori introduced a sweeping amnesty law
granting total legal amnesty to all military and police officers implicated in human rights
abuses since 1980. The law passed, the convictions of the officers in the La Cantuta case
were overturned, the men were released from their prison terms, and all new legal action
against security agents outside the military courts was effectivelv killed. The 1995
•
. 68
amnesty law was extremely unpopular: 85% of the public opposed its passage. '
Domestic and international human rights organizations, along with the U.S. State
Department, protested the measure immediately. When one judge chose not to apply the
new law in the case before him. Congress passed a second law demanding that all courts
6
These investigations continue at the time of this writing. See next chapter on this.
O
Degregori Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos 2004. p. 77. On the amnesty law and
reactions it provoked, see also No. no. no. no. no, no Ideele 77 (July 1995): 10-12;
Gestion June 13. 1995; El Grupo Colina anda suelto. Oiga . June 19. 1995; US Embassy
cable Amnesty Law in Peru June 15. 1995. declassified and available through the
National Security Archives; Basombrio Castigo y Impunidad 2001 . The relevant laws
are Law 264790 and 26492.
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abide by the amnesty. When a few courageous prosecutors and judges threatened to
continue the Barrios Altos investigation, the army s armored division brought the tanks
into the streets once more.
Though McClintock and Vargas write that Fujimori and Montesinos were acting
to increase without conditions the power and prerogatives of Peru s armed forces.
"
the reality was more complex. In fact, manipulation and politicization of the army
command was part of a broader pattern of corrupting the military and subjecting it to
subservience to a small, self-interested leadership and to the whims of the executive. As
Mauceri and Cameron write, the power relationships among Montesinos, Fujimori and
Hermoza were a type of double-edged sword for the armed forces, elevating its power to
conduct antisubversive warfare without accountability for its excesses, and yet re-
introducing the destructive cancer of politicization into the institution and diminishing its
ability to operate effectively. The same armed forces which gave up power in 1 980 to
avoid damaging military unity and espirit de corps w ith politicization were now seeking
widening powers by replacing longstanding institutional arrangements w ith personal
connections and loyalties. Professional criteria and seniority, the bases of military
promotion as established in regulations from the 1950s. were completely eschewed. A
flurry of executive decrees and internal documents w ere issued by the regime in 1991 and
1992 rendering previous rules, such as that requiring the highest military rankings be
reserved for members of the top 5% of the graduates of the country s military academies,
and that the high command be changed annually, void, and making political appointees to
64
Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 105-7.
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military command permanent. While the military was now granted much wider latitude to
act without restraint, inviting abuses of its power, the dependence of top military
commanders for the political support of Fujimori and Montesinos meant that in exchange
the institution gave up its historical role of serving as a check on abuse of power by the
executive. As McClintock and Valias write, the immediate beneficiary of these changes
was Hermoza. an undistinguished, second-rank officer [who] apparently achieved his
promotion though a pledge of compliance with key decisions made by Montesinos and
Fujimori including support for the autogolpe.
1
According to one general speaking
from exile several years after the coup, this reflected the preference of the majority of the
armed forces for a civilian dictatorship. '
Mauceri and Cameron point out that the civil-military alliance Fujimori and
Montesinos constructed defies traditional models of civil-military relations, which posit
the two as separate and competing to protect their respective spheres of influence. The
military is understood to act as a unitary rational actor protecting its autonomy from
intrusions of civilian oversight in internal matters which directly affect the institutional
integrity of the armed forces. Yet in Peru a faction of the military7 leadership happily
traded away control over basic matters of internal promotion and assignment in exchange
for an enhanced capacity to pursue the selective interests of the power triumvirate and of
the regime s chosen allies within the military command. To Fujimori and Montesinos. the
1
McClintock and Valias The United States and Pent 2003. p. 57. See also Obando The
Power of Peru s .Armed Forces 1994. Civil-Military Relations in Peru. 1980-1996
1998. According to General Robles, speaking in exile several years after the coup, this
reflected the preference of the majority of the armed forces for a civilian dictatorship.
Quoted in d Ornellas Commentary 1994. p. 70.
2
General Rodolfo Robles qtd. in d Ornellas Commentary 1994. p. 70.
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armed forces were, like all other institutions of the state, malleable to their will; only
because military authority was key to carrying out the most egregious of their assaults on
the constitutional order and because national security was so fundamental to Fujimori s
popularity among the public would it be invited into the circle of power. In truth, the
armed forces only appeared to be a genuine partner in the authoritarian project
underway: overall. Fujimori and Montesinos were leading the military to an inevitable
crisis. Montesinos used SIN to spy on members of the military to ensure their loyalty to
the system he and Fujimori oversaw. Those who remained loyal could count upon
receiving the political support from the president and Congress they had longed for in the
1980s. Congressional investigations were blocked: critics of the armed forces were
blasted in the strongest language possible by the president himself: no oversight of
military expenditures would be allowed. In turn. Fujimori could charge his political
opponents with attempting to destabilize the government and provoke military
intervention whenever they became too critical.
4
The relationship between Fujimori and
the military was so cozy that uniformed officers were on several occasions caught
actively campaigning for the president s reelection.
Before the late 1980s. SIN had been a relatively w eak and unimportant pan of the
machinery of the Peruvian state. President Garcia utilized SIN as a tool to spy on military
leaders w ho might be plotting his removal, but it was under Montesinos leadership that
' On this point, see Obando s insightful essay Las relaciones civiles-militares en el Peru
en la decada del 90: lecciones para el future 2001
.
4
Fujimori made such claims, for example, in the run-up to the referendum on the new7
Constitution. Conaghan Fujimori s Pent 2005. p. 62.
7
" Ibid. p. 82. See. for example. La Republica Sept 8. 1994.
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the agency became truly powerful. SIN s budget was multiplied fifty or sixty times and
its role increasingly became that of serving as a political police force, whose brutal tactics
were to be aimed at all opponents of the government. Death threats, lengthy and
unprovoked tax investigations, wiretapping, unfounded legal cases, blackmail, and smear
campaigns were its most frequent tools; journalists, members of civil society, and
opposition politicians were its most common targets. Though occasionally stories of SIN
misbehavior would leak out. SIN was always eventually cleared of wrongdoing and its
power left unchecked. Stories that did come to light emerged when former members of
SIN. the military, or SIE. the army intelligence agency, fled the country to report abuses
they had suffered from their own agencies. Many of these individuals ended up beaten or
killed. Montesinos undercover agents systematically infiltrated every agency of
government, creating a pervasive culture of fear and suspicion within the state and
extending Montesinos control to even' corner of government.
h
Though the stark
reduction in conflict with Sendero Luminoso after Guzman s capture would seem to have
weakened threats to national security. Congress used increases in common crime and
gang violence to legitimize new laws granting Fujimori the right to make national
security legislation by decree. Despite the virtual end of organized armed confrontation
with insurgents. Fujimori made no immediate reduction in the number of zones under
state of emergency status nor any attempt to reduce the extensive powers of the armed
forces such status accorded. As the Peruvian truth commission would later write, this
period was characterized as counterinsurgency without insurgency. Fujimori s success
' One story of SIN misbehavior that leaked out was in 1998. when an extensive
surveillance and wiretapping arrangement by which Montesinos monitored the
communication of members of Congress, the armed forces, and Fujimori s own cabinet
became public. This was further investigated after the fall of the government in 2000.
120
at using the specter of terrorism to legitimize his authoritarian behavior, enhance the
power of his allies, and discredit his challengers made it too useful a logic to give up.
New executive decrees transfer[ed] significant power from the police and judiciary to
the SIN and the military Diez Canseco notes. This is like giving powers to A1 Capone
to fight crime. ' Montesinos was ultimately able to extend the power ot SIN over the
military itself. Though in the past each branch of the armed forces had its own
intelligence agency and SIN operated as an appendage of the executive office, under
Fujimori all intelligence agencies reported to SIN. which alone reported to the president.
Montesinos gradually consolidated his control over the executive-military nexus of the
regime.
Cracks in the Power Structure
From 1993 to 1998. the power triumvirate of Fujimori. Montesinos and Hermoza
held strong. Hermoza s power w ithin the military was greatly enhanced after the
autogolpe. and. gradually, just as Fujimori and Montesinos had co-opted Hermoza. the
general w as able to co-opt his own allies within the military and accordingly secure a
netw ork of support that provided the general with his ow n pow er base and a degree of
autonomy.
u
In a 1997 poll conducted by Apoyo. 53% of respondents to the question
W ho do you think controls the country, the military or the president? answered it was
77 . .
Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004 Tome I. 119-121, Tome II
sections on Fujimori government and Armed Forces.
s
Youngers Human Rights and Politics in Peru Today 2000.
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the military; only 38% thought it was the president. (On the other hand, public opinion
surveys that asked respondents to rank the most important individuals in the country
usually cited Fujimori first. Montesinos second, and Hermoza third.)80
Yet once Guzman s capture was followed by a precipitous drop in the strength of
Sendero Luminoso. division within the military ranks began to resurface, as McClintock
and Valias explain:
Many top officers became more concerned about the authoritarian proclivities of
the regime and intensifying politicization of the military institution. In November
1992. some of these officers plotted a countercoup against the Fujimori
government and. in April 1993. others charged Montesinos and Flennoza with
responsibility for the human-rights violations at La Cantuta University. On both
occasions. Flennoza ordered his troops into the streets.
81
Though Hermoza w as able to put dow n these attempts, he w ould soon face much greater
challenges. In 1996 and 1997. individuals continued to come forward linking Montesinos.
Hermoza and the military to numerous crimes via Grupo Colina. General Rodolfo
Robles, who had fled the country years before after publicizing the names of agents of the
Grupo Colina, now returned to Peru under cover of the 1995 amnesty law s to continue his
denunciation of the death squad and blame the group for a recent bombing of a radio
o->
t .... . . .
station in Puno. ~ The military resorted to intimidating Robles by arresting him in 1996.
1
McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003. p. 58. On the evolving
relationship between Montesinos. Fujimori and Hermoza. see "LTna historia de encuentros
y desencuentros" Gestion Aug 21. 1999.
oa ... . .
Rospigliosi Montesinos y Las Fuevzas Armadas 2000. p. 166. Polls published in La
Republica July 7. 1997 and Debate 95 (July-Aug 1997) respectively; both were
conducted by Apoyo.
81
McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003. p. 58.
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For Robles own account of the Grupo Colina. see his Crimen e Impunidad: El Grupo
Colina v El Poder 1996. See also US embassy cable Dec 2. 1996. declassified and
To avoid confrontation and mounting bad press. Fujimori sent a new amnesty law to
Congress, this one giving amnesty to Robles and any member of the judiciary (including
the CS.TM) for any possible violations committed in the course of dealing with Robles
case. Then, to ease tensions with the military. Fujimori waived the annual review of
military leadership, keeping all top commanders of the armed forces in their positions.
Members of the military went much farther to prevent two members of Grupo
Colina from speaking out. Military intelligence agent Mariela Barreto was killed before
she could leak information about the group: another such agent. Leonor La Rosa
Bustamante, survived a brutal beating intended to shut her up. She survived, only to go
on television to denounce the group. Replicating the by now familiar pattern, a military
court quickly found four low level officials guilty for La Rosa s beating, and the Minister
of Defense intervened to prevent the congressional opposition from holding its own
investigation. Around the same time, a flurry of news reports were alleging that
Montesinos and members of SIN and the armed forces were deeply involved in
narcotrafficking. The CSJM refused to investigate, and military guards that had
traditionally protected the news media stations from possible terrorist attacks were
suddenly w ithdraw n. Investigative journalists later uncovered a military intelligence
program designed specifically to target for intimidation members of the press critical of
the armed forces human rights violations. The tension between the armed forces and the
available through the National Security Archives; and La Republica May 16. 1993: for an
overview of human rights abuses in this period see De la Jara Basombrio Violencia
politica y derechos humanos. 1980-1998 1998 and Comision de la Verdad Informe Final
2004 among numerous other reports cited in the next chapter.
media was highlighted when the high command felt compelled to issue an official
communique, printed in every major newspaper and read on every television station.
• • • . .
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accusing a major media executive ot detaming the armed forces.
Hermoza and Montesinos seemed impervious to the public outrage these incidents
induced.
84
but beneath the surface of the ruling triumvirate s strength, a power struggle
was taking place. Montesinos was steadily moving to extend his power over the military
and to eliminate Hermoza from power. His opportunity to do so arose from a surprising
new development. War broke out between Peru and Ecuador over their long-standing
border dispute, though it had been widely believed that Pern s decisive defeat of Ecuador
during the last round of confrontations in 1981 had effectively settled the issue. ' As
McClintock and Valias write.
Apparently, as of approximately 1991. the Ecuadorian military command doubted
that Peru would be able to counter its advances as effectively as it had in the past.
The Ecuadorian military decided largely correctly that the Peruvian military s
priority was the struggle against the guerrillas and the drug traffickers, that
Peruvian military capability was suffering amid the nation s economic crisis, and
that President Fujimori s politicization of promotions within the military7 and the
•• • o/
foreign ministry was undermining these institutions.
o
J Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 143-150. Ultimately these cases were investigated:
see next two chapters, especially Ch 4. note 38. On Barreto, see La Republicct April 3.
2001; El Pernemo May 3. 2001; on La Rosa see
84
Both Montesinos and Hermoza were, by 1997. deeply disliked by most Peruvians,
according to polling results published in Gestiou October 13. 1997 and conducted by
Apoyo.
8 ^ iOn the Peru-Ecuador confrontation, see Marcella and Downes Securin' Cooperation in
the Western Hemisphere 1999: Palmer Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict 1997 and
Overcoming the Weight of History 2001: Bonilla Peru-Ecuador: Problema de
Vecinidad Ouehacer
.
Tulio/agosto 1996.
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McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003. p. 78.
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The Ecuadorian assessment proved accurate; though the conflict would cost the two sides
hundreds of lives and one billion dollars, the Peruvian military s response proved
uncoordinated and ineffective. Gradually, the two countries moved toward what, in 1998.
would result in negotiated settlement perceived (especially by Peruvians) as highly
favorable to Ecuador. Though Fujimori scored major international points for his work
toward the accords. Hermoza pressed for a renewal of military engagement to restore the
Peruvian military s pride through a decisive victory. Some in Ecuador worried the
general might make his fantasy of air force attacks on Ecuadorian cities a reality when
Peru decided to purchase eighteen Russian MIG-29 jets. Though Hermoza would never
get his way on the Ecuadorian front, he was able to punish dissenters inside the armed
forces; three generals were indicted by the CSJM for insulting the armed forces by
criticizing the military s conduct during the confrontation with Ecuador. In Conaghan s
analysis, the indictments were widely viewed as political payback and as a sign that
dissent in the armed forces would not be tolerated.
Next came a hostage crisis. Members of the MRTA guerrilla movement took 72
individuals hostage in the Japanese ambassador s residence in 1997. As negotiations with
the hostage-takers dragged on over four months, the military took over the situation,
eventually executing a daring raid on the residence. Though only one hostage and two of
the 140 commandos involved in the operation were killed, every one of the fourteen
MRTA rebels was killed. Though charges that the military commandos executed the
rebels in cold blood after the) had surrendered were sent to military courts for trial, the
8
Ibid.
88
Ibid., p. 104.
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operation was deemed an overwhelming success. (As discussed in Chapter V, after
Fujimori s government fell, the bodies of the rebels were exhumed and autopsies proved
they had indeed been killed after surrendering.) General Hermoza immediately
congratulated himself in public for his leadership in the affair, downplaying the role of
the president. This deeply angered Fujimori, who had similarly felt he had received
insufficient credit for the 1 992 capture of Guzman, though this success is universally
attributed to the work of a special investigative police force without connections to
Fujimori. Montesinos or the military. Fujimori publicly denied Hennoza s account of
planning the hostage rescue and claimed he. Montesinos. and three army colonels
working with Montesinos had planned the event. Most Peruvian military officers saw
Fujimori s attack on Hermoza. both the head of the military and the commander of the
men who conducted the rescue operation, as a deep affront to the institution of the armed
forces. Regional military commanders participated in a public show of support for
Hermoza. forcing Fujimori to hold a highly secretive meeting with the police and armed
forces command to demand their support. 89
But the combination of Hermoza s attempt to grab the spotlight from Fujimori
over the hostage situation and his extreme hawkish position on restarting combat with
Ecuador had alienated many of his allies and pushed Fujimori and Montesinos to
marginalize the general. In August 1998. Fujimori called the top ranking military officers
together for a meeting at the presidential palace. After securing the approval of the rest of
89 •
Ibid., p. 75; Peru: Fujimori. Cabinet Meet Over Military Support for Hermoza
Agence France Presse Dec 20. 1997. See also Richard Codings Despatches BBC
Online Dec 21, 1997; El Sol Chcivin de Huantar: modelo ck estrategia frente al tercer
milenio 1999: and Comision de la Verdad Informe Final Tome III. p. 129-132. For
Hermoza s own account of these events, see his Operacion Chcivin de Huantar 1997.
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the military command. Fujimori shocked Hennoza by announcing his replacement by the
then-Secretary of Defense. General Cesar Saucedo.
40
Montesinos used the opportunity to
further expand his power over the military by filling nine of the twelve military
commander positions with his closest supporters, members of his own 1966 military
academy class, and to shift from a triumvirate of power to a virtual copresidency with
Fujimori. Montesinos soon reduced the military to yet another tool of the president s
reelection campaign, among other duties, requiring officers to collect information and
submit reports on the campaign throughout the country.
41
By 1997. the momentum in Perm ian politics had shifted, and more and more
voices began to question the regime. Though Fujimori continued to enjoy general
popularity, as Catherine Conaghan has pointed out. polls often showed widespread
disapproval of many of the government s policies, especially in the realm of military,
human rights and constitutional or legal issues.
4
‘ Nevertheless, these same polls
indicated to the president that the public was not likely to punish him for such abuses.
4 '
Much more damaging to Fujimori s popularity was his choice to pursue a third election to
the presidency. The campaign to orchestrate his re-reelection began in 1996 and. as
411
Ibid., p. 58. Ultimately videos of meetings in which Montesinos. Fujimori. Saucedo
and others planned Hermoza s removal were made public. See Geslion. El Comercio.
Liberation. El Peruana, and La Republica March 16. 2001
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Montesinos described the employment of the military in Fujimori s re-election
campaign in his testimony to Congress. Transcript. Congreso de la Republica. Primera
Legislature Ordinaria de 2001. December 20. 2001. Cited in Conaghan Fujimori s Peru
2005. p. 164-5. After the fall of the regime, videos were released that proved Montesinos
directly controlled military promotions and incomes of high-ranking military personnel.
See Gestion
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Conaghan and others have documented, required extraordinary efforts on the part of both
Fujimori and Montesinos to undermine any institutional blocks to the president s
reelection, including those which were established in the new constitution. The high costs
incurred by Fujimori to secure his 2000 re-election led many analysts to argue that the
president. Montesinos and others who profited from the perverse institutionalization
constructed over the previous decade recognized that without a presidential heir apparent
to replace Fujimori, the entire edifice would crumble, exposing the abuses of power that
held the system together. Yet the campaign proceeded, despite polling numbers as early
as January 1996 indicating that a majority of Peruvians were opposed to the possibility of
another Fujimori election.
^
As Conaghan writes, the perceived necessity of perpetuating Fujimori s control
led to a highly orchestrated campaign to undermine the institutions of the state:
Clearing away the obstacles to re-election required a comprehensive assault on
the autonomy of all institutions that had legal jurisdiction over elections. The goal
was achieved by enacting legal measures to ensure political control over the
personnel of all relevant institutions and reformulating the rules governing the
prescribed powers of institutions. Whenever the re-election project appeared to be
in jeopardy, government supporters in Congress (known as oficialistas) found
new legal subterfuges to keep it in play. The government majority, grouped
together in the Change-90-New Majority electoral alliance, turned into a battering
ram for re-election, ready to take down any institution that stood in its way. As
recently revealed videotapes show, the legislators met with Montesinos in his
office at the SIN and listened to him plot out the political and legal strategies that
they were to use to pursue the re-election. The result was a progressive
evisceration of the checks and balances laid out in the 1993 constitution.
' J
Ibid. Many of the details of Montesinos use of SIN to promote the political goals of
Fujimori, especially his re-reelection campaign, came out in press reports and
congressional investigations after the fall of the regime. See. for example. El Comercio
Jan 12,2001.
b On this pattern of institutional destruction see also Youngers Deconstructing
democracy: Peru under president Alberto Fujimori 2000.
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Assistance came from the oficialista congressional bloc, supplemented by the votes of
members of Congress bribed into joining the president s coalition. By the late 1990s.
Fujimori relied more and more upon bribery to hold together his political omnipotence, a
tactic that, as we shall see. eventually backfired. In Peru. C’onaghan writes, the vast
criminal conspiracy of the state aimed not only at personal enrichment, but at maintaining
electoral authoritarianism.
46
Though scholars of Peruvian politics might debate just when Fujimori crossed the
political boundary into authoritarianism, virtually all would agree that at some point in
the 1990s. Peru slipped from the category of democracy albeit limited, delegative. or
some otherwise qualified type of democracy into authoritarianism. Many have settled
on the term electoral authoritarianism to describe Peru in the last years of the twentieth
century. Unlike even partial democracy, a system in which parties lose elections, in
electoral authoritarian states. Schedler quips, opposition parties lose elections. That is.
it is a system of governance which maintains elections and formal political institutions
and the legitimate routes to and means of wielding political power, but in which those
with power violate the rules of democracy so frequently and so seriously as to make
genuine democratic political contestation an impossibility. By violating the first principle
of democracy, contestation of political power through elections, such regimes earn
themselves the authoritarian title even without resorting to widespread violence or
46
Conaghan Immoral Economy of Fujimorismo 2006. On the buying of votes in
Congress, see also Gestion Jan 1 1. 2001.
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repression and despite the holding of formal elections. From 1997 to 2000. the Peruvian
Congress and courts assisted Fujimori s formation of an electoral authoritarian system to
ensure his continuity in power.
9
Most importantly. Congress passed the Law of Authentic Interpretation of the
Constitution . asserting Fujimori s right to stand for reelection in 2000. 98 Predictably, this
provoked a storm of legal and bureaucratic battles. Conaghan has detailed three different
fronts on which the battle over Fujimori s 2000 reelection proceeded: the Constitutional
Tribunal (TC). the National Elections Board (JNE). and a referendum drive. Though in
the end the efforts of all these bodies to challenge Fujimori s reelection campaign were
blocked, they serve as important indicators of the changing political tide, and of the
measures to which Fujimori and the oficicilistas in Congress were willing to stoop.
g
For the clearest application of the EA model to Peru, see the many excellent
contributions to Carrion The Fujimori Legacy 2006. particularly the introductory’ and
concluding chapters by Carrion and the chapter by McClintock ( "Electoral
Authoritarianism versus Partially Democratic Regimes: The Case of the Fujimori
Government"). The idea of electoral authoritarianism as a model of governance w as
advanced in the April 2002 edition of the Journal ofDemocracy, with contributions by
Diamond. Schedler. Levitsky and Way. On the debate over Peru s democratic or
authoritarian status, see especially McClintock "Es autoritario el gobierno de Fujimori?"
1999; Cotier Politico y Sociedad en el Peru: Cambios y Contmuidades 1994: Lopez
Jimenez Peru: golpe. democradura y democracia 1993. (Democraclura implies the
simultaneous existence of some forms of limited democratic representation, authoritarian
caudillismo and a civilian government closely tied to military leadership which
guarantees the military special treatment as a state within a state. ) Some described
Peruvian politics under Fujimori was a permanent coup : Lauer Campana Electoral
Permanente La Republica May 12. 1996: Javier Perez de Cuellar El Comercio
November 1 7. 1997; Conaghan The Permanent Coup: Peru s Road to Presidential
Reelection 1998.
The Chair of the Judiciary Committee argued that Fujimori was not banned from
running for reelection because his first election, in 1990. had taken place under the
previous constitution. Given that the 1993 constitution allow ed for presidential reelection,
a win in 2000 would, he argued, legally count as a second (and therefore legal) election
of Fujimori, not a third. This rationale was the basis of the Law of the Authentic
Interpretation of the Constitution.
Together they moved to oust opponents of the reelection project, stack institutions with
control over these matters with supporters, and further undermine the legal system.
Despite the regime s best attempts to silence critics, the reelection campaign was a
catalyst for a newly united opposition to Fujimori s power, both among the congressional
opposition and in civil society. Among other outrages, the dismissal of three
Constitutional Tribunal magistrates over their anti-reelection stance was met with
massive street demonstrations, the first against the Fujimori government. The incident
also prompted the OAS Human Rights Commission, in Lima at the time to participate in
an OAS Assembly General meeting, to issue a statement of concern after meeting with
the dismissed judges. In the judgement of the OAS Human Rights Commission, the
president and Congress were cooperating to undermine judicial autonomy and obstruct
the functioning of the very courts intended to guarantee the rule of law and protection for
human rights. 99
Manipulation of the legal system, already a key component of the strategy to
shelter the military from justice, simultaneously served Fujimori s goals of securing
reelection. The judiciary had never enjoyed the good opinion of the people of Peru, but
the level of corruption and politicization of all branches of the judiciary had been
displayed throughout this series of events in new and shocking ways. The concept of
judicial autonomy was a joke in Peru under Fujimori, and both he and his supporters in
Congress were constantly coming up with new measures to guarantee that all important
posts in the legal system were held by allies, including many provisional appointees
dependent on the government s favor for their positions. In particular, political control
99 Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005: Jose Antonio Puertas Peru: OAS Commission
Concerned With Dismissal of Peruvian Judges Agence France Presse June 5, 1997.
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was exercised through the creation of new institutions that could be manipulated by the
executive, all of which Fujimori claimed was part of his own campaign of judicial
reform, funded in part with World Bank funds for that ostensible purpose."
11
The
National Council of Magistrates was repeatedly blocked from performing its duty of
overseeing the appointments ofjudges and prosecutors, leading to the resignation of the
entire council in 1998. To replace the Council, the government created an executive
commission charged with overseeing all judicial reform efforts and led by a retired navy
admiral with no legal experience. His replacement in this position was a former advisor
to the Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar . the highest military court. Both individuals, it
seemed likely, could be trusted to conduct judicial reform in ways unthreatening to
military justice or Fujimori s interests. 101
On the surface, it appeared that Fujimori was tightening his grip on power and
ensuring his future in office. Yet with each new measure to eliminate checks on his
power and his campaign for reelection in 2000 he was inching closer to the line in the
sand the people of Peru had drawn: they opposed his bid for a third term in office. This
1(1(1
For example, the government created an executive commission empowered to oversee
the Public Ministry, thereby exercising powers previously reserv ed to the office of the
Attorney General, such as the assignment of prosecutors to cases. This commission was
controlled by Blanca Nelida Colan. a close ally of Montesinos. Many of the details of
how Montesinos and Fujimori manipulated the judiciary came out in 2001 as the
vladivideos discussed below were released. See. for example, all major Peruvian daily
newspapers on Jan 25. 2001.
1,1
This commission, like the one ov erseeing the Public Ministry, reported directly to the
president and was unaccountable to the legislature or other agencies of the judiciary. Its
powers were extensive, including setting budgets and making changes to judicial
personnel. Fujimori also manipulated the Judicial Academy, responsible for the training
ofjudges and prosecutors, by curtailing its powers and then stacking its Executive
Council with allies. See Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005; Youngers Human Rights and
Politics in Peru Today 2000: De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobre jusiticia y derechos
humanos 2003, ch. 3.
public rejection is even more significant when one considers the fact that Fujimori s
Ministry of the Presidency (a new invention in Peruvian politics) was consuming 40% of
the national budget to dole out presidential largesse to the public.
1
"' Though Fujimori
continued to extend these patrimonial benefits, via development projects and food aid.
throughout the country, the public mood was shifting against him. The referendum
campaign had created a sense of unity of purpose among opposition legislators and a
renewed activism in civil society. University students, artists and intellectuals were
beginning to take prominent roles in demonstrations and organizing efforts.
Blocked from effective legal action at home. Fujimori s opponents were turning
more frequently to the international community to exert pressure on the government. For
example, the TC magistrates removed from office for their opinion against Fujimori s
right to run for reelection took their case to the Inter-American Commission on Fluman
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. When, in another case before the
1ACHR. the Court ruled that convictions issued by the military courts of Peru were
invalid. Fujimori responded by removing Peru from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court s jurisdiction. Military courts continued to try all terrorism cases, usually ruling in
favor of life sentences for those found guilty of treason to the fatherland and
aggravated terrorism. I(b When the US ambassador to Peru told the press that the state
"'Taylor From Fujimori to Toledo 2005. p. 269.
" Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005: all jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court for
Human Rights is available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/paises_ing/peru.html. Throughout
this text I use IACHR to refer to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whereas I
refer to the Commission by spelling out its name. Removal of Peru from the IACHR
required cooperation from Fujimori s bloc in Congress, but testimony released in 2001
suggests that the police helped persuade Congress of how to vote on the issue. As
reported in El Comercio Jan 12. 2001. Carlos Regalado, a key witness on the question of
should abide by the IACHR recommendations and reinstate the dismissed TC judges. a
Congressman close to the military and the new TC president reacted angrily by telling
Ambassador Jett not to meddle in Peru s internal affairs.
1
"
4
Hence, despite the virtual elimination of Sendero Luminoso in the wake of
Guzman s capture, by the late 1990s. Fujimori's government was growing desperate to
maintain popularity and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Already losing public
support as the economy weakened, stories that leaked out linking Montesinos and
perhaps even Fujimori to the Grupo Colina and its killings were gaining credibility. The
government s response, paralleling moves to control the judiciary and legislature, was to
gain greater power to manipulate the media in its favor. Montesinos and his SIN devoted
much of their energy and money during the final years of the 1 990s to gaining control of
the media, both by buying the loyalty of television, radio, and newspaper companies, and
by punishing those in the media who attempted to exercise freedom from Montesinos
direction.
10
' In the years since the collapse of the Fujimori regime, a wealth of
information about the corruption orchestrated by Montesinos has been made public, with
the role of SIN in campaigning against opposition legislators under Fujimori, testified
that in 1999 the police colonel had called eighty officers into the environs of the
Congress during the debate over whether to remove Peru from IACHR jurisdiction,
suggesting that this was intended to intimidate Congress into doing so. On continuing
military court convictions of alleged terrorists, see. for example. Military Court Upholds
Life Sentence for 'Camarada Rita’ Agence France Presse June 26. 1999.
1 4
Peru: Court President Criticizes US Ambassador's Remarks Agence France Presse
Jan 23. 1999.
1 Of the several Peruvian cases pending before the IACHR at the time, one of the best
known is the case of Baruch Ivcher. who. in 1997. had his Peruvian citizenship revoked
and his control of television network Channel 2 taken away after he allowed the channel
to broadcast stories critical of SIN. However, among the cases that prompted Fujimori s
withdrawal was one challenging the military courts 1994 conviction of four Chileans,
alleged members of MRTA. to life sentences in Peru.
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the bulk of this information coming from Montesinos own meticulous records.
Investigators uncovered the most expensive and extensive network of corruption in the
history of Peruvian history, implicating numerous individuals and totaling Si .9 billion
stolen from the state.
106
John McMillan and Pablo Zoido have used the information on
individual bribes to analyze the priorities of the Fujimori government in its last few
years.
1
" Though Montesinos used bribes to undermine judges, politicians, and the news
media, the media drew the largest financial benefits from the corruption: The typical
bribe paid to a television-channel owner was about a hundred times larger than that paid
to a judge. One single television channel s bribe was five times larger than the total of the
opposition politicians bribes. McMillan and Zoido conclude that the strongest of the
checks and balances on the Perm ian government s power, by Montesinos revealed
prelerence. was television. ' The strategy of the government was to [deny] the public s
right to know altogether and [shut] down attempts by the press and the opposition in
Congress to pierce the veil of governmental secrecy, especially in regard to the conduct
of the military and the intelligence apparatus. When stories damaging to the military did
make into the media, they were met with accusations of forgery and. on at least one
occasion, prompted the military justice system to advance charges against members of
the press before the Electoral Tribunal and the Ombudsman s Office.
106
McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003. p. 162.
McMillan and Zoido How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru 2004.
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Ibid.
Quote is from Conaghan cited in Youngers Human Rights 2000: Independent
Journalists Decry Harassment by Military Agence France Presse Sept 9. 1999.
Stories about human rights violations and Fujimori s assaults on democratic
institutions, in particular, were spun in the regime s favor. And Montesinos certainly
had the resources to buy off most of the Peruvian media. SIN s budget, which was
completely secret even from Congress, was roughly $1.5 million per month. Of this.
McMillan and Zoido estimate that perhaps $400,000 was spent on operational costs,
leaving $1.1 million to be spent each month by Montesinos in whatever way he saw fit.
Beyond this. Montesinos was also receiving approximately $750,000 per month from the
Ministry of the Interior and the military, as well as funneling money to himself and SIN
from state contracts. After he tied the country. Montesinos bookkeeper testified that up
to $9 million were entering SIN each month by 2000.
Regime Collapse
In May of 2000. Fujimori was elected to a third term in office. The electoral
irregularities were so rampant that international observers organized by the OAS. and the
governments of Latin America. Canada and the U.S.. immediately declared it insufficient
to meet the standards of a free and fair election. 11 " Election observers found evidence that
11,1
In Catherine Conaghan s words. By failing the election test. Peru definitely lost any
status it might have enjoyed in the academic discussions regarding hybrid regimes in
Latin America. In scholarly debates over the evolution of regimes in Latin America. Peru
under Fujimori was sometimes cited as an example of delegative democracy or some
other kind of qualified democracy. The concept of delegative democracy, developed first
by Guillermo O Donnell, describes hyper-presidential systems with weak mechanisms of
accountability. But the notion of delegative democracy also included the criteria that such
regimes were found on free and fair elections. The 2000 election rendered any lingering
questions about whether Peru was a delegative democracy effectively moot Fujimori s
Peru 2005. On the electoral irregularities in 2000. see NDl-Carter Center Peru Elections
2000 2000. The Peruvian press covered the activities of and statements from the OAS
ever single day over the course of the first two weeks of April as the first round of voting
approached, according to my survey of press coverage synopses provided by
more than one million signatures had been forged in order to place Fujimori s name on
the ballot. After the first round of the election had been clearly tampered with, Fujimori s
opponent in the race. Alejandro Toledo, pulled out of the second round. Virtually no-one
considered the election legitimate, despite Fujimori s claims that a conspiracy of
international NGOs to discredit the elections was to blame. To send the clear message
that the regime would remain unshakeable in the face of international criticism, Fujimori.
Montesinos and General Jose Villanueva Ruesta. Hermoza s replacement as chief of the
armed forces high command, oversaw a massive parade of military troops in a ceremony
swearing military allegiance to their commander in chief before he was even sworn in for
his new term. When the Clinton administration and the OAS. after first threatening not to
recognize the results of the election, abandoned this stance, one newspaper headline read
Tanks l.OASO. 111
The OAS had decided that, rather than take the legitimacy of the regime on
directly, it would instead use its clout to pressure the new Fujimori regime to reform
itself. The OAS decided to send a high-level mission led by OAS Secretary-General
APRODEH s news summary service. Indeed, only rarely were there days in April when
it was not the case that every single major daily carried at least one news story about the
OAS mission. In addition, see the weekly news magazine Caretcts April 7. 14. 2000 and
all major daily newspapers coverage of Eduardo Stein s staunch criticism of the
elections, and Fujimori s attempts to alternately reject or appease those criticisms, on
April 27. 28. 2000. On the role of the OAS in the events of 2000. see De la Jara
Basombrio Ensayos sobrejusticia y derechos humanos 2003.
1 1
1
Liberation June 9. 2000 (also cited in Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 207):
Gestion. La Republica. El Comercio. Expreso and Liberation April 3. 2000. On the May
elections, see all major daily newspapers May 20-30. 2000. The US State Department
statement characterizing Fujimori s election as illegitimate was reported in all major
Peruvian daily newspapers on May 30, 2000; on the military ceremony see all major
dailies June 9. 10. 2000. It is noteworthy that most press sources interpreted the military
ceremony as a sign of Fujimori s weakness and a poor attempt to assert authority.
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Cesar Gaviria and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, to Lima in June 2000.
The purpose of this mission was to advise the government on needed democratic reforms
and facilitate a democratic dialogue between Fujimori and his opposition. But the
president s domestic opposition felt betrayed by the international community s implicit
decision to back off calling for new elections that would meet the free and fair
standards the just-concluded elections had so clearly failed. Still, seeing few other options
open to them, most of the opposition and key elements of civil society chose to engage
with the OAS-led talks. 112
The mesa de dialago. facilitated by the former foreign minister of the Dominican
Republic Eduardo Latorre. was composed of eighteen participants, among them four
government ministers from the Fujimori s administration, eight members of the
opposition, two special invitees selected by the OAS. and two representatives of civil
society. Among the participants from the opposition were Congressman Luis Solari of the
Peru Posible party, whose Alejandro Toledo was the popular favorite to w in the elections
until he pulled out citing fraud. The special invitees included Dr Jorge Santistevan de
Noriega, the national human rights ombudsman, and Monsenor Luis Bambaren. president
of the Peruvian Episcopal Conference as a representative of the country s Roman
"“On the decision to send the OAS mission rather than invoke 1080. see all major daily
newspapers in Peru May 30. June 1. 2. 2000 and Caretas June 2. 2000. For Peruvian
press coverage of the OAS- ed mesa see El Perucmo June 8, 9. July 1, Aug 2. Nov 23.
2000; Expreso June 8. 9. July 1. Aug 2. Nov 23. 27. 2000; El Comercio June 8. 9. July 1.
Aug 2. Nov 23. 27. 2000; Liberacion June 8. 9. July 1. Aug 2. Nov 23. 2000; Gestion
June 8. 9. July 1, Aug 2. Nov 27. 2000; La Republica June 9. July 1. Aug 2. 8. 9 2000.
On the Marcho de los Cuatros Suyos. see all major daily newspapers July 28-Aug 1.
2000. as well as Liberacion Aug 3, 2000. While Fujimori s supporters blamed the
outbreak of violence on Toledo, participants in the protests argued violence and a fire had
been started by the armed forces and police in order to create chaos and discredit the
protest.
Catholic Church. Sofia Macher. executive secretary of the Coorclinadora National de
Derechos Humanos
.
an influential, nation-wide coalition of human rights organizations
(hereafter simply the Coorclinadora). also participated. Though the civil society
participants did not have votes at the mesa, the combination of these forces, in the words
of Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler. tipped the balance of the mesa tow ard a highly
visible and transnationalized human rights constituency. ' The agenda of the human
rights community was made clear both through Macher s participation in the mesa and
through the Coorclinadora s well-publicized public activism in favor of a truth
commission, trials for those accused of human rights violations, an end to impunity, and a
well-developed agenda for institutional reform. 114
The OAS talks were based on a twenty-nine point agenda for reform of Peruvian
democracy. This list contained five substantive issue areas: judicial reform and
strengthening the rule of law; freedom of expression and the press: electoral reform:
congressional oversight and means to combat corruption; and civilian control over the
intelligence sen ice and military and the professionalization of the armed forces. 11 If
Fujimori wanted to clean up his image, the international community made clear, he was
going to have to act on the agenda established in these talks. Heading the list of demands
1
1
' Cooper and Legler A tale of two mesas: the OAS defense of democracy in Peru and
Venezuela 2005: De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobrejusticia y derechos humanos
2003. ch. 2. See also Cooper and Legler Intervention Without Intervening? 2006 and
The OAS in Peru: A Model for the Future? 2001. and McClintock s response in the
same issue. The role of the Peruvian human rights community and its international allies
is covered in detail in Chapter IV of this text.
1 14 Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos 44 puntos para una plataforma basica
sobre derechos humanos en el Pern Jan 2000.
IL
" Cooper and Legler A tale of two mesas 2005.
the talks generated were a total reform of the national intelligence service and
Montesinos removal from power. Though initial progress in the OAS talks was slow, a
series of events would serve to catalyze the talks and to elevate their importance.
Vladimiro Montesinos standing in the eyes of the US had gone through a major
transformation over the last few years. Once considered a vital ally in the war on drugs,
the centerpiece of US policy on the Andean region, and for a time an important CIA
contact, by 2000 Montesinos was out of favor with the US. In August 2000. a major anus
shipment, originating in Jordan and passing through Peru on its way to the hands of
FARC guerrillas in Colombia, was discovered. While Fujimori praised Montesinos for
uncovering the plot, the Jordanians version of events implicated Montesinos in actually
organizing the arms transfer. Among the deal s architects were a senior Peruvian general
and a government contractor who had supplied the Peruvian army in at least eleven deals
with the regime. The mesa s demands for reforms focused anew on Montesinos removal
from power. 116
September w as to be a very bad month for Montesinos and the beginning of w hat
w as soon dubbed the Vladivideo scandal. A videotape of Montesinos bribing an
opposition legislator w ith $15,000 was aired on television. (No-one is sure w ho leaked
1 16 The level of Montesinos corruption and abuse of power was ultimately documented
in great detail. See especially Feinstein Fujimori s Rasputin 2001 and Montesinos:
Blind .Ambition 2002. These online briefing books contain links to declassified US
documentation and the Peruvian Townsend Commission s final report. They leave no
doubt that the US was fully aware of Montesinos involvement in human rights
violations, drug trafficking, and general corruption of the Peruvian state. For Peruvian
press coverage of the FARC gunrunning scandal, implicating SIN and the military, in the
last months of Fujimori s government, see La Republica Aug 23. 24 and 25. Sept 21.
2000 .
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this first video to members of Congress. One popular theory was that military officers,
perhaps from the Navy, the most disgruntled of the armed services, stole the tape both for
money and revenge on Montesinos.) 1
1
Public reaction was overwhelming and a sudden
crisis was provoked. From this point, the pace of events accelerated and seemed to spiral
out of control. Fujimori promptly fired Montesinos and promised to disband SIN. the
intelligence unit under Montesinos control, though many claimed that he simply
transferred the functions and members of SIN to the army. Over the weeks and months to
come, thousands of videos were discovered, many of them in Montesinos apartment,
which he soon abandoned in a hasty departure from the country. Many of the videos
gradually became public, showing him bribing judges, politicians, and others. Virtually
no-one in government seemed clear of the taint of corruption, and rumors flew in all
directions.
1 1N
In a surprising move, before the month was out. Fujimori called for earl}'
elections and vowed to step down from office. Given the lengths to which Fujimori had
proven himself willing to go to remain in office, the hastiness of this decision fueled
everyone s suspicions. Some suggested that the videos would direct!}' implicate Fujimori
1
1
Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 228-9. See also McClintock and Valias The
United States and Peru 2003. p. 88: Clifford Krauss Fujimori's Fall: A Nation's Lion To
Broken Man New York Times Dec 3, 2000. For a sense of the fallout from the tapes, see
La Republica Sept 15. 2000: Caretas Sept 22. 2000. and the 2001 Townsend Report,
available online through the National Security Achives.
||0 # ^ #
The chief corruption prosecutor of Peru alleged in 2001 that Fujimori paid Montesinos
$15 million to leave the country after the release of the video. Peru Spy Chief Said to Be
Paid Millions to Quit Aeu York Times May 10, 2001 . Clifford Krauss Peru's New-
Chief Sworn In. Vowing to Revive Democracy New York Times Nov 23. 2000. The
most complete record of the contents of the videos can be found in the 6 volume report,
Congreso del Peru En la Sala de la Corrupcion: Videos y Audios de Vladimiro
Montesinos (1998-2000) 2004.
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in wrong-doing, while others felt that the reach of the corruption of the regime, whether
directed by Montesinos or Fujimori, was damaging enough to eliminate the possibility of
a viable Fujimori presidency. Or perhaps Montesinos had such good dirt on Fujimori that
the president saw no other option but to slink into the shadows with what public support
he still had before the information got out. McMillan and Zoido write: In the event that
the whole network collapsed, the tapes gave [Montesinos] a threat he could use against
anyone who might turn against him. The tapes also game him the power to destroy the
president, so Fujimori could not fire him. 1 Their release created an unprecedented
1 "Hi
collapse of regime legitimacy. "
Yet many explanations of Fujimori s decision to step down highlighted a different
factor: the military. Many analysts interpreted the decision as a sign that the president s
control over the armed forces had vanished along with Montesinos. who. after all. had
hand-picked virtually every senior police and military officer appointed over the last
decade. Indeed, many among them were old friends or classmates of Montesinos. His
brother-in-law was at this moment an Army general and commander of the armored
division headquartered in Lima. The day after the first of the Vladivideos was aired.
Montesinos called together 15 members of Congress to attempt to persuade them of his
innocence: when they remained unconvinced, he brought the armed forces commanders
into the room to underline the point that he maintained the military s support.
1-1
1 |g
See also Clifford Krauss s reporting on this swirl of speculation and rumors.
Fujimori's Fall: A Nation's Lion To Broken Man New York Times Dec 3. 2000.
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Peru: Ombudsman Views Crisis. Rules Out Heading Transition Government El Pais
(center-left national daily of Spain) Sept 23. 2000.
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Before Montesinos fled Peru. U.S. officials and OAS Secretary General Gaviria
persuaded Panama to grant Montesinos asylum. Protecting Montesinos was justified, they
argued, to avoid him making good on threats to lead the military in staging a coup against
Fujimori. It was later confirmed that, indeed. Montesinos had previously collaborated
with military officers to put together a plan to stage a military coup to maintain the
regime intact even if Fujimori stepped down or in case Toledo won the 2000 elections.
According to the plan, the military intervention would be justified by calls for free and
fair elections and would promptly hand power to a civilian interim government. In 2001
.
Fujimori acknowledged the coup threats were one of the factors for his decision, and
General Villanueva admitted that Montesinos had indeed developed a plan to overthrow
Fujimori s government, though the general claimed he had rejected the proposal because
of his democratic convictions and fear of the economic impact a coup would have. 1"
Though some scholars, analysts and journalists had long been warning of
Montesinos unprecedented power over the military, these warnings had generated little
public concern before now . With the sudden turn of events, the quandary Fujimori had
Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 230- 1 . For press analyses of the likelihood of a
military coup, some based on information that became public only after the fall of the
regime, see Gestion Feb 20. 2001 : La Republica Oct 3. 2001 : Anthony Faiola Army
Played a Key Role in Departure of Fujimori Washington Post. Sept 18. 2000: Faiola
How Fujimori s Power Unraveled Washington Post Sept 24. 2000: Kevin Hall
Military in Peru Continues Coup Threat Miami Herald Sept 27. 2000: Christopher
Marquis Fujimori Asks Washington for Backing on Peru Transition New York Times
Sept 30. 2000: and C. de Carlos Peru: General Predicts Imminent 'Democratic Coup'
Against Fujimori MadridADC Sept 2 1 . 2000. in which former General Jaime Salinas
claims that his contacts within the military were planning on staging what he called a
democratic coup within the next six months to oust Fujimori, whose government they
considered corrupt. According to Krauss (supra note 106) a coup was planned, but the
navy and air force balked. Marquis reported that the military had threatened a coup if
Montesinos w ere not granted exile. Villanueva s account came out w hile he w as in jail
in 2001: see El Comercio. Liberacion. La Republica, Gestion and Expreso Jan 15. 2001.
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faced for at least the last year suddenly became clear: Montesinos had become an
intolerable political liability for Fujimori (both at home and abroad), but his consolidation
of power over the military into his own hands made him virtually untouchable. 1 ' '
Fujimori suddenly looked less like a semi -authoritarian strong man and more like a
puppet for Montesinos and the military7 . Even after the release of the video. Fujimori
could go no farther than to fire Montesinos and vow to track him down. He quickly
proved unable to fulfill that promise, as the military showed itself unwilling to cooperate
in any action against Montesinos. whose silence on military misbehavior w as their only
hope in avoiding trial. Given military opposition to punishing Montesinos. and given
Fujimori s dependence on Montesinos to secure the military s backing. Fujimori saw no
other option but to step down. Under other circumstances, he would not have allow ed his
plans to be derailed simply because of a $1 5.000 bribe scandal involving an aide. None of
the groups pushing Fujimori s regime to reform had anticipated that their one
nonnegotiable demand Montesinos removal was the very one that could unravel the
entire regime. Protestors filled the streets, demanding Fujimori s resignation and the
introduction of a transition government.
1-4
Fujimori s announcement led many to wonder what the military s reaction would
be. Rumors of a military coup were everywhere. The commander of the armed forces.
General Jose Villanueva Ruesta. waited several days after Fujimori s announcement of
12
' For warning about Montesinos take-over of the military high command, see La
Republica Dec 1 1. 1999 and Gestion. Liberation and La Repub/ica, April 3. 2000.
Montesinos control of promotions within the military was ultimately proven by videos of
him deciding and doling out promotions among top commanders. For press coverage of
these videos, see Gestion
,
El Comercio. La Republica and Expreso May 22. 2001.
1-4
Workers Protest in Lima. Demand Transition Government Agence France Presse
Sept 29. 2000.
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new elections before publicly issuing a statement of support, further fueling coup rumors.
Only when Fujimori went to Washington to seek backing for his new plan were these
rumors dampened: the message that the US would not tolerate any military uprising was
made clear. The press reported that the US went out of its way to clarify its position to
the military leadership by sending US General Pace to meet with Perm ian Defense
Minister General Carlos Bergamino and the chief of the armed forces. General Jose
Villanueva Ruesta. to strongly advise the military to cooperate with the OAS mission and
the transition process.
~
W ith the government now in absolute free fall, the OAS mesa de dialogo assumed
far greater importance. Fujimori s chief representative to the talks. Justice Minister
Alberto Bustamante introduced a stunning new argument before the mesa: the 1995
amnesty law passed by the fnjimorista majority in Congress, he argued, would not be
sufficient to guarantee a peaceful transfer of power. If Fujimori were to hand over power
through new elections w ithout guaranteeing the military protection from a witch-hunt
under the new regime, no climate of stability could be constructed to safeguard the
transfer. W hat Fujimori wanted was a new amnesty law granting military and civilian
12?
Kevin Hall Military in Peru Continues Threat Miami Herald Sept 27. 2000: John
Lancaster Fujimori Makes Surprise Visit to Washington Washington Post Sept 29.
2000; Gestion Oct 2. 2000; Clifford Krauss Peru Turning a Colder Shoulder New York
Times Oct 1. 2000: Opposition Leader Says Montesinos Threatening With Military
Coup NOTIMEX Sept 19. 2000; David Gonzalez Peru s Military Backs Fujimori in His
Call for New Elections New York Times Sept 22. 2000. Marquis wrote that Clinton
administration officials were acutely worried that [Fujimori] might be ousted by military
officers loyal to his fired intelligence chief. Even months before, members of the
international press had questioned Toledo as to whether he might call upon the military to
oust Fujimori; Toledo vowed not to do so and thought the possibility unlikely. The
question would seem much more relevant by October. Toledo Will Not Call Armed
Forces to Depose Fujimori NOTIMEX (state-controlled Mexican press agency) May 27.
2000 .
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officials (himself included) immunity from prosecution over a wide variety of crimes,
including drug trafficking and human rights violations, and for the amnesty law to be
incorporated into the constitution to make rescinding it extremely difficult. It is likely that
this new demand actually reflected the president s desperation to maintain the support of
the military, and there were indications that the proposal emanated directly from
Montesinos cronies in the military7 leadership. Carlos Basombrio goes further, calling the
new proposal for further amnesty an attempt on the part of the military high command to
exchange impunity for new elections. 1-6 Because Lord Axworthy had been making public
statements since the previous June that the OAS dialogue included the ultimatum that
Fujimori would not receive foreign assistance in future unless he curbed military and
secret policy abuses, it is perhaps not surprising that it was here, at the mesa de dialogo
,
that the ultimate confrontation over amnesty occurred.
Bustamante made clear the amnesty demand was a precondition for any further
reform. Days before this sudden demand was articulated, the army issued a public
announcement affirming that military commanders scheduled to retire at the end of
December would indeed step down on time. Several analysts and commentators believed
the military was trying to send the message that, in exchange for several Montesinos
appointees stepping aside peacefully, they wanted amnesty. Compliance with scheduled
retirement, however, struck no-one as a powerful bargaining chip, and the immediate
response to the amnesty proposal was outrage. A document released by the Ministries of
the Interior and of Defense stated clearly the motive behind the new amnesty: the 1995
l2
'’ Vecchio Opposition accuses Peru s Fujimori of forcing military amnesty 2000 and
Peru spy chief desperately seeks amnesty law . military experts say 2000: Lama
Politics: Peru - Army Demands Amnesty In Exchange for Retirements 2000: Rivera
La reconcilacion segiin Bustamante ideelemail Oct 24. 2000.
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amnesty laws now appeared insufficient to guarantee that members of the military will
not becomes victims of revenge of those who blamed the armed forces for the brutality
of the internal conflict with Sendero Luminoso. Yet even Fujimori s politically
conservative opponents, echoing similar statements from a host of opposition leaders,
rejected this: We are not disposed to permit or tolerate that a military group menaces all
of Peruvian society, the government and the opposition groups The country is
politically polarized and this military group must comprehend that the nation comes
ahead of its interests. 12 So strong was the outpouring of anger at the suggestion that
the military joint chiefs of staff felt compelled to issue a public statement the same day.
denying that the armed forces were attempting to impose their will on political
negotiations.
*"s
The conflict exploded even further as word trickled out that Montesinos had
returned to Peru. The question of Fujimori s control over the military came to a head as
Montesinos managed to evade capture. Military experts insisted that the military
leadership had decided to back the president and distance itself from Montesinos. but the
failure to locate and capture Montesinos upon his return to Peru seemed to lead to two
possible conclusions: either Montesinos was being protected by Fujimori - or by military
12 Congressman Rafael Rev. quoted by Vecchio Opposition accuses Peru s Fujimori of
forcing military amnesty 2000: Basombrio C'astigo y Impunidad 2001.
1
")Q
" Vecchio Opposition accuses Peru s Fujimori of forcing military amnesty 2000. See
also New York Times editorial The Shadowy Politics of Peru Sept 19. 2000:
Opposition Gives Government 'Ultimatum' To Remain in Talks EFE Oct 9. 2000: Peter
Fiakim Putting a Country Together Again Christian Science Monitor November 6.
2000 .
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forces.
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The president, in a leather jacket, went careening through the streets of Lima
with a large contingent of police personnel in tow in a clearly staged attempt to find
Montesinos. According to Catherine Conaghan. Testimony by military personnel later
confirmed that, as the presidential search was underway. Montesinos was being hidden in
Lima on orders from Peru s top ranking military7 officer. General Jose Villanueva
Ruesta.
L'°
Even members of Fujimori s administration reacted with outrage to the gamble
and saw Montesinos return, the military announcements, and Fujimori s new requests
for amnesties as a baseless ploy to protect the crumbling infrastructure of corrupt power.
First Vice President Francisco Tudela resigned in protest as Fujimori hurriedly called
emergency meetings with his cabinet and military7 leadership. Fujimori s negotiating
power had practically vanished by this point, and he soon gave up his demand, though
political analysts thought the generals were sure to push Fujimori for broad legal
protection, as payment for staying out of the Montesinos standoff. They [had] reason to
worry. Human-rights activists [were] demanding the creation of an independent truth
commission. Despite indubitable Army pressure. Fujimori was powerless to pass a new
amnesty law without opposition support, impossible given the circumstances. Jorge del
Castillo, a member of the opposition within Congress, was quoted as saying. Amnesty
laws should not be made by a government on its way out. They should be made when a
new government is coming in. to clear the air. Indicating their intention to pursue
'' 4
Contreras Fujimori and The Fugitive 2000; 4th Military Region Commander
General Defends Montesinos La Republica Oct 3. 2000: Peruvian Government Deputy
Martha Chavez Admits Danger of Coup D’Etat NOTIMEX Oct 4. 2000.
I •'A
v Conaghan Making and LInmaking Authoritarian Peru 2001.
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accountability for wrong-doing under Fujimori. Sofia Macher. head of the Coorclmaclora .
filed one of many criminal complaints against Montesinos linking him to murder, torture,
money laundering and other crimes. 1 "’ 1
On October 29. the farcical hunt for Montesinos ended with his fleeing the
country yet again and Fujimori at last taking the step of purging Montesinos strongest
allies from the military' leadership, starting with Villanueva Ruesta. the heads of the air
force and navy, and Montesinos brother-in-law. General Luis C'ubas Portal. Fujimori,
attempting to demonstrate he was also in control of the troops, temporarily confined all
military personnel to their barracks. Nevertheless, a group of seventy renegade soldiers
led by Lieutenant Colonel Ollanta Flumala and his brother staged an armed uprising near
the city of Puno. calling for Fujimori s resignation. Montesinos arrest, and a purging of
the military. After taking an army general hostage and occupying the mining town of
Toquepala. the group retreated into the Andes with a team of elite troops in hot pursuit.
(Though the rebellious group was soon captured, an opposition-led Congress soon
pardoned them.) This small group aside, however, the military seemed resigned to the
reality that their threats to stage a coup were empty threats and that no outright military
*' 1
Contreras Fujimori and The Fugitive 2000. Fujimori held several secretive meetings
with the military high command and Defense Minister Bergamino in this period, but the
discussion that took place in those meetings can only be guessed at. Fujimori Returns
After Traveling to Unknown Location with Army Chiefs NOTIMEX Oct 25. 2000. On
the tensions between Fujimori and the military, see also Armed Forces' Loy alty
Reportedly Divided Between Montesinos. Fujimori EFE (independent Spanish press
agency) Oct 25. 2000.
Ij
“ Fujimori struggles to control army in crisis-ridden country Reuters Oct 3 1 . 2000;
Clifford Krauss A Platoon-Size Mutiny in Peru, Floping to Force Fujimori Out New
York Times Oct 30. 2000 and Fujimori Fires 3 Top Aides In Military New York Times
Oct 29. 2000; Fujimori Replaces Top Military Commanders Agence France Presse. Oct
28. 2000; Howard LaFranchi Macho militaries flex muscles Christian Science Monitor
January 3. 2001
.
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government had a prayer in twenty-first century Latin America. McClintock and Valias
write:
Obviously, a coup attempt would have faced overwhelming opposition, both
internationally and domestically, including serious opposition from other sectors
of the Perm ian military. In the view of many journalists, the coup threat was
merely a story cooked up by Fujimori and senior officers to solve the problem of
what to do with Montesinos and avoid the publie trial that the opposition were
demanding (a public trial in which these senior officers were likely to have been
incriminated.) 1 ^
Still, at the time, and given recent failed attempts at military coups in Ecuador. Paraguay
and Venezuela, the fact that any coup would be highly unlikely to survive U.S. and OAS
opposition did not mean anyone was willing to take a gamble on whether Montesinos
might stage a military uprising anyhow. After all. he had little to lose, and was working
hard to give his threats credibility by surrounding himself with top-ranking military allies
and telling Fujimori s cabinet chief, if I want to T can stage a coup.
14
In November, the opposition won control of Congress for the first time in eight
years, its leadership going to a coalition led by the Popular Action party. Congress then
called for a vote to remove Fujimori from office, declaring him unfit to serve. Fujimori
himself was by then increasingly implicated in the various illegal schemes Montesinos
had organized. The special prosecutor appointed to investigate Montesinos case argued
that a parallel investigation of Fujimori s own misbehavior was absolutely necessary. Fie
noted that Roberto Escobar, the brother of the Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar, had
testified that the Medellin cocaine cartel contributed SI million to Fujimori s 1990 first
1 McClintock and Valias The United Stares and Peru 2003. p. 154. Quote is from
Fujimori s grey eminence Latin American Regional Report Andean Group (Oct 3.
2000), p. 2-3.
L'4
Salas quoted Montesinos to this effect in testimony reproduced in La Republica Nov
30. 2000 and cited in Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 230-1.
presidential campaign. " Adding to Fujimori s woes was the release of an official report
by the Defensoria del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsman) blaming the military for over
four thousand disappearances of workers, students, and peasants. The report called for an
end to the impunity enjoyed by the military for such crimes. 1 '’ 6
In Lima, hundreds of thousands of citizens protested against the regime over the
course of the year s developments. 1 ' On November 19. Fujimori, on a trip outside the
country, fled to Japan and faxed his resignation to the legislature. By all accounts, even
members of his own cabinet were shocked by the sudden departure of the president.
Several military leaders decided Fujimori had the right idea and promptly fled the
country. The Fujimori regime had collapsed. 1 x
Other juicy details of Ivlontesinos involvement w ith drug trafficking came from
Peruvian drug traffickers in jail, who described how he had enriched himself to the tune
of $700 per kilo of cocaine leaving the country by protecting drug traffickers.
Ijh
The report was based on denunciations filed by human rights organizations and
families of the victims, who blamed the Army for 60% of the disappearances. See
Defensoria del Pueblo La desaparicion forzada de personas en el Peru (1980 a 1996)
2000: El Comercio Nov 1 7. 2000. The role of the Defensoria in Peru s human rights and
transitional justice experience are discussed in the next chapter.
See Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. Ch. 9.
L' 8 On the regime s final collapse, see Balbi and Palmer Political Earthquake 2001:
Cameron Endogenous Regime Breakdown 2006: Marcus-Delgado and Tanaka
Lecciones del final del fujimorismo 2001 and Basombrio Peru: The Collapse of
Fujimorismo 2001 . Members of the military who fled the country after Fujimori s fall
included Victor Malca, who also served as Fujimori s Minister of Defense. Reported in
El Comercio . Expreso, La Republican and El Peruano Jan 1, 2001. Others were caught
attempting to flee the country, such as the former head of SIN and military commander
Julio Salazar. Reported in Gestion. El Comercio. Expreso. and La Republica Jan 3. 2001.
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Conclusions
The Fujimori regime operated on the assumption th within every institution of
the state, individuals could be persuaded to place personal interests above institutional
ones. While some of these individuals could be corrupted with wads of cash, the armed
forces greater importance to the regime meant their payoff was bigger: not only did
members of the military leadership seek personal enrichment and power, they also sought
fundamental concessions to the interests of their institutions. Though they were willing to
trade away the military s typical role of checking the power of the president and even
control over appointments and advancement within the military and oversight of
intelligence collection, in exchange for Fujimori s subjective control the armed forces
were granted vast new protections from human rights accountability and a free hand in
carrying out their counter-insurgency plan. As Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux argue, and as
discussed in Chapter I of this text, control over essentially political matters, such as
internal security and protection from human rights accountability, were major
battlegrounds on which civilian governments and their militaries would fight for power
during Latin .American transitions to democracy.
The Peruvian military s gamble for pow er under Fujimori cost them in 2000: w ith
the fall of Fujimori, none of the protections and privileges they had enjoyed w ould
remain safe. Would the Peruvian military, like those in the rest of South America, bargain
away its other powers but cling to autonomy in the area of human rights accountability,
or had the pow er relationships in Peru been so thoroughly disrupted that even
accountability was now on the table? What political calculations and mechanisms w ould
shape the impending battle over human rights accountability?
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CHAPTER IV
TRANSITION AND RE ALIGNMENT OF POWER 2000-2001
The speed with which Fujimori s regime collapsed came as a profound shock to
Peruvians and international observers alike. In March of 2000. as the elections Fujimori
would soon steal approached. Coletta Youngers wrote:
Even if an alternative candidate wins highly unlikely at this point Peru will
still face a difficult transition period as the new president and Congress seek to
contend w ith the overarching pow er of the SIN and the military, the imbalance of
powers and the setbacks to the rule of law. The best case scenario for Peru is thus
one of a long and arduous transition, w ith the hopes that relatively free and fair
elections will take place in the year 2005. In either case, the Peruvian human
rights movement will continue to voice the concerns of many on the need for
democratic change and respect for the basic human rights of all Peruvians. 1
Youngers pessimistic predictions for Peru no doubt reflected the frustration of her
partners within Peru s human rights community. One can imagine the shock and
excitement that gripped Fujimori s opponents when the long-awaited transition arrived
suddenly at the end of 2000. setting in motion a new flurry of change. New elections for
the legislature and executive were held in 2001. but dramatic steps to alter civil-military
relations, eliminate SIN. strengthen the means to protect democracy, and reestablish the
rule of law began even in the first days of Paniagua s transitional administration. Just
how far such reforms might ultimately go remained unclear. Wherever the
administration s agenda embraced human rights accountability and the end of impunity
for members of the military, the fingerprints of the Peruvian human rights community
1
Youngers Human Rights and Politics in Peru Today 2000; see also Degregori
Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre la Comision de la Verdad y
Reconciliacion 2004.
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were visible. Before proceeding to analyze the changes in civil-military relations
introduced by the Paniagua administration, let us examine the Peruvian human rights
movement and its international network of allies in closer detail.
A Brave New Human Rights Movement?
Scholars have long lamented the weakness of Peruvian civil society, but the
events of 2000 and 2001 may give them reason to reassess. Indeed, one of the surprising
features of Peru s 2000 regime transition was the powerful role of civil society. Though it
is clear that the fall of the Fujimori regime and the ensuing transition were a result of
regime collapse and not directly attributable to popular mobilization, the massive loss of
regime legitimacy symbolized by this mobilization was indeed a principal cause of the
regime s collapse. During the transition, a highly organized and focused movement
within civil society, in partnership with key allies within the state and abroad, exerted a
surprising degree of control over human rights matters. The Perm ian human rights
community was able to influence questions of transitional justice in part because of a
major surge in the legitimacy and respect these groups enjoyed in 2000 and 2001. when
mam of the complaints they had been making ox er the past decade w ere proven justified,
events precipitated an apparent change in social attitudes, and virtually all political actors
in the state were discredited. The links these groups had built with partners in
international nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, and international
bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Fluman Rights enabled them to turn this new
legitimacy into concrete outcomes in 2001.
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Civil society has historically been weak and divided in Peru, though in the 1970s
the military regime initially supported its development, though only of a corporatist sort.
When, in the latter half of the docenio the regime s leadership began to perceive the
community groups and trade unions organizing across Peru as a threat rather than a
support to the military regime, it reversed its support for civil society. Economic crisis
worsened the decline of civil society in the 1980s and continued in the 1990s. 2 Trade
unions, more influential and active in the 1 980s. had been weakened by
deindustrialization and high unemployment. Grassroots social movements had
succumbed to intimidation from Sendero Luminoso and their own government as well as
the dire economic conditions of the country.
'
Yet the human rights movement was. in these same years, emerging as one of the
strongest sectors of civil society. The Peruvian human rights mov ement was born in the
late 1970s when, working with elements of the Catholic Church, family members of
political prisoners pressured the military regime to release them. The movement gained
strength in the 1980s. w hen high lev els of v iolence and human rights violations by both
Sendero Luminoso and the armed forces of the government led the movement to focus on
an agenda of documenting abuses, seeking punishment for them in the courts, and
reforming the military to curb its abuses. An early catalyst for the mov ement was the
1983 murder of eight journalists in Uchuraccay. When it became clear that both the
congressional investigation and the judicial proceedings that followed were indicative of
a lack of w ill on the part of the state and judiciary to bring to justice those responsible.
' On civil society in Peru, see Stokes Cultures in Conflict 1995.
' Taylor From Fujimori to Toledo 2005. p. 570.
the human rights community started to organize to respond to these failures. In
particular, these groups formed around community leaders, religious organizations,
family members of the disappeared, and a dedicated group of lawyers and activists. In
1985, over fifty such organizations decided to work together under an umbrella
organization, the National Coordinator for Human Rights (the Coordinadora). As the
Peruvian truth commission wrote, the Coordinaclora quickly became the forum for
collective decision-making within the human rights community and its most important
representative organ when dealing with the public and the state. 4
When, in the 1 990s. Sendero was almost completely destroyed, the prevalence of
massacres, extrajudicial killings, disappearances and other abuses committed by the
armed forces also rapidly declined. Rather than disband or splinter in the absence of the
same pressing need that had held the group together in the past, however, the human
rights movement quickly recognized the new threats Peru was facing from Fujimori s
attacks on the democratic institutions of the state. When Fujimori staged his 1992
autogolpe. the movement discovered a new raison d etre: to document and fight
Fujimori s abuses of power and to articulate the links between democracy and human
rights. Despite Fujimori s best efforts to either stifle or placate the human rights
movement throughout the decade, it managed to carve a large role for itself in the major
debates and changes that rocked the nation in the last few years of the tw entieth century
4 Comision de la Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome I. p. 39-40. Tome III. p.
293-318. For a detailed history of the Coordinadora s work, see Youngers I lolencia
Politicay Sociedad Civil en el Peril 2003: Youngers and Peacock Peru s Coordinadora
Nacional de Derechos Hwnanos: A Case Study ofCoalition Building 2002;
Drzew ieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Hwnanos 2000. See also the
Coordinadora s declaration from its first national meeting Nos pronunciantos por la
vida 1985: its published reaction to the 1986 prison killings En defense de la vida. no a
la barbarie La Republica July 29. 1986: etc.
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and into the beginning of the next. When Fujimori announced the 1995 amnesty laws, the
human rights community began to enjoy greater support from and activism among
university students." However, as the twin threats of economic disaster and terrorism
receded, so too did public interest in the human rights movement s demands for an end to
impunity until the events of 2000.
The human rights community in Peru had persistently documented and demanded
accountability for the many human rights abuses committed by Sendero Luminoso and
the armed forces throughout the Belaunde, Garcia and Fujimori administrations. Despite
the letial ambiguitv in international law surrounding human rights violations bv non-state
actors, human rights groups such as the Coordinadorci and its members held both the
state and insurgents to international standards; in this they were well ahead of much of
the international human rights movement. Amnesty International, for example, did not
begin documenting human right abuses perpetrated by non-state actors. h For nearly this
entire period. Peruvian human rights organizations carried out this work under conditions
of intimidation and danger, but also widespread public disinterest. It may seem strange
that these organizations had to work so hard to gain public recognition of the abuses that
were taking place daily in the 1980s and early 1990s. but. in fact, many - perhaps most -
Peruvians w ere unaware of the scope of the violence and mayhem that the conflict w ith
Sendero had provoked in the 1980s. Even in 2000. nearly a decade after the conflict was
" Comision de la Verdad v Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome I. p. 40.
6
See. for example. Aprodeh Tan cerca de la muerte: reportaje a un grave atropello a los
derechos humanos en el Peru 1997 and Peru: la practica estatal de la desaparicion
forzada, OEA 1990-2000 2001 : Instituto de Defensa Legal Los grupos paramilitares
1989; Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Manifesto a los peruanos 1989;
Comision de la Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final 2003 Tome III. p. 293-318.
157
defused, estimates of the numbers killed in the conflict hovered between twenty and
thirty thousand. Only after the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission published
its final report in 2003 did a new figure become accepted: 69.000 killed.
Because the vast majority of the violence took place far from Lima, much of the
middle class was able to distance themselves psychologically from the effects of the
conflict, and information was much more easily controlled by the state. When fear of
Sendero directly threatening their world did intrude upon the reality of hmefios
,
the
typical reaction was support of strong military responses and a refusal to carefully
question the tactics employed in fighting what was. after all. a frightening and
bloodthirsty enemy. Guzman s calls for his followers to unleash a river of blood and to
take one million lives in the name of the revolution did little to strengthen the hand of the
human rights community to raise concerns about treatment of terrorist suspects or
villagers alleged to support the guerrillas. When, in the 1990s. the human rights
community turned to focus on challenges to democracy, they again fought against the
public s initial unwillingness to recognize the problem: Fujimori enjoyed incredibly high
approval ratings during his first six years as president. Not until Fujimori launched his
campaign to seek a second reelection did public opinion begin to shift to match the
concerns of the Coordinadora groups. By 2000. scholars such as Joanna Drzewieniecki
were able to affirm that, whatever its challenges, the Coordinadora was universally
recognized as one of the strongest and most united human rights movements in the
world.
Drzewieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Hinnanos 2000. p. 1. For a sense of
the dialogue taking place within the human rights movement in the 1990s. see Basombrio
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Throughout the 1990s. the network assembled under the umbrella of the
Coordinadora was truly impressive. In addition to the Washington Office on Latin
America. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, two other key international
NGOs were vital to the work on the Coordinadora and the human rights movement
overall: the Comision Andina de Juristas and the Center for Justice and International
Law. The Comision Andina de Juristas is an international nongovernmental organization
based in Lima and founded in 1982. Its work focuses on questions of the rule of law and
o
human rights in Bolivia. Chile. Colombia. Ecuador. Peru and Venezuela. The Center for
Justice and International Law (CEJIL) is an international NGO focused on the
InterAmerican Commission and the InterAmerican Court for Human Rights. Founded in
1 991 . it has offices in Brazil. Costa Rica, and the US. Such groups have contributed to a
growing effort to extend the strong network of organizations in Peru to an Andes-wide
response to human rights challenges/’ But the foundation of the Coordinadora is and was
the domestic NGOs which continued to spring up across the country, including
organizations like the Asociacion Pro Derechos Humanos. the Instituto de Defensa Legal,
and Paz y Jusiticia.
I Y Ahora Cite? Desafios para el irabajo por los derechos humanos en America Larina
1996.
8
See Comision Andina de Juristas Los problemas de la democracia en la region andina:
mecanismos de defensa y procesos de transicion 2001: Seguridad ciudadana y derechos
humanos 1999: Las tareas de la transicion democratica 2001 ; El control democratico de
la defensa en la region andina 2004: La Reforma del Sector Defensa v Las Relciciones
Civiles-Militares en el Peru 2005; Chiri Marquez Lineamientos para una politica de
Defensa Xacional: Peru 2006-2011 2006: and Garcia-Sayan Vidas paralelas: Region
Andina: desafios y respuestas 1998.
4
www.cejil.org
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In 2000. the organization consisted over more than 60 member groups, ranging
from Catholic and Protestant organizations to secular ones, and with groups of anywhere
from half a dozen to hundreds of members. As political violence faded, the human rights
community enjoyed much greater press coverage and an improved public image. For the
fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example. El
Comercio included a special feature on human rights every week for one year. Before the
1990s. El Comercio rarely included stories about or press releases from human rights
NGOs; now they did so frequently. This can in part be attributed to the press s growing
awareness of the Fujimori administration s attempts to stifle the freedom of the press and
convert it into a propaganda machine for the regime. Human rights discourse was moving
into the mainstream, despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm in the public for challenging
the Fujimori regime. 1 "
Fujimori s second term as president consisted of an endless sequence of moves to
consolidate control over Congress, the judiciary, and even the media. According to the
Peruvian truth commission, the constant denunciations of the human rights movement
signified to the state the grave risk of losing public legitimacy. Unable to buy the
support of human rights groups. Fujimori and Montesinos attempted instead to alternately
appease the groups with concessions or. more frequently, discredit them with smear
campaigns including nationally broadcast attacks ads. (Fujimori s Minister of Justice
Bustamante, for example, described the human rights NGOs of the country as dedicated
full-time to the destroying the reputation of the Peruvian government with the rest of the
w orld. ) Hence, human rights legislation long demanded by the human rights community
Drzewieniecki Coordination! Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2000. p. 38-40:
Youngers Violencia Politico y Sociedad Civil 2003.
160
in the country were passed in these years, including legislation on racial discrimination,
women s rights and family violence, and torture. The human rights community, and
particularly the Comision Andina de Juristas. won a major concession with the creation
of the Human Rights Ombudsman s office in 1 996.' 1 Youngers writes, since its
inception in 1996. it has obtained an unprecedented moral stature and has contributed
significantly to legitimizing human rights work. The office has contributed greatly to
generating pubic awareness of human rights issues and. at a practical level, instructing
individuals on how to file complaints and seek redress. As a result, people are more
willing than before to come forward to make their demands heard. Given the disunity
within the political opposition to Fujimori, the Coordinadora and its new ally within the
state represented the clearest voices pushing for reform.
If the Peruvian human rights community struggled to gain public attention and
influence within the country, it had no such problem finding allies and support
internationally. Focus on international campaigns has a long tradition in Peru; a notable
example of this is the career of Javier Perez de Cuellar, the legendary Peruvian diplomat
w ho ultimately served as the Secretary General of the United Nations. As early as 1984.
human rights lawyers brought the Peruvian crisis to the attention to the UN Working
Group on Forced Disappearances, which in turn sent repeated repons to the Perm ian
1
1
The Defensoria del Pueblo is the Human Rights Ombudsman Office. The purpose of
this office is to defend the rights of citizens against government abuse. Comision de la
Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final 2003 Tome III. p. 307. Bustamante s comments
appeared in Gestion Oct 8. 1999. also cited in Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 200
Tome III. p. 307. See also Drzewieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos
2000 Youngers Jlolencia Politico v Sociedad Civil 2003 and La promocion de los
derechos humanos: las ONG y el estado en el Peru 2006: Unger Human Rights in the
Andes: The Defensoria del Pueblo 2004. The Defensoria s website offers a wealth of
information, including a digital library including all of the institution s reports and
relevant legislation. Go to http://wvvw.Defensoria.gob.pe/Defensoria.html
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government. Though these reports were largely ignored, it sent early notice to the
government that international actors were critical of the prosecution of the counter-
insurgency campaign and that international respect for the Peruvian state was in
jeopardy. ' According to Thomas Legler and Andrew Cooper, the 1992 autogolpe was
an important catalyst for linking the actions of civil society organizations in Peru with
those of their counterparts abroad :
In a manifestation of what Keck and Sikkink have called the boomerang effect.
Peruvian human rights activists who encountered hostility and repression from
Fujimori authorities toward their grievances turned abroad to cultivate
international support and protection for their struggle. Human rights organizations
such as the Washington Office on Latin America. Americas Watch, and
channeled support to the [Coordinadorci] in its struggles to defend human rights
and democracy in the extremely difficult context of a state of emergency. These
links were used to ferry information about human rights abuses from Peru to U.S.
government and public audiences. The links were not only with foreign civil
society organizations: the Coordinator communicated regularly with foreign
diplomats in Lima and frequently sent delegates to the Linked Nations and OAS.
In 1994. the Coordinator had the symbolic distinction of receiving the first high-
level Clinton administration delegation to visit Peru ever efore meeting with the
Fujimori government. In contrast to their relative absence during the 1977-1980
period, coordinated, cross-border civil society actions began to take on
significance around the time of the autogolpe in 1 992. 1
'
One major change precipitated by Fujimori s actions was the redirection of LIS
democracy assistance money away from Peruvian state institutions and to civil society
organizations. These funds, directed to Peruvian partner organizations by U.S.
12
For examples of international reports on the Peruvian human rights situation from its
partners in the TAN described in this chapter, see Amnesty International Caught Between
Two Fires 1989 and Human Rights During the Government ofAlberto Fujimori 1992:
Americas Watch Peru Under Fire 1992 and Americas Watch/Human Rights Watch
annual reports on human rights developments in Peru from 1992. 1994. 1995. 1996.
1997, 1998. 1999. 2000: Washington Office on Latin America Human Rights
Determinationfor Peru 1991 and After the Autogolpe: Human Rights in Peru and the US
Response 2004. See also discussion in Comision de la Verdad Informe Final 2003 Tome
III. p. 307 and US State Department Reports.
1
Legler and Cooper Intervention Without Intervening? 2006. p. 88.
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nongovernmental organizations, helped support a number of groups with clearly
oppositional stances toward the Fujimori government. 14 Among them was Transparencies
assisted from its founding with funds and support from the National Democratic Institute.
By the time of the 2000 election. Transparency was recognized as the most trustworthy
domestic electoral monitoring body, and its quick counts of the voting were considered
authoritative by all international observer groups. Transparency was able to field nine
thousand volunteer observers in the 2000 elections and was pivotal in preventing sinister
forces within the Peruvian government from manipulating the vote count to ensure a
decisive Fujimori first round victory. Perhaps most importantly, the Transparencia-ND I
connection served as the nexus around which an even larger informal transnational
coalition of electoral observation organizations was built in Peru in 2000. encompassing
members of the Office of the Peruvian Ombudsman, the Peace Council, opposition
parties, and international observer groups. Cooper and Legler characterize this
cooperation as a triumph of networked multilateralism. I:>
By 2000. it was clear that the same could be said of the transnational human rights
network that de\ eloped around the Coordinadorct. Coletta Youngers argues that the
successes of the Coordinadora . which she labels the most successful country-based
network of human rights organizations in Latin America . can be attributed to several
features that distinguish it from civil society organizations and movements in other
countries. Perhaps most important for the success of the Perm ian human rights
movement was its ability to unite under one banner, which greatly enhanced the
14
Legler and Cooper Intervention Without Intervening? 2006. p. 92. Basombrio Civil
Society Aid in Peru 2000.
^ Legler and Cooper Intervention Without Intervening? 2006. p. 95.
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effectiveness of the movement and allowed the Coordinadora to link its work at the
local, national and international level in a way that few country-based organizations have
been able to achieve. Indeed, much of its success must be attributed to its strategy of
enlisting the international community in its struggles and directly lobbying international
organizations and foreign states.
The Coordinadora repeatedly turned to the Organization of American States, the
United Nations, powerful governments like that of the United States, and human rights
organizations in other countries for help in its struggle. Youngers herself had extensive
contact with the Coordinadora through her work at the Washington Office on Latin
America (WOLA). which collaborated closely with Perm ian human rights activists to
bring the attention of U.S. legislators and presidents to the Peruvian situation. WOLA
also played a key role in facilitating the Coordinadora s direct lobbying efforts with the
US government. In particular, the lobbying strategy aimed at the LIS focused on
linkage of the question of human rights with US drug policy in the Andes. This process
accelerated greatly after the 1992 autogolpe. when the attention of the US sharpened on
Fujimori s antidemocratic behavior. The Clinton administration went so far as to
postpone International Monetary Fund meetings to approve loans to Peru until the
Peruvian government agreed to initiate a Commission for Dialogue with the
Coordinadora and other Perm ian human rights groups. However, w hen the
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Coordinadora found the Fujimori government was not taking this process seriously, and
in reaction to the cover-up of the La Cantuta killings, the Coordinadora pulled out of the
Commission for Dialogue. 1 "
The role of international organizations in the human rights battles the
Coordinadora and other human rights advocates waged during the Fujimori
administration was large. Americas Watch repeatedly and successfully prevailed upon the
US Congress to block anti-narcotics funding to Peru due to human rights concerns,
though the effect within Peru was to make superficial changes in order to appear to be
meeting the demands of the US Congress. In 1999. Fujimori rejected the OAS Inter-
American Court of Human Rights jurisdiction over Peru. Several highly sensitive
Peruvian cases were before the court at the time, and in all the Court received hundreds
of cases from Peru of human rights violations committed by government agents during
the worst years of the insurgency, more recent actions aimed at silencing the political
opposition and the press and other complaints. The Peruvian truth commission w rites
that the Peruvian government w as deluged by an avalanche of cases before the Inter-
American Court. In June of 1999. the Court ruled that the sentencing of four Chileans by
a faceless military court to life in prison for treason should be ov erturned and that the
defendants ought to be granted a new trial meeting the standards of due process. Despite
arguments by Fujimori and his congressional allies that Peru would no longer recognize
16
Drzewieniecki Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2000. For WOLA s
reports on the human rights situation in Peru, see for example WOLA After the
Autogolpe: Hitman Rights in Peru and the US Response 1994 and Youngers Peru Under
Scrutiny: Human Rights and US Drug Policy 1992. For the best overview of US-Peru
relations in the 1990s see McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru:
Cooperation at a Cost 2003. On the international component of the Coordinadora s
strategy see Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Objetivos del trabajo a nivel
internacional de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos 1993.
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the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, in September of 1999 the Court responded
by ruling that Peru had no legal grounds for doing so and that it would proceed with cases
related to the country. Fujimori s opposition not only failed to block cases damaging to
his reputation from going before the Inter-American Court, it also severely damaged his
reputation among international organizations, the EU and the US. who recognized the
importance of the Court as a key arena for Peruvian rights battles, given the state of the
judiciary and the persistence of amnesty laws in Peru. In 2000. three particularly
important cases were before the Court, including those related to Baruch Ivcher s
situation, the gutting of the Constitutional Tribunal, and the involvement of Montesinos
and General Hermoza Rios of the 1992 La Cantuta disappearances. During the Paniagua
administration, as we shall see. Peru returned to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, before which 165 cases related to Peru were pending.
Youngers also argues that the Coordinadora drew strength from some of the
unique circumstances of the conflict with Sendero Luminoso. 1 The egregious brutality
and hypocrisy of the guerrilla movement (which claimed to fight for the poor Indians of
the countryside, while victimizing these very groups) led the human rights groups united
under the Coordinadora to embrace a position as critical of Sendero as it w as of the state.
Because human rights movements in other Latin American states tended to focus on
abuses by the state (which, typically, represented the bulk of abuses committed in those
states ), they were more easily targeted as enemies of the state and could be more easily
depicted as rebel sympathizers to the public. Indeed, in order to minimize the credibility
1
For similar arguments, see Cano and Ninaquispe El papel de la sociedad civil en la
demanda v la promocion de justicia 2006: Diamint Estado y sociedad civil ante la
cuestion civico-militar 1999: Garcia Sayan "La tenaza de la democracia y los derechos
humanos" 2002.
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of government attacks against the human rights community as in league with the
terrorists, the Coordinadora adopted the principle of refusing legal assistance to those
accused of terrorism, though many of their programs ultimately focused on the unfairly
accused and imprisoned. Fujimori, his congressional supporters, and many members of
the military did attempt to paint the human rights movement and the Coordinadora as
Sendero sympathizers, but these groups continuing dedication to working with victims
of Sendero s violence and to documenting their abuses kept this slander from sticking.
Also, though human rights activists in Peru often risked their liv es and were
targeted as much by the guerrillas as by the armed forces, they did not have to operate in
quite as dangerous a set of circumstances as had their colleagues in El Salvador.
Guatemala, or Colombia. This allowed for much greater continuity in the movement, as
well as the time to adapt and adjust a variety of strategies to combat the violence and
abuses their country suffered. In the late 1990s. this long-term learning allowed the
movement to shift from a primarily denunciatory role to one of making specific proposals
for reform and even shaping the eventual transition agenda.
Furthermore, the organization was on many occasions successful at achieving
another important ingredient in Keck and Sikkink s recipe for a successful TAN
campaign, creating a strong and direct link between grievances and those responsible for
them. In the 1990s. the Coordinadora led a lengthy campaign to address for the wrongful
imprisonment ofmany thousands of Peruvians convicted under Fujimori s anti-terrorism
laws. During this campaign, referred to as In the Name of the Innocents, the
Coordinadora emphasized building linkages with other groups in civil society, including
church and university groups, and utilizing the media. Ultimately, public outcry over the
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painful stories of thousands of wrongfully imprisoned Peruvians led Fujimori to create an
Ad Hoc Review Commission, composed of the Minister of Justice, the Human Rights
Ombudsman and a special representative to the president, to review convictions and
determine whether individuals names ought to be forwarded to the president for pardon.
When the Commission s mandate expired in 1999. it had forwarded hundreds of names
for Fujimori s pardon. He did in fact grant 481 of these pardons.
Soon Fujimori reversed his position on the pardoning of those convicted under his
terrorism laws, claiming that the Commission was forwarding the names of terrorists for
pardon. But it was too late to reverse the change in public attitudes that the campaign In
the Name of the Innocents had already precipitated: large numbers of Peruvians were
convinced that the Coordinadora was right to argue that many of their compatriots had
been unfairly convicted and that Fujimori was wrong to paint the human rights
organizations as guerrilla sympathizers. The Human Rights Commission of the Ministry
of Justice continued to review convictions, in seeming agreement with the
Coordinadora s claim that there were hundreds more innocent Peruvians in prison on
terrorism charges: they pardoned 32 more prisoners. The wave of pardons also inspired
judges to review cases and ultimately absolve wrongly accused prisoners. Hence, in all.
some 1.087 prisoners were absolved or pardoned between August 1996 and December
1999. Even the normally complacent Congress was moved to act: in 1998 Congress
passed a law expunging the criminal records of those cleared of blame in this process.
After the fall of the Fujimori government, this trend continued; as discussed later in this
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and the subsequent chapter, by 2003. hundreds more Peruvians were pardoned and freed
in the process established during the Paniagua government and continued under Toledo.
By 2000. the agenda of the human rights organizations under the Coordinadora
had converged around two major themes: the aftermath of the conflict with Sendero and
new forms of authoritarianism on the part of the Fujimori government. In the first
category fell the 1995 amnesty law and continuing impunity for human rights abuses
committed by the armed forces (as most of the major players in Sendero Luminoso who
committed abuses of human rights had long since been arrested and imprisoned for
lengthy sentences). Also, much of the country continued to be governed more or less by
the military under state of emergency status, despite the absence of serious conflict.
Overcrowding and wretched prison conditions and continuing reports of torture, as well
as the problem of internally displaced peoples, occupied much of the Coordinadora s
attention. Furthermore, the Coordinadora maintained its challenges to the anti-terrorism
legislation under which military courts tried cases of alleged treason and special civilian
courts heard terrorism cases.
In 2000 the Coordinadora focused its activities on Fujimori s unconstitutional
reelection campaign. In the run-up to the 2000 elections, the Coordinadora worked
closely with other groups in civ il society to protest Fujimori s re-election bid. publicize
cases of intimidation of opposition politicians, and struggle against manipulation of
electoral monitoring agencies. In Youngers words, the Coordinadora [was] playing an
1
See Comision de la Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome III: Youngers
Violencia Politico y Sociedad Civil en el Pent 2003. p. 344: Secretaria Tecnica de la
Comision Ad Hoc La labor de la Comision Ad Hoc 2000: and especially De la Jara
Basombrio Memoriay Batalias en Nombre de los Inocentes: Pent 1992-2001 2001
.
Fujimori and the Minister of Justice ended the pardons commission early (Expreso April
3. 2000).
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important role in revealing the fraudulent nature of the electoral process in Peru and in
advocating changes that would allow for a more level playing field. Among the issues
targeted by the Coordinadorci were judicial counter-reform
,
the growing power of SIN,
and the lack of freedom of the press. When the regime s collapse came, the
Coordinadorci was well placed, from its position within the Mesa de Dialogo. to
influence crucial questions of the transition. De la Jara Basombrio argues that the human
rights community, through the Coordinadorci s participation in the mesa, was able to
decisively intervene to prevent a new amnesty for members of the military and to
establish a consensus among the participants in favor of human rights accountability and
democratic re-institutionalization along the lines of the movement s long-cherished
agenda.
14
As Drzewieniecki wrote in 2000. despite the movement s great successes in the
innocent prisoners campaign, educating the public about human rights, forcing the
government to adopt human rights rhetoric to improve in its public image, and
influencing some human rights legislation, the Coordinadora had been less successful
on issues in which the Fujimori regime or the Peruvian military [had] strong interest such
as democratic institutionality and impunity. Events were about to alter this situation in
dramatic fashion.
14
De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobrejusticia y derechos humcmos 2003. p. 122-3.
''’Drzewieniecki Coordinadorci Nacional de Derechos Humcmos 2000. p. 1.
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As we shall see. the Perm ian human rights community reached the apex of its
influence over the state during the transitional administration of President Paniagua, in
the immediate wake of Fujimori s political self-destruction. During this period, the
human rights movement of the country would utilize a new vehicle to shape the state s
response to the delicate questions of transitional justice now suddenly before it. and enjoy
unprecedented success with some strategies they had long pursued. In particular, we will
examine the role of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by
Paniagua and the controversial decisions by the administration and Supreme Court to
embrace a ground-breaking ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In both
cases, the human rights movement within Peru and its international partners in the TAN
. . . . a . . 7 1
would play the decisive role in the state s management of transitional justice.'
The Paniagua Transitional Administration
In the w ake of the Fujimori regime collapse. Valentin Paniagua, voted into the
position of president of the Congress less than a w eek before, w as promoted to Interim
President. To Paniagua and to the Peruvian public, the events of recent months were not
mere interruptions in the democratic governance of the country; as the Truth
Commission would soon write. In 2000. Peru began a new transition to democracy. 22
Paniagua s inaugural address of November 23. 2000 spoke of the need for
reconstruction and democratic re-institutionalization. Indeed, even before Paniagua
took office, the OAS-led Mesa de Dialogo had already dismantled some of the
'' De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobrejusticia y derechos humanos 2003. ch. 2 and 4.
" Contision de la Verdad v Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome I. p. 37.
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institutional infrastructure of Fujimori s power, such as the special judicial committees
which had answered directly to the executive and constituted a grave interference with
judicial autonomy, and issued new guidelines for the reform of the judicial system as a
whole. 2 '
1
As I explore below, this process involved two types of efforts. The first includes
steps taken in the name of democratic reinsertion into the international communin' of
democracies and the reintroduction of international mechanisms to enforce the rule of
domestic and international law in Peru. The second set of initiatives involved domestic
efforts to reform the institutions damaged by association with the Fujimori Montesinos
web of corruption, and to establish new domestic tools intended to determine the legal
and moral responsibility for abuses of state power and violations of the rights of the
Peruvian citizenship. Both sets of initiatives would have profound impacts on civil-
military relations, but none would have as great an impact in this area as did Peru s return
to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights and the creation of the Peruvian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. As we shall see. the transitional administration of Paniagua
provides compelling evidence that the human rights TAN explored above was able to
gain considerable control over questions of human rights accountability during Peru s
transition.
2
" On Paniagua s ascension to president of Congress and then to interim president, see all
major daily newspapers Nov 17 and 23, 2000. On Fujimori s resignation, see Perm ian
newspaper coverage for Nov 20. For useful overviews of the legal and political situation
of the country during this period, see Ames, Bernales et al Situation de la Democracia en
el Pent (2000-2001
)
2001 and Comision Andina de Juristas Las Tareas de la Transition
Democratica 2001. especially the chapters Lopez Jimenez Peru 2000-2001 : La
transicion democratica y el gobierno de transicion 2004. On the Mesa s judicial reforms,
see Dargent Reforma Judicial en el Peru (1990-2005) 2006.
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I. Democratic Reinsertion
Many members of the human rights community suddenly found themselves in
positions of power in the Paniagua administration. Having spent years in the trenches
fighting Fujimori s assault on democracy and accountability, these individuals pursued
the accomplices of Montesinos and Fujimori throughout the Peruvian power structure.
Moreover, they immediately sought to institutionalize the great lesson of the Fujimori
regime that it is not necessary to overthrow a government to undermine democracy - by
successfully promoting the InterAmerican Democratic Charter in the OAS.'4
To the Peruvian leadership it was clear that the OAS had failed to respond
adequately to Fujimori s destruction of democracy in the country throughout its
engagement with the country in 1992 and 1995. and had only finally taken steps in the
direction of pushing back against the regime s assaults on democracy with Stein s OAS
mission of 2000. In part, they knew, this reflected the OAS s tradition of involving
itself in the affairs of its sovereign member states only when democracy had been
interrupted usually read to mean that a coup d etat had occurred. Though the self-
coup of 1992 had been close to the OAS understanding of interruption of democracy.
OAS member states were nevertheless easily satisfied by Fujimori s promise to hold new
elections, oversee the writing of a new constitution, etc. His orchestration of these events
allowed him to consolidate his pow er to a much greater degree than possible before the
autogolpe. but. dissuaded by Fujimori s overwhelming popularity at home, the OAS
" 4
Legler Peru Then and Now 2003. The text of the 1ADC is available at
www.upd.oas.org
2
' For critical assessments ofOAS activities in Peru through 2000. see McClintock The
OAS in Peru: Room for Improvement 2001 and McClintock and Valias The United
States and Peru 2004.
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failed to press for democratic reforms traditionally considered outside its prerogatives.
Then, in 1995, the OAS electoral observation mission failed to acknowledge serious
irregularities in the electoral process and to issue its report until months after the election.
As Fujimori continued to destroy the various institutions constructed
under his very own constitution whenever they seemed to stand in the way of his
pursuit of a third term in office, the OAS stood idly by. As Legler suggests:
Having managed to get away with a self-coup, rewriting the Constitution, and
manipulating elections. Fujimori and Montesinos undoubtedly calculated that
their next equally daring move, to run for an unconstitutional third term of office,
could successfully weather any opposition from the Inter-American system. In
fact, international resistance to Fujimori s reelection efforts, apart from a group of
international human rights organizations in solidarity with their Perm ian
counterparts, was minimal .Thus, when the OAS finally began to adopt
measures to defend democracy in Peru in 2000. the country had long since
descended into de facto authoritarian rule.'
h
In 2000. electoral observation missions from the NDI, the Carter Center, the European
Union and the OAS deserved credit for decrying the electoral irregularities perpetrated by
the state and refusing to grant the election its stamp of approval. When the demands of
the international missions and their domestic NGO partner. Transpctrencia. for immediate
changes to the electoral system went unheeded, they did not hesitate to terminate their
monitoring missions and to declare that the elections fell far short of international
standards of freedom and fairness. Both internationally and domestically, this was a sharp
blow to the quickly weakening legitimacy of the Fujimori government, one that certainly
contributed to a growing sentiment among all observers that genuine action needed to be
taken.
2
26
Ibid.
2 OAS activity related to Peru through 2000 is described in the previous chapter.
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Yet the international community s uncertainty over whether competitive
authoritarianism or delegative democracy, increasingly common phenomena in the
Americas, warranted intervention only encouraged Fujimori to further his project of
dismantling democracy from within, while keeping in place the facade of legitimacy
provided by elections. The OAS reaction to the 2000 elections was a disappointment to
many members of Peruvian civil society, for though some, notably the United States.
pushed for OAS collective action under Resolution 1 080. few other countries were
willing to stretch the provisions of the resolution to cover a non-coup scenario. Instead.
Canadian and Mexican diplomats brokered a compromise. Resolution 1753. sending the
Axworthy-Gaviria OAS High-Level Mission to Peru. Though Peruvians themselves
considered the mission and the mesa de dialogo it established a weak response to the
country s problems, particularly after the massive demonstrations against the regime s
electoral fraud resulted in an outbreak of violence and chaos. Legler describes this
mission as a Trojan horse w hich was able to insen itself directly into a number of
highly sensitive areas within Peruvian jurisdiction via the mesa de dialogo.
As the Fujimori government disintegrated in the autumn of 2000. [the mesa]
became increasingly prominent as a parallel congress with de facto political
decision-making power and undoubtedly helped prevent a slide tow ard further
state repression, a military coup, or even civil war. Peruvian elites, thanks to the
. p o
mesa, reached agreement on 16 of the 29 items on its agenda."
Circumstances allowed the OAS mission to assume an importance in the Peruvian
transition that far exceeded the expectations of the civil society and political opposition
participants. Once they reached positions of pow er under Paniagua (who himself had
served as one of the eight opposition politician participants in the mesa), key members of
28
Legler Peru Then and Now 2003.
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that mesa sought to institutionalize stronger mechanisms within the OAS that built on the
lessons they derived from the OAS role in the events of Peru over the previous decade.
As De la Jara Basomhrio writes, practically overnight Peru was converted from a state
opposed to the Inter-American system to one that fought to fortify that system. He
specifically cites a sense among the human rights community that, whatever their
limitations, the Inter-American Commission and Court for Human Rights and the OAS
missions had contributed powerfully to Peru s return to democracy: this created a debt to
the Inter-American system Peruvian diplomats now paid in full.'"
The InterAmerican Democratic Charter was the brainchild of three main Peruvian
fathers in the Paniagua administration: Manuel Rodriguez. Peruvian Permanent
Representative to the OAS: Diego Garcia-Savan. Minister of Justice: and Javier Perez de
Cuellar. Foreign Minister. It would be difficult to find another diplomatic team with such
shining human rights credentials. Recall that de Cuellar is a former Secretary General of
the UN: Garcia-Sayan would become a judge on the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights during the Toledo administration. Their goals were to systematize the various
principles, norms, and procedures available to the OAS into one clear and consistent set
of guidelines for responses to threats to democracy in the region, and to broaden the OAS
2"
For Peruvian press coverage of the OAS-led mesa, see El Peruana Aug 2. Nov 23.
2000. Jan 18. 2001 : Expreso Aug 2. Nov 23. 27. 2000. Jan 1 8. 2001: El Comercio Aug 2
Nov 23. 27. 2000. Jan 18. 2001: Liberacion Aug 2. Nov 23. 2000. Jan 18. 2001: Gestion
Aug 2. Nov 27. 2000. Jan 1 8. 2001 : La Republica Aug 2. 2000. Jan 1 8. 2001 . On the
Marcho de los Cuatros Suyos. see all major daily newspapers July 28. 31. Aug 1. 2000.
as well as Liberacion Aug 3. 2000. While Fujimori s supporters blamed the outbreak of
violence on Toledo, participants in the protests argued violence and a fire had been
started by the armed forces and police in order to create chaos and discredit the protest.
" De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobrejusticiay derechos humanos 2003: see especially
chapter 2 Lecciones politicas desde el Peru frente al Sistema Interamericano de
Proteccion de Derechos Humanos.
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treatment of such threats from covering only interruptions to include alterations of
democracy. Furthermore, they sought to establish a fundamental connection between
democracy and human rights. Were democracy recognized as a fundamental human right
within the inter-American system, actions such as Fujimori s destruction of the
Constitutional Tribunal or his attacks on Peru s electoral body could have been subjected
to review by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The IACHR had been one of
the venues where Peruvians enjoyed the greatest success in fighting the Fujimori machine
in battles over human rights accountability; now they sought to vastly expand its capacity
to pass judgment on a regime s respect for human rights by redefining those rights to
include rights to democracy. Such a linkage might also open up a greater role in this area
for the United Nations human rights system.
'
1
A draft of the InterAmerican Democratic Charter sped its way through the
Peruvian Congress and various stages of the OAS system. Like Argentina, which
successfully promoted the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in 1985. and Chile, which
played a key role in passing Resolution 1080. Peru s successful promotion of the
InterAmerican Democratic Charter served to facilitate the country s democratic
reinsertion into the international community. Only one provision pushed by the
Peruvians failed to make it to the final version. Article 13 would have made special
missions by and reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights primary
tools in the monitoring of human rights and democratic crises in the region. Despite this
small failure, the IADC successfully institutionalized all other elements of the Peruvian
jl
See Legler Peru Then and Now 2003; Legler and Cooper Intervention Without
Intervening
?
2006; and comments by Peru s Ambassador to the OAS. Jose Rodriguez in
El Peruano June 17, 2001. All IACHR jurisprudence related to Peru can be found at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/paises_ing/peru.html
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proposal, including a clear linkage of poverty and inequality to threats to democracy,
making civic education a priority for the consolidation of democratic civil societies, etc/'
Given the extraordinary level of commitment from the Paniagua administration to
international mechanisms for the protection of democracy, it is obvious that members of
the administration themselves considered these bodies as instrumental to responding to
the types of crises Peru itself had survived in recent years. At the same time, however, the
very weaknesses of the IADC indicate the inability of bodies such as the OAS to
intervene in those post-crisis areas most crucial to democratic consolidation, among them
civil-military relations. Whatever the successes of the OAS missions of 2000 in
challenging Fujimori, the fact that the mesa and OAS mission to Peru immediately closed
up shop in the wake of Fujimori s resignation, long before the two-year horizon
originally set for the OAS mission had passed, indicates that the problems the country
faced once the electoral crisis passed were well beyond the bailiwick of regional
organizations and ad hoc dialogue groups. Though most Peruvians polled expressed a
desire for the OAS-led mesa to continue its work, members of Congress argued that the
responsibility for reforming the state now rightfully belong to the legislature."" As Legler
writes. While the [InterAmerican Democratic Charter] identifies strengthening [of
El Peruana, El Comercio and Expreso (April 22. 23. 2001) covered the approval of the
IADC and the strong role of Paniagua s cabinet in pushing it through the inter-American
system. The full text of the IADC is available online at
http://\vww.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution l_en_p4.htm
"" Surprisingly. Sofia Macher agreed with this opinion. See El Peruano Nov 23. 2000:
Expreso Nov 23. 27. 2000: El Comercio Nov 23. 27. 2000: Liberacion Nov 23. 2000;
Gestion Nov 27. 2000. On the mesa s dismantlement, see all major Peruvian daily-
newspapers on Jan 17. 18. 2001 . On the OAS. Carter Center and NDI missions to observe
the 2001 elections, see El Peruano March 2. June 3. 2001: all major daily Peruvian
newspapers April 9. 10. 2001: and El Comercio June 3. 2001.
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democracy] as a function of the OAS. it is in the post-crisis phase of rebuilding
democratic institutions, pursuing national reconciliation, and consigning troops to their
barracks that we see among the Organization s biggest remaining challenges. The
severe limitations on OAS activities, including resource constraints and a tradition of
by-invitation-onlv activity within countries, render it poorly suited to tackle the most
pressing issues facing states in the immediate post-crisis and transitional phases.
However, even as the IADC was winding its way through the OAS. other changes
in Peru s relationship with the OAS were taking place that would have a much more
immediate impact on Peru s transitional justice questions. Even before Paniagua s
inaugural speech. Congress took a major step toward democratic reinsertion via the OAS
system. On November 12. the Congressional Commission on Human Rights and the
Subcommission of the Dialogue Mesa on Democratization introduced a measure to
return Peru to IACHR jurisdiction without any reservations. Five days later, the same day
that Paniagua assumed the presidency of Congress, several Congressional committees
moved to restore Peru to the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
These committees simultaneously moved to enforce several decisions the IACHR had
made relevant to Peru. The first of these returned to their posts the Constitutional
Tribunal judges removed in 1997 for challenging Fujimori s right to run for a third
election. By reinstating the judges. Congress restored the TC to functioning order. Later
IACHR decisions led to the restoration of Supreme Court justices removed during the
1992 autogolpe. A second IACHR decision accepted by Congress related to the Baruch
Ivcher case. The timing of the IACHR decision by Congress coincided with the release
by the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defenson'a del Pueblo) of its report on
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the disappeared, which called for an end to military impunity. After two months of
debate, and after Prime Minister Javier Perez de Cuellar signaled the Paniagua
administration s intention to comply with all IACHR decisions upon the reestablishment
of its jurisdiction, the full Congress voted to return Peru to the IACHR on January 12.
2001. 34
The decision to return to the IACHR was urged by and then met with glowing
approval from domestic and international human rights groups, ambassadors throughout
Latin America, and the press. Francisco Soberon. director of APRODEH. and a mission
from the International Federation for Human Rights were quoted in major daily
newspapers as pushing for return to IACHR jurisdiction and for the state to comply with
all IACHR decisions. They argued that a return to the court would help Peru avoid the
impunity which reigned after other Southern Cone states returned to democracy. La
RepubUca assured its readers that prosecution of human rights cases before the IACHR
" 4
The Prime Minister remained purposely ambiguous about whether the president or the
courts were the mechanism that would implement the IACHR s decisions, but clearly the
principle of accepting its jurisdiction was embraced first by the president and only later,
and partially, by the courts (see El Pentcmo Jan 12. 2001 ). On the Defensoria s report,
see El Comercio Nov 20. 2000. This report, based on denunciations filed by human rights
groups and families of the disappeared, held the Army responsible for 60% of the
disappearances: see Defensoria del Pueblo La desapctricionforzada de personas en el
Peru (1980 a 1996) 2000. On the Congressional and Executive steps to return Peru to
IACHR jurisdiction, see El Comercio Nov 12. Dec 1. 2000. Feb 1. 2001: El Peruano Nov
12. Dec 12. 2000. Feb 1, 5. 2001 : La RepubUca Nov 29. 2000. Feb 1. 2001 : Expreso Dec
12. 2000. Jan 20. 2001: Gestion Dec 26. 2000. Jan 20. 2001: and all major daily
newspapers on Jan 12. 2001 . All coverage in the major daily newspapers was highly
supportive of the return to the IACHR and pushed Congress and the Paniagua
government to enact the measure with haste, with exceptions in Expreso. Key
congressional committees included those on Human Rights and on Justice. The
reinstatement of TC judges also came with a payment of reparations to the judges, as
required by the IACHR decision. This seemed to indicate the state s willingness to follow
IACHR precedents for the granting of reparations. More on reparations is discussed in the
next chapter. El Peruano and Gestion April 27. 2001. On the reinstatement of Supreme
Court judges, see El Comercio May 17. 2001.
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is not an act of vengeance. It is an act of justice on behalf of the relatives of the victims
of the violence who deserve to know the truth, as only then can calm be restored and
forgiveness be granted. Each of these sources cited a return to the IACHR as one step
among several the state must take to re-establish the rule of law in Peru, others including
the creation of a truth commission and signing the statute creating the International
Criminal Court.
Once the move was approved. TC judges, human rights groups, and Congress
hailed it as correcting one of the worst mistakes of the previous regime. " That the
decision went a long way toward reestablishing Peru s democratic and human rights
credentials in the Americas was reaffirmed by glowing praise from Cesar Gaviria,
Secretary General of the OAS. He. along with Ambassadors to the OAS from Canada
(Peter Boehm) and Panama (Juan Castulovich). added that the decision would strengthen
and reinforce the interamerican system. Chancellor of Costa Rica Roberto Rojas told
Peruvian media that the country s return to the IACHR had brought great satisfaction to
the governments of the region.
"
Peru s return to the jurisdiction of the IACHR had a major and immediate impact
on Peru. The judicial system of Peru was in a state of crisis, with virtually no public
confidence behind it. The courts were filled with Fujimori appointees promoted on the
basis of political loyalty, but even in politically' neutral cases, the courts were inefficient,
slow, corrupt and thoroughly loathed by the public. Manx members of the courts.
" See La Republica Nov 29. Dec 5. 2000 and Jan 13. 2001; Expreso Dec 5. 2000;
Gestion Dec 5. 2000; El Comercio Jan 1 5. 2001 ; and El Peraano Feb 1 . 2001 . On Feb 8.
2001. El Peruano specifically stated that the return to the IACHR was significant in
signaling Peru s reintegration into the democratic community of the hemisphere.
~ 6
El Comercio. Gestion. Expreso Feb 1 . 2001 ; El Peruano March 24, 2001
.
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including members of the highest courts in the country, were also implicated in the
arious plots orchestrated by Montesinos. such as protecting narcotraffickers. Lima
superior Court President Sergio Salas estimated that 60% of the country s judges and
vocales had gained their positions through irregular means. Nine of the sixteen Supreme
Court justices were accused of having direct ties to Montesinos: four were shown in one
of the vladivideos taking orders directly from him. yet no action was taken against
them by the court itself. By February 3. 2001. at least 58 members of the judicial system
and 154 of the Public Ministry were being investigated as part of the criminal case
against Montesinos. Others were simply without sufficient training to fulfill their duties.
No argument enjoyed more consensus support than that the judiciary required a complete
overhaul, a reform process that would take years.
Meanwhile, the status of numerous temporary or special courts developed over
the previous decade and crucial to Fujimori and Montesinos manipulation of the
judiciary, remained ambiguous. As with other institutions of the state, finding suitable
replacements for those discredited after the fall of Fujimori presented a serious challenge:
often it took two or three appointments to key positions before a candidate considered
untainted by association with the regime could be found. More than tw o hundred judges
dismissed by Fujimori during the 1992 autogolpe would now be reviewed and. in mam
cases, reinstated/
1
Rather than leave highly sensitive cases to these collapsing courts, the
For a sense of the crisis in the judiciary during the transition government, see the
World Bank s report to that effect FIND THIS: De la Jara Ensayos sobrejusticia v
derechos humanos 2003. ch. 1 and 3; Dargent La Reforma Judicial en el Peru (1990-
2005) 2006: Hammergren La experiencia peruana en reform judicial 2004: Justicia
Viva La reforma del sistema de justicia: ?que reforma? 2004: Gestion Jan 2. 1 7. 25. 3 1
,
Feb 1. 3, 2001: El Comercio Jan 5. 8. 17. 25. 29^ 31. Feb 1. 3. 14. 2001: La Republica Jan
7. 8, 12. 25. 29. Feb 1. 3. May 2, 2001 ; Liberation Jan 9, 12. 25. Feb 1. 3. 2001: El
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IACHR seemed a credible, trustworthy alternate authority to handle the trickiest of
questions of transitional justice. In essence. Paniagua opted to adopt IACHR jurisdiction
and authority en masse to substitute for the lack of legitimacy that characterized the
Peruvian courts at this time.
When Fujimori and his allies in Congress removed Peru from the Court s
jurisdiction in 1999. they had sought to avoid a series of decisions by the IACHR against
the state in violation of human rights; now. a deluge of new decisions came out of the
IACHR that would shake Peru s legal system to the core. In the wake of Congress s
decision, many judges removed from the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court and
other courts in the wake of the 1992 autolgolpe or as a result of their opposition to
Fujimori s reelection plan were restored to their former posts. ,s But when news that an
IACHR ruling had found that four Chileans, alleged members of the MRTA guerrilla
group, convicted of terrorism years before under Fujimori s anti-terrorism legislation
should be granted a new. civilian trial, the previously muted opposition began to speak
Pentano Jan 17. 25. Feb 1. 3. 2001: Expreso Jan 2. 7. 25. 31. Feb 1. 3. 2001. As usual.
Expreso was more critical of the situation under Paniagua and Toledo than it had been
under Fujimori: if the judiciary was bankrupt, the fault belonged in large part to
Fujimori s successors, the paper suggested. See also Clifford Krauss Tapes Spy Chief
Left Behind Scandalize Peru New York Times February 3. 2001 . This issue is treated in
greater detail in the next chapter. Salas statement was quoted in Expreso Jan 7. 2001: on
review ofjudges dismissed in the autogolpe
,
see Expreso Jan 1 1. 2001. which criticized
the government for dismissing any judge w ith a connection to Montesinos.
-> o
On return of the judges to the TC and Supreme Court, see La Republica Jan 10. 12.
2001 : Liberacion and Gestion Feb 9. 2001 . The IACHR ruled in favor of the three TC
judges removed in 1997 for opposing Fujimori s reelection in Feb 2001. The IACHR
found all reinstituted judges deserved moral and material compensation for the injustices
perpetrated against them by the Fujimori government. It later became a point of debate
w hether the IACHR or the Peruvian courts should set the amount of reparations victims
of state human rights abuses w ould receive. See. for example. Liberacion June 18. in
which APRODEH lawyers and the Peruvian courts dispute the matter.
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up. Had Peru committed itself to a court which might now force it to retry thousands of
cases of convicted terrorists? Did the return to the IACHR mean that Peru must give
away its sovereignty? Would thousands of convicted terrorists now receive new civilian
trials and possibly go free? Given that IACHR decisions had already called for the
payment of S600 million in restitution from the Peruvian state to victims of human rights
violations, would terrorists convicted under the old laws now be entitled to reparations?' 9
Administration officials announced that, while they certainly would not be paying
any reparations to the Chileans, they would indeed comply with the IACHR decision to
grant them a civilian trial. This in turn provoked the President of the Supreme Court.
Mario Urrello. to state that the Sala Penal of the Supreme Court, autonomous from the
IACHR and all other courts, was the only institution empowered to determine whether or
not to comply with any IACHR decision relevant to the Perm ian courts. On May 1 5. the
CSJM declared the conviction of the four Chileans null and forwarded the case to civilian
courts in accordance with the IACHR decision. 4" Members of the administration and
4
For example. Luiz Salgado. a congress member of the C90-NM coalition, warned that
Peru s return to IACHR jurisdiction should carry a request that the court to exercise
precaution in its findings in cases related to terrorism ( Expreso Jan 14. 2001 );
Congresswoman Beatriz Alva says the decision was important, but that it would have
been better to stipulate that no terrorism cases would be subject to revision (El Penicmo
Feb 1. 2001). Even those who supported the decision to give the Chileans a new trial
insisted that the trial be severe with the accused and that thousands of retrials presented
a genuine political problem for the state. (See Lourdes Flores comments in Gestion Feb
2. 2001 of those of Miguel Jugo. subdirector of Aprodeh in Liberation April 28. 2001
.)
On the case of the Chileans, and whether Peru was bound by the IACHR decision, see
Expreso Feb 2. May 9. 12. 16. 2001; Gestion Feb 2. May 5. 9. 2001; El Penicmo Feb 2.
May 12. 16. 2001: La Republica April 5. May 4. 12. 16. 2001: El Comercio April 5. May
16.2001.
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Gestion March 30. 2001; El Pernano Feb 1. 2. May 16. 2001: Liberation Jan 31, 2001:
Expreso March 30. Feb 2. May 16. 2001: El Comercio and La Republica March 30. May
1 6. 2001 ; Chile hails Peruvian decision to order retrial in major human rights case
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judiciary continued to strike a cautious pose, even as they praised the decision to abide by
IACHR decision. The told the press the IACHR decisions on the Chilean MRTA case did
not necessarily imply all those convicted under the anti-terrorism laws in military courts
would now be entitled to civilian retrial. Claims to the contrary. Ombudsman Walter
Alban stated, were a ploy to confuse the public and promote fear and insecurity. Expreso ,
on the other hand, called the IACHR decision a victory for Abimael Guzman who. they
argued, would now be treated as a prisoner of conscience rather than a genocidal maniac.
Garcia-Sayan explicitly rejected the possibility of new trials for Abimael Guzman and
other members of Sendero Luminoso convicted a decade earlier under the anti-terrorism
laws.
41
Minister of Justice Diego Garcia Sayan, under continuing pressure from human
rights organizations, especially APRODEH. IDL. Amnesty International and the
Coordinadora, began anew the process of reviewing convictions under the anti-terrorism
laws, and releasing and granting pardons to those found innocent. Families of prisoners
and human rights organizations staged large protests, demanding more rapid response to
the situation of innocent prisoners convicted as terrorists. Finally, the Justice Minister
oversaw the establishment of a new pardons commission, including as members Javier
Ciurlizza (Peru s representative before the IACHR. now the president of the new
Comision de InduUos. Derecho de Gracia y Conmutacion de Penas), Hubert Fannsiers (a
Madrid EFE in Spanish May 15. 2001 (FBIS translated excerpt available through World
News Connection database). On the C'SJM decision, see La Republica. El Pernano and
Gesrion May 15. 2001.
41
£7 Pernano April 3. May 17. 21, 2001; La Republica April 3. May 16. 2001: Gestion
and Expreso April 3. 2001 . Marcos Ibazeta. president of the Sala Nacional Corporativa
para casos de Terrorismo. warned 3000 subversives would now be set free ( Gesrion May
3. 2001 ). This would become a major issue in 2003.
respected priest), Wilfredo Pedrazo (assistant Human Rights Ombudsman), and Ernesto
de la Jara (head of the NGO Institute) de Defensei Legal). The commission announced
plans to review 250 cases forwarded to it by human rights groups and families of
prisoners over the next two months. The Ministry of Justice relaxed prison visitation rules
and began drafting proposals for the reform of the anti-terrorism legislation. Ultimately, it
granted pardons to some 163 prisoners.
4
" Nevertheless, when members of Sendero
Tuminoso in prisons throughout Peru staged hunger strikes and called upon President
Paniagua and Congress for a general amnesty to promote national reconciliation, both
made clear it had no intention of releasing dangerous terrorists from prison. As the
Paniagua administration drew to a close, the debate about how many prisoners were
innocent, and whether terrorists were being released along with the innocent, was just
beginning to grow heated, despite the administration s best attempts to allay fears that
Guzman and others would be granted new trials. These very questions would become
explosive issues under Toledo.
4,
4
" De la Jara Basombrio Memoriay Batalias en Nombre de los Inocentes: Pent 1992-
2001 2001
.
p. 83 1 -841 ; Expreso May 16. 2001 . See La Republica Jan 3. 11. 13. 20. Teb
2. March 4. May 16. 2001: El Peruana Jan 16. 2001: El Comercio Jan 16. 2001: Gestion
May 3 1 . 200 1 : Liberacion Jan 1 6. May 3 1 . 200 1 : and Expreso Jan 13. 200 1 . On pardons
of prisoners, see La Republica Jan 24. 31. Teb 2. 14. May 13. July 1 1. 2001: El Peruano
Jan 3 1 . 200 1 : Expreso Jan 3 1 . May 1 6. 2 1 . 2001 : El Comercio Jan 24. Teb 1 4. June 1
.
2001: Liberacion Teb 2. 2001: Gestion May 21. 2001. When prisoners were pardoned,
sometimes after nearly a decade in prison, the press sometimes continued to follow their
difficulties in finding work and reintegrating into society. See also Comision de la
Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome III. p. 293-3 1 7.
' Liberacion Teb 15. 2001 . Even among prisoners advocates in the human rights
community, there was little agreement on the number of innocent prisoners. Amnesty
International said hundreds ( Gestion and Liberacion May 31. 2001 ). Aprodeh and
Amnesty International argued clearly that all those convicted under the now-challenged
laws deserved retrials; Liberacion April 28. 2001: La Republica April 27. 2001. See also
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In March of 2001. the IACHR. ruling on the 1991 Barrios Altos case, issued a
judgment that Peru s 1995 amnesty laws were without legal merit. The Court found the
Peruvian state responsible for the Barrios Altos killings (alleged to be the work of the La
Colina death squad, acting under the leadership of Major Santiago Martin Rivas),
demanded the state fully investigate the crime, and argued the case was indicative of the
intention of the 1995 amnesty laws to grant impunity to human rights violators. The
decision called upon the Peruvian authorities to hold the perpetrators responsible and to
make reparations to the victims in the case within the next three months. 44 The Court s
ruling opened the door to prosecution for any crimes committed after 1980. International
human rights organizations such as Amnesty International hailed the decision as
historic : in essence, it set a new precedent to argue that no human rights amnesties held
legal validity as they would violate the principles of the Interamerican Convention on
Human Rights. Amnesty International argued this decision would open a new era in
human rights accountability for the Americas.4
'
It may well be that the IACHR decision caught the Paniagua administration
somewhat unprepared. The week before the decision. Javier Ciurlizza. Peru s
representative before the IACHR. announced that Peru was studying the possibility of
voiding the 1995 amnestt law s. Minister of Justice Diego Garcia Sayan in turn assured
Retrial for Suspected Rebels New York Times May 15. 2001. We return to this topic in
the next chapter.
44
The IACHR decision made headlines in all the major daily newspapers in Peru on
March 21. 2001. El Comercio praised the IACHR decision and joined its call for
immediate investigations of major human rights cases (April 2. 2001). See also La
Repablica and El Comercio March 26. 2001.
4
" Gestion March 27. 2001: Gestion, Liberacion, La Republica and El Comercio March
24. 2001: El Comercio March 28. 2001.
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the press that the transitional government would leave such an important decision to the
new government and Congress to be elected in the next few months, though on other
occasions he stated the validity of amnesties was a question that would fall within the
powers of the proposed truth commission to investigate.
4h
Once the IACHR decision was
released, however, the government came under immediate pressure from human rights
groups and the families of victims of state violence during the 1980s and 1990s to void
the amnesty laws, whatever the outcome of the ongoing debate over whether Peru was
under any legal requirement to enforce IACHR decisions. Sofia Macher and Francisco
Soberon. the heads ofAPRODEH and the Coordinadora respectively, met with the
president of the Supreme Court to press for a reopening of all human rights cases closed
by the amnesty laws. Within the press, at least, the majority was supportive of adopting
the decision against the amnesty. Dissent came primarily from the pro-Fujimori
paper Expreso which repeatedly fulminated against the notion of subjecting those
pardoned by the amnesty laws to new trials as a violation of the principle that an
individual could only be tried for a crime once.
4
A week after the IACHR decision, the Peruvian Supreme Court ordered that the
ruling be enacted, the Barrios Altos case be reopened, and that the amnesty laws be
IO
t §
voided. ' Special prosecutor Ronald Gamarra announced the existence ot thirteen
4h
La Repablica and Expreso March 16. 2001: El Perucmo and Gestion March 8. 16.
2001 .
4
Expreso Jan 3. April 5. 2001: La Repablica April 5. 2001: El Peruano and El
Comercio April 10, 2001 . On whether Peru was obligated to adopt IACHR decisions, see
Liberacion and La Repablica March 28. 2001.
4X
El Peruano, Expreso, Gesiion. El Comercio March 28. 2001: Expreso April 6. 2001.
Once more the institutional powers to determine whether to abide by the IACHR decision
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outstanding arrest warrants for members of Grupo Colina. charged with murder in the
Barrios Altos case. The former leaders of SIN. General Julio Salazar, and of the Army
Intelligence Service. Juan Rivero, were arrested immediately after the IACHR ruling as
alleged members of the Grupo Colina. Rivero had. in fact, been sentenced to five years in
prison by a military court for the Barrios Altos incident, but had then been pardoned by
the 1995 amnesty laws. New revelations were made that Montesinos. Hermoza and others
had also been tried before military courts for the Barrios Altos murders, but had been
found not guilty. The Judicial Police also initiated an operation to capture Martin Rivas,
chief of Grupo Colina. and ten others charged as authors of related human rights
violations.
49
On June 1. the Ombdusman s office released a report, entitled. Amnesty vs
Human Rights: Searching for Justice. The report argued that the 1995 amnesty laws
violate constitutional principles and backed the IACHR Barrios Altos decision, which
declared these laws incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights. Not
only should the state comply with the decision, the report stated, but it should consider
the decision relevant to all human rights cases. It was less clear if this was the
were unclear. While The Supreme Court was ruling on the matter and petitions were
brought before the C'SJM to hear the case. Congress was considering a bill to void the
amnesty laws after President Paniagua stated that it was Congress s decision (Expreso
April 24. 2001 : El Comercio March 24. 2001 : El Peruano March 26. 2001 ). The CSJM
continued hearing the case against the Grupo Colina (Gestion . Liberation, La Republica
March 24. 2001 : see next chapter on this issue) as new cases opened in civilian criminal
courts.
49
Financial Times Information. Global News Wire. Peru: ICHR - Supreme Court Orders
Enactment of ICHR Ruling. Amnesty Law Voided. March 28. 2001 . Lexis-Nexus
online. Death Squad Arrests in Peru BBC Online March 25. 2001. Reported in
Expreso. La Republica. El Comercio. and El Peruano March 24. 25. 28. 2001 : La
Republica April 1. 2001: Gestion April 3. 2001. On the Rivas operation, see La
Republica March 26. 2001.
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administration s position; even after the IACHR decision. Justice Minister Diego Garcia
Sayan continued to state that the government did not have the power to void the laws and
that a truth commission was being established in the country as a way of determining
who ought to legitimately receive amnesties for human rights abuses. Meanwhile, the
process of preparing investigations into thousands of cases of human rights violations
began. Investigative reporters and teams of prosecutors began the arduous task of sifting
through the details of long-shelved cases. The Grupo Colina cases in particular produced
damning evidence of military complicity in human rights violations.' 0
Peru took other steps to commit itself to international mechanisms for human
rights accountability in this period. Manuel Rodriguez. Peru s representative to the OAS.
announced in January that the government had signed the Interanierican Convention on
Forced Disappearances. On December 7. 2000. Peru s permanent representative to the
UN. Jorge Valdez, signed the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court. Valdez
" La Republica March 30. April 1. 2. 5, June 1. 2001. Gestion, El Comercio, Expreso and
Liberacion March 27. March 30. April 2. 2001; Caretas April 5. 2001. On the Barrios
Altos investigation and others related to the Grupo Colina. including both denials and
testimony continuing Grupo Colina s involvement and the participation of members of
the military, see El Comercio April 10. July 24. 2001; La Republica April 2. 3. 4. 13. 17.
21. May 12. June 22. July 24. 2001; Expreso April 10. 17. 19. July 28. 2001; Liberacion
April 1.4. 10. 21, May 2. 28. July 24. 28. 2001; all major Peruvian daily newspapers on
Jan 17. May 22. 24. 26. June 3. 2001; Caretas July 26. 2001: El Peruano March 27.
2001; Gestion April 2, 3. 4. 10. 2001. On the debate over whether civilian or military
courts should have jurisdiction in these cases, and whether previous CSJM decisions in
these cases should stand, see El Peruano March 27. April 22. 2001 : El Comercio April
30. 2001: Expreso Jan 29. April 1. 6. 22. 24. 2001: Gestion March 24. April 3. 2001: La
Republica and Liberacion March 24. April 22. 2001. Attempts were made to link
Fujimori (in absentia) to the Grupo Colina crimes; Expreso, La Republica. and Gestion
April 1 1. 2001 : El Peruano May 3. 2001 . On the question of reparations for the families
of the Barrios Altos victims, see El Peruano April 19. 2001. This Grupo Colina cases are
discussed further in the next chapter.
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argued that signing the statute not only signified a change in Peru s orientation to
questions of international law. but also represented a sign to the international community
that Peru was on the path to democracy and human rights accountability.' 1
Journalists and human rights advocates periodically urged the legislature to ratify
the Statute of the International Criminal Court. They pointed out that while 139 countries
had signed the document, only 28 had ratified it (usually requiring the approval of the
legislature). However, the ICC could not be considered as the venue in which to deal with
Peru s myriad human rights cases, given that the Rome Statute cannot be applied
retroactively (and therefore the human rights violations in question fell outside the court s
jurisdiction)/' However, the possibility that Fujimori himself might one day be subjected
to trial in an international court repeatedly surfaced over the next several years. Members
of Paniagua s cabinet, especially Minister of Justice Diego Garcia Sayan, made
statements in support of the Rome Statute, appealing to Peruvians sensitivity to the
question of what should happen to state criminals outside the jurisdiction of their home
country s court; as he argued, the ICC would be a powerful tool to eliminate the impunity
many enjoyed by tleeing their countries. Peru eventually ratified the Rome Statute of the
ICC on November 1 1. 2001. after Congress was assured the Statute did not limit the
state s ability to engage in anti-subversive campaigns or punish terrorists/
'
' Gestion. Dec 7. 2000. Jan 9. 2001: El Peruano Dec 9. 2000.
On Nov 29. 2000. La Republica called for Peru to take all necessary steps toward
supporting and joining the ICC. as did El Comevcio Feb 21. May 29. 30. 2001. For other
relevant coverage, see La Republica Dec 5. 2000 and May 29. 31. 2001; Expveso Dec 5.
2000. June 10. 2001: and Gesrion Dec 5. 2000.
” Much of that convincing was done by people like Eduardo Gonzalez. Latin America
Coordinator for the World Coalition for the ICC, an international NGO. El Comevcio
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As Legler writes:
Civilian supremacy over the military in Peru, a precondition for democratic
consolidation, is by no means a foregone conclusion. While discredited by its
abuses of human rights and the rule of law during the Fujimori presidency, initial
attempts by the Toledo gov-eminent at bringing the military under civilian
authority soured civil-military relations. The OAS has a potentially important role
in assisting governments in Peru and elsewhere to depoliticize their militaries and
bring them under civilian control.
In truth, however, no international organization can force the agenda of civil-military
reform within a state; the constraints on interference with a domestic political matter so
intimately connected to the security and identity of the state are simply too great for the
impetus for reform to come from external pressure. In Peru, pressure for change in this
field would have to come from the state itself. Yet it was largely due to the OAS s choice
to include influential members of human rights organizations in the mesa de dialogo that
the parameters for civil-military reform were established even before Paniagua assumed
the interim presidency: no immunity from prosecution would be tolerated for any
individual implicated in human rights violations, and the use of military' courts to ensure
convictions of alleged Sendero Luminoso members w hile simultaneously protecting
members of the military from accountability for human rights abuses must be dismantled.
Demands for human rights accountability had long topped the agenda of the
Peruvian human rights community and their international allies, like the Washington
Office on Latin America. When the Vladivideos surfaced, suddenly the complaints of
these groups over the corruption and anti-democratic behavior of the Fujimori regime
w ere proven correct, and their demands for full disclosure of the abuses perpetrated by
May 23. 2001. Expreso
.
on the other hand, warned that the ICC would illegalize the fight
against terrorism and extend the arbitrariness of human rights cases into the
international sphere. May 24. 2001. On Diego Garcia Sayan s comments, see Expreso
June 10, 2001.
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the regime met with overwhelming public support. Members of the congressional
opposition recognized that their newfound power over the state rested primarily on their
ability to draw clear ethical distinctions between themselves and Fujimori s allies.
Investigating his regime s abuses was not only popular but also vital to his opponents
capacity to establish themselves as legitimate political leaders.
Over the course of 2001 . Fujimori s political opponents were left to fill the
political vacuum created by Fujimori s departure. When new legislative elections were
held in April 2001. Fujimori s supporters in his Change 90-New Majority coalition lost
49 of its 52 seats in the 120 member Congress. Meanwhile, Alejandro Toledo s Peru
Posible went from 29 to 45 seats, making it the largest party represented in Congress,
though without a majority: and Alan Garcia s APRA took 28 seats compared to none in
2000 and only 8 in 1995."''" For the first time in Peruvian history, the politicians in charge
of the state and the domestic human rights community enjoyed a confluence of interests
and a high degree of consensus over the necessity of re-establishing the rule of law by
holding parties guilt of corruption and human rights violations accountable before the
courts be they politicians, bureaucrats, or members of the armed forces. Moreover,
several important offices within the Paniagua administration were filled by individuals
with deep personal commitments to such a project, including Paniagua himself. Garcia-
Sayan. Perez de Cuellar, and Rodriguez. Let us now turn to the domestic institutions
established by the Peruvian state to address the question of civil-military relations and
human rights.
M
For excellent comparative data on legislative and executive elections, including data on
Peru, see Binghamton University s Election Results Archive of the Center on Democratic
Performance. Online at http:/Avww.binghamton.edu/cdp/era/elections/
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II. Civil-Military Relations: Domestic Drivers of Change
As Conaghan writes. For the Paniagua government, pursuing democratic re-
institutionalization would be a far-reaching challenge that included purging what
remained of the Montesinos-linked Mafia from positions in the state apparatus,
investigating the corruption and abuses carried out by the regime, and starting the long
process of bringing criminals to justice. " After Montesinos was finally arrested,
prosecutors estimated that between $600 million and $1.5 billion had been embezzled by
the Fujimori regime. Furthermore, millions had been spent bribing politicians, judges,
media executives, and others.' 6 Public demands that Montesinos network of corruption
be eliminated from the state were powerful, and pressure on the Paniagua government to
take decisive steps to eliminate that influence was overwhelming. The chants of Justice
for Fujimori that met Paniagua as he stepped onto the balcony of the presidential palace
would be more difficult to accomplish: mat task would await the next administration.'
" Conaghan Making and Unmaking Authoritarian Peru 2001; Mensaje a la Nacion
La Gacera
.
November 26, 2000.
'
Vl
For example, several opposition politicians were kept on allowances of $5.000-$20.000
a month for either switching to Fujimori s coalition in Congress or collaborating with
Montesinos in other ways. The bribery extended to members of Fujimori s cabinet.
Supreme Court justices, and members of the media. For an overview of the corruption,
see Conaghan The Immoral Economy of Fujimorismo 2006. For relevant press reports,
particularly covering the revelations of Montesinos and SIN s misdeeds, see El
Comercio Jan 11. 14. 18. 20. 2001: La Republica Jan 11. 14. 18. 20. 2001: Gestion Jan
11. 14. 18. April 4. 2001; Expreso Jan 18. 20. April 4. 2001; Liberation Jan 18. 2001; El
Peruano Jan 18. 2001. Many of the congressional investigations discussed below
detailed Montesinos network of corruption.
Clifford Krauss Peru's New Chief Sworn In. Vowing to Revive Democracy New
York Times Nov 23. 2000. For example, an Apovo poll conducted Dec 19. 2000 found
that 38% of the public felt the president was acting decisively to eliminate Montesinos
influence, while 51% felt he had done nothing significant in this area. Similarly, the poll
found that 38% of respondent felt Congress had acted decisively in this area, and 30%
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Like Congress and the justice sector, the armed forces were severely discredited
by the fall of the Fujimori regime and the release of videos proving that Montesinos had
bribed and corrupted military commanders along with everyone else. But the loss of
legitimacy in the armed forces was also influenced by several other factors, including its
failure in the conflict with Ecuador in 1995: the widespread recognition that the military
leadership had been thoroughly politicized and corrupted throughout the Fujimori
administration: the revelation that the armed forces had become subservient to the
national intelligence agencies of the country (an unprecedented situation in Latin
America) under Montesinos: and the continuing revelations of their past involvement in
human rights violations.'
When news of Fujimori s long-distance resignation reached Peru, the armed
forces high command immediately announced their support for whomever was chosen as
his successor. The next day. Fujimori s Vice President Marquez signed a decree approved
by the Minister of Defense and the joint command of the armed forces: the resolution
announced that ten military generals connected to Montesinos would be retired effective
December 1. Retired General Salinas argued that Marquez was a mere puppet for military
interests, an allegation strengthened by the high command s move to speed up the
promotions process w hile Marquez momentarily held pow er. Among those w hose
promotion was expedited was Elias Ponce of the Navy. APRODEH quickly denounced
felt the armed forces had. 52% felt Congress had done nothing significant to remove
Montesinos influence from the state, and 58% felt that was true of the aimed forces.
Apoyo poll conducted in Lima, reported in El Comercio Dec 19. 2000.
On the destruction of the reputation of the armed forces at this point, see especially
Rospigliosi Las Fuerzas Armadas y La Democracia 2001 and La frustracion de la
reforma de las fuerzas de seguridad 2006.
195
his promotion; in 1998. the InterAmerican Commission for Human Rights had found
Ponce responsible for crimes related to the disappearance of a student from the
University of Callao. Meanwhile, on Nov 18 Liberation printed a list of 25 generals and
three colonels it accused of forming Montesinos circle of military allies/ 9
Marquez immediately ceded authority to Paniagua, whose administration carried
out extensive investigations of military' wrongdoing and adopted a more aggressive
stance toward removing wrongdoers. Further investigations by the Paniagua government
found that Montesinos had assured the loyalty of the armed forces by paying each of the
generals S10 million, money believed to have come from illegal arms sales and
connections to drug trafficking. 60 The da}’ after Paniagua s inauguration. Carlos Ferrero,
soon to become President of Congress, warned the interim administration that if it did not
act within the next 48 hours to dismantle the military high command. Montesinos
military allies would unite to make the country ungovernable. But the weakness of
Montesinos allies in the context of the collapse of his network of corruption meant they
were at least temporarily unable to respond to governmental action against them: in
particular the armed forces, with a public approval level of only 29% (the second lowest
’
9 On the response of the armed forces high command to Fujimori s resignation, see La
Republica. El Comercio, El Peruano Nov 20 and 21. 2000. On Marquez s dismissal of
commanders, see Oscar Zamalloa Outgoing Commanders Charged With Various
Crimes Agence France Presse Nov 20. 2000; La Republica, El Comercio. Gestion, El
Peruano, and Liberation Nov 2 1 . 2000. On the case of Ponce, see Liberation Nov 22.
2000.
0,1
La Republica and Gestion . Nov 24. 2000: Politics Peru: Historic Chance to
Depoliticize the Armed Forces. Inter Press Service. Oct 5. 2001
.
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levels of public approval in the country in December 2000). would be unable to resist
governmental activism to root out the corruption, politicization and impunity which
characterized their institutions at the time.
Within weeks of Paniagua s inauguration, the interim president installed a new
cabinet, which immediately set about a major shake-up in the military. Within hours of
the announcement of his appointment. Defense Minister (retired) General Walter
Ledesma notified the media that twelve army generals scheduled to retire at the end of
December would now be retired immediately. Soon more announcements of earl}’
retirements were made, including those of the president of the CSJM and the head of
SIN. Military commanders forced out of the sendee by Montesinos and Fujimori, like
Ledesma himself, were reinstated. Among those reinstated was General Carlos Tafur.
who now was named Chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces and Commander
General of the Army. Rodolfo Robles, the whistleblower who had defected from the
military and been forced into exile after he went to the press with details of Grupo Colina
atrocities, gained the restoration of his good name and his military record, just as the
IACHR had decided he deserved. 61
In July 2001. David Waisman became Toledo s second vice-president and
continued to fill the position of Minister of Defense. The congressional commission on
corruption which Waisman headed released its report in June, only weeks before the
61
Calls for the reinstatement of military officers removed by Fujimori began on the day
of Paniagua s inauguration, and ultimately many were reinstated. In one case, the state
held a ceremony to reincorporate 25 members of the army w ho had lost their positions for
their participation in the 1992 counter-coup staged against Fujimori (this story was
covered in all major daily newspapers on May 15. 2001.) See also El Comercio Nov 23,
27. 2000. Jan 13. May 16. 2001: La Repitblica^ox 24. 2000. Jan 13. May 16. 2001 and
all major Peruvian daily new spapers Dec 5. 2000. On the armed forces lack of public
approval, see Apoyo Opinion data published in El Comercio Dec 19. 2000.
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transition to the Toledo government and the capture of Montesinos. The commission s
primary focus was on untangling the web of corruption over which Montesinos had
presided. In the course of the investigations, over 180 individuals were implicated in
corruption during the Fujimori administration. Shockingly, General Miguel Medina,
president of the joint command of the armed forces since his appointment by Paniagua in
April 2001. was accused by the commission as well. Medina had been appointed to
replace the corrupt military leadership that resigned over the Vladivideo showing them
pledging allegiance to Fujimori s coup, but the congressional commission reported that
Medina too was involved in irregularities surrounding military purchases of Russian
fighter planes. Apparently, Medina, then the head of the air force, had claimed the Mig-
29s were new, when they were not. The commission found the fraudulent deal had
enriched middlemen by roughly $80 million. Waisman called upon Defense Minister
General Ledesma to remove Medina from his post. 62
Its final report also implicated a number of Fujimori s former ministers in cases of
illegal enrichment, drug trafficking, covert amis deals, and other forms of corruption, and
called for charges to be brought against those named in the report. Members of the
military, however, were particularly affected, as the report found that the main
mechanism Montesinos used to funnel money into offshore accounts w as military
purchases. Given the vast amounts spent on military purchases and the very low levels of
oversight required of such purchases under Fujimori. Montesinos had found many w ays
62
For the best coverage of the Waisman Commission report and related stories of misuse
of funds in military purchases, see La Republica Dec 27. 2000. June 16. 2001. See also:
Peru lifts lid on corruption. BBC online. June 13. 16. 2001; La Republica Jan 5. 7. 12.
14. June 14. 15 16, 2001; Gestion Dec 27. 2000. Jan 5. 12. June 13. 14. 15, 16. 2001;
Liberacion and Expreso Jan 12. June 13. 14. 15, 16. 2001: El Comercio Jan 12. March
19. June 10. 14. 15, 16. 2001; El Peruano Dec 27. 2000.
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of using these accounts to enrich himself and fund the activities of SIN. Every member of
the military high command structure during Hermoza s tenure as president of the joint
command, and several foreign defense ministers, were accused of crimes related to using
military contracts for illegal enrichment and violations of their Constitutional duties.
Though members of the Air Force held a press conference to repeat claims that the
purchase of Belarussian MiG fighter jets was legitimate, members of Congress promptly
warned the armed forces not to stage any manifestation of their displeasure. The days
when the military might intimidate Congress into backing down by staging tank parades
or issuing threats. Congresswoman Tow nsend told the press, had left Peru along with
Fujimori.
In July, the Morales Commission released its report, providing many additional
details of the role of military purchases in state corruption. It agreed that the biggest and
most far-reaching illegal business activity of the past government was the massive
purchase of military equipment. The Commission found that much, perhaps most, of the
$1.9 billion in military purchases under Fujimori had benefited allies of Montesinos who
then contributed to funding SIN s various illegal activities. Though the Morales
Commission defended General Medina from the Waisman Commission s claims that he
w as involved in the MiG affair, overall the tw o commissions met the same conclusion.
Such massive and consistent manipulation of military purchases had been made possible
by collusion betw een Montesinos. the military high command, amis dealers and President
Fujimori. Though neither uncovered direct evidence that Fujimori knew of individual
Ibid. On the air force s defense of the MIG deal, see also El Comercio and La
Republica Jan 6. 2001 . The armed forces continued to offer arguments in defense of the
deal: an ad hoc commission of the Peruvian Armed Forces reported to the CSJM that they
found no irregularities in the deal: Expreso April 30. 2001
.
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abuses of military purchases, it was his removal of these purchases from public or
Congressional scrutiny on grounds of national security that allowed the corruption to
flourish. Furthermore, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, if Fujimori did not
know the substance of these purchases, he would have been in dereliction of his duty. 64
Similarly, the Waisman commission found evidence that the pension fund for
members of the military and police had been used as a slush fund under Montesinos. FTe
and his partners had managed to reduce the fund to practical insolvency: whereas in 1991
it had contained $124 million, by 1999 only $5 million was left. High ranking members
of every branch of the armed forces were implicated in the abuse of the fund - sixteen
from the Army, eight from the Navy, seven from the Air Force - along with eight from
the national police and 28 civilians. 6
'
Between November 2000 and Ap 1 of 2001, many members of Fujimori s
military command were arrested, including General Nicolas Hermoza. the head of the
armed forces from 1991 to 1998 and implicated in drug trafficking, human rights abuses,
abuse of office, and illegal enrichment. 66 Also arrested were General Jose Villanueva
64
See La RepubJica April 30. July 26. 2001 . On the Morales Commission, see also La
Republica Jan 13. 2001: Gestion Feb 2, 2001: Expreso May 26. 2001.
Ibid. On the pensions issue, see also Caretas Jan 1 1, 2001: La Republica March 4.
2001 : El Comercio. Gestion. Liberacion June 13, 2001.
66
Press coverage of the charges, arrest and trials of Hermoza was extensive during this
period. On Hermoza s illegal enrichment and arrest, see Liberacion Dec 27. 2000. Jan 13.
April 6. 2001; La Republica Dec 27. 2000. Jan 11, 12. 14. April 6. 30. 2001. Nov 16.
2004: El Comercio Jan 12. 13. Feb 9. April 6. June 10. July 13. 2001: Gestion Dec 27.
2000. Jan 31. Feb 9. April 6. 30. 2001; Expreso Jan 31. Feb 9. March 6. April 6. May 8.
2001 . On allegations of his involvement with Grupo Colina and other human rights
violations, see La Republica Jan 14. March 8. May 13. 26. June 3. 22. 2001; Expreso
March 6. May 24. 26. June 3, 2001; Gestion April 3. May 26, 2001: El Comercio May
26. June 3, 23. 2001 ; Liberacion May 26. 28. June 3. 2001 ; El Peruano June 3. 2001 . In
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Ruesta. Hermoza s successor as armed forces chief: and General Walter Chacon Malaga,
joint commander of the armed forces and interior minister under Fujimori, accused of
corrupting government officials, bribery, and amassing vast wealth through illegal
transactions including stealing from the military pension system and manipulating
massive military contracts for arms acquisition.
h
Testimony from drug baron Demetrio
Chavez ( Vaticano ) indicated that Hermoza. Montesinos and numerous members of the
military received protection money from drug barons. The men received S50.000 for each
airplane load of drugs they allowed to leave the coca-producing region of the Huallaga
Valley. Vaticano also claimed the Navy had allowed SIN to torture prisoners in its
bases.
hS
addition to these, his participation in undermining democratic institutions w as covered in
El Comercio and Gestion April 24. 2001.
Also arrested or restrained from leaving the country in this period were Cesar Saucedo.
Eduardo Bellido. Edmundo Silva. Luis Salazar. Luis Delgado and Oscar Villanueva, all
generals in the armed forces under Fujimori and closely linked to Montesinos web of
corruption. The air force high command removed Col. Hector Vargas from his command
for illegally assisting Montesinos flight from Peru: El Comercio January 6. 7. 2001: El
Peruano Jan 7. 2001 . Victor Malca. Minister of Defense under Fujimori, fled the country
to avoid arrest. On the arrests for and allegations of corruption among military
commanders, see (among literally hundreds of articles in the major Peruvian newspapers
on these topics) La Repnblica Jan 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. 8. 10. 11. 25. 29. Feb 3. 2001: El Peruano
Dec 27. 2000. Jan 3. 4. 25. 2001 . El Comercio Jan 3. 4. 6. 12. 13. 25. Feb 3. April 1 1
.
2001: Expreso Dec 27. 2000, Jan 3. 4. 6. 1 1. 25. 2001: Gestion Dec 27. 2000. Jan 3. 4. 8.
1 1. 25. April 1 1, 2001. By Jan 22. 2001. at least six generals and two colonels of the
Army were in prison for illicit enrichment, and seven high commanders were being
prevented from leaving the country as charges against them were investigated: La
Repnblica Jan 22. 2001
.
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Other members of the military command arrested in this period include Juan Llanque.
Luis Cubas Portal. Juan Delgado. Former Army Commander Walter Chacon. Colonel
Mario Arbulu. and Luis Delgado, charged with illegal enrichment, bribery, corruption,
money laundering and aiding Mr. Montesinos's flight. On these arrests, see Peru
Arrests Associates Of Ex-Spy Chief New York Times January 21. 2001: Peru general
faces drug charges BBC Online April 6, 2001: New Cabinet Installed in Peru; It
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Over the seven months of the Paniagua administration, not a single day passed
without at least one of the major Peruvian newspapers carrying a story detailing
corruption within the military. Investigative reporting accused members of the military
who had not been implicated in wrongdoing by the congressional committees and pressed
for greater activism in rooting out corrupt allies of Montesinos within the military. 69
Retired military commanders joined reporters in focusing blame on Montesinos and
Hermoza for using the armed forces as a tool to enhance their own power and wealth, and
in so doing corrupting and weakening the military. 70 Hundreds of military officers were
eventually charged with corruption as part of Montesinos network as stories unfolded
about how he had converted military accounts into the principal cash cow for illegal
enrichment for himself and members of the military command. Many recognized that
Quickly Ousts Top Generals New York Times November 26. 2000; Peru's ex-army
chief arrested BBC Online December 30. 2000; Judicial System Prohibits Departure
From Peru of Nine Generals With Ties to Montesinos Agence France Presse Dec 27.
2000. On Vaticano s testimony, including his claims that Fujimori. Malca. Bellido.
Hermoza and other members of the military were involved in or aware of the drug money
Montesinos was making, and that the drugs were transported in army helicopters, see La
Republica Jan 5. 17. 31. Feb 3. 2001: Gestion Jan 31. 2001; Expreso Jan 17. 31. 2001:
and in all major dailies on Jan 12. 2001 . Victor Malca was caught after fleeing to Mexico:
La Republica Jan 3 1 . 200 1
.
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This claim is based on my survey ofAPRODEH s new summaries, available at
www.aprodeh.org.pe See. for example. Liberacion Jan 7. 2001. A similar attitude toward
the national police was often reflected in press coverage; see. for example. La Republica
Jan 4. 2001.
" See. for example, comments by retired army generals Obando. Parra. Soriano and
Pastor in La Republica January 2. 22. 2001: those by Obando in Gestion Jan 6. 2001: and
by Salinas in Expreso Nov 23, 2000. Obando highlighted accusations that members of the
military had been forced to support certain political candidates, and to convince their
family members to do so as well; Salinas expressed hope that the armed forces could now
begin to regain its lost prestige and institutional integrity.
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corruption extended throughout all ranks of the military, deeply exacerbated by the
shockingly low pay members of the armed forces received in Peru compared to other
workers in the country and to their counterparts in the armed forces of the region.
1
Yet more than simply responding to the massive corruption the previous regime
had encouraged to flourish within the armed forces. Paniagua faced the problem of
reconstructing the entire relationship between the civilian and military spheres of the
state. Military complicity had enabled Fujimori to undermine democracy in the early
1990s. but his (and Montesinos ) politicization and manipulation of the armed forces had
weakened the defense sector to the point of incapacity. Beyond removing Montesinos
cronies from positions of power within the defense sector, it was vital to build the
foundations for professional, democratic civil-military relations and to subject a reformed
military, one with the will and capacity to sen e the national interest as defined by elected
civilian leadership, to the rule of law.
Of course, the matter of civil-military relations was more complex than the
apparent consensus on accountability at first implied. Though there w as clear agreement
within the government and among the Peruvian public - on the need to thoroughly
investigate and prosecute those who contributed to the network of corruption orchestrated
by Montesinos to perpetuate Fujimori s competitive authoritarian regime, there would
prove to be far less agreement on re-opening questions of state responsibility for human
rights violations in the conflict w ith Sendero Luminoso. By the time this major crack in
the consensus for accountability became apparent, however, the human rights community
1 On use of military' pensions for illegal enrichment by Montesinos and members of the
military, see La Republica Feb 3. 2001: El Comercio, Gestion. Liberacion June 12. 2001:
Caretas Jan 1 1 . 2001 . On sources of military corruption, see Obando Corrupcion y
fuerza armada Ouehacer 129: Marzo-Abril 2001.
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had further embedded itself in the institutional mechanisms Paniagua created to oversee
Peru s first attempts at transitional justice. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that
the judicial system had been hit by the wave of discrediting revelations released with the
Vladivideos: many members of the judicial branch, including several Supreme Court
justices, were also shown being corrupted by Montesinos. Within days of the first arrests
of military personnel, other members of the military were telling the press that soldiers
and officers would not trust the civ ilian courts to treat them fairly, and that all cases
involving the military including cases of excesses committed in the course of the
anti subversive campaign - ought to be heard by military courts. 2
Meanwhile, dozens of communal gravesites. in which the bodies of thousands of
victims of the armed forces and Sendero Luminoso had been dumped, were being
uncovered across the country by forensic teams working with nongovernmental
organizations. The families of the killed and disappeared called upon the new
government and the human rights community to reopen their cases, which had been
shelved by the Fujimori administration. Often the announcements were handled by local
offices of the Human Rights Ombudsman, organizations of family members of the
disappeared, or the national human rights groups. Perhaps because the majority of the
bodies discovered were found to have been killed in the 1980s and by members of the
military, some of them still in active military duty, calls for justice inevitably included
" See. for example, comments by retired general Jaime Salinas in Expreso Jan 22. 2001.
It should be noted that some measures of military reform were made under Fujimori. For
example, in January 2000. obligatory military service was eliminated as a result of
pressure from the Defensoria del Pueblo. See Ames, Bernales et al. Situation cie la
democracia en el Peru. 2000-2001 2001. p. 205.
204
demands for investigations into the Belaunde and Garcia governments. Anger at the
corruption and abuses of power under Fujimori now mixed with calls for justice for all
those abuses perpetrated by the state over the past twenty years. °
One of Paniagua's first acts during his six months in office was the creation of a
Truth Commission by executive decree. The questions Rospigliosi pondered in 2004 are
as relevant today:
Until the beginning of the year 2000. to predict that soon there would be a TRC in
Peru would have sounded eccentric. How then did the window of opportunity for
its creation open a mere eighteen months later? How has its work impacted the
dispute over a hegemonic history of the conflict? How did its Final Report modify
the intellectual and political agenda?
4
Plans to create a truth commission had been circulating amongst members of the
government and civil society for several years prior to this. In the first of the nine
volumes of the Final Report of the Peruvian TRC. the commissioners wrote that, when
Fujimori's pursuit of further constitutional change to allow his third election provoked
international intervention to negotiate a return to normality in the country, one of the
main bargaining points on the agenda of civil society and government opposition groups
was the institution of such a commission.
'
' El Comercio Jan 3. 15. 16. 17. 18. 23. May 5. 6. 8. 26. June 21. 2001: La Republica Jan
16. 18. Feb 7. March 24. April 22. May 4. 6. 7. 8, 18. 26. July 3. 2001: Liberation Jan 8.
16. 23. March 24. July 3. 2001: Expreso Jan 29. 2001. See also Peru: Mass graves give
reminder of "dirty war", bring call for Truth Commission EFE fa Spanish news agency)
Jan 17. 2001. An FBIS Translated Excerpt is available through the World News
Connection Database. Harrowing details of massacres and human rights abuses from the
1980s were now reported in the press, either for the first time or in reviews of the horrific
events: El Comercio Feb 7. 2001 : Liberation July 24. 2001
.
74
P. 75.
‘ Contision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion Informe Final 2004.
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In December 2000. mere weeks after taking office. Paniagua s interim
government created an Interinstitutional Working Group, composed of the Ministers of
Justice, the Interior. Defense. Advancement of Women and of Human Development, and
the Human Rights Ombudsman s Office, and. from civil society, the Peruvian Episcopal
Conference, the Peruvian National Evangelical Counsel, and the Coordinadora. This
group was charged with the design and institution of the truth commission, a
responsibility which entailed three months of planning sessions in consultation with
hundreds of groups in civil society as well as national and international experts. Among
the many important points decided upon by the Working Group was the scope of the
investigations to be conducted bv the commission: not only would it undertake an
examination of the crimes committed by all sides during armed conflict with Sendero
Luminoso. but also the crimes committed under the government of Fujimori, including
intimidation of legal opposition groups and the derogation of civil rights.
Throughout the three months of work of the Interinstitutional Working Group,
members of Congress, the human rights NGO community, and even the group itself used
the press as a way of lobbying for their preferences for the formation of the commission.
Nearly all these actors were consulted by the group itself. Sofia Macher. Executive
Secretary of the Coordinadora. was particularly vocal about how the truth commission
ought to be formed and how it should focus its work. As early as January 1. 2001.
Macher s vision for the commission was being reported in the press. Of particular interest
was her insistence from the beginning that the commission pave the way for
accountability in the civilian courts system, in addition to reparations for the families of
victims. The commission should carry on its work over two years and must fairly
206
investigate the crimes committed by the state. Sendero Luminoso and MRTA.
h
From
within the administration. Justice Minister Diego Garcia Sayan and Ombudsman Walter
Alban echoed Macher s position, though the}' were careful to emphasize reconciliation,
justice for the most significant cases, and a focus on developing institutional reforms to
prevent a recurrence of human rights violations. Lourdes Flores, a high-profile member
of Congress and later the early front-runner in the first round of the presidential contest in
2006. argued that the commission need only deal with a few symbolic cases and not
attempt a comprehensive treatment of all human rights crimes. At the top of her list of
crimes to be investigated was the prison assault carried out under President Alan Garcia.
Many others chimed in to support the position that the commission s work ought to reach
back to the Belaunde administration and acknowledge that human rights abuses had
peaked under Garcia. The Human Rights Ombudsman s office concurred.
Less clear was whether the commission should be empowered to address the issue
of questionable convictions under Fujimori s anti-terrorism laws and the question of
amnestied soldiers legal status. Many Peruvian scholars and journalists examined other
countries experiences with truth commissions for guidelines for Peru s ow n version.
Should Peru s commission, like that of South Africa, offer pardons to those who admitted
their crimes? The human rights community and popular opinion w ere united on this
point: no reconciliation would be accepted that included pardons for members of the
military or rebel groups who committed abuses. Yet even after the Working Group s
h
La Republicci Jan 1. 2001. This position was backed by all human rights organizations
cited in the press. See Liberation Jan 8. 2001
.
El Pemano Jan 2. Feb 14. March 8. April 4. May 28. 2001; La Republica March 25.
Feb 14. April 2. May 30. 2001: Expreso Jan 22. April 2 2001: Gestion Feb 14. March 8.
April 2. May 30. 2001: El Comercio April 2, 2001.
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proposal was forwarded to Paniagua, these points remained contentious. Justice Minister
Diego Garcia Sayan insisted that neither the commission nor the administration was
empowered to void amnesties, and that the truth commission ought to help determine
how to grant amnesty in a legitimate manner to promote reconciliation. Other members of
the Working Group signaled their belief that the invalidity of the military amnesties had
already been established by the IACHR decision and that the truth commission was
intended to assign responsibility, not grant amnesties.'
If the most controversial question was the time period to be investigated, many
other points of contention drew public comment as well. Some emphasized that the
commission must coordinate the forensic work taking place in communal gravesites
throughout the country. Others discussed the appropriate makeup of the committee,
alternately suggesting that the commissioners be appointed or popularly elected, or that
they be drawn from Peru s human rights community or civil society broadly,
international specialists in transitional justice, representatives from the UN. or some
mixture of these groups. APRODEH advocated the inclusion of members of the US NGO
the International Center for Transitional Justice, among them scholars of transitional
justice and former members of truth commissions in other countries, including Priscilla
Hayner. Douglas Cassel. Paul Van Zyc and Juan Mendez. International observers voiced
their opinions as well: Jorge Baraybar reflected on his experience in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the challenges before Peru s truth
78
Ibid. For the Working Group s final report see Grupo de Trabajo Interinstitucional
Anteproyecto de de Decreto Supremo. Creacion de la Comision de la Verdad 2001. For
the legislation establishing the Commission, see Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros
Resoluciones Supremas 330-2001 (July 6, 2001 ) and 438-2001 (Sept 5. 2001 ) and
Decretos Supremos 065-2001 (June 2. 2001 ) and 101-2001 (Aug 31. 2001): and
Ministerio de Justicia Resolucion Supremo 304-2000 Dec 9. 2000.
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commission, which he felt sure would need more than two years to complete its work.
Luis Salgado of the UN expressed his opinion, based on experience with the Guatemalan
transitional justice apparatus, on the Peruvian commission s makeup (which he thought
ought to include officials from the UN), length of operation, time period covered, etc.
Peruvians influential in the debate, including the Human Rights Ombusman s Office,
preferred to restrict its work time to two years or less. 79
Meanwhile, citizens held demonstrations in support of the truth commission and
its prompt formation in Lima, joined by human rights groups and the mayor. Alejandro
Toledo and indeed all of the major candidates for the upcoming elections. Alan Garcia
and Lourdes Flores included, pledged to continue to support the truth commission if
elected president, whatever the Working Group and administration decided in terms of its
parameters and nature. When the Working Group reported to Congress in March, it
proposed the commission s formation before the change of administration, affirmed that
its work would reach back to 1980. and maintained that it should conclude its
investigations in fifteen to eighteen months. The Working Group proposed a composition
of seven commissioners appointed by the president.
When the Working Group sent its proposals to the president, large demonstrations
were again held to press for immediate action. Public opinion polls showed that 82.9% of
the public supported the truth commission s creation and 74.3% thought the moment w as
right for it to begin its work. Public comments from the Working Group upon completion
of its proposal emphasized the need to uncover the truth and reconstruct national memory
4
La Repablica Jan 7. 8. Feb 14. March 8. June 10. 2001 : El Comercio Feb 6. 14. June
10. 2001: Expreso Jan 22. March 5. 2001: Caretas Feb 8. 2001: Gestion Feb 14. March
16. 2001.
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in order to heal the wounds left by two decades of conflict: little was said about whether
prosecutions would result. Confusing the situation mightily were conflicting statements
in the press: while some argued prosecutions would absolutely follow the findings of the
commission, others argued that national reconciliation implied impunity for those guilty
of abuses. Roberto Garreton. a Chilean expert on human rights who had frequently
worked with the UN. told the press that Peruvians ought to reject any truth commission as
it would replace prosecutions, a claim roundly rejected by most Peruvian human rights
experts and international members of the TAN. Mary Robinson. TNI High Commissioner
for Human Rights, for example, promised her agency s assistance to the truth
eommission in its objectives of identifying the victims, trying the victimizes, and ending
impunity. Members of the Working Group and the human rights community continued to
use the media to advocate for their sometimes disparate visions for the truth commission,
and to propose individuals as potential commissioners. Other organisms of civil society,
such as the confederation of labor unions CGTP lobbied alongside members of the
_ t #
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military for representatives oi their organizations to be included in the commission.'
80 .
Toledo s comments about the truth commission were covered in all major daily
newspapers in Peru on Jan 6. 2001 . He made similar comments to Gestion on Jan 1 6.
2001. though oddly his comments included the argument that the commission should also
investigate abuses perpetrated in the course of anti-narcotics operations. See also El
Peruano
.
El Comercio and Liberacion May 20. 2001 and El Pernano March 8. 2001. The
Working Group s unfolding plans for the truth commission and the various controversies
over its nature were reported in great detail in the press. See La Republica Jan 7, 8. Feb
14. March 16. 24. 31. May 2. 23. 27. June 17. 2001; El Comercio Feb 6. 14. March 28.
April 4. June 17. 2001: Expreso Jan 22. March 5. May 28. 29. 2001: Caretas Feb 8. 2001:
Gestion Feb 14. March 16. 31. May 3. 25. 28. 29. 2001; Liberacion March 31. 2001: El
Peruano April 4. May 3. 28. 2001. On the question of w hether the truth commission
implied impunity, see for example, contrasting comments by Garreton. Montoya. Garcia-
Sayan. Diez Canseco, and Robinson in La Republica May 20. 30. June 10. 2001 and El
Comercio May 30. 2001
.
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Though severely weakened by the shake-up in the command structure and the
discrediting of its leadership from the previous decade, the military did not remain
complacent as debates about the transitional justice agenda took place. Retired military
personnel, in particular, came forward to argue that, while it was right and just to hold the
military leadership under Fujimori responsible for their abuses of power and corruption,
it was unfair to use the weakened state of the armed forces as an excuse to blame them
for excesses committed in the countersubversive campaign. Peru s soldiers had dutifully
carried out the orders of their civilian presidents to fight a dangerous enemy: to subject
them to trials in the deeply flawed court system and in the context of a public mood in
search of scapegoats to blame for the national crisis would be unjust.
While few rejected outright the need for a truth commission, members and
supporters of the armed forces opposed any commission that would seek to individualize
responsibility for human rights abuses within the military, and many called upon the
commission to include representatives of the armed forces in its work to ensure
protection against a witch hunt against the military, two positions members of the human
rights community immediately rejected. A small minority expressed the opinion, usually
in the pages of Expreso, that the truth commission w as a tool of the Leninist left that
sought to destroy the armed forces. Such important decisions, the}' argued, should be in
the hands of elected leaders, not special commissioners hand-picked by the president and
Q 1
heavily influenced by the NGOs.
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Expreso Jan 1 1 , 22. 23. May 27. 30. June 21. 200 1 ; see also Caretas May 3 1 . 2001 and
La Republica May 27, 2001 . For accusations that there was a witch hunt against the
military' and/or supporters of the Fujimori regime, see Expreso Jan 16. 25. May 30. 2001:
Gesrion Jan 22. 2001: El Comercio Jan 15. 2001 (this last one based on public statement
by the Association of Officials. Generals and Admiral in Defense of the Armed Forces,
At this point, some members of Congress began to reassess the accountability
consensus: to some, it now appeared that Paniagua was allowing the human rights
community to use the consensus over investigating and prosecuting Fujimori s corrupt
regime as a battering ram to force through their political agenda of spreading blame for
human rights abuses to the political and armed forces leadership of the last twenty years.
Alan Garcia s APRA. only just returned to majority party status in the April 2001
legislative elections, had reason to fear what a thorough investigation of Garcia s own
handling of the conflict might reveal. Garcia had returned from his self-imposed exile in
Colombia, where he had fled after Fujimori s autogolpe in part to dodge the
government s investigations into charges he had taken millions of dollars in bribes while
serving as president, only weeks before the legislative elections and was busily
attempting to restore his own political image and prestige as both the head of the
country s largest political party and as a candidate for the presidency. "
The first round of the presidential election, held the day before the legislative
elections, put Toledo and Garcia on the ballot for the second round. When the second
round vote was conducted in June 2001. Garcia received 47.9% of the vote compared to
who blamed the press for damaging the reputation of the armed forces). Members of the
administration, the truth commission. NGOs and Toledo often responded to these charges
via the press: La Republica, Liberation Jan 20. June 10. 2001 : Gestion Jan 22. 23. July
16. 2001: El Peruana Jan 23. July 16. 2001. Accusations that members of the military
could not expect fair trials in the civilian court system were much more plausible
(Hermoza s sister made such an accusation. Expreso April 17. 2001 ).
o->
t # ...
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" On Garcia s return and the debate over whether to abide by the 1ACHR s decision in
his case, see Expreso Jan 9. 10, 18. 2001; Liberation Jan 9. 10. 11. 2001: La Republica
Jan 10. 11. 18. 2001; El Peruana Jan 15. 2001: El Comercio Jan 10. 18. 2001; Gestion
Jan 9. 10. 1 1. 15. 18; and Caretas Jan 1 1. 2001. Garcia s strong showing in the elections
and his position on the truth commission are discussed in detail in the next chapter. See
Gestion and El Comercio May 26, 2001; Expreso May 27. 2001
.
Toledo s 53. 1% - a remarkable showing for Garcia who. after all. was considered by
many the worst president in Peruvian history, had spent the last eight years avoiding
prosecution for corruption, and had been found guilty of contempt of court and human
rights abuses by the IACHR. Now. as the head of the second-largest party in Congress.
Garcia gave greater voice to his doubts about the truth commission and the IACHR.
Garcia gave the proponents of the truth commission good reason to worry that he would
hinder or limit its work if he were elected president. Though he ultimately signed a
pledge to support the truth commission if elected, members of civil society pressed the
Paniagua administration to establish the commission before the elections, lest Garcia,
who would have great incentive to restrain it. be elected. International and domestic
human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch. Amnesty International, and many
others, publicly and privately called upon Garcia to respect and abide by the findings of
the truth commission if he were elected. Others intensified their denunciations against
Garcia, accusing him of having overseen genocide and a variety of human rights abuses,
and calling upon the Justice Minister to initiate criminal investigations against the ex-
president.
Though Garcia himself attempted occasionally to gain political capital by
criticizing the armed forces and promising its reform if he became president. Toledo had
the obvious advantage in this matter. Toledo taunted Garcia in the press, promising to
work with him as soon as the ex-president submitted to the justice the truth commission
would demand. It was anticipated that Garcia might end compliance with IACHR
decisions as well, given the court s findings against his administration in the cases of the
El Frontin and other prison case and forced disappearances carried out during his
presidency. When asked whether he would support the IAC'HR decision to grant new
trials to those convicted under Fujimori s antiterrorism laws. Garcia responded he would
o
opt instead to protect the security of la patria. '
'
The public s impression that the new accountability agenda implied investigation
of Fujimori s government and not of the conflict with Sendero Luminoso persisted for
months. Large numbers of respondents in focus groups and polls indicated their belief
that the primary goal of the truth commission was to study the corruption and crimes of
the Fujimori regime, despite the fact that the Working Group s proposal had specifically
O I
excluded corruption from the commission s investigation parameters. In fact. Paniagua
had unilaterally institutionalized a powerful mechanism for the human rights community
to achieve a vital step in its broader agenda of establishing state security forces role in
massive human rights abuses peipetrated in the course of the conflict with Sendero
Luminoso. Leaders of the Peruvian human rights community, in partnership with a
transnational activist network often spearheaded by the New York-based International
Center for Transitional Justice, were influential in shaping the design and powers of the
Sj
Liberation April 28. 2001 : Expreso Feb 1 9. 2001. On the question of Garcia s position
on the truth commission before the elections, and demands that the commission be
established before the second round of the presidential election, lest the winner refuse to
institute it. see also La Republica April 29. May 4. 6. 15. 21. June 17. 2001: Gestion May
26. 28. 2001: El Comercio May 4. 12. 26. 2001. Expreso May 27. 2001. On Garcia and
the 1ACF1R see El Comercio May 26. June 1. 2001: Liberacion May 26. 2001: Expreso
May 1 . 2001 . General denunciations of human rights abuses under Garcia: Liberacion Jan
17. 2001. On Garcia s and APRA s campaigning on military reform, see La Republica
April 22. 2001.
s4
Penaflor Guerra "Documento de Trabajo: Analisis del impacto de la Comision de la
Verdad y Reconcilacion" 2005; see comments by Walter Alban El Comercio April 4.
2001 .
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Peruvian TRC. Commissioners and members of civil society drew heavily upon the
experiences of other states with truth commissions in creating their own plans for Peru's
transitional justice experience. 8
"
Its reputation severely tarnished and its leadership under Fujimori deeply
discredited, the armed forces were to face a still greater blow. In April 2001. only days
before the first round of the elections, another videotape rocked Peru, this one taken in
1999 - showing top military and police commanders and hundreds of officers signing a
document supporting Fujimori s 1992 closure of the judicial and legislative branches of
government and proclaiming their opposition to human rights investigations. After the
release of the video, the military s top commanders many of whom appeared in the
video - gave a press conference during which Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Pablo Carbone explained the commanders were forced to sign the document. He
asked for understanding and forgiveness from Peruvians, explaining that they had no
choice but to sign. Carbone went on to pledge his loyalty to the interim government and
the constitution. He. along with Admiral Victor Ramos. General Carlos Tafur and
National Police General Armando Santisteban. all of whom had been appointed in
November 2000 to replace Montesinos cronies, apologized to the nation, condemned the
1 992 autogolpe. and then offered their resignations to President Paniagua.
o ... ... .
This claim is substantiated by interv iew results, references in the final report of the
truth commission, and numerous public statements made by the Commissioners to this
effect. See. for example, comments by TRC President Salomon Lemer and TRC
Commissioner Carlos Tapia in El Comercio'
s
January 2005 special edition review ing
progress since the release of the final report.
86 On the initial release of the tape and the response of the military commanders, see El
Peniano, La Republica, Gestion, and El Comercio April 6. 9. 11. 12. 2001: La Republica
April 13.2001.
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Although it was the Peruvian Congress which chose to release these videos.
according to the BBC.
President Paniagua s government [had] earlier [that] month expressed support for
the current police and military high command, arguing they were forced to sign
the endorsements You must understand that for reasons of national and
internal security we can t replace all of the officers who have been blackmailed.
Prime Minister Javier Perez de Cuellar said last week. It was the same as if a nun
• 87
were put to your head and you were told: Sign or die.
While the administration kept the military commanders in place through the election.
Paniagua ultimately accepted the resignations of the military commanders in a historic
address to the nation. With one stroke, the high command of all branches of the military
was replaced. The office of the Minister of Defense prepared charges against the officers
to be heard by the highest military court, the CSJM. The response had been carefully
crafted to send a double message: first, that the administration recognized the necessity to
maintain the institutional integrity of the armed forces by not discrediting all military
officers who had served under Fujimori, but that, second, the military command was now
completely subservient to the civilian government and would be held accountable for its
actions. The fear that military leaders might be tempted to lead a rebellion in order to
protect officers from prosecutions and themselves from a loss of power was now. a mere
five months later, dispelled. Though Caretas reported a growing unease across the ranks.
88
they remained silent in the face of the high command s self-criticism and repentance."
s
Peruvian military chiefs offer to quit. BBC Online. April 1 7. 2001. The story was
covered in all major Peruvian daily newspapers April 16. 17. 2001.
88
See El Comercio, El Peruano and Liberation April 12. 18. 2001 and Caretas April 1 1.
2001 .
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Of course, even replacing the entire military command could not eliminate the
mark of Montesinos and Fujimori upon the military. Among the replacements for the
high command there were several with troubling connections to Montesinos. Roberto
Chiabra. for example. Carlos Tafur s replacement, had worked for SIN under Montesinos
and been promoted by the Fujimori administration. Moreover. El Comercio scoffed at the
notion that the CSJM might deal fairly with the commanders removed for appearing in
the video and pledging their allegiance to Fujimori s abusive regime: six of the eleven
justices of the CSJM who would hear the case against the commanders had themselves
signed the document, according to military sources. And how could any legitimate
command structure be rescued from the military at this point, many wondered, when only
two members of the Air Force command structure had not signed the pledge because
they were out of the country?
84
Still, the public and the press were pleased to see the president take decisive
action against the military. Apoyo opinion polls indicated that 77% of respondents
approved of the president s decision to accept the resignations of the military
commanders; only 10% disapproved. Of those who knew about the president s message
to the nation (37% did not). 82.5% approved of it. The press found many retired military
commanders who embraced the idea that Paniagua s strictness with the military'
commanders would help restore the credibility and honor of the armed forces, but public
opinion polls indicated that a majority (66%) believed the commanders statements
84
See Liberation April 12. 2001: El Comercio April 13. 2001 and all major daily
newspapers April 19 and 20, 2001 . Experts in security, such as Enrique Obando. and in
justice, such as president of the National Council of Magistrates, the body which appoints
judges, were already calling for the CSJM to be reorganized under the civilian judicial
system (.Expreso Jan 29. May 2. 2001 ). a matter which will be discussed in detail in the
next chapter.
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rejecting the autogolpe and pledging their commitment to the new democratic regime was
forced rather than sincere. The only debate, it appeared, was about whether the
commanders should be tried for their support of the autogolpe . and which courts ought to
have control of the case. El Comercio demanded the case be tried by civilian rather than
military-' courts and rejected the idea of a parceled out system ofjustice that only slowly
challenged the military s traditional use of the justice system for its own protection. This
would become the issue that would define civil-military relations in the area of human
rights accountability under Toledo. For now the debate was deferred by the CSJM s
decision to send the case to the civilian Supreme Court. 90
The appearance of the video and the subsequent replacement of the high
command prompted calls for total reorganization of the military: it was not enough to
replace the faces of the military, observers agreed. A genuine reform of the institutions of
the armed forces to reflect the new democratic era of the country and the altered security
situation was absolutely necessary.
01
This sense was reinforced greatly when a letter was
publicized in the media providing evidence that the commanders of the army. navy, air
force and police had been planning a coup in the run-up to Fujimori s fraudulent 2000
9,1
Polling data available in Opinion data. Apovo Opinion y Mercado. Resunien de
Encuests a la Opinion Publica. 18 de Junio del 2001 . Available online at www.apovo-
om.com.. For statements of support for Paniagua s action in this case, many of them from
former military commanders, see La Republica April 13: El Comercio
,
Caretas. La
Republica. Gestion. and El Peruano April 16. 19. 2001. On the question of military trials
and punishment of the commanders, see La Republica and El Comercio April 16. 21.
2001
.
and Gestion April 2 1 . 200 1
.
91
See comments to this effect from Luis Iberico. Marciano Rengifo. Carlos Tapia. Alan
Garcia and others who would have a big impact on later reform ofme military: El
Comercio
.
La Republica. El Peruano. Expreso. and Gestion April 17. 18. 19. 2001. See
also El Comercio April 16. 21 (calling for new laws governing military behavior); La
Republica Jan 13. May 1 6. 200 1 ; Gestion June 2 1 . 200 1
.
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election. In the wake of the letter. President Paniagua established a commission on
military reform: the final report of this commission would be released after Toledo s
assumption of the presidency and would serve as a guide for the military reform agenda
for the next five years.
The press and the public renewed their calls for the formation of the truth
commission as well, for after creating the Inter-Institutional Working Group to oversee
the commission s creation, little concrete action had been taken on that front. Given
increasing evidence of the reach of Montesinos corruption into the judiciary and
especially the military courts, the truth commission was seen by many, particularly within
the NGO community, as the only trustworthy institution to investigate in a
comprehensive manner the human rights abuses of the recent past. As the elections
approached. Paniagua received intense pressure from Amnesty International. APRODEH.
the Andean Commission of Jurists, family members of the disappeared and killed, and
others to install the truth commission. These groups held protests, high level meetings
with Paniagua, and a petition campaign to demand an acceleration of its installation and
an explanation for the delay.
While the public and international and domestic human rights groups and even
Toledo himself - pushed for the commission to begin work before the end of the Paniagua
administration, and despite frequent promises from the administration that it would install
the commission before the end of its term, the commission was ultimately created and the
commissioners appointed only weeks before the Toledo administration began. In a final
flurry of press reports clarifying the Paniagua administration s vision for the commission,
a number of points were clarified: the commission would name individuals it deemed
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responsible for human rights violations: it would forward cases to the courts for
prosecution: the commissioners would all be Peruvian; and there would not be
commissioners appointed from the armed forces, which some had suggested as a means
to ensure their cooperation and assist in their rehabilitation.
Other points were deferred to the incoming administration, such as whether the
commission s findings on institutional reforms should be legally binding. When one of
the commissioners appointed not. as it turned out. based on Paniagua s preference, but
rather on a secret voting procedure by the president s council of ministers provoked
criticism from members of Congress and the human rights community for her service
under Fujimori, the possibility that Toledo might alter the truth commission was widely
discussed. Though Congress made moves to hold its own vote on the establishment of a
truth commission and to make changes to the plan decreed by the executive, such moves
were quickly shot down. 92
9
' For calls for and promises of the speedy formation of the truth commission,
specifically linked in most cases to reform of the military and holding members of the
armed forces accountable for human rights abuses, see El Comercio April 4. 11. 18. 20.
May 4. 12. 30. 2001: La Republica April 1 1. 18. 19. 20. 22. 29. May 1. 4. 5. 6. 8. 14. 16.
17. 1 8. 20. 2 1 . 200 1 : El Peruano March 8. April 11. 18. May 9. 1 7. 200 1 : Caretas April
5. 19. 2001: Gestion March 7. 8. April 17. May 17. 2001: Expreso April 20. May 5. 18.
2001. The cabinet s announcement that the truth commission would be installed before
the change of administration, but begin its work under the new administration, was
carried in all major daily newspapers on May 26 and 29. 2001 . On the long-awaited
installation of the commission and the appointment of its seven commissioners, and the
controversy over Beatriz Alva s appointment and the decision to exclude non-Peruvian
commissioners, see Expreso and El Comercio June 11, 13. 14. 2001: La Republica June
13. 2001: Gestion June 14. 2001: all major dailies on July 7. 8. 9. 10. 2001; El Peruano.
Gestion. Expreso, and La Republica July 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 18. 2001: beyond this,
see next chapter, in which the Commission s work is discussed in detail. A. public
opinion poll conducted by Apoyo found that the public w as divided over whether the
commissioners appointed by Paniagua could be removed by Toledo: see Opinion data.
Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion Publica. 16 de Julio del
2001 . Available online at www.apoyo-om.com. Also on this, see Caretas May 31, 2001
.
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It appeared that much of the machinery for reform of civil-military relations and
transitional justice established by Paniagua would be at work long after Toledo took
office. The new administration would inherit a military agenda crowded with
controversy. While the new military commanders pledged upon their confirmations to
uphold the democratic values of the Constitution, to restore the glory and trustworthiness
of the armed forces, and to support the work of the truth commission in its investigations.
Defense Minister Ledesma promised the changes in the military were only beginning.
In the weeks after the latest military crisis, Ledesma announced that the Defense
Ministry had trimmed $424 million dollars from the defense budget already, and that
more cuts lie ahead, despite objections from within the military that more budget cuts
might jeopardize anti-narcotics and anti-subversive campaigns. The number of high-
ranking officers had been trimmed, and the Ministry was working on proposals for the
reform of the laws overseeing the military. Finally, the CSJM was being reformed and
staffed with retired military personnel removed by FujimoriW Though retired military
personnel continued to propose alternate mechanisms for dealing with military abuses,
including a Military Truth Commission separate from the one decreed by Paniagua, the
On whether the commission s findings would be legally binding, see Gestion and La
Republica June 12. 2001: on whether Congress could or should make its own proposals
for the truth commission, see Gestion and La Republica June 11, 12, 13. 2001.
4-1
La Republica and Gestion April 20. 28. 2001: Expreso April 23. 2001: El Comercio
April 23. 28. 2001: El Pentano April 25. 28. 2001: Liberacion April 28. 2001. Caretas
(April 26. 2001 ) called for further firings of high-ranking military personnel connected to
the Fujimori regime. Ledesma s reforms w ere met with praise from many retired military
personnel {El Pentano April 29. 2001 ) and members of the press {El Comercio April 30.
2001). For an excellent treatment of military reform under Paniagua, see Pedraglio.
Tamayo and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control civily relaciones civiles-militares 2002.
military s acquiescence to the new civilian mechanisms of human rights accountability,
including the IACHR decisions and the emerging truth commission, now seemed
assured.
1,4
Conclusions
Paniagua s assertion of civilian control of the armed forces and his establishment
of a truth commission by executive decree were bold and swift moves, the likelihood of
which had seemed remote only months before. As Carlos Degregori writes, To dare to
speak about the crimes and violations of human rights of our recent history in a manner
so direct would have been unthinkable three years before. Suddenly empowered to
publicize the evidence of massive human rights violations, the human rights community
looked forward with great anticipation to the upcoming truth commission. Human rights
groups praised Paniagua for improving the outlook of human rights in the nation
through the steps of restoring IACHR jurisdiction, forming the working groups to set up
4
Politics Peru: Historic Chance to Depoliticize the Armed Forces. Inter Press
Service. Oct 5. 2001 . The publication of the coup plot letter also elicited a response from
Fujimori, who issued a statement from Japan asserting that the coup was intended to stop
investigations of human rights violations and corruption committed by Montesinos.
Fujimori continued to deny involvement. On the speeches of the new military
commanders and Tedesma s comments, see Gestion. Expreso, El Comercio. La
Republica and El Peruano April 17. 19. 20. 2001: Caretas April 26. 2001. On retired
General Sinesio Jaraina s proposed plans for military reform, including the formation of a
separate Military Truth Commission to promote reconciliation between the armed forces
and Perm ian society, see La Republica June 1 6. 2001
.
9
' Assessments of the Paniagua administration were very positive, as reported in both
domestic and international. For international expressions of support for Paniagua, see. for
example. Levitsky and Sanborn s editorial in the New York Times May 9, 2001 and
statements by US ambassador to Peru John Hamilton in Gestion April 19. 2001.
Degregori Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre la Comision de la
Verdad y Reconciliacion 2004. p. 81
.
the TRC. handling the crisis of the military high command, and reestablishing the
Constitutional Tribunal. Military reform was taking place at an unexpected pace. Public
opinion, too. supported the creation of the truth commission, by an overwhelming
majority: 86% of respondents supported its creation when polled in July 2001 ; only 10%
were opposed.
g When Paniagua left office, his name had become virtually synonymous
with transitional justice in Peru: politicians and the public alike envisioned his future role
as either Human Rights Ombudsman. Secretary General of the OAS. President of the
Supreme Court, or president of the truth commission.
What had occurred during this transitional phase was an unprecedented
confluence of forces. Within Peru, the human rights community and the state operated as
powerful allies, empowered to move against the military on controversial questions of
human rights accountability. These two actors enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the
public when virtually no other institution of the state or society did. and while the armed
forces were at least temporarily paralyzed by the implication of the high command in
corruption, institutional decay and politicization, and human rights abuses. Beyond Peru,
however, these actors were further empow ered and influenced by the Inter-American
system and by the partners in the human rights network painstakingly constructed over
two decades. The domestic and international partners in the Perm ian human rights
Financial Times Information. Global News Wire. Peru: Human Rights Amnesty
Praises Historic Inter-American Court Ruling on Peru. March 26. 2001. Lexis-Nexus
online. See also El Perucmo April 24. 2001 : Gestion April 26. 2001 . Opinion data.
Apoyo Opinion v Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion Publica. 16 de Julio del
2001 . Av ailable online at www.apoyo-om.com.
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Gestion May 29, 2001; Opinion Data Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de
Encuests a la Opinion Publica. 18 de Junio del 2001. Available online at www.apoyo-
om.com
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network had found the Inter-American system a receptive and powerful venue for its
campaign. As De la Jara Basombrio writes, the Peruvian experience demonstrates that
when national momentum coincides with a surge of momentum from the Inter-American
system, the possibilities for advance in the desired direction are greater. Where the
human rights community s campaign against impunity and for the rule of law coincided
with the interests of those in power in Peru and the demands of the Inter-American
system, rapid change resulted.
w
As we shall see in the next chapter, the influence of the
Inter-American system and the human rights movement in shaping the Peruvian
experience with transitional justice would continue to play out over the next several
years.
The public was pleased with the results of the Paniagua administration. The
interim administration enjoyed exceptionally high approval levels, indicating that most
Peruvians were convinced Paniagua was taking the country in the right direction by
rooting out Montesinos cronies and re-establishing Peru s democratic credentials before
the w orld. Opinion surveys found that 81% of respondents considered the Paniagua
transitional government to have been a positive experience for the country: only 1 1%
considered it to have been negative. Forty six percent of respondents believed that respect
for human rights had improved over the course of the Paniagua transition: 47% thought
control of corruption had improved: and 54% felt respect for democracy had improved. 100
L,L>
De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobrejusticia y derechos humanos 2003. p. 41.
1 "" Opinion data. Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion
Publica. 19 de Julio del 2001. Available online at www.apoyo-om.com. 39% said respect
for human rights had not changed over the Paniagua administration: 10% said it had
worsened. 33% felt control of corruption remained the same: 10% thought it had
worsened. 31 % said respect for democracy had stayed the same: 10% thought it had
224
Paniagua had clearly opened the way for the dismissal of members of the military
whose loyalty to democracy and their own institutions had been tarnished: over the
course of 2001. Paniagua and Toledo oversaw more than 450 retirements, among them
more than twenty brigadier generals, aimed at weeding out corruption and cutting the size
of the bloated military. According to McC'lintock and Valias, for the most pail, the top
ranks of Peru s military were so discredited by their association with the Fujimori regime
that they could not resist the new governments purges. The public remained rather less
convinced that the military was now entirely under control: 35% of those polled in July
2001 believed that it was likely there would be a military coup in the next year (54%
thought it was unlikely). In one final coup de grace, the Paniagua administration was able
to announce that Montesinos had been captured in Venezuela. His capture occurred less
than two weeks after a congressional committee reported on the network of corruption he
had established from his privileged position within the state under Fujimori and on the
quarter of a billion dollars he had amassed as a result. 1
" 1
However, efforts to investigate human rights abuses were not among the high
priorities of Peruvians in this period, and support to eliminate corruption was much
stronger than that in favor of human rights accountability. When asked at the end of his
worsened. For domestic assessments, see La Republica May 13. 2001. in which
Paniagua s success is attributed in large part to his very un-caudillo style.
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Ministry of Defense. Peru. Plan Estrategico de Reforma del Sector Defensa.
Available at www.mindef.gov.pe According to McClintock and Valias The United Stales
and Pent 2003. the number of purged officers was 486. p. 164. On the capture of
Montesinos. see all major daily newspapers in Peru, but especially La Republica. on June
25. 2001. Opinion data. Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion
Publica. 1 8 de Junio del 2001 . Available online at www.apoyo-om.com
presidency what the Paniagua administration s greatest achievements had been. Peruvians
ranked them as follows:
1 . The capture of Montesinos
2. The cleanness of the elections
3. The return to democracy
4. The fight against corruption
5. Assistance to areas affected by earthquake
6. The creation of the Truth Commission
At the beginning of the transitional administration, polling respondents said they thought
the highest priorities of the transitional government ought to be the economy (39%).
corruption (32%). and the next elections (26%): as the administration ended, the concerns
of the population reflected the same set of priorities, with unemployment and poverty
heading the list. Human rights violations now were a rare phenomenon (only 12% of
those polled considered human rights violations as one of the three largest problems the
country faced: only 2% thought it should be the first issue the new administration
tackled); the much more immediate dangers of poverty and joblessness were foremost in
the minds of the public. While Peruvians were supportive of the president s efforts to
create accountability as a whole, there already seemed to be more doubt and disinterest
over human rights accountability in the public than the nongovernmental organizations
wanted to admit. Corruption remained a much greater danger in the public mind.
Furthermore, the high level of public support enjoyed by Paniagua and his cabinet
were not available to Congress or the Judiciary, whose approval ratings remained low at
38% and 28% in March 2001 (compared to Paniagua s 68%). 102 Congress would, over
102 Apoyo poll conducted in Lima, reported in El Comerc\o Dec 19. 2000: also Opinion
data. Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a la Opinion Publica. April
2001. Available online at www.apoyo-om.com. On approval ratings for Paniagua,
typically ranging from 65% to 80%, see this same poll, as well as one by the National
226
the course of 2001 and 2002. assert greater control of the transitional justice agenda, but
with much lower public support than it had under Paniagua. Cooperation among
members of Congress was difficult to broker, as was already becoming clear by the end
of the Paniagua administration. Paniagua attempted to construct a Mesa c/e Dialogo.
modeled after the OAS-led mesa of 2000 but now to be composed of political leaders of
all parties and institutions in an attempt to develop the democratization agenda for the
incoming administration. It quickly fell apart due to partisan bickering. 1
"'
Similarly. Toledo would never enjoy the high level of public approval of
Paniagua. What the incoming Toledo administration and new Congress would make of
the transitional justice agenda they inherited and of the sticky business of civil-military
reform remained to be seen.
Engineering University in Lima reported the same day in La Republica (the source of the
Congressional approval ratings cited here). For comparative Apoyo data, go to
wvwv.apoyo-om.com On public priorities, see Apovo polling data report for June 18.
2001 .
1
See El Comercio April 20. May 3. 2001: La Republica and Gestion April 20. 2001.
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CHAPTER V
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER TOLEDO
When Alejandro Toledo entered the presidency, a high level of consensus existed
among the public and the political elite in favor of far-reaching changes to the political
system of the country. In August 2001
.
polling data indicated that the public found even
the Constitution of 1993 to be illegitimate, a sign of the debilitated status of state
legitimacy at the time.
1
Consensus existed too for thorough investigation of the
wrongdoings of the previous regime, including those committed by the military, as a
necessary step toward rebuilding the institutions of the state and earning back public
respect and trust for them.
However, as the institutions established to ascertain the truth about wrongdoing
within the state gradually released their reports and set about punishing those deemed
responsible, that initial consensus began to fracture. It quickly became apparent that
Toledo s control of the transitional justice agenda was quite weak, as he was largely
reduced to reacting to the controversial decisions of a series of commissions and from
various parts of the court system: generally, his reaction was avoidance. Whereas
Paniagua was able to control the transitional justice agenda himself (creating the truth
commission and purging the military high command). Toledo had less direct control of
the unfolding process. Paniagua had taken advantage of the release of the video showing
the military high command committing itself to protecting Fujimori s authoritarian
project to exercise an unprecedented power over the military institutions, but over the
1
Poll conducted by Universidad de Lima and published in El Comercio Aug 16. 2001:
cited in Bernales Ballesteros Aspectos constitucionales de la transition democratica
2001 . As of this writing. Peru has not drafted a new constitution.
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course of the Toledo administration, these institutions would recover much of their
power, credibility and authority. Meanwhile, the center of action shifted from the
President to Congress and then to the Courts. As we shall see. each of these institutions
struggled with a crisis of legitimacy, with public approval of these institutions reaching
all-time lows. The window of opportunity for changing the nature of civil -military
relations in the area of human rights accountability would begin closing quickly.
Certainly, there were early signs that the country faced troubling times. Toledo
inherited a less corrupt and unstable system than had Paniagua, but the 2001 elections
gave the new president a weak mandate. Surprisingly, ex-president Alan Garcia, who
reentered the county shortly after Fujimori s fall, narrowly missed defeating Toledo in
the presidential elections, receiving only 5% fewer votes. Furthermore. Toledo s Peru
Posible party controlled a mere 26% of congressional seats, perpetuating the country s
historic problem of executive-legislative tension. Toledo also came into the presidency
with a public in a deeply cynical and suspicious mood. The continuing release of
Montesinos thousands of videos embittered the public and turned rumor-mongering into
the new national pastime. Peruvians interviewed by the domestic and international press
regularly complained that These tapes show you can't trust a single politician.
Allegations w ere constantly been made and then rescinded, many of them touching upon
the country s key politicians, including Paniagua and Toledo. Though such allegations
were usually proven false within days, the stink of the Fujimori regime s corruption
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continued to taint the entire political class, driving a deeper and deeper wedge between
Peru s elites and the public. The steady flow of shocking information revealed by
Montesinos from prison exacerbated the problem.'
Part of Toledo s strategy for building public trust in the state was the appointment
of a highly impressive technocratic team of advisors. Paniagua s cabinet had included
individuals known best for their stance on human rights and their commitment to the
inter-American and international system (Javier Perez de Cuellar, former Secretary
General of the UN is the most obvious example ), and many of them now turned to work
in positions within the human rights TAN. Paniagua s controversial Minister of Justice.
Diego Garcia Sayan, became a judge on the Inter-Amercian Court of Human Rights, and
Susana Villaran joined the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Toledo, on the
other hand, drew his team from the world of business/
Despite the weak electoral mandate, most analysts felt Toledo was in a strong
position to tackle the country s major challenges, including the poverty in which the
majority of the population lived and. of course, the necessity of military reform. As one
' See. for example. Clifford Krauss Tapes Spy Chief Left Behind Scandalize Peru A’eir
York Times Feb 3, 2001 or Carlos Tapia Jaded Peruvians Wonder ifNew Indian
President can Save Them from Culture of Cynicism Pacific News Service. June 25.
2001. Lexus-Nexus online. More Videos Set To Shock Peru BBC Online Feb 12. 2001.
On the allegations against Paniagua, see all major Peruvian daily newspapers on Jan 29.
2001 and La Republica . Gestion . and El Comercio Feb 3. 2001. Each of these last three
cite a National University of Engineering poll which indicated that though nearly all
respondents had heard about the allegation implicating Paniagua in Montesinos network
of corruption, a mere 1 0% believed the report to be true, and that Paniagua s approval
ratings remained exceptionally high, around 76%. Politicians and other public figures
rushed to state their support for Paniagua in the face of these accusations; see all major
daily newspapers Jan 29. 2001 . On Diego Garcia Sayan s joining the IACHR. see El
Comercio
,
Expreso and El Perucmo April 28. 2001 and Expreso Nov 9. 2004. which
accuses Garcia-Savan of being too soft on terrorists during the Paniagua administration.
' See La Republica s profile of Toledo s advisors. June 8. 2001.
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reporter noted. Mr. Toledo must also reform the military, which is bloated and
overstocked with generals. The armed forces are so discredited in Peruvian eyes by their
repressive and corrupt behavior that Mr. Toledo may be able to reduce their size and
budget.
4
Toledo and his main opponent in the 2001 elections. Alan Garcia, had
campaigned in part on promises to reduce military size and budget and to oversee
military reform. And for the first two years of his administration. Toledo did take
concrete steps to continue Paniagua s first steps towards reform of the military, budget
reductions, and reassertion of civ ilian and democratic controls over the institution. Over
the course of 2001. 451 members of the military w ere relieved of duty. In December
2002. the defense minister conducted w hat military critics labeled a sadistic vendetta,
forcing 420 officers of the armed forces into retirement, bringing the total reduction of
military officers for the year to 460. more than half of them in the Army/ While this
number was higher than normal, proponents of the move pointed out that it was needed
(and will be each year until 2006) to give a top-heavy force a conventional pyramid
profile. Meanw hile, the budget of the defense sector w hich until 2000 represented
14% of PBI was reduced under Paniagua s Minister of Defense Walter Ledesma to
4
Mr. Toledo s Peru Posible New York Times June 5. 2001 . On Garcia s surprising
success in the elections, see Steven Levitsky and Cynthia Sanborn s New York Times
editorial. A Hard Choice in Peru May 9. 2001. The authors explain Garcia s resurgence
as the result of Peru s weak institutions and parties, as well as Garcia s superior
campaign skills (contrasted with Toledo s tendency to stumble into scandal). The authors
also argue that the greatest danger of another Garcia presidency w ould not be a repeat of
his failed economic policies, but rather the main problem w ith Mr. Garcia is that he still
faces credible charges of corruption and responsibility for gross human rights abuses
during his first administration. If a vote for Mr. Toledo is a shot in the dark, a vote for
Mr. Garcia is a vote for impunity.
' Ministerio de Defensa Plan Estrategica : Castro Contreras Politica de seguridad.
defensa nacional y reforma del sector defensa 2005, p. 14.
9.6%. then to 6.86% under Toledo s first Minister of Defense David Waisman. and
finally to 6.06% under Aurelio Loret de Mola. According to The Economist. By the end
of the year, soldiers were being sent home at weekends for lack of rations, and money for
maintenance had run out. The government responded with one-off payments to plug the
gap. and authorized the selling of redundant defense-ministry properties.
Yet it was the impact of two processes already underway that would provide the
crucial tests for Toledo s control of civil-military relations during his administration, in
particular the release of the final report of the truth commission and the unfolding drama
in the courts.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The commitment to rooting out corruption and authoritarian tendencies continued
in the months after the transition from Paniagua s interim presidency to Toledo s
presidency. Toledo and many members of his party had campaigned heavily on promises
to support transitional justice efforts, to make reparations to victims of state human rights
violations (including proposals to use recovered money pilfered from the state coffers by
Montesinos to make such reparations), and to aggressively take on military reform and a
Military mutters The Economist Jan 1 1. 2003: Castro Contreras Politica de
seguridad. defensa nacional y reforma del sector defensa 2005: Clifford Krauss
Candidates in Peru’s Presidential Race Peck at Fading Military New York Times May
25. 2001: Gestion April 21. 2001. On the matter of reform of the military budget process,
see Sibil la Los procesos de asignacion de recursos para la defensa 2005: Robles
Montoya Transparency y Control en la asignacion de recursos para la defensa: discurso
y realidad 2005: Palomino Milla Economici c/e la defensa nacional 2004: IDL
Trcmspavenciay eficiertcia en gastos para la defensa 2003.
Throughout this text. I alternately refer to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as
the truth commission or TRC and by its Spanish-language initials. CVR.
reduction of military powers and impunity. Congressmen continued to form committees
and hold hearings on the corruption and abuses of the 1 990s. Meanwhile, the creation of
the CVR was ratified by Toledo and expanded from seven to twelve commissioners. For
the next two years, the Commission held public and televised hearings and collected over
1 7.000 testimonies throughout the country, supervised the collection of forensic evidence
at over 2.000 mass grave sites, assembled extensive documentation later turned over to
the Attorney General's office to assist in future prosecutions, and developed a detailed
list of recommendations to address the weaknesses and failures of the state and system
which allowed these events to occur. According to the Commission itself, its purpose was
to clarify the nature of the violence of Peru s recent past and determine those responsible:
in doing so. help establish the transparency and accountability essential to the legitimacy
of the new democratic regime: and begin to heal the breach that decades of violence and
state failure had created between state and society, between political and social factions,
and between individual citizens. In the opinion of the commissioners, establishing the
foundations for a consolidated democracy based on a stronger sense of civil society and
the rule of law was the ultimate aim of transitional justice. To these ends, they called
upon those implicated in the report to admit their guilt, ask for the forgiveness of their
countrymen, and submit to legal proceedings against them.
4
The Commission benefited from the assistance and participation of a wide array
of human rights groups, both domestic and international. For example, the International
s
See El Comercio May 12, 20. 2001; Gestiou Jan 16. 22. April 21. May 29. 2001: El
Peruano May 8. 20. 2001: Liberacion May 20. 2001: La Republica April 22. May 21.
2001; and all major daily newspapers in Peru on Jan 6. 2001
.
4
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.
Center for Transitional Justice based in New York City sent consultants to work with the
commission throughout its tenure: hired a Lima-based consultant to work with the
Peruvian Association for Human Rights (APRODEH) to report on post-CVR
developments in weekly bulletins: provided nongovernmental organizations and
prosecutors with information about techniques and strategies of massive crime
investigation : sent another consultant to Peru in June 2004 to conduct a six-week
program with APRODEH to aid and assess its work on prosecutions : and today (2006)
continues to provide technical assistance on post-Commission criminal justice issues
and implementation of reparations, while tracking the post-CVR process and analyzing
lessons to be learned. Domestically, the umbrella organization Coordinadora National
de Derechos Humanos and its many participant NGOs played a vital role. The
information and testimonies these groups had collected over the last two decades became
primary data for the analyses of the CVR. In its final report, the Commission specifically
thanks the Coordinadora groups, saying its work would have been impossible without
their assistance and information. Man) 7 members of the Coordinadora worked for the
truth commission in varying capacities, both in Lima and throughout the country, and the
organization itself played a central role in publicizing the activities of the truth
commission and convening numerous meetings and conferences on related topics. 1(1
The example of other states and recent developments in international human
rights law had a powerful impact on the truth commission. The legal question of the
applicability of international human rights law to non-state actors had always presented a
111
www.ictj.org/americas/peru.asp Retrieved February 4. 2006: Comision de la Verdad v
Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome 1. Tome IX: De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobre
justicia y derechos humanos 2003. p. 211-3.
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challenge to the Peruvian human rights community. During the Paniagua transitional
regime. Peru had signed the Rome Statute establishing the International Court of Justice,
in which individuals can be prosecuted for violations of international law. Moreover, the
Commission explicitly cited the examples of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda established by the United Nations. Together, they wrote,
the events of the 1990s demonstrated a growing international will and legal basis on
which to create vigorous mechanisms of universal jurisdiction to pursue those
responsible for crimes against humanity regardless of the place they were committed.
These developments allow us to establish with clarity the international legal
responsibilities of particular individuals that form part of non-state organizations.
Though the debate over the nature of legal applicability of international law to non-state
actors continued, they wrote, the principle of the extension of moral culpability for
human rights violations to such groups was perfectly clear and the ability of individual
states to prosecute them on this basis unquestionable." They also conducted a detailed
study of other countries experiences with transitional justice, including Sierra Leone.
Argentina, and Chile. But above all the Commission cited the role of the groundbreaking
2001 ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Barrios Altos case. This
decision, discussed in Chapter IV of this text, established the inv alidity of amnesty laws.
No state has the pow er to create exemptions from international human rights law
.
according to this ruling. The Commission agreed, calling for immediate steps to end
impunity in Peru and reassert civilian judicial authority over human rights. 12
1
1
Comision de la Verdad v Reconcilacion Informe Final Tome I. p. 45-47. ch. 4.
12
Ibid, p 72-76. 294-301.
235
One of the most shocking findings of the CVR was that all previous death toll
estimates had grossly underestimated the actual toll of the conflict Even human rights
organizations had accepted death toll figures of approximately 25.000. and the
Commission itself received 23.969 reports of deaths and disappearances. Yet the
Commission, in part relying on statistical projections under the guidance of the Human
Rights Data Analysis Group of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, found that the actual number was closer to 70.000. a number some find difficult
to accept and others see as evidence of the enormity of the gap between Lima and the rest
of the country only in a country so divided between urban and rural cultures and deeply
marked by a lack of information or interest in events outside of Lima could so many
people be lost without public outcry or knowledge. Thousands more suffered torture,
illegal detention, and other violations. The CVR found that the vast majority of the
victims of human rights abuses were poor, indigenous. Quechua speakers, poorly
educated individuals living in the Peruvian countryside in essence, the most
marginalized and forgotten sector of the population. The peaks of violence during the
conflict had occurred in 1984. 1989 and 1990. thereby implicating all three of the
administrations responsible for governance during this period for failing to minimize
violence in response to surges in terrorist threats.
*"
lj
I include the Human Rights Data Analysis group as part of the transnational activist
network and/or epistemic community that influenced the Peruvian CVR. Lor earlier
estimates, see all major Peruvian daily newspapers on July 26. 2001 . when the Census
for Peace was released by the Ministry for Women under Susana Villaran. as well as La
Republica April 1 8. 2001
.
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While the Commission clearly stated that the greatest responsibility for this
violence lie with Sendero Luminoso. it did attribute 38% of all deaths and disappearances
during the conflict to security forces of the state, including both the military and national
police. The Army was implicated in by far the greatest number of deaths and human
rights abuses committed by agents of the state: 55% of all forced disappearances
perpetrated by the state was attributed to the Army. The Commission went beyond
blaming the two armed parties in the conflict, however, to condemn (in the words of the
Commission President Salomon Lerner). "a double scandal the killings, disappearances
and torture on a huge scale, and the indolence, ineptitude and indifference by those able
to intervene in the human catastrophe and who did not.” The Commission recognized the
great sacrifice made by the armed forces to defend the nation from subversion, including
1.100 fatalities and 1.600 seriously wounded soldiers. It did not hesitate, however, to
roundly condemn members of the military for perpetrating massive human rights
violations, nor the political leaders who endorsed such strategies by their inaction or
cooperation.
14
The Commission s reports include specific sections detailing the responsibilities
of the three presidents w ho held office between 1980 and 2000. the judiciary. Congress,
the media, the Church and civil society. And unlike many truth commissions, the
Peruvian CVR stated unequivocally that prosecution of the crimes documented in their
report was an absolute requisite of progress toward national reconciliation and justice. In
the last of the nine volumes of the final report, the Commission details recommendations
for institutional reforms to redress the structural sources of the problems detailed in their
14
Informe Final de la CVR, Tome I.
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report. Among the reforms recommended that relate directly to the armed forces were:
strengthening the Ministries of Defense and Interior as civilian checks on military
autonomy, reforming military training to emphasize human rights and democratic ideals,
changing legislation relating to state of emergency status in order to protect citizen s
rights and narrow the military mandate in such cases, establishing stronger controls over
national intelligence, and overhauling the military justice system. 1 '
The truth commission presented its final report to President Toledo. Congress,
and the country s judges in August 2003. With the release of the report, the commission
also forwarded 44 cases to the Public Prosecutor s Office and the judicial branch for
investigation and. where appropriate, trial. Finally, they recommended the government
put in place a program to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the violence
described in the report. The International Center for Transitional Justice, which provided
technical assistance to the truth commission throughout its investigations, focused on
assisting in the development of a reparations plan over the last few months of the
commission s work. 16
Analysts attempted to assess military and politicians reactions to the TRC. and
often their interpretations were contradictory. On the one hand. The Economist reported.
Unusually, members [of the commission] had the official cooperation of the army
See Tome LT del Informe Final de la Ci'R 2003: Ciurlizza Contreras Las reformas
institucionales propuestas por la CVR 2005: Hurtado Meza Una reflexion sobre la
fuerza armada peruana a partir del informe final de la Comision de la Verdad y
Reconciliacion 2005.
16
Information about the ICTJ role in the work of the Peruvian CVR can be found at
www.ictj.org/amercias/peru.asp. as can a link to the ICTJ s Sept 2002 report. Parameters
for Designing a Reparations Program in Peru.
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(though not of the navy, whose marines were also called on to defeat the insurgency).
On the other hand:
Politicians and military men have scuttled to defend themselves. The
commission s members, mostly respected academics and human-rights activists
with leftist sympathies, have been called reds and communists. Critics accuse
them of being tougher on the Peruvian armed forces, obliged to defend a
threatened democracy, than on the bloodthirsty insurgents who sought to take
over the state. The report was a Marxist ploy to undermine Peru s heroic armed
forces, said one congressman.
1
Roberto Chiabra Leon had upheld his repeated pledge to support the work of the truth
commission, but no-one in the military endorsed the idea of holding individuals
responsible for the crimes discussed within the commission s findings. ' The question
now before the state was whether to immediately open criminal investigation on the 120
groups and individuals the commission cited as responsible for human rights violations. 19
Immediately upon the publication of the commission s final report, domestic
human rights groups demanded the government take immediate steps to implement its
recommendations. Among their immediate priorities were establishing the identity of the
victims of the violence in order to establish a reparations program, dissemination of the
commission report to the public and its inclusion in the educational curriculum of the
country, and advancement to trial of cases of human rights abuses. They had reason to
worry. The attention to and interest of politicians in reforming the state and investigating
human rights abuses was quickly w aning. As Degregori wrote:
1
Dealing with the past (3): The Shining Path Revisited. The Economist. Sept 6. 2003.
18 Members of the truth commission hailed these statements, made as Chiabra Leon took
over the commander general s position in the army, and saw it as a major change from
earlier army leaders attitudes. See En La Mira. Feb 2003.
19
Ibid.
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Sixteen months after its formation the spaces that had opened for the work of
the CVR seemed to be disappearing. The economic difficulties the fragility of
the regime sharpened the tension between truth and justice on one side, and
democratic governabilitv on the other. Skepticism undermined the credibility of
institutions. The spaces for a reelaboration of the past narrowed and the
temptation to forget returned The principal risk the CVR ran was that its final
report would be received with total indifference.'
The human rights community did its best to keep the findings of the truth commission in
the public spotlight. The Permian office of Amnesty International issued a public
declaration pushing Congress to approve plans for a new commission designed to
determine how best to implement the CVR recommendations but also demanding that
the commission not simply study the matter but take concrete measures to implement
the new agenda.
21
Amnesty International, the Instituto de Defensa Tegal. the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and various human rights organizations continued to
monitor the implementation of reforms demanded by the truth commission in regular
surveys, reports and articles in the years after its release. 22 Similarly, major newspapers
such as El Comercio periodically issued special reports to judge progress in this area, and
frequent newspaper editorials contributed by human rights practitioners and the
Commissioners of the CVR attempted to keep the question before the public eye and
pressure the Toledo administration to rapid!}' act on the commission report. Still, as
11
Degregori Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre la Comision de la
Verdad y Reconciliation 2004. p. 80.
21
Amnistia Internacional Declaracion Publica. Oct 13. 2003. Available at
http:Aveb.amnesty.org/library/
22
See for example. Amnistia Internacional La Comision de la Verdad v Reconciliacion -
un primer paso hacia un pais sin injusticias 2004. Available at
http:/web.amnesty.org/library/ Pern21 Feb 26. 2005.
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Degregori acknowledged. Before the reticence of the majority of parties, of the public
ministry and of the very government, nothing guarantees that its recommendations will
be assumed by the government and supported by important sectors ot public opinion.
If one of the purposes of the political leaders and civil society sectors responsible
for the creation of the Commission was to discredit implicated politicians, the armed
forces, and other responsible parties, this goal went largely unrealized. The report directly
challenged the reputations of many of the country s leading politicians and military
officials, many of them still in power or in active duty, as well as all three political
groups that had held political power since the return to democracy in 1980 (AP. APRA
and Fujimori s movement ). Given the systematic patterns of abuse revealed by the
Commission s investigation, they argued responsibility could be attributed to the military
and political commanders who oversaw these policies. Many of these individuals
continued to deny responsibility for the events covered by the CVR. including most
importantly elements of the armed forces and Alan Garcia.
Garcia continued as head of his party and was universally acknowledged as the
face of the political opposition in the country during the Toledo administration, and it
does not appear that his political reputation has been affected in any way by the findings
of the CVR. Garcia came in a close second to Toledo in 2001 and then won in the 2006
presidential elections. Unbelievably, one of the least successful Latin American
presidents in recent history has been returned to pow er in Peru for another five year term.
In the estimation of the truth commission. Garcia w as not only responsible for ordering
military operations without regard for the inevitable loss of life among unarmed civilians.
2 '
Degregori Heridas abiertas. derechos esquivos: reflexiones sobre la Comision de la
Verdad y Reconciliacion 2004. p. 85.
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but also contributed to the evisceration of democratic norms by embracing the same
attitude other political leaders during this period adopted: while democracy represented
an idealized goal for the state, the reality of the conflict with Sendero Luminoso
demanded the suspension of normal democratic guarantees. Attempts by the
Coordinadora and others to advance legal proceedings against Garcia were blocked when
the cases were shelved by public prosecutors, though cases were advanced against
members of the military who participated in the El Frontin killings.' 4
As for the military, the Commission had gone to great pains to clarify that the
abuses they had documented were not the acts of a few perverse individuals, but rather
massive and systematic, resulting directly from military strategy. In certain periods and
places, they wrote, the Armed Forces engaged in a systematic or generalized practice
of human rights violations The commission finds reason to believe these constitute
crimes against humanity, as well as infractions of international humanitarian law. The
final report included detailed information about the use of extrajudicial killing,
disappearances, torture, massacres, and sexual violence during the counter-insurgency
campaign. Of all the deaths caused by agents of the state between 1982 and 1994.
roughly half were victims of forced disappearance."'
24
For detailed weekly and monthly polling data in the run-up to the elections see
www'.apoyo-om.com: on Garcia s win see Forero Failure in 90. Ex-President In Peru in
a Comeback New York Times June 5. 2006 and all major Peruvian daily papers June 5.
2006. The 2006 elections are further discussed at the end of this chapter. On failed
attempts to prosecute Garcia for the El Frontin prison deaths, see El Comercio Dec 1.
2004. Feb 7, 2006; El Correa Dec 2. 2004; Peru21 Dec 3. 2004.
2 ' Comision de la Verdad y Reconcilacion Informe Final . Tome I, see especially Tome II.
section on the Armed Forces.
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According to Amnesty International:
many members of the Armed Forces and Police expressed their displeasure with
the report and rejected its conclusions, and attempts were made to discredit the
Commissioners by accusing them of being hostile to the security forces. Serving
and retired members of the security forces and their relatives, while recognizing
that excesses were committed by State officials during the internal armed confl ict.
also denied that human rights were systematically violated.' 6
Though an August 2003 poll found that only 15% of respondents believed that the
Commission treated the Armed Forces in a prejudicial manner, and despite the fact that
the Commission found that the police and military were responsible for more than 40% of
the violations occurring between 1980 and 2000. and that the Arm}' alone was
responsible for 28.73% of all deaths and disappearances during this period, as we shall
see. the armed forces have successfully recovered their reputation. Part of the explanation
for the recovery was the public s perception that the reforms demanded by the
government and the elimination of the corrupt military leadership were in fact being
accomplished. The year the truth commission s final report was released (2003). a poll
conducted by Imasen found that 52.8% of respondents were pleased with the process of
reform the armed forces had undertaken to date. 2
The image of the armed forces remained contentious, with the armed forces
themselves alternately accepting responsibility for excesses committed during the
conflict and glorifying the historic role of their institutions in fighting subversion and
protecting the nation. In December 2003. the army opened the Museum of National
Pacification, meant to document and honor their role in the war against rebels, including
Amnistia Internacional La Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion - un primer paso
hacia un pais sin injusticias 2004.
2
Published in La Republica Feb 16. 2003. See En La Mira . Feb 2003. Polling data also
available at wvwv.apoyo-om.com
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Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The building in which this
museum is housed is a replica of the Japanese ambassador s residence built so the
soldiers could practice storming the building before the rescue operation in April 1997.
The museum s opening ceremony included a reenactment of the storming of the
residence (in which one hostage, two soldiers and all 14 guerrillas were killed) and was
presided over by the army chief. General Roberto Chiabra. and top naval officers. Neither
Defense Minister Aurelio Loret de Mola nor any other civilian from the Toledo
government was in attendance. (As discussed below. Chiabra eventually replaced Loret
de Mola as Minister of Defense, in w hat many interpreted as an attempt to shore up
relations between the armed forces and Toledo.)
Relations between Toledo and the military were w idely considered to be frosty
during this period. The museum s opening ceremony was interpreted by many as a
provocation to the government, as it was held on the very day Toledo had designated the
da} - of national reconciliation. Even as the ceremony proceeded, a crowd of roughly
1.000 protestors gathered outside the Justice Palace to celebrate Human Rights Day and
to demand that Toledo set into motion trials of military personnel accused of atrocities.
Marlene Roman, a coordinator of a youth group for human rights, told reporters.
December 10 should not be a day of reconciliation because in Peru there is neither
justice nor truth. For reconciliation there has to be justice and the military must assume
their responsibility. Protestors reenacted a military massacre of farmers and demanded
reparations for victims of human rights abuse. 28
-) Q
' Peruvian army opens anti-terrorism museum Agence France Presse. Dec 11.2003.
Lexis-Nexus online.
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Fujimori s reputation was not entirely destroyed either. Throughout 2003 and
2004. polls continued to indicate that Fujimori would enjoy the most support among
possible candidates expected to run for the presidency in 2006. at the same time that other
polls indicated that large majorities considered his government to have been the most
corrupt in recent years.'
1
' Several scholars and commentators have attributed the ongoing
popularity of Fujimori and the lack of public outrage over military and police atrocities
during the war on terrorism to the commonly held belief that it was only possible to
create order and defeat Sendero by resorting to drastic and authoritarian measures. A
vocal minority of the public felt a clear nostalgia for the sense of order imposed by the
Fujimori regime.
In fact, the truth commission s efforts did little to dissuade the public of the
increasingly entrenched notion that order and democracy are incompatible states and that,
of the two. order is far more important. (Barometro polls indicate a mere 57% of
respondents selected democracy as their preferred form of government, w ith the majority
selecting weaker, mixed forms of democracy.) This idea w as advanced by Fujimori
himself on many occasions. So too was the idea that the political Left in Peru w as
thoroughly corrupt and only interested in protecting the rights of terrorists, an argument
also invoked to discredit the truth commission and human rights groups by supporters of
Fujimori or others accused of w rongdoing. Even w eeks after Fujimori tied the country, a
large minority of Peruvians approved of his presidency (only 53% disapproved). When
asked in 2002 to reflect on Fujimori s autogolpe a decade earlier. 34% answered that it
29
El Coireo Nov 9. 2004; El Peruano Nov 4. 2004. Both polls were conducted by
Apovo.
had been a positive thing for Peru, while 52% considered it to have been negative.
Though these attitudes would gradually decline, the public retained serious doubts about
democracy as it actually functioned in the country/
Reception of the final report of the Peruvian truth commission was largely
positive, and opinion polls in Lima indicated that the public accepted as true the version
of history the Commission offered. Unfortunately, knowledge of the actual findings of
the Commission was weak and highly variable, in part due to the scarce media coverage
it received before, during and after its work. One study by the media analysis group
Calandria found that coverage of the work of the CVR by the most p oular newspaper
(El Comercio). radio station (RPP) and television programs (90 Segundos. America
Noticias. and 24 Horas) was incredibly low. These sources dedicated 1%. .9%. 2.5%,
3.7%. and 2% of their coverage to the process of national reconciliation, including the
CVR. between February and July 2003 and that tells us nothing about the content of
that coverage, which could be positive or negative.
'
1
This lack of attention contributed to the ephemerality of the public's response to
the final report and their rapid disillusionment as concrete changes demanded by the
Commission (such as the reparations) failed to materialize. Indeed, as we shall see below,
the failure of concrete resolutions of the cases the truth commission forwarded to the
courts may actually reinforce the public s sense of inefficacy and distrust of government.
The CVR's legitimacy also suffered as a result of the devastating lack of popularity
~
(!
Apoyo polls conducted in Lima. The first was reported in El Comercio Dec 19. 2000.
The second, conducted in April 2002 is available online at www.apoyo-om.com. On
nostalgia for Fujimori, see for example R. Letts article in Expreso Nov 3. 2004.
jJ
Penaflor Guerra "Documento de Lrabajo: Analisis del impact de la Comision de la
Verdad y Reconcilacion" 2005.
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enjoyed by President Toledo, possibly the least popular Latin American head of state in
history. (Since February 2004. Toledo's approval ratings have hovered between 8 and
10%P2 ) Furthermore, according to Javier Torres Seoane/' nearly every group in civil
society and in government that supported the work of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission also threw its support behind Toledo's campaign for the 2000 elections.
Hence, as Toledo's government became discredited, the brief period of expanded respect
enjoyed by these groups was also diminished substantially, which in turn hurt the
reputation of the CVR. That nearly every branch of government continued to suffer from
shockingly low approval ratings over the five years of Toledo s term made legitimizing
the work of any such body more difficult.
' 4
Guerra goes so far as to identify - an active campaign to discredit the CVR. yet
finds that these orchestrated attacks against the CVR had relatively little effect those
who had heard of the CVR continued to hold favorable opinions of it. despite having
heard criticisms that the Commission had been a waste of money, was partial towards
Sendero and against the Aimed Forces, and staffed by the Leftists. According to Human
Rights Watch, footdragging on the pail of government and open attacks against the
commission from several directions were obvious obstacles impacting the effectiveness
of the commission. For example. "The impartiality of the commission was repeatedly
questioned by politicians belonging to APRA Although the government supported the
' 2
Barometro: Estudio 255: Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Feb 2005. Online at
http://www.elcomerciopem.com.pe/ediciononline/html/BAROMETROFEBRERO2005_
GOP_ULIMA.xls
Torres Seoane "Documento de Trabajo: Balance a Nivel Regional y Local de los
Procesos en Relacion a las Recomendaciones de la CVR" 2005.
' 4
Expreso May 4. 2005. This is explored further in this and the concluding chapter.
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commission, it was slow to make up its 60 percent share of the commission's budget
Cabinet minister and prominent members of C ongress tried to prevent prosecutions"
demanded by the commission. °
The biggest challenge to the legitimacy and acceptance of the work of the CVR
seems to lie elsewhere, however. Because the CVR's institutionalization was expedited
by the fall of Fujimori, it emerged more as a political project of certain sectors of civil
society and the political opposition than as a result of public demands. Though this
community enjoyed unprecedented influence and prestige during the Paniagua transition,
it constituted a relatively weak base of public support for the work of the commission, for
several reasons. First, the very concept of national reconciliation was and is deeply
problematic in the context of Peruvian politics and national identity. Fujimori employed
the concept of national reconciliation to justify the 1995 amnesty laws, and given the
continued support for the armed forces in Peru (they continue to receive the highest levels
of public support of all branches of government), one suspects that many people accepted
this line of argument. Peruvians wholeheartedly reject the idea of reconciliation with
those implicated in subversion, leaving the nature of reconciliation itself somewhat
unclear. This rejection of or at least lack of consensus over the meaning of reconciliation
has been reinforced by President Toledo, who has openly stated that reconciliation is
impossible and not a goal of the state.
Moreover, there is little faith among the public that it is possible to uncover the
truth in Peru. As Giovanna Penaflor Guerra has written, the challenge before the
commission was not only to bring to light the horrors of the last two decades in Peru, but
" Human Rights Watch World Report 2003 Available at www.hrw.org
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also to prove to the public that it is indeed possible to hold an effective, impartial
investigation into the past and obtain the truth. The current political culture in Peru is
marked by a type of exhaustion amongst the public. With 64% of the public citing grave
dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in their country, only 49% of the
public claims to be somewhat interested in politics today, while another 35% is not at all
interested. Distrust of the various branches of government is matched by distrust of news
media, with 62% of poll respondents claiming to have little trust in the media. Fully 86%
believe that the media manipulates information about political issues. This contributes to
an overwhelming sense of inefficacy among the public, both in the sense that it is not
empowered to exert any control over government or demand its improvement, and in the
sense that the average person cannot ascertain the truth about the political reality in their
own country7 . As one final indicator of this trend. 66% of individuals polled respond that
in general, the right to be informed in not respected in Peru.' These factors would
contribute to the debate surrounding those human rights cases which were soon to go to
trial.
The lack of consensus over the concept of reconciliation indicates that another
cause for the fragile public support for the CVR is the massive gap in state-society
relations plaguing Peru. In their conclusion to The Peruvian Labyrinth. Mauceri and
Cameron note that, while civ il society became stronger and better organized throughout
the 1980s and 1990s. this had little effect on the "top-down, centralized and authoritarian
h
Pehaflor Guerra "Documento de Trabajo: Analisis del impact de la Comision de la
Verdad v Reconcilacion" 2005.
Grupo de Opinion Publica de la Universidad de Lima. Consejo de Prensa Peruana.
Estudio 245. Enero 2005. Available online.
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structures in society." The chasm between state and society in Peru, which Mauceri and
Cameron argue is severe even in comparison to other Latin American states, has not been
mitigated by the greater development and organization of civil society in Peru because of
the historical and continued failure of national integration.
Divided as ever by race, class, and geography, the Peruvian public has not found
in organized civil society either an accurate reflection of their own identity and interests
nor an adequate means of channeling their energy to effectively impact the state. Hence,
like the democratic transition of 1980 (which, as Mauceri and Cameron write, "did not
occur as a result of a mass movement favoring a return to democracy" and which did not
reflect a consensus about the desirability or meaning of democracy), the CVR can be seen
as a project of organized civil society without deep reserves of public energy or a
consensus about the desirability or meaning of truth and reconciliation behind it.' If the
1980 transition to democracy was the result primarily of the withdrawal of the military
from direct power rather than public demands for democracy, so too was the 2000
transition the result of the political vacuum created by Fujimori s removal: that an
organized civil society and political opposition was able to fill this vacuum does not
indicate any wellspring of public support for those groups, and does help explain why its
popularity and sustainability softened quickly.
s
Cameron and Mauceri The Peruvian Labyrinth 1997.
For a critique of the Sierra Leone CVR which relies on related arguments about the
social basis (or lack thereof) for such a process, see Shaw "Rethinking Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions 2005.
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The same basic argument can be applied to Peru s transition to democracy. In
1980 Peru began its transition with cessation of military Rile and a return to regular
elections. Yet. surprisingly, it was at this moment that the armed insurgency of Sendero
Luminoso began to grow, demonstrating to much of the population the utter incapacity of
the state to provide even basic protection to the public, thereby undermining the
legitimacy of democracy in their eyes and laying the foundations for public support of
authoritarian moves by Fujimori in the 1990s. Clearly, the last two decades has witnessed
a failure to consolidate democracy in Peru and periodic slides away from democracy. The
Toledo government, much loathed by the public, did nothing to strengthen public support
for democracy, and the great likelihood that Toledo entered the 2000 elections by
falsifying thousands of signatures has reinforced the sense that the political reality of the
country continues to be mired in such corruption as to provoke public disgust at every
turn. Hence, if any transition is taking place in the country, it remains unclear to
Peruvians and observers alike in which direction that transition might take the country, or
even in which direction the public wants it to be taken.
It is perhaps too early to pass judgment on the effects of the CVR on the Peruvian
public s psyche and on the future of the state of human rights and democracy in the
country. It does seem fair, however, to argue that the general lack of consensus and
cooperation amongst the various groups holding power in Peru also marked the birth of
the Commission. Even as the CVR emerged largely as a project of a specific set of actors
who. due to the political opening created by Fujimori s hasty departure, w ere not forced
to compromise or engage in extensive bargaining with their opposition, so too the
Peruvian public remains fragmented and interpretations of the country s recent history
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remain up for grabs. The few oldfujimorista stalwarts who had managed to cling to their
posts had. of course, never ceased to defend Fujimori and the armed forces. Martha
Chavez, the best-known of these, stated clearly that she would support any opportunity to
pass a new amnesty law for the military. Chavez also told reporters that, despite the
confessions of several former members of the La CoJina group, she would never
recognize the existence of such a group or accept that the Fujimori regime was implicated
in the abuses allegedly perpetrated by La Colina 40 As the debate moved to the court
system, it only intensified. The outcome of Peru s transitional justice experience would
be determined in large measure by the drama unfolding there.
II. The Courts
In 2001. Congress approved charges against Montesinos and Fujimori as co-
authors of numerous murders and disappearances conducted by death squads such as
Grupo Colina. 41 Except for a few hardliner Fujimoristas who held onto congressional
seats, there was consensus within Congress that the ex-president and his right-hand man
needed to be held accountable. Publicly exposed as Montesinos had been, the political
elite no doubt saw his reckoning with the law as not only serving the cause ofjustice, but
also creating the opportunity to prove that Fujimori shared responsibility with
4
" La Republica Dec 19. 2005.
41
McClintock and Valias The United States and Peru 2003. p. 163. Montesinos was
finally captured in Venezuela in June 2001 and returned to Peru. He promptly offered to
hand over tens of thousands of videotapes implicating hundreds of individuals. Clifford
Krauss, Peru s Spy Chief Captured AVir York Times July 1, 2001.
Montesinos for the crimes being uncovered daily in the press. Fujimori denied all
responsibility, laying sole responsibility for the corruption on Montesinos. and indeed no
known documentation or video has linked the president to these abuses.
Politicians clearly worried that Fujimori was retaining a core of support in the
public sphere and that he might even eventually made good on his promises to return to
Peru to run for the presidency again. President Toledo and special prosecutors
strenuously lobbied Japan to return Fujimori to face trial in Peru or The Hague, but to no
avail. The public blamed government incompetence and inefficiency for the failure to
bring Fujimori to Peru to face trial: In 2005, 80% considered the work of the government
and prosecutors in the extradition case to have been inefficient and 60% considered it
inadequate. 48% believed the main reason Fujimori had not returned for trial was the
incompetence of the government: others blamed the protection of the Japanese
government or a lack of sufficient evidence.
'
As would soon become apparent, the consensus in Congress for pursuing
Montesinos and Fujimori did not extend to the idea of a relentless pursuit ofjustice for
violators of human rights within the military. In May of 2002. the two main opposition
party blocs, the National Unity coalition and the APRA party, each introduced draft
legislation granting amnesty to military officers involved in the 1997 siege of the
Japanese ambassador s residence, during which all fourteen of the insurgents were killed.
4
” As early as 2002. the Peruvian and international media conjectured and Fujimori
hinted that he might try to replicate Alan Garcia s tactic of staying outside the country
until charges against him were dropped and then return to run again. James Brooke
Peru's Former President Plots His Return to Power New York Times Dec 22. 2002. The
Apoyo polling data from Nov or Dec 2005 is available online at www.apoyo-om.edu. On
the failed campaign to have him extradited from Japan, see Expreso Dec 28. 2004: El
Peruano Nov 29. 2004. Dec 27. 2004: El Comercio Oct 29. Dec 21. 2004.
Autopsies of eight of the insurgents indicated that they had been shot at point-blank range
in the back of the head, implying they had been summarily executed after surrendering.
When, on May 1 1. 2002. Judge Cecilia Polak issued arrest warrants for twelve officers,
among them three generals, accused of the killings, the army refused to act on the
warrants. Though Minister of Justice Fernando Olivera. striking a conciliator}* tone,
announced that the arrest warrants would be replaced with summons, the proposed
legislation, which would have ended the investigations into the case, was explicitly
offered as a way to prevent a direct confrontation between the armed forces and civilian
authorities.
Aprista Congressman Jose Barba Caballero argued that the arrest warrants are
unjust and dangerous. Unjust because they seek the arrest of the suspects before carrying
out an investigation, and dangerous because they place the army in a position of
disobedience, which could give rise to something more serious. He also accused Justice
Minister of Fernando Olivera of pursuing the case for politically motivated reasons; the
administration clearly wanted a human rights case that would implicate Fujimori in
ordering abuses. From the Left, Congressman Javier Diez Canseco countered that neither
the international community and courts nor the Peruvian Congress w ould accept
amnesties aimed at granting impunity for human rights violations. 4 * Clearly the questions
of military subordination to civilian control and of amnesties were not as settled as they
appeared, and at least some members of Congress, including members of its first and
4
' Abraham Lama Peru: Opposition Seeks Amnesty to Prevent Military LTnrest. Inter-
Press Service. May 17. 2002; Peru Rethinks Order For Arrest of Officers In '97 Rescue
Raid ATir York Times May 21, 2002. Lexis-Nexus online.
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third largest political parties, continued to worry about military unrest and to uphold the
heroism of members of the military implicated in human rights abuses.
Evidence of deep and systematic corruption within the judiciary has destroyed the
credibility of the entire legal system that functioned under Fujimori. The Vladivideos had
directly linked members of even the highest courts in the country to Montesinos and
implicated them in abuse of the legal system and corruption. Moreover. Fujimori s
dismissal of a large percentage of the judges in the system at the time of his coup and
their replacement with provisional judges dependent on his administration for office left
few courts with credentials of autonomy, professionalism or even-handedness. The
problem of how to address the non-existence of a fair and just legal system over the
previous decade occupied much of the time and attention of the Paniagua and Toledo
presidencies. In January 2003. just months before the release of the truth commission s
report, the issue had provoked a new crisis when the conviction of Abimael Guzman was
overturned. Peru s Constitutional Tribunal (TC) ruled the bulk of the Fujimori-era
antiterrorism legislation unconstitutional, in keeping with the 2001 Inter-American Court
of Human Rights decision, and found those convicted under the legislation entitled to
retrials in civilian courts.
44
At once, the unimaginable began: the courts began preparing to retry imitates
imprisoned on charges of treason against the nation or serving life sentences under the
Fujimori anti-terrorism legislation. When the TC made its ruling. 1.935 imitates fell into
these categories. Within days of the ruling, one hundred of them had filed for new trials.
By October 2004. The Economist reported that 212 inmates convicted under Fujimori s
44 On the TC decision to overturn the cases, see La Repuhlica Jan 9. 10. 2003; El
Peruano Jan 10. 2003.
anti-terrorism laws had already been released for lack of evidence or because they had
completed their sentences. The public reacted with shock and anger. Polling results
indicated that, of the 64% of respondents who had heard of the TC decision. 77%
disagreed with the decision and only 19% agreed. 60% interpreted the court s decision to
mean that some terrorists would now go free (only 35% disagreed with this statement);
71% understood that the ruling meant some terrorists could now be retried in civilian
courts (23% disagreed). Though 52% believed the ruling reflected a desire to bring Peru s
standards ofjustice in line with those of the international community. 32% attributed it to
a weakness of the courts before the terrorists. President Toledo made contradictory
statements about the ruling, both supporting the court s decision as a necessary step
toward re-establishing democracy and the rule of law in Peru, and simultaneously
promising to declare a national state of emergency if an} - terrorists went free.4 '
Efforts to retry those who had been convicted of terrorism touched a very raw
nerve, particularly when it came to Abimael Guzman and other leading Shining Path
members. Guzman s retrial began in 2004. at a difficult moment for the Toledo
administration.
46
The judiciary continued to exhibit weakness and was constantly under
attack, but this obstacle paled in comparison to Toledo s own dismal approval ratings.
Though President Toledo had publicly criticized the slow progress made on high profile
4
" Apoyo polling data from Jan 2003. Available online at www.apoyo-om.com: La
Republica Jan 10. 20. 2003.
4,1
At the time of writing, the case against Guzman remained unresolved, in part due to the
failure of the first trial convened, and numerous resignations and scandals over the
conduct of the trial. On torturous path of Guzman s retrial, see La Republica March 28.
Nov 3. 2003, Nov 7. 8. 9, 10. 1 7. 2004; El Comercio Nov 10, 1 1. 16. 30. 2004: El
Peruano Nov 3. 8. 15. 16, 18. 2004: El Correo Nov 10. 2004; Expreso Nov 3. 2004;
Peru21 Nov 30, 2004. March 14. 2005.
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cases, he had also warned in a television interview that Peru runs the risk of having the
doors opened for terrorists to be freed. Others feared that public coverage of the new
trials would encourage new growth among the remnants of the Shining Path, particularly
after the defendants began chanting Sendero slogans in a courtroom packed with
reporters and cameras. The level of continuing uneasiness over a terrorist movement
largely defeated a decade before was surprising. A September 2004 survey conducted by
the polling firm Apovo found that 45% of Lima residents thought it probable or very
probable that Peru would suffer from a new wave of terrorism in the next ten years.
The public clearly linked the Constitutional Tribunal decision to both the human rights
movement of the country and the earlier rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights as. indeed, did members of the Peruvian NGO community.49
The retrials particularly angered the military. A January 2003 article reported:
The retired admiral is seething: I don t know when we went from being
acclaimed as national heroes to being in the dock. Peru s armed forces were once
hailed for having crushed terrorism. The downfall of Alberto Fujimori laid bare
their involvement in hug kickbacks on arms purchases, in human-rights abuses
and even electoral fraud. But now the army reckons the pendulum has swung too
far. A dozen generals are in jail, facing corruption charges. Alejandro
Toledo wants to bring the armed forces under tight civilian control. His
government aims to slim the officer corps, and make is more professional and
accountable (the auditor-general would check the military books). But reform is
stirring up unrest.
4
See especially El Correo Nov 9. 2004: El Peruana Nov 8. 2004: La Republica Nov 4.
8. 2004.
48
Peru s Terrorism Trials: Still shining after all these years Economist Oct 30. 2004.
'
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The article also warned that ordinal'}' Peruvians still see Mr. Fujimori s crushing of
terrorism as a triumph, and do no juibble about the methods used. '°
Military courts proved relatively cooperative with demands that civilians
convicted under anti-terrorism legislation within the military courts be granted retrials in
civilian courts. The initiation of civilian court cases against members of the military
provoked much greater resistance, on the other hand. The military s capacity to block
criminal procedures against current and former officers at first did not seem great.
Numerous members of the military7 were ultimately tried and convicted to lengthy prison
sentence for illegal enrichment and general corruption, among them both Vladimiro
Montesinos and General Cesar Saucedo Sanchez. Interior and Defense Minister from
1997 to 2000.
51
Yet progress on human rights cases represented a mixed experience. The truth
commission forwarded 47 to the Public Ministry for investigation and prosecution. By
2005, 22 investigations had been opened. On one hand, the advancement symbolized by
the opening of these cases was a genuine step forward for those advocating human rights
accountability; in 2005. at least 383 individuals had been charged and legally processed
in these cases. Of these 383. 277 were current or former members of the Arm}
(representing 72.3% of all those charged): 64 were from the national police force; and 1
were Marines. The accused included both active duty and retired members of these
forces: of the 277 members of the Army charged, for example, at least 58 were still on
active duty, and more than half the accused national police officers were. In addition to
Military mutters Economist Jan 1 1 , 2003.
?l
Gestion Dec 28, 2005. La Republica Dec 21. 2005
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the cases forwarded by the truth commission, four other human rights cases were opened
by 2005 at the behest of the Defensorla del Pueblo. Together, of these 26 cases, 1
5
involved charges of qualified homicide: 10 of forced disappearances: 8 of kidnapping: 3
of torture: 2 of simple homicide: 1 of aggravated kidnapping: 1 of qualified torture; 1 of
aggravated terrorism: 1 of sexual violation: and 1 of genocide/'
By February of 2005. journalists were dramatizing the fear of prosecution which
current and former members of the military had come to known. As one article entitled
Justice May Be Delayed for Decades. But in the End it Comes put it. the nights are
getting progressively longer for some members of the military The fear has grown and
some have accustomed themselves to living day by day. The impunity of yesteryear has
been dying. One hundred and eighty officers were implicated in a series of human rights
violations and connected to the kidnapping, torture and executions of more than 520
individuals between 1983 and 1997; their cases fell within 16 of the 44 the truth
commission had forw arded to the Ombudsman and judiciary for investigation. In 2005.
the capture of many of these 180 accused was ordered. Though others, like Clemente
Noel, the chief of the military-political command of Ayachuco in the early 1980s.
continued to move about in total freedom in public w ithout being apprehended, some
took precaution and tied the country. Numerous implicated individuals continued in
positions of power in both the military and government under Toledo /"'
Defensoria del Pueblo A dos cmos de la Comision de la Verdady Reconcilacion 2005.
ch. 2; for coverage of human rights cases, see La Republica Dec 21. 2004.
x
' Oscar Castilla C. La Justicia Puede Tardar Decadas. Pero A1 Fin Llega. El Comercio
Feb 13.2005.
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Some bold prosecutions did go forward. In March 2004. the Fourth Criminal
Court of Huancayo charged retired General Luis Perez Documet with kidnapping.
Documet was military chief of Junin province in the early 1990s. a period in which at
least nine university students were forcibly disappeared after being held at a military’ base
in Huancayo. Luis Alberto Ramirez, a key witness in the trial who also testified before
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission about brutal torture he suffered and witnessed
at the base, survived a third attempt on his life in June 2005. Though the Peruvian
government supplied Ramirez with a police guard after the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights request that the)' do so. the attempts on Ramirez s life lead to repeated
demands by Human Rights Watch that the Peruvian government improve its witness
protection services and investigate the attempt.
4
Among the bold moves taken by the courts to bring those responsible to justice
were the opening of procedures against those implicated in cases of large-scale military
abuses alleged to have occurred in Accomarca and Cava, two v illages in the Ayacucho
region. In June 2005. twenty nine arrest warrants were issued for military officials
accused of involvement of the 1985 massacre of 72 villagers in Accomarca. Though the
military courts had found a handful of officers guilty of the massacre in 1993. these
officers too had been granted amnesty under Fujimori, and few outside the military'
believed the case had been fully investigated in the first place.
1'' Special Human Rights
Prosecutor Cristina Olazabal went so far as to accuse ex-president Alan Garcia, a former
4 Human Rights Watch. Peru: Third Attempt on Life of Key Torture Witness. June 3.
2005. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/03/perul 1 074_txt.htm
" Rich Vecchio Peru military resists civilian trials of human rights violations.
Associated Press. July 7. 2005 Lexis-Nexus online. Caso Que Hizo Aflorar la CVR en
Manos de Juez. El Comercio Feb 4. 2005.
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president of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, a former chief of military
command in Ayacucho. and other high officials of criminal complicity in the Accomarca
massacre/
h
Then, within the space of one week in July 2005. orders were ordered to
detain 1 18 individuals implicated in events that transpired in the village of Cayara in May
1988. More than two dozen villagers were killed as a result of military' actions there, and
many others were tortured. Reportedly, the massacre was in retaliation for a guerilla
attack on an army convoy a day earlier. '
Bold action within the judiciary was met with political avoidance from Toledo
and Congress. If the release of the CVR final report had presented Toledo, who, as
Wilson wrote in August 2003. "has never been popular with the Perm ian military w ith
the politically delicate task of weighing the growing public cries for justice against
allowing the report to stand as the final word on the war." his actions on this front were
often contradictory. At times Toledo opted for avoidance of the question of prosecution
of implicated individuals in the security forces, despite a succession of moves by the
courts to speed the justice process. The capacity of the Toledo administration to seriously
challenge the armed forces and force wide-reaching changes on the institution rapidly
diminished ox er the course of his presidency. During this period, all institutions of the
state w ould continue to suffer from extremely low lex els of public confidence. President
' 6 Caso Que Hizo Atlorar la CVR en Manos de .Tuez. El Coniercio Feb 4. 2005 and
FB1S-LAT February 5. 2005.
Vecchio Peru military resists cixilian trials of human rights x iolations. Associated
Press. July 7. 2005 Lexis-Nexus online.
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Toledo, by 2003 the single least popular head of state in the history of polling on such
matters in Latin America, was hardly in a position to challenge the military, which,
conversely, enjoyed the highest levels of popular respect and trust as early as 2003.
One of the biggest obstacles to prosecution proved to be the assertiveness of the
military courts in continuing to claim jurisdiction over human rights cases. As discussed
in Chapter I. the tradition of militaryfueros, under which the armed forces enjoyed
special, separate legal procedures overseen by members of the defense sector themselves,
has long served as one of the pillars of special privilege enjoyed by Latin American
militaries. The Peruvian military justice system, led by the Supreme Council of Military
Justice (Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar. CSJM). has been instrumental in protecting
members of the services from the careful scrutiny they would have received in criminal
courts. As the Insituto de Defensa Legal puts it. the military justice system served as the
political machinery to guarantee impunity to human rights violators within the military."
In the 1990s. Fujimori passed a decree that all military personnel operating in zones of
emergency were in action 24 hours a day: therefore, any charge brought against a
member of the military in such a zone could only be tried in military courts, even if the
alleged crime would normally fall under the jurisdiction of tradition civil courts. This was
one of several expansions of military court jurisdiction ox er the Fujimori regime.
Though the CVR has specifically called upon the Toledo government and
Congress to institute reforms to subject the military courts to the supremacy of the
civilian court system and to define clearly via law the jurisdiction of civilian courts in all
human rights cases, in 2005 and 2006 this issue remained unresolved. In 2001 the CSJM
" 8 IDL Los nudos de la defensa 2005.
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and the Council of Magistrates (the institution empowered to appoint judges) had
developed a proposal to implement such reforms, yet Congress refused to consider the
issue over the course of the next four years. By this point, the attitude within the CSJM
had hardened against the reform.
54
The CSJM now insisted on asserting its claims to
jurisdiction over all cases involving current and former members of the military, even in
those human rights cases already under investigation in civilian courts in accordance with
the demands of the truth commission, and despite the fact that many members of the
CSJM. like members of all high courts in the country, had been found guilty of
corruption and abuses of the courts to further impunity under Fujimori. 60
But in 2004. a watershed ruling was issued by the Constitutional Tribunal,
declaring the military courts out of bounds. The ruling had been provoked by the decision
by the CSJM to acquit Vladimiro Montesinos. Fujimori s armed forces commander
Nicolas de Bari Hermoza. and his military operations chief Luis Perez Documet. of
charges that they were the intellectual authors of the 1992 La Cantuta massacre. The
highest civilian court fought back with a ruling that challenged the military courts
4
Ciurlizza Contreras Las reformas institucionales propuestas por la CVR 2005.
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traditional wide conception of their jurisdiction, arguing that it must in future be limited
to hearing cases related to offences in furtherance of military duties. Military courts,
the TC argued, did not meet the requirements of impartiality and independence required
to guarantee due process. This ruling was immediately followed by public demands from
Prime Minister Carlos Ferrero for the military courts to respect their subordination to
civilian courts and accept the annulment of their past rulings in cases now deemed
inappropriate for their review. Supporting the judges arguments that the military justice
system was acting in violation of the constitution. Ferrero called for the annulment of
rulings that breach human rights, so that there can be in the future no further excuses or
pretext for dodging prosecution. 61
Nevertheless, military courts continued to conduct their own investigations into
human rights cases. 6- In the majority of these cases, the victims were without legal
counsel. In the cases forwarded by the CVR to the courts. 75.9% of the victims were
without legal counsel: 23.5% enjoyed legal counsel provided by NGOs: and only .6%
employed private legal counsel. The accused enjoyed somewhat better legal
representation, with 12.8% enjoying legal counsel provided by the state. 44.6%
represented by private counsel, and 42.6% w ithout counsel. The police forces of the
country continued to do their part to contribute to the avoidance of prosecution of the
61
For coverage of the TC case and its implications, see Peru: Move to curb reach of
military justice Latin American Weekly Report. Intelligence Research. Aug 31. 2004,
Lexis-Nexus online: La Republic Nov 2. 3. 2003:
' 2
Defensoria del Pueblo A dos alios de la Comision de la Verdady Reconcilacion 2005.
p. 129-149.
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armed forces (and members of the national police implicated in human rights cases).
Only 1 7.1% of those charged with human rights violations for whom arrest warrants had
been issued had actually been detained by 2005; 82.9% remained at liberty. 6j
III. Public Opinion and Multiple Crises of Legitimacy
The response of Toledo and the legislature to the powerful step the TC had taken
in finally challenging the military' courts is telling. The responsibility now fell to the
legislature to assemble a delegation charged with the responsibility of overseeing a
rewriting of the rules of military justice. Congress immediately attempted to pass
responsibility back to the executive by arguing the}' were not capable of engaging in such
a project, citing the highly technical nature of the matter as grounds for abdicating their
authority. Experts on civil-military relations condemned this refusal on the part of the
legislature to develop new rules for military justice and relocation of the military courts
under the control of the civil legal system as clear signals that the legislature was
unwilling to challenge the military courts as an autonomous legal entity. They concluded
that, moreover, military reform as a whole was more window-dressing than genuine
commitment to democratic reform of civil-military relations. Meanwhile, the confusion
over jurisdictions further delayed ongoing trials. The special criminal court re-hearing the
Grupo Colina cases had held the alleged death squad members in prison for 36 months
without sentencing them when, in January 2006. it decided to extend the prisoners
detention for another 36 months. Though the law states that prisoners held 36 months
63
Ibid, chapters 2 and 3.
without sentence must be released, the court justified the extension on the grounds that its
work had been severely hampered by legal uncertainties over the rules of military justice,
amnesties, and the multiple competing judicial jurisdictions that had been invoked/ 4
Clearly, many political decision-makers still saw it as in their best interest to
maintain the status quo ante in the field of military prerogatives. 6 ' The Defense and
Military Reform div ision of the Institute) de Defensei Legal argued the move was the
result of intense lobbying by representatives of the CSJM and the armed forces in general
to persuade members of Congress to drop the issue. Multiple seminars and meetings had
been held by the CSJM and armed forces to discuss the issue with members of Congress,
and numerous public statements on the matter had been issued by the president of the
CSJM. 66 Though this was a particularly egregious example of Congressional abdication
of responsibility in military reform, it was not entirely surprising: Congress had made
little effort to exert itself in this area since the transition. Though a congressional
Commission on Defense and Internal Order had been active since 2003. it had only
approved a handful of the hundreds of pieces of legislation under its review. The vast
majority of the energy and time of the Commission was dedicated to settling questions of
promotion and retirement.
6
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If anything, the CSJM s actions grew bolder. In 2005. the CSJM sent dozens of
official requests to the Human Rights Ombudsman s office for information contained in
the truth commission s records relating to criminal cases the commission had sent there
and to the judicial branch for investigation. This signaled not only the CSJM s intention
to continue trying cases the Constitutional Tribunal had ruled beyond their jurisdiction,
but also their intention to use data, such as DNA samples, autopsy repons, and testimony,
collected by the truth commission and civilian couns in order to undermine those same
institutions! The Ombudsman refused to hand over the information, arguing the requests
were as illegal as the CSJM s trials. Assistant ombudsman Rocio Villanueva s analysis
was worrying: the military wished to settle these cases in their own courts before civilian
courts could try them fairly so as to give any convictions an uncertain legal status and to
zo
invalidate the civilian court procedures for essentially retrying already-settled cases.
Then, in the final two hours of the legislative session of 2005. Congress, having
left the passage of a new law governing military justice to the last moment allowed by
law. finally passed Law 28665 - the Law on the Organization. Functions and Competence
of the Specialized Jurisdiction over Military Penal Matters. The contents of the new law
provoked an immediate political firestorm. Susana Villaran. presidential candidate and
congressional member of the Concertcicion Decentralista. reported that the law passed
w ith the unanimous support of UN, APRA. F1M and Peru Ahora in w hat she described as
68
Fuero Castrense No Tiene Competencia El Comercio. Aug 28. 2005.
69 Laws are published in El Perucmo and their full text can be found on the paper s
database at http:/A\w'w.elperuano.com.pe/ under Normas Legales. On Congress s last
minute decision, see El Perucmo Dec 14. 15. 2005: Peru21 and Gestiou Dec 15. 2005.
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an attempt to protect the military s intervention into the legal system.
0 Though Toledo
continued to reject pleas from a congressional minority pushing to offer at least some of
these officers amnesty, he did now back the formation of the special court within the
Supreme Court to review cases against military' suspects, which accorded with his
argument that members of the military' deserved a more expedited settlement of their
legal status in human rights cases. The new Supreme Court of Military Justice (Sola
Suprema Judicial Militar). officially created by Congress s approval of Law 28665. was
to be composed of three military magistrates and two civilian judges. By a simple
majority vote, the court would determine which military abuse cases should be forwarded
to civilian courts and which ought to be heard in closed military tribunals. 1
This was interpreted by the human rights community as a major setback,
reversing much of the significance of the previous year s decision by the Constitutional
Tribunal declaring the military justice system unconstitutional and calling upon Congress
to create new legislation asserting civilian jurisdiction over military courts. Now a new
avenue was being created to circumvent civilian courts and route sensitive cases back to
military jurisdiction, and the president was blasting the discredited civilian court
system for the persecution of military personnel. ' The Attorney General ( Fiscal de la
Nacion) Adelaida Bolivar appealed to the Constitutional Tribunal (TC). arguing that Law
" Villaran denuncia aprobacion de ley que permit ira intromision militar en justicia
comun. El Comercio Feb 7. 2006: on the significance of the law. see La Republica Jan
27. 2006: Defensoria del Pueblo s comments in El Comercio Feb 28. 2006.
1
Approval of the law w as announced in the government newspaper. El Peruano on Dec
16. 2005. under the headline Congreso crea Sala Suprema Judicial Militar. For
Toledo s demands for more celerity in the military justice process, see El Peruano Dec
28.2005.
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28665, which had originally legalized the CS.TM s wider jurisdiction, violated the
Constitution and international law and jeopardized the autonomy of the Peruvian legal
system. The TC agreed to hear the case. The new law met with immediate protests,
including one staged outside CSJM by members of the Colegio de Abogcidos de Lima in
February' 2006. That same day. the country s Supreme Court was scheduled to name the
civilian judges to be appointed to the new Sala Suprema Judicial Militcir. Mn a response
interpreted by many as indicative of the Supreme Court s rejection of the idea of the Sala .
the justices refused to make the appointments or allow the panel to convene until the
question of its constitutionality was established. Chief Justice Walter Vasquez Vejarano
announced that a commission ofjudges was in the process of reviewing the laws of
military justice, but that under no circumstances would any law. including Law 28665. be
allowed to militarize the justice system nor institutionalize interference with the duties
of the civilian court sy stem.
Meanwhile, La Republica reported that three of the generals being considered as
possible appointees to the new Sala Suprema Judicial Militar had strong ties to
Montesinos during the Fujimori administration. Two of the three had participated in
' CAL realiza planton en rechazo de ley que permite a justicia militar juzgar otros
delitos and TC acoge demanda contra reforma de la justicia militar El Comercio. Feb
7. 2006. Bolivar s appeal was reported in nearly every Peruvian newspaper, including La
Republica El Peruano. Gestion. Expreso, and El Comercio on Jan 26. 2006: see also
Gestion and Peru21 Feb 13. 20. 2006: El Peruano Feb 15. 16. 20: La Republica Feb 13.
16. 20. 2006.
4 CAL realiza planton en rechazo de ley que permite a justicia militar juzgar otros
delitos El Comercio Feb 7. 2006.
Poder Judicial no pondra en funcionamiento sala militar El Comercio Feb 9. 2006.
The Inter-American Comision on Human Rights expressed its concerni over the new law
and requested reports from the government and human rights organizations on the matter:
Peru21 Feb 21. 2006.
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signing the oath of loyalty to Fujimori videotaped in 1999 and released publicly during
the Paniagua administration. At that time, the military leadership pledged to obstruct any
investigation into human rights abuses alleged to have been committed by the state and
its agents and reaffirmed its commitment to amnesty for members of the military. Three
of the judges considered for the slots had defended Montesinos in military court, while
another was undergoing investigation for malfeasance of office. In light of these and
other objections. Susana Villaran and others organized protests, including the symbolic
washing of the flag outside government offices.
h
The government s next steps further enflamed those who pressed for genuine
military reform. In December 2005. Rick Vecchio of the Associated Press reported that
human rights groups complain [Toledo] has done an about-face, bowing to military
pressure to sidestep the prosecution of abuses. Among the evidence were public
statements made by the president and many members of Congress that military suspects
had not received due process in civilian courts. This was clearly a position gaining
popularity in Congress. In December 2005 and January 2006. Luis Iberico. president of
the Defense Committee of Congress, accused members of the Public Ministry of bringing
charges against members of the military based solely on charges made by the truth
commission and of violating officers fundamental rights in the course of legal
procedures. Provincial magistrates were charged with borrowing whole paragraphs from
b
Reported in Gestion. El Perucmo, El Comercio and La Republicci Feb 3. 2006.
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the CVR report as justification for accusations against members of the military; members
of Congress now pointedly reminded members of the legal system that the word of the
truth commission was not sacred.
Furthermore, Iberico was joined by UN s Jose Barba in accusing Peruvian and
international NGOs and the truth commission itself of unjustly pressuring judges and
attorneys into prosecuting human rights cases. According to Barba, this helped explain
why a large percentage of the cases against members of the military involved excesses
and arbitrariness committed by the Public Ministry. PAP s Judith de la Matta added her
own estimate that 90% of the cases against members of the military were based on the
opinion of the truth commission. Members of the military were being blamed and tried
collectively, she argued, in violation of the military justice principle that all military 7
crimes are individual rather than corporate or collective.' Julio Favre went so far as to
say that the unjust persecution of those who fought heroically against terrorism on behalf
of the Peruvian state was the fault of the truth commission, which, he said, had opened a
wound in the nation that would never be fully healed.
°
Iberico put forward a new amnesty law for Congressional consideration, one
which would grant amnesty to the more than 600 members of the military being tried in
civilian courts for human rights violations at that time.™ Once more the question of
78 A series of articles on these matters appeared in Correct Jan 3. 2006. See also Expreso
Jan 10. 2006.
q
Correo Jan 12. 2006.
x
" Gestion Dec 26. 2005. La Republica Jan 12. 2006: El Comercio Jan 3. 2006.
Interestingly. Luis Iberico was one of the members of Congress who revealed the first of
the Vladivideos. As Clifford Krauss reported in the New York Times on Dec 3, 2000.
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amnesty provoked a firestorm. Ombudswoman Beatriz Merino countered the proposal by
reminding the public that the Inter American Court of Human rights had specifically
ruled amnesties inapplicable to cases of human rights violations such as torture,
extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances. Furthermore, only judges and not
members of Congress had the authority to judge defendants innocent or guilty in such
cases." Others accused Iberico. who was at the time campaigning as the vice-presidential
candidate on the FIM ticket, of simply playing politics: the restoration of the right to vote
to military and police personnel meant there were now 134.000 military and police votes
o-»
to court in the upcoming elections. " not to mention those of former members of the
military and police and their families, a group potentially encompassing millions.
That these arguments reflected military opinion was clear, but in January 2006 it
became obvious just how closely they reflected military opinion when a report prepared
by the military was circulated among members of Congress. The report forcefully argued
that legal proceedings against members of the military were the result of pressure from
human rights NGOs on judges and attorneys to apply the recommendations of the truth
commission. The military report claimed that the human rights organizations (including,
specifically named in the report. IDL. Amnesty International. Aprodeh. Anfasep. Cedal.
CAPA. Ceapaz. CAAAP. and Ipedehp) were able to employ three times as many legal
experts as could the defendants in such cases and that they unjustly threatened judges
with legal complaints if they failed to prosecute. Even members of the National Counsel
Iberico was contacted by a friend who said the videos came from members of the
military7 and intelligence community who wanted to embarrass Montesinos.
81 Dec 29. 2005.
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of Magistrates (CNM. Cornejo National c/e la Magistratura) argued that the NGOs had
broken their moral pact with the country by politicizing the legal process with attacks
against the military and its political allies.
Most accusations of this kind were published in Expveso. whose editors accused
the NGOs of trumping up charges in order to garner more resources from international
allies, but they could be found in other papers as well. On November 12, 2004. for
example. El Comercio reported APRA Congressman Jorge del Castillo s charge that
seventy Peruvian NGOs were directly controlled by Sendero Luminoso. Congressmen
and presidential candidates rushed to outdo one another in raging against the NGOs. and
several called for a congressional investigation of these NGOs and the foreign interests
they were accused of serving. The Defense Minister immediately backed calls for the
NGOs to be investigated and tried, and he acknowledged that the links between these
groups and subversive groups remained a constant preoccupation of the armed forces.
Retired generals told the media that the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoria del
Pueblo), human rights groups and the truth commission had long conspired together to
disappear the Peruvian armed forces. Even a member of the Supreme Court concurred
with this assessment of Peruvian human rights groups, suggesting that their members
were simply angling for large international donations and positions on the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. The Defense Minister joined Iberico and his allies in Congress in
their calls for amnesty for members of the military unjustly persecuted in the witch
hunt of human rights trial, portraying such an amnesty as a "legitimate proposal to
v
' Expreso Jan 10, 16. 17. 18. 23. 26. 2006. On the campaign to discredit NGOs see De la
Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobre justice y derechos humanos 2003. p. 86-89: La Republica
Jan 23. 2006.
reconcile Peruvians." They added that in cases when abuses were indeed perpetrated, the
weight of responsibility rested upon the civilian government who had failed to give clear
guidance to the military and police charged with carrying out the anti-subversive
campaign. 84
The debate over a new amnesty was fueled in part by concerns about national
security, rising once more in light of renewed, but isolated, attacks by members of
Sendero Luminoso. In December 2005. President Toledo declared a state of emergency in
six provinces of the Huanuco region after SL fighters ambushed police officers, killing
eight.
85 Some suspected ST might be gearing up to interrupt the upcoming 2006
elections. The Council of Ministers President. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. pointed to the
ambush as proof that his repeated warnings over the past year that ST was rearming and
regaining strength had been prescient. He told the press that the attack also indicated that
"most of the 10.000 terrorists liberated under Valentin Paniagua's interim government
had rejoined the ranks of Shining Path." Fernando Rospigliosi. Interior Minister under
Paniagua, issued an immediate reply to this charge, pointing out that the Paniagua
government had released only 540 alleged terrorists, all of whom had been cleared of
suspicion by the ad hoc commission granted this responsibility. Furthermore. SL had
84 Quote is from Expreso Dec 28. 2005. See also Expreso Jan 16. 17 and 19. 2006;
Peru2J Jan 19. 2006.
s
~ Periodic attacks by SL continued sporadically throughout the years after Guzman s
capture, though the groups numbers never reached more than a few hundred members.
For example, on March 21. 2002 terrorists set off a car bomb in Lima the night before a
visit by US President Bush. Eight people were killed and 40 injured by the bomb blast
outside the LJS embassy. A similar car bomb explosion was set off in Lima in 1991. See
A cor York Times March 21 and 22. 2002. The 2005 incidents were reported on Lima TV
Dec 23, 2005.
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never had more than 4.500 militants at any one time. so. Rospigliosi argued. Kuczynski
was merely being alarmist and dishonest. The Ombudsman s Office too rejected
Kuczynski s claims, citing the fact that the number of Peruvians imprisoned on terrorism
charges had peaked at 3.878 in 1997: to claim that Paniagua himself could have released
o/
10.000 such individuals was a gross exaggeration.
However, these figures did little to reassure the public, as unidentified military
sources continued to warn that SL was planning numerous new attacks across the
countryside to sabotage the elections. The Council of Ministers responded by allocating
$14.5 million to restore military and police counter-insurgency bases in the region and
another $7.5 million to the armed forces to step up antisubversive operations. Defense
Minister Marciano Rengifoalso announced that 46.000 troops would be deployed to
0*7
provide security during the 2006 elections.
Several political appointments provoked the ire of human rights advocates and
criticism from military experts. Toledo appointed Army General Jose Williams as the
new commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Opinion is deeply divided over Gen.
Williams, as Vecchio explained: Many Peruvians consider Williams a hero for his role
in the retaking of the Japanese embassy in 1997. But he was also one of the 29 military
officials issued arrest warrants over the Accomarca case, in which the victims were
Indian w omen, children and village elders. According to Vecchio.
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The women were raped before being killed. Williams, then a major and company
leader in the Andean zone, denies any wrongdoing, saying a rogue army patrol
under his command carried out the massacre without his knowledge. He used his
induction ceremony [as commander of the joint chiefs of staff] to blast the human
rights charges facing Peru s military, telling troops their comrades who fought to
pacify the country are now being persecuted, slandered and mistreated.
Shortly after the initial order for Williams arrest was issued, the courts agreed to suspend
it and allow him to remain in the army s custody, essentially in a legal limbo. Toledo s
decision to appoint him commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the midst of such
charges seemed to send the message that the tide had turned once more in favor of the
military and against new efforts to drag officers before the courts. Though the 2002 laws
governing career advancement within the military specifically stipulated that no officer
under investigation for criminal activity could advance to the next rung in the military
hierarchy, such promotions did continue to occur. 11 Human rights groups such as
Aprodeh cited Williams promotion as an ominous sign that the administration no longer
took human rights accountability seriously.
In addition, after appointing the first two civilian defense ministers in Peru s
history, Toledo turned the office over to retired army General Roberto Chiabra in
December of 2003. Fernando Rospiglioso. perhaps Peru s best known expert on civil-
military relations, argued that under this new appointment, the relationship with the
military has returned to what it was before and that early efforts by the Toledo
administration to rein in the military had been short-lived. Ana Maria Tamayo agreed that
88 En La Mira Oct 2005. On Williams appointment, see El Comercio Dec 19. 2005: on
accusations of irregular promotions under Toledo, see also El Correa Dec 27. 28. 2004:
La Republica Dec 17. 2004: Expreso Dec 16. 17. 2004.: El Comercio Dec 16. 2005.
89 Peru21 Dec 19. 2005.
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the window opened by the transition [of 2000] was now shut. What s happening now
with military people who have detention orders and are not being detained. Rospigliosi
stated, is occurring with the approval of the defense minister The president is
primarily responsible. The civilian government is afraid to confront the military. They
don t have sufficient authority. 90
The Ministry of Defense, it should be noted, was created to serve as a check on
military power by limiting the influence of the three individual heads of the military
branches and subjecting them to civilian leadership. Tamayo writes that despite the new
legislation governing the Ministry of Defense, in 2005 it had yet to transform the
Ministry of Defense into a source of civilian control of the military both because of its
insufficient power and funding as well as its return to military (albeit retired) leadership.
C'hiabra s suggestion that the armed forces would support a new removal of Peru from
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights a suggestion he brought
before the Counsel of Ministers - did much to confirm the suspicion of human rights
groups that the momentum for human rights accountability over the armed forces ended
with Chiabra s ascension to Minister of Defense.
'
1 (While Peru remained in the IACHR.
the idea of abandoning the court seemed to have gained popularity as that court s ruling
on the controversial Lori Berenson case approached.)
1
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Alejandro Silva, the new head of the National Coordinator for Human Rights,
criticized these moves, and complained as did Judge Pablo Talavera. president of
Peru s national criminal court - that police continually failed to act on court-ordered
arrest warrants for active and retired military personnel implicated in human rights
abuses. The human rights community of Peru argued that the military s influence over
government remained powerful, and that an ongoing campaign of intimidation, threats
and violence directed at their organizations and witnesses was being carried out against
Peruvian NGOs. g ' El Comercio regularly featured stories about death threats made
against Salomon Lerner in 2005 by supposed defenders of the military institutions that,
in a false espirit de corps, interpret the report [of the truth commission] as an offense
against the Armed Forces. International organizations such as Human Rights Watch and
the International Center for Transitional Justice lobbied the Peruvian government to
provide the truth commissioners and many of the individuals who gave testimony before
the commission with protection after they received similar death threats.94
Armadas 2002 and El proceso de la reforma del Ministerio de Defensa y el rol de las
Fuerzas Armadas para la consolidacion democratica 2004.
4
' Congressman Rafael Rev continued to insist the IACHR was full of leftists and
therefore partial. The IACHR found in favor of the Peruvian state in the Berenson case.
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Meanwhile. Lerner s public statement that the politicians who participated in
governing Peru from 1 980 to 2000 apologize publicly for their failures to prevent the
outrages described in the truth commission s reports provoked immediate responses from
the leadership of the APRA and Accion Popular parties. While APRA s secretary Jorge
del Castillo contented himself with waving away the possibility of any individual
politician apologizing. Victor Andres Garcia Belaunde. president of Accion Popular, shot
back that Lerner himself should apologize to the Peruvian people for hiding behind a
desk for twenty years while politicians had made the hard choices.
4
President Toledo
did. in fact, apologize to the victims of the violence detailed in the report, and to their
families, on behalf of the nation.
But by this point. Toledo s presidency was plagued by corruption scandals,
investigated by several congressional committees. Minister of Defense Chiabra himself
came under investigation for allegedly accepting bribes from Montesinos earlier in his
career.
06
The most damaging scandals, however, touched upon the president himself.
According to the New York Times . Today more than a dozen of Mr. Toledo's relatives,
including his wife and brothers, are accused of using their influence for personal gain.
Opinion polls give him among the lowest ratings of any Latin American leader, and his
government has been bled by nearly constant media sniping over the scandals. This is
part of a wider trend of second-generation leadership of Latin American democracies
^ Exhortacion que no se escucha. El Comercio Aug 29. 2005.
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disappointing the public and failing to fulfill promises to end corruption, a trend touching
Brazil under Lula da Silva. Ecuador under Lucio Gutierrez, Mexico under Vicente Fox.
and others. 97
Unfortunately, corruption in the Toledo administration went beyond placing
family members and political allies in plum jobs. Investigators have uncovered evidence
that Toledo s sister oversaw the forgery of many (perhaps most) of the petition signatures
the Toledo campaign produced as pail of the requirement to get his name on the
presidential ballot in 2000. A congressional commission convened to further investigate
the matter and questioned Toledo over his involvement in the forgery scheme, but he
denied the event ever took place. This is a factory of lies, he claimed. Take me at my
word. I'm telling the truth. Despite substantial improvements in the Peruvian economy
over Toledo s tenure in office, he was deeply disliked by the public.
g
Larry Rohter and Juan Forero. Unending Graft is Threatening Latin America. New
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Ibid. For a critical assessment of the Toledo administration, see Adelman Andean
Impasses 2002: for a much more positive one. see Taylor From Fujimori to Toledo
2005. On economic improvements, see El Peruano Jan 27. 2006 and La Republica Dec
22. 2005. which notes that the Peru s national statistics institute reported GDP growth of
21.2% from 2002 to 2005. a rate higher than that of Chile, and attributing this growth in
large part to sound fiscal and monetary policies and to the Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). On export growth, see Expreso Dec 23. 2005: on low-
levels of inflation see El Comercio Feb 7, 2006. However, polling results indicate that the
improved macroeconomic situation was not perceived by much of the population. When
asked in August 2004 to compare their family s economic situation with how it had been
twelve months earlier, only 1% said their family s economic situation was much better:
12% said it was a little better: 28% said it was the same. 3 1 % said it was a little worse:
and 28% said it was much worse. Their economic outlook was fairly pessimistic, as well:
when asked how their household economic situation would be in another twelve months.
3% said much better: 17% a little better: 31% the same: 19% a little worse; and 24%
much worse. Similarly, when asked to evaluate the president s claim that the number of
poor people in the country had decreased by 420.000. 80% believed this was false and
that the number of poor people had increased; 15% said it w as partially true: and only 3%
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The most serious scandal related to charges that his party. Peru Posible. falsified
signatures to get Toledo on the ballot in 2000. Whatever the facts of these cases, opinion
data indicates that the majority of the public believed the charges to be true. In the case of
the falsification of signatures, 74% of the public believed the charges to be true: 83%
believed the charges against Toledo s wife were accurate. This refected both the
unpopularity of the Toledo administration and the wider perception of Peruvians that
most politicians and public figures are corrupt. According to Apoyo analyses, this
perception was so strongly reinforced by the Vladivideos scandal that it has become a
permanent feature of the Peruvian public psyche.'
w
Charges that Toledo was interfering with the normal process of promotion in the
military came from all sides. Allegedly. Toledo not only violated the norms of promotion,
but also made the promotions without consulting the commanders of the Air Force and
Army. Both commanders resigned in protest. 1011 Alan Garcia, who once more set his
sights on the presidency, grew highly critical of Toledo as the 2006 elections approached
and often decried Toledo s abuses of the military. Garcia and other members of the
PAP coalition claimed Toledo s military promotions of the high command, especially the
said it was true. Opinion Data: Resumen de Encuestas a la Opinion Publica. Apoyo
Opinion y Mercado. Sept 2004. Available at www.apoyo-om.com
Opinion Data: Resumen de Encuestas a la Opinion Publica. Apoyo Opinion y
Mercado. July 2004. Available at www.apoyo-om.com. On the forgery scandal, see El
Correct Dec 28. 2004: El Perucmo Nov 1 1. Dec 30. 2004: Expreso Dec 15. 30. 2004: El
Comercio Dec 27. 2004: La Republica Dec 1, 2004. On corruption and other scandals
involving the president and his family, see. for example. La Republica Dec 22. 2004.
May 4. 2005: El Comercio Nov 8. 2004. May 4. 2005.
11111
See Fernando Rospigliosi s comments in El Comercio Dec 16. 2005. See also El
Correo Dec 27. 2004. which details the normal process of promotion and accusations that
Toledo abused the system in order to advance his personal pilot among others.
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promotion of General Cesar Reinoso as general commandant of the army, were based
strictly on personal loyalty to Toledo, violated institutional norms of advancement and
seniority, and constituted political manipulation of the armed forces. Retired generals and
other political candidates agreed, and retired General German Parra s warning that such
politicization of the military command would inevitably provoke dissension within the
armed forces was reinforced when sources in the Ministry of Defense told reporters at El
Comercio that several generals, including Williams, had threatened to resign if Reinoso s
promotion went forward. ""
Assessing Civil-Military Relations Under Toledo
The original plan to radically recraft civil-military relations had become
increasingly difficult to realize over the course of 2002 and 2003. During the Toledo
administration, all institutions of the state would continue to suffer from extremely low
levels of public confidence. President Toledo was soon polling as the single least popular
head of state in the history of polling on such matters in Latin America, with approval
ratings often as low as 7%. As early as November 2002. Toledo s control seemed to be
slipping. When elections were held to create 25 regional governing bodies to decentralize
political control in the country. Alan Garcia APRA was awarded 1 1 . with the rest
divided among many small parties. The results were widely interpreted as a vote of no
1111
See El Comercio , La Republica, Correo. Perull Dec 10. 20. 2005; Ojo Dec 19. 2005
and El Comercio Dec 16. 2005.. Lourdes Flores (UN), who led the polls for the
presidency for several months before the 2006 election, joined other candidates including
Susana Villaran (CD) in responding to Williams and Reinoso s promotions by
demanding respect for the military and its rules of promotion.
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confidence by a public angered by Toledo s policies of privatizations and. above all. his
mishandling of several personal scandals." ~ Toledo was hardly in a position to challenge
the military, which, conversely, enjoyed the highest levels of popular respect of any state
institution after 2003. The courts. Congress, and the executive were widely distrusted by
the public. (See Graph 4 in Appendix.)
Particularly disappointing to the victims of the violence of the 1980s and 1990s
was the failure of the Toledo administration and Congress to institutionalize the long-
promised reparations program. Though legislation passed in 2005 established the
parameters for such a program, no national program was in place at the end of Toledo
administration.
10
' Moreover, even this legislation refected the reality of tensions within
the concept of reconciliation. For example, the legislation prohibited any reparations
from being awarded to individuals who had belonged to subversive organizations.
Though the truth commission itself had proscribed the possibility of reparations being
paid to those injured or killed in armed conflict with the state (or their family members),
the 2005 legislation would also rule out any individual in any way affiliated with a
subversive organization from being considered a victim and receiving reparations, even
in cases where the state was found responsible for acts such as rape, torture. 1
14
l0
‘ For example, after Toledo refused to recognize his illegitimate daughter for many
months, he then reversed course. Juan Forrero. Opposition Party Makes Strong Showing
in Peru Election New York Times Nov 1 8. 2002.
Ilb On the absence of a reparations program, see Pem21 Dec 25. 2004. March 7. 9. 2005;
11,4
Defensoria del Pueblo A dos anos de la Comision de la Verdady Reconcilacion 2005,
p. 276. Chapter 7 of this text offers the best and most up-to-date assessment of the
reparations situation in Peru available.
Certainly, military reform progressed on many levels, particularly in the sense
that the Ministry of Defense consistently articulated messages reflecting the primary
lessons of civil-military relations to emerge from the Fujimori debacle: measures were
necessary to assure that the members of the armed forces respected the subservience of
the institution to the civilian control of elected governments but that it be protected from
political manipulation. Documentation from the Ministry of Defense, like the White
Book (developed in conjunction with groups like the Instituto de Defensei Legal), and
public statements reflect a sensitivity to human rights issues as well. New efforts went
forward to incorporate human rights training into military education and to develop clear
ethical guidelines. The Ministry repeatedly elaborated on the need to define the methods
and goals of defense reform along the lines established by the truth commission s final
report, the Commission on the Integral Restructuring of the Armed Forces, the
Constitution, and the National Accord. In 2003, the Armed Forces Center of International
Human Rights was created, and the Ministry7 of Defense signed an agreement to work
with the International Red Cross and the Andean Commission of Jurists to strengthen
mutual cooperation in areas of human rights. Dozens of public meetings were organized
by civil society and by the various national branches of the Defensoria del Pueblo to
promote better relationships between the armed forces and the communities in which they
are based."
1 '
"
' For a sense of the Defensoria del Pueblo s role in reconstructing relations betw een the
armed forces and society and promoting military reform, see its reports Democraciay
relctciones civiles-militares: construyendo un estado de derecho 2003 and Relaciones
civiles militares: el catnino esta abierto (conclusiones-recomendaciones
)
2003. See also
IDL publications such as Pedraglio. Tamayo and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control civil
v relaciones civiles-militares 2004.
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But Ministry of Defense reform plans and public discussions are a rather weak
measure of actual change in civil-military relations in the wake of the 2000-2001 regime
transition. Efforts to alter the political culture of the armed forces were not reflected in
spending priorities; a mere 1.2% of the defense sector budget covered all educational and
cultural activities of the armed forces. More worryingly, Peruvian experts on civil-
military relations consistently warned that the control of the Ministry of Defense over the
various branches of the armed forces was in fact quite weak and that the strong language
about changing the culture and orientation toward the state among the members of the
armed forces was not reflected in true change. The Ministry received less than one
percent of the budget dedicated to the Defense Sector. 1
Rut Diamint warned that, throughout Latin America. Defense Ministries
incapable of exercising professional control of defense sector policies, and continuing
military resistance to civilian control, were threatening democratic consolidation.
"
Felipe Agiiero agreed: the key to successful military reform was the construction of
strong central organism of civilian control over the military. Only if the Ministry of
Defense was strengthened to the point where it was accepted as the authoritative source
of policy control over the armed forces would the fundamental steps toward reform be
made, and this required above all restructuring institutional mechanisms to establish this
control and the placement of indiv iduals who. by their stability in positions of pow er, by
their quality management, could command the respect of those under their jurisdiction.
106 Tamayo and Robles Prioridad: Fortalecimiento Ideele. Dec 2005.
1(1
Interview. Claves para la conduccion democratica de la Defensa. Ideele. No. 167.
Dec 2004.
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By 2004 a number of political moves by Toledo indicated a new willingness to concede
control of defense sector reform to the military and to seek military support for his weak
and deeply unpopular government. The Minister of Defense position, filled first by
civ ilian David Waisman (particularly unpopular with the military and considered
completely ignorant of military7 affairs) and then civilian Aurelio Loret de la Mola. was
for the remainder of the Toledo presidency filled by General Roberto Chiabra of the
Army. Chiabra s rise marked, in the eyes of many Peruvian experts on civil-military
relations, the end of the constructive period of reform initiated by Paniagua. As discussed
below. Toledo also introduced new sources of funding for the armed forces. Iw
The Ministry of Defense s own articulation of the plan for reform of the armed
forces indicated, too. that the tide had changed in favor of supporting the military rather
than appearing to aggressively intervene in its affairs. In 2004. the Ministry of Defense
made public its Strategic Plan for Reform of the Defense Sector 2004-2010 which
clearly indicated that, though from 2001 to 2004 it had been necessary for the armed
forces to accept budget and personnel cuts, unilaterally disarm . and submit to new
political control, all that was now behind them. From 2004 to 2006 the plan envisions the
l "'s Tamayo and Robles Entrevista con Felipe Aguero. Reforma Militar: El debate
publico es clave. Icleele. No. 1 64. July 2004.
|( ’g
Hurtado Meza Una reflexion sobre la fuerza armada peruana a partir del informe
final de la Comision de la Verdad v Reconciliacion 2005: see also Pedraglio. Tamayo
and Castillo Fuerzas Armadas: Control Civil y relaciones civiles-militares 2002.
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armed forces consolidating the process of reform, but also recuperating its operative
capacity
,
modernizing its forces, and engaging in strategic planning. From 2006 to 2010
the highest priority for defense sector reform would be modernization and planning. 1 10
Clearly the nature of reform had begun to slow even before 2004. For example,
from over 460 retirements from the armed forces in 2002. the number dropped to 264 in
2003. In 2004. members of the armed forces received pay increases, followed by new
increases in 2005 and 2006. In 2006. military expenditures rose as a share of the budget.
Purchases of large ticket military equipment were re-initiated, including that of several
frigates. Where the Ministry of Defense and the high command of the armed forces had
shown great hesitance to complain about budget matters and demand new expenditures
for the first few years after Fujimori s departure, in the last two years of Toledo s
presidency they demonstrated a new assertiveness on such matters, arguing that low7
military budgets were negatively impacting the capacity and training of the military.
During Minister of Defense Chiabra s tenure, the stipend paid to soldiers doubled. 111
The mission statement of the Ministry of Defense and those of the armed forces
reflected several important changes in the conceptualization of the role of the military in
serving the national interest. The Ministry of Defense identified five special roles the
defense sector should play in national life:
1111
Ministry of Defense. Peru. Plan Estrategico de Reforma del Sector Defensa.
Available at www.mindef.gov.pe
111 La Republica Nov 1 5, 2004: El Comercio Oct 29. Nov 25. 2004.
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To guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in
safeguarding the national interests.
To assume control of internal order during states of emergency.
To participate in civil defense.
To contribute to the scientific, technological, economic, and social development
of the country.
To participate in projecting the state in the international context of a regional
defense system and hemispheric security. 11_
Participation in humanitarian civic action w as one of the ways in which the armed forces
actively participate in state policies related to development and national integration.
This had been the norm during the 1990s. when military command with control over
zones in emergency status engaged in highway repair, urban development, health care,
and even literacy and civic education initiatives, and even outside the zones the military
was frequently employed in the delivery of social sendees and humanitarian assistance.
The military rapidly replaced civilian social service delivery institutions of the state and
local governments, whose budgets were being slashed under Fujimori s economic
austerity programs while military budgets grew. 11 ’ In 2004. the armed forces of Peru
participated alongside U.S. military counterparts to bring medical assistance to 22.000
poor citizens, and engaged in a wide array of humanitarian services throughout the
countryside.
1 14
In 2005. Toledo announced specific plans to reinsert the anned services in
the war on poverty, noting that military and police forces were disseminated across the
national territory, making them an ideal tool to implement low-cost efforts to improve the
1 12
Ibid. The reader will recall that Legislative Decree No. 749. published in El Perucmo
Nov 12. 1991. placed all local and regional government powers and resources in the
hands of Military Political Commands organized by the aimed forces.
11
J
Rospigliosi Montesines y Las Fuerzas Armadas 2000. Ch. 1. See. for example. La
Republica Oct 14. 1991.
1 14
El Correo May 4. 2005 and website of the Peruvian army.
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economy of the countryside. 1 ' " Now, as then, the armed forces are considered a viable
alternative to civilian institutions of the state given their infrastructure, national presence,
and public respect.
Especially worrisome was the growing role of the armed forces in fighting the
vaguely-defined war on terrorism, which included the multiple goals of stymieing the
activities of anus smugglers, drug traders, and insurgents, along with a broad defense
agenda, which included addressing the socio-economic causes of violence. In part a
reflection of US security policy. Peruvian military policy includes a mixture of security
and defense concepts, reflecting the growing sense that the greatest threats to security
in the twenty-first century come from groups operating inside state borders but linked to
criminal or terrorist groups that crossed borders, as well as from socio-economic
challenges. Security is a concept broad enough to include the protection of individuals
from a wide array of risks to their well-being, including poverty, environmental
insecurity, unemployment, and poor health. Defense is understood to relate directly to
harnessing the state s violent or coercive capacity to protect the public from military
threats.
116
As w ith military' participation in humanitarian civil sendee, the expansive role for
the military in domestic security worried those who argued that, in fact, the only safe and
democratic role for the military in Latin America was to combat external threats to
security. Police and domestic intelligence agencies ought to be strengthened in their
11
' El Peruano Feb 25. 2005.
116 Gaston Chillier Defensa y Seguridad: ?De Nuevo Mezclados? Ideele. No. 167. Dec
2004; Pedraglio. Tamayo and Castillo Fuerias Armadas: Control Civil y Relaciones
Cixil-Militares 2004. ch. 2. On this phenomenon across the region, see Manwaring
Guerrillas. Narcotics, and Terrorism: Old Menaces in a New World 1 996.
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capacity to fight these dangers, just as the national bureaucracy and social service needed
to he strengthened to deliver medical care, build roads and integrate isolated border towns
into national structures. To delegate these responsibilities to the armed forces was, in
these critics eyes, a dangerous step backward in establishing democratic controls on the
military. It provided new openings for the corruption that had plagued the military under
Fujimori, and slowed the pace of consolidating efficient state institutions to deliver public
services. Peruvian military control over counternarcotics operations, established during
Fujimori s presidency and still in place, in particular reflected the vision of and pressure
from the United States, which ultimately won out over the concerns of many Peruvian
army officers who felt that their main focus ought to be counterinsurgency and border
protection rather than counternarcotics, with all its potential to negatively impact the poor
indigenous communities that grew the coca and to provide dangerous temptations for
corruption and illicit dealing among members of the military. Furthermore, as concern
over FARC activities in northern Peru built over the course of 2005 and 2006. the
military was increasingly called upon to respond to the potential spread of Colombia s
conflict.
11
7
1
1
FARC is a guerrilla movement engaged in combat in Colombia. McClintock and
Valias The United States and Pent 2003. Ch. 6: Musso Marcovich La participacion de
las Fuerzas Armadas en la lucha por la seguridad nacional 2002; Rospigliosi Las
Fuerzas Armadas y La Democracia 2001. The Paniagua administration adopted a more
cooperative attitude toward US and Colombian antinarcotics operations, and ordered the
first deployment of troops to the border in 2001 for coordinated action with the
Colombian military; Peruvian Defense Minister Views Deployment of Troops to
Colombian Border. Plan Colombia Agence France Presse May 1 8. 2001 (FBIS
Translated Text available through World News Connection database). The Toledo
administration continued these policies.
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Interestingly, the reform plan specified the goal of finding alternate sources of
funding for defense priorities. President Toledo announced the creation of a new national
defense fund in 2004. The defense sector s traditional exemption from regular national
budgetary proceedings under the control of the Congress was widely considered a
contributing factor to the overspending, corruption, and menacing power of the military
as an institution over the entire history of Peru. Just as it seemed possible they would at
last be subjected to the same demands to legitimize their expenditures as did every other
institution of the state in the course of hammering out a budget in Congress (something
reformed militaries throughout the region had come to accept in recent years, with the
exception of Chile). Toledo now introduced a protected fund for the security forces,
encompassing both the national police and the three branches of the military. This was
exactly the opposite of the recommendation of the Truth Commission. As Rut Diamint
and others argued, the action represented a deficiency of democracy, in the sense that is
diminished Congress s capacity to exercise the vital power of the purse over the armed
forces. ' The president called upon whoever was elected in 2006 to increase the money
dedicated to this special fund.
1 14
Simultaneously, in 2004 the armed forces received their
first increase in military budget since the transition: these would be followed by more
increases in 2005 and 2006.
118 * .
Interview. Claves para la conduccion democratica de la Defensa. Iaeele.No. 167.
Dec 2004: Rospigliosi s comments in El Comercio Nov 1. 2004. The defense fund was.
in fact, based on the Chilean model, particularly in the sense that a percentage of the
income from natural gas production would legally be dedicated to the fund, just as Chile
guaranteed the armed forces a percentage of copper sales. On the defense fund, see La
Republica Oct 29. Dec 20. 2004: El Perucmo Dec 10. 16. 17. 2004: Degregori s article in
Peru21 Nov 25. 2004.
119 En La Mira Oct 2005.
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Still, it is undeniable that many positive changes in civil-military relations were
moving forward. Like many of its neighboring states. Peru found that when its transition
back to democracy and civ il peace left it with a massive military and few immediate
threats, giving the military a greater role in multinational peacekeeping efforts could
serve many needs at once. Contributing to such operations provided critical funding for
the armed forces without diverting state resources needed elsewhere: it satisfied the need
of the armed forces for missions and a positive public image: and it afforded the state a
greater presence in international organizations and operations than normally achieved by
minor powers. 1 " 0 In 2003 and 2004. the Peruvian armed forces actively participated in
UN peacekeeping efforts in the Congo. Liberia. Eritrea/Ethiopia border areas. Cyprus,
Haiti and Burundi. 1 ' 1
Reforms also involved opening the armed forces to greater interaction with civil
society and creating greater transparency within the defense sector. Over the course of
2004. members of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces participated in meetings
and workshops with the Institute of Legal Defense, the International Red Cross, the
Andean Commission of Jurists, and the Catholic University on topics related to human
rights.
1-2 No doubt a more difficult goal of the plan is. as the plan states, to change the
120 On peacekeeping operations as a major new area of activity for the aimed forces of
third wave democracies, see Hunter State and Soldier in Latin America 1996: Child
Peacekeeping. Confidence Building 1996.
121
El Comerc\o Nov 10. 2003
jT)
" www.idl.org.pe
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mentality of the members of the armed forces to indoctrinate and consolidate respect
for constitutional precepts, democratic principles, the legal and normative system, human
rights and international humanitarian law. I2j
The majority of these reforms were popular with the armed forces themselves. In
particular, the biggest reform of 2005. was one deeply desired by the defense sector: for
the first time, members of the armed forces and national police would be allowed to vote
in elections. Though the prohibition of their votes had long ago been formulated as a way
to assure the nonpoliticization of the security forces, it was widely recognized that
denying these individuals their right to participate in democratic elections only reinforced
the separate worlds of civilian and military life that had prevailed in the past. As Ana
Maria Tamayo and Jose Robles argued, restoring the rights to vote contributed to the
integration of the armed forces into normal roles as citizens and individuals rather than
primarily as members of an institution. 1 ' 4
Conclusions
After initial indications that Toledo would continue the massive reform efforts
initiated by the Paniagua administration, his presidency w as a disappointment to
supporters of reform in the judiciary and human rights trials for members of the military.
In the assessments of Eduardo Dargent and Ronald Gamarra. the failure to press for
judicial reform reflected a lack of political will and the weakness of Toledo s presidency.
Others were far harsher, attributing to Toledo more malicious designs. Fernando
12
~ Tamayo and Robles Prioridad: Fortalecimiento Ideele. Dec 2005: El Comercio Nov
12. 2004: Expreso Nov 16. 2004: Gestiou. Peru21
,
and La Republica Feb 9. 2006.
124
Ibid.
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Rospigliosi. w ho, it should be noted, served as Minister of the Interior tw ice and briefly
as head of the National Counsel on Intelligence (CNI) under Toledo and ultimately
resigned from office after a motion of censure by the Congress, attributes the failure of
military reform not to mere weakness or turpitude. Rather, he w rites. Toledo sought to
buttress military support for his weak presidency by making tactical concessions in the
area of human rights accountability. Fears that political opponents. Fujimori, or the
military itself might threaten his administration continued to influence presidential
policy-making more than a decade after Fujimori s autogolpe. 1 '"
February 2005 Barometro polling data continued to show Fujimori receiving the
second highest approval ratings among the public, despite his self-imposed exile in Japan.
(It should be noted, however, that he also receives the second largest response to the
question "With which political figure do you have the least sympathy?”) 1-6 Then, near
the end of 2005. Fujimori once more shocked Peruvians by showing up in Chile, where
he was arrested before he could re-enter Peru. ' Fujimori may have been hoping to take
Rospigliosi La frustracion de la reforma de las fuerzas de seguridad 2006: Gamarra
Derechos humanos. justicia y transition democratica 2006: Dargent Reforma Judicial
en el Peru ( 1 990-2005 ) 2006.
126
Barometro. Estudio 255 Feb 2005.
1-7
For detailed press coverage of Fujimori s stay in Chile and Peru s attempts to have
him extradited to Peru to stand trial, see El Comercio s special link to stories on these
matters. Fujimori Detenido. Fujimori had long been promising to return to Peru to run
again. See. for example. Larry Rohter Surprise! Before He's Even Gone. Fujimori May
Be Planning His Comeback New York Times Sept 2 1 . 2000.
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advantage of ongoing tensions between Chile and Peru, due to maritime boundary
disputes and evidence that Chile had supplied Ecuador with arms during the Peru-
Ecuador conflict, in order to avoid arrest or extradition. "
Ollanta Humala s campaign for the 2006 presidential elections clearly
demonstrated the political capital to be gained from associating with the military.
Humala. a former army lieutenant colonel, participated in the military rebellion (led by
Ollanta Humala s brother. Ann}' Major Antauro Humala) staged in the final months of
Fujimori s presidency. Though suspected of involvement in human rights violations
committed in the early 1990s, he routinely campaigned in a green military-style jacket
and praised the 1968-1975 military government of General Velasco. As Humala raced
into second place in polls on the presidential campaign, journalists explained that many
Peruvians see Humala as the tough military man the country needs to punish the corrupt
and impose order. Humala views himself in the same light. Due to my military
experience 1 believe we need discipline in the country, discipline and order.
1-4
Five civilians filed criminal complaints against Humala in the run-up to the
election, accusing him of ordering or participating in disappearances, torture, and
extrajudicial killings while in charge of a military base in the Huallaga Valley 1992.
Human rights organizations report that 300 people disappeared in the valley that year as a
result of conflict between Sendero Luminoso. the army and narcotraffickers. Humala s
defense was that the accusers want to destroy a soldier but I will not permit it. On
1-8 On these tensions see La Republica Nov 1. 2005; FBIS-LAT April 30. 2005; El
Peruano Dec 23, 2004. May 4. 2005.
I_g
Associated Press Jan 14. 2006. For an overview of the (few) proposals put forward by
the parties relating to civil-military relations during the campaign, see Florez and
Castaneda Orden Cerrado 2006.
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another occasion he shouted that he was being attacked simply for belonging "to that
generation of Peruvians whose turn it was to fight insurgency, to defend our sovereignty
in the Condor Mountains." He then promised the military and police forces that as
president he would "vindicate their institutional values." 1
""’ 0
The Coordinadora and IDL
provided legal defense for the accusers. Polling data indicated that 41% of respondents
believed he was guilty of the alleged human rights violations. Meanwhile. Humala shot to
first place in the polls in the weeks before the first round of voting. To drive home his
nationalist message and further embrace the caudillo image, he staged a thrilling
campaign stunt, riding a chestnut mare through the streets of Lima, into the Plaza de
Armas, shouting slogans and promising to revolutionize Peru. Humala won the most
votes in the first round of the elections, but ultimately lost the presidential elections to
Alan Garcia on June 4. 2006. 131
lj0 Quotes from Associated Press Feb 25. 2006 and El Comercio March 10. 2006. On
Humala and human rights, see El Correct Feb 3. 27. 2006. La Republica Feb 8. 14. 2006
(the latter includes an interview with him). Many compared Humala to Venezuela s Hugo
Chavez (who quickly endorsed Humala) or to Ecuador s Lucio Gutierrez. On March 22.
2006. La Republica reported that Humala s military records showed that he received
excellent marks for his participation in operations that involved human rights violations,
including Operation Spoon . an operation of which the CVR had been highly critical.
Polling data is from Opinion data. Apoyo Opinion y Mercado. Resumen de Encuests a
la Opinion Publica. Feb 2006. Available online at www.apoyo-om.com.
bl
El Comercio Feb 3. 6. 2006; all major Peruvian daily papers Feb 2. 2006; Juan Forero
Nationalism and Populism Propel Front-Runner in Peru New' York Times April 2. 2006.
See also At the double. Ollanta the Outsider Economist March 25. 2006; AP Left-
Leaning Candidate Surges in Peru New York Times Jan 14. 2006; AP Criminal
Complaints Filed Against Humala New York Times Feb 25. 2006. For coverage of the
results of the two rounds of election, see all major Peruvian daily newspapers April 1 1-
June 7, 2006.
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Humala was not the only one who tried to use the military card to gain political
capital in the presidential race. The ultimate winner was Alan Garcia, whose running
mate, retired admiral Luis Giampetri. worried Salomon Lemer. who told El Comercio
that Giampetri had strongly opposed the work of the truth commission. He considered
Garcia s choice of running-mate as an indication that Garcia was signaling that he would
enact new military amnesties if elected president and would court military favor by
keeping the authoritarian option an open possibility. Giampetri s aversion to the truth
commission and his support for a new amnesty reflected his own history: he himself had
been tried before a military court for involvement in the El Frontin prison incident of
1986, in which 1 1
1
people were killed. Though the military courts dismissed the charges
against Giampetri and others in the case, new legal procedures in civ il ian courts were
going on when Garcia chose him as running mate.
Though human rights groups claimed the trial itself was a victory for advancing
the principle that court decisions on human rights cases tried by military courts were
invalid and could now be retried, the court s apparent decision to shelve the case in early
2006 outraged these same groups. Giampetri s criticisms of the truth commission and
human rights organizations did not let up during the presidential campaign. In January
2006. he accused IDL. law faculty at the Universidad Catolica. and others of allowing
terrorists to go free as a result of their campaign against military judges, and of giving the
truth commission false or circumstantial information which the CVR treated as fact. 1 '"
El Comercio Feb 6. 2006: La Republica Jan 4 and 12. 2006: La Primera Feb 10. 206.
The IACHR itself heard this case, and in August 2000. condemned the Peruvian state
under Alan Garcia and members of the armed forces for human rights violations. See El
Comercio May 3. 2001
.
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Giampetri joined those who supported the new mil itar}’ amnesty proposals. He
also opined that the military amnesty granted by Fujimori was still valid and legal, an
opinion shared byfujimorista Martha Chavez. Arturo Woodman, vice-presidential
candidate for UN, urged Congress to reopen the question of legal amnesty for members
of the military. Sebastian Brett of Human Rights Watch shot back that any new amnesty
would violate Peru s international treaty obligations and that discussion of such measures
was clearly conducted in attempt to gain military backing for the upcoming elections.
1
'5 ''’
Alan Garcia s actions tended to confirm the sense that pail of his electoral
strategy was. if nothing else, to portray himself as closely supportive of the military. In
February 2006. Garcia promised that, if elected, he would raise military budgets and
salaries within his first six months in office. Garcia was particularly critical of low
military budgets, and promised to seek international credits to finance higher mi litan-
spending. Retired General Carlos Tafur Ganoza. the former army commander general,
also ran on the APRA ticket, but for Congress. Throughout his campaign, he advocated
increases in military spending to bring the Peruvian military to parity with the Chilean
forces, as well as increases in the numbers and salaries of troops, and the purchase of
impressive new equipment. Tafur envisioned restored military power as key to solving
many of Peru s problems: "This will have immediate consequences. We will give
occupation to 50.000 unemployed persons, improve the training conditions of personnel,
and. above all. draw youths away from gangs and delinquency." 1 ' 4
1
' La Primera Jan 6. 2006; La Republica Jan 6. 2006; La Republica. El Peruano. and
Peru21 Jan 9. 2006.
14
La Republica Feb 27. 2006; El Peruano Feb 2. 2006.
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The impact of Garcia s return to the presidency, both on questions of human
rights accountability and on Peru s attempts to consolidate democracy, remain unclear.
One can only hope his attempts to portray himself as reformed in terms of economic
strategy at least were sincere: it is harder to be optimistic on the human rights
accountability front. Only with time will it become clear whether this too was more
political calculation than a genuine resistance to reform. Regardless, before further action
can be taken to hold members of the armed forces accountable before civilian courts, or
before their role in fighting internal subversion can finally be eliminated. Garcia will
have to restore the public s trust in and respect for the Peruvian government. Given the
overall failure of the Toledo administration on these fronts, we can at least breathe a sigh
of relief that Toledo s presidency is over, for despite the stability and relative prosperity
Peru enjoyed from 2001 to 2006. the public s discontent with their government and
particularly its leadership was all too clear.
However, with Garcia in the presidency and Humala s coalition holding a
majority of seats in Congress, little interest in pressing the question of human rights
accountability is to be found in the ruling political class. Guzman s case remains
unresolved. Human rights groups w ithin Peru and the TAN. as well as many journalists
and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, decry the slow progress towards
implementing the reforms the truth commission had called for. '
lj
‘ De la Jara Basombrio is pessimistic as to what a new Garcia administration would
mean for human rights prosecutions: see Ensayos sobre justiciay derechos himicmos
2003. p. 88-89.
1 ' h
Peru21 Nov 1 1. 25. 2004. Jan 13. Feb 28. 2005: Gamarra Derechos humanos. justicia
y transicion democratica 2006.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The Peruvian case study offered here supports the emphasis scholars like Risse.
Keck, and Sikkink place on transnational activist networks. The pressure of a well-
organized network of domestic and international activists was brought to bear upon the
state, in pan because that netw ork successfully shopped for the international venues
most likely to influence the Peruvian state s behavior (the InterAmerican Commission
and Court for Human Rights and the OAS mesa de dialogo). After the creation of the
Human Rights Ombudsman s office (.Defensoria del Pueblo ) in 1996 and the selection of
a new Constitutional Tribunal (TC) after the fall of the Fujimori regime, these institutions
became primary catalysts for change from within the state. The pressure from this
network w as arguably the most important factor in shaping Peru s rapid transition
towards the rule of law and military accountability for crimes committed in the course of
defeating the Sendero Tuminoso threat, outcomes unimaginable only months before. This
network of activists, cleverly utilizing international connections in civil society,
international organizations, and foreign governments, pushed the state to overcome the
antidemocratic balance of civil-military relations which continued to characterize
Argentina and Chile years after their transitions.
Peru fits the model Risse and Sikkink offer in many ways. (See Figure 1 in
Appendix for the Risse and Sikkink Spiral Model of Human Rights Change. ) Certainly,
repressive behavior on the pan of the state spurred the TAN to collect and utilize
information, invoke international human rights norms, pressurize the state, and mobilize
international organizations (though rarely liberal states) in its campaign. Presidents
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Belaunde Terry and Fujimori, in particular, reacted to this campaign with denial of the
validity of human rights norms as subject to international jurisdiction and claimed Peru
should be immune from the intervention of other states as it dealt with matters of internal
security and human rights. Fujimori s removal of Peru from the jurisdiction of the
InterAmerican Court of Human Rights is the most obvious instance of this denial. In the
wake of this decision, the TAN did sustain its multilateral network pressure on the state,
by continuing to carry its campaign to the Organization of American States, to the US
State Department, to international NGOs. and to the Peruvian people. It continued to
employ information and symbolic politics as it criticized the Fujimori regime, and built
public confidence through its In the Name of the Innocents campaign.
In 2000. there was indeed a mobilization and strengthening of groups engaging
human rights norms in Peru. But this mobilization was the result of Fujimori s decision
to run for a third (unconstitutional) term as president. Public opinion was at last with
Fujimori s opposition and those making principled arguments against Fujimori s actions.
The mobilization and strengthening of the human rights community in this case is
certainly linked to the sustained TAN campaign for human rights accountability, but it
cannot be linked causally as the Risse-Sikkink model suggests. Just as Pinochet s arrest
in Europe created an opening for the pursuit ofhuman rights accountability within Chile,
the fall of the Fujimori regime created the political space the Peruvian-based TAN w ould
exploit to remake human rights policy. But while Pinochet s arrest might be considered
pan of a TAN campaign. Fujimori s self-destruction cannot. There was nothing
inevitable about the dramatic collapse of the regime, and the successes of the TAN in this
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case came about because network members were positioned to take advantage of the
political opening created by changes beyond their control.
That the tactical concessions granted by Fujimori in response to the network s
pressure strengthened the position of that network does seem accurate: for example, the
creation of the Fluman Rights Ombudsman s Office did reduce the regime s margin of
maneuver re human rights. But regime change came to Peru in 2000 and 2001 as a result
of an internal collapse of legitimacy provoked by the release of the Vladivideos and the
crumbling of the internal power structure Montesinos had held in place. Regime change
was not primarily a result of the expansion of human rights groups in a new political
space
;
rather, the increase in influence of those groups was made possible by the
collapse of the regime. The human rights TAN at work in Pern did play a unique role in
the tumultuous politics of the country during its transition and effectively achieved policy
change in the areas around which it had so long campaigned. The human rights
movements pushed consistently for the development of legislation to institute the truth
commission and conducted a campaign to gain public support for it. and then refocused
its efforts on prosecution of human rights violators.
The speed with which the truth commission was established makes the process of
its creation by the transitional administration seem almost inevitable, but De la Jara
Basombrio points out there was little political incentive for the administration to take this
position. The Paniagua transitional administration s main functions, after all. were to
organize new elections and maintain governmental continuity and stability, not to issue
groundbreaking human rights policies. Furthermore. Paniagua s decision cannot be
explained by electoral dynamics, as he was not running for office and already enjoyed the
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overwhelming support of the public and the institutions of the state. Given that the groups
demanding human rights accountability represented the interests of the poor,
marginalized indigenous families of victims, and that the public as a whole was far more
interested in questions of corruption and the economy than in human rights cases, there
was no society-wide demand for the creation of the truth commission. lj If human rights
assumed centerstage in societal discourse in Peru at this time, it did so in a way which
carried with it all the ambiguity and ambivalence that was soon to reveal itself. The
public and the political class were united in their desire to purge the state of the
corruption which had flourished under Fujimori s power, but this surface consensus hid a
deep ambivalence about the desirability of aggressively prosecuting alleged human rights
violators within the ranks of the armed forces and retrying those convicted as terrorists
under Fujimori s antiterrorist legislation.
The capacity of transnational networks to affect civil-military relations is at its
peak when prevailing power relationships within the state are fundamentally upset, but
the window of opportunity open to these groups to enact key elements of their human
rights and democratization agendas is narrow 7 and closes quickly. Though international
intervention or the collapse of institutions of the state grant transnational networks,
previously marginalized, the ability to assume extraordinary powers to shape the national
dialogue on matters key to civil-military relations, the mechanisms they are able to craft
to exercise this influence are either temporary or indirect. In Peru, transnationalized
pressure for human rights accountability, the civil-military matter usually most resistant
to fundamental change, was able to achieve powerful successes in the first three years
L
' De la Jara Basombrio Ensayos sobrejusticiar derechos humanos 2003. p. 124.
after Fujimori s fall from power. In particular, the TAN was able to influence the creation
and reach of a truth and reconciliation commission, an item high on the Peruvian human
rights community s agenda for many years. They effectively used cases before the
InterAmerican Human Rights Courts to push the new administrations of Paniagua and
Toledo to overturn amnesty laws, to reopen domestic civilian court proceedings on
paradigmatic human rights cases from the past, and to adopt a discourse of human rights
accountability.
However, the field of civil-military relations is, perhaps more than any other
matter of democratic reform, a difficult one for actors in civil society to navigate. Here
the literature on civil-military relations traced in Chapter II bears relevance, as
institutionalist, rationalist and culturalist factors influence, and in this case clearly limit
the capacity of TAN campaigns to transform civil-military relations. The armed forces
continue to enjoy a special privileged status which makes them exceptionally difficult to
affect from outside the traditional avenues of power. International organizations,
transnationalized institutions, and even other countries have a strictly limited capacity to
alter the nature of civil-military relations within a state, for no such change can be
decreed into reality, and strong pressure from outside will surely be interpreted as
trespassing on the most sacred reserve of national security policy, a fundamental
component of sovereignty. The intense pressures the Fujimori regime was subjected to
from the OAS. transnational civil society partners such as Transparencia in Peru and
WOLA in the US. international financial institutions, the countries of the Americas and
Europe, etc. were not sustained within the country after the immediate threats to
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democracy had been removed. No international force could press for reform of civil-
military relations in Peru; the pressure had to come from within the state.
By 2003 power relations within the country had settled into new patterns, and the
powerful but brief alliance between Fujimori s political opponents and civil society
profoundly altered. In the final days of Fujimori s regime, it had been only too easy to
find consensus among his political opposition, particularly among the participants in the
OAS-led mesa de dialogo. But once the opposition of yesterday became the
congressional majority of today, many of the great principles articulated in the course of
the transition fell by the wayside. The political opportunity structure that had enabled
principled arguments about accountability and justice to carry the day in 2001 gave way
to renewed public discontent with the institutions of power. Once more the military
seemed to a majority of Peruvians the least offensive wielder of power.
The biggest obstacle to efforts to hold members of the armed forces legally
accountable for human rights violations is the institutional weakness and public distrust
of the legal system. As the final report of the truth commission w rote, the weakness of the
rule of law remains the Achilles heal of Peruvian democracy. They warned that, so long
as the public system proves itself incapable of resolving the problems of impunity and
everyday administration of justice, respect for the state and the rule of law will continue
to erode and the option of violence w ill remain a pow erful alternative. The Commission
went so far as to argue that at times the massive violation of the right to due process
t e
I -so
rendered the legal system of Peru itself an agent of violence against the people.
'
I •'O
' Comision de la Verdad Informe Final Tome III. p. 247-8. See section on justice
system, p. 247-280.
Public opinion in both Peru and in Latin America as a whole considers corruption
to be high in the state and in society. (See Graph 1 in Appendix. 1
' 9
) Furthermore, the
perception in Peru that the state is becoming more rather than less corrupt severely limits
any possible gains transitional justice efforts might have offered in establishing public
faith in the rule of law. (See Graph 2. 140) In Peru, across Latin America, and indeed
across the globe, public distrust of state institutions is highest for the legislature and the
legal system: this trend is noticeably worse in Peru than it is globally or in Latin America.
In Peru, public trust is worst for Congress and the Judiciary, the two institutions that
ultimately exert long-term control of the transitional justice agenda within the state, while
the armed forces are considered significantly more trustworthy. (See Graph 3. 141 )
Since the regime transition of 2000. this trend has worsened, with the legislature
and judiciary losing public trust, even as the armed forces recover public trust. (See
Graph 4.) In fact, a December 2005 poll conducted by the University of Lima found the
armed forces to be the most trusted institution of the state, with 54.6% of respondents
supporting it.
14
' This trend is especially dramatic when the level of public satisfaction
with the armed forces during the Toledo administration is compared to its level in
December 2000 (when the Fujimori government had just fallen apart and the armed
19
The data in this graph is drawn from Transparency International s Corruption
Perception Index. Available at
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
140
Ibid.
141
The data in this graph is drawn from the Transparency International s Global
Corruption Barometer. Available at
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb
l4
' Reported in Gestion Dec 13, 2005.
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forces complicity in corruption was gradually being revealed). At that time, only 29% of
respondents approved of the management of the Armed Forces: this figure rose to 38%
by 2002 and 48% in early 2005. placing it among the most trusted institutions of the
state.
14
' On the other hand. Peruvians are more likely to consider the judiciary Not at all
trustworthy today than they were during Fujimori s presidency. (See Graph 5. 144 ) This
too seems related to the issue of corruption. The public perceives the military to be far
less corrupt than Congress or the legal system, both in Peru and the region as a whole. In
Peru, the public believes the armed forces have done a much better job dealing with its
corruption than the Congress and judicial system have done with theirs. As time has
passed, the Peruvian public has also become less likely to blame the armed forces or
Fujimori for human rights violations from the 1980s and 1990s. (See Graph b. 14 ^)
The weakness of institutions undercuts their capacity to challenge the prerogatives
of other institutions of the state. Paniagua, who enjoyed exceptionally high levels of
public approval, particularly when he was seen to be taking strong steps to hold the
military leadership accountable, was able to channel his popular legitimacy into
institutional strength sufficient to assert control over the transitional justice agenda. (See
Graph 7.) Toledo, throughout this five years in office, suffered from a devastating
collapse of popular support which made the executive weaker relative to other
institutions. (See Graph 8.) Though Toledo entered office committed to human rights
l4j
The 2002-2005 data in this graph is drawn from Apoyo Opinion Polling Data.
Available at www.apoyo-om.com. See also Apoyo polling data in El Comercio Dec 19.
2000 .
144
Ibid.
145
Ibid.
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trials for members of the military, his inability and lack of incentive for cooperating w ith
Congress or supporting the judiciary contributed to a gradual backsliding that ultimately
resulted in the armed forces reasserting institutional control over human rights
accountability for its own members.
Though the public was highly supportive of the Truth Commission when its
formation was first decreed under Toledo, support for its work declined during the
commission s work and after its conclusion. (See Graph 9. I4fl ) Similarly, the two
components of the legal system s attempts to restore the rule of law via trials civilian
retrials of individuals convicted under Fujimori s antiterrorism legislation in military
courts, and prosecution of members of the military implicated in human rights abuses
have provoked deep uncertainty. While little generalized polling data exists on this
question, the fact that large majorities disapproved of the Constitutional Tribunal s
decision to retry civilians convicted in military courts under antiterrorism legislation, and
believed that terrorists would go free as a result of this decision, is indicative of
dissatisfaction with that measure. Polls relevant to public perceptions of trials of those
members of the military accused of human rights violations are few and problematic as a
basis for generalization, but are nevertheless suggestive. For example, a poll was
conducted on attitudes toward the order for the arrest of officials involved in the military
operation Chavin de Huantar. which rescued hostages held in the Japanese Ambassador s
residence from members of the MRTA in 1997. Polls indicate that though slight
majorities believed that members of the MRTA had been executed after surrendering
(56%). that the executions had not been necessary (55%), and that the case ought to be
l4(
’ Supra note 4 for Graphs 7-9.
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investigated (53%), 44% wanted the case closed without investigation and 60% (and
therefore including some of those who agreed with the first three statements) approved of
a proposed law to grant amnesty to the participants in Operation Chavin de Huantar.
Few Peruvians believe a fair trial is likely in Peru. Though most Peruvians want
to see Fujimori returned to Peru to face trials for charges of corruption and human rights
abuses, only 23% believe he would receive a fair trial in Peru. Fhis is only one part of
a much broader crisis of legitimacy within the judicial system of Peru, and indeed in
much of Latin America. Eduardo Dargent writes, the distrust in the justice
system forms parts of a deep distrust of the citizens in the democratic institutions of
Peru.
,4S
Indeed, the Peruvian transitional justice experience faced a unique challenge
relative to other such exercises in Latin America: because the overwhelming majority of
human rights abuses investigated in the Peruvian case had been perpetrated under the
leadership of civilian, democratically elected governments, the danger that transitional
justice initiatives might actually weaken rather than strengthen support for democracy in
the country was very real.
144
14 Nov or Dec 2005; www.apoyo-om.com
l4s
Dargent La reforma judicial en el Peru ( 1990-2005) 2006: Justicia Viva La reforma
del sistema dejusticia: ?que reforma? 2004: Hammergren La experiencia peruana en
reforma judicial 2004. On the Latin America-wide trend, see especially Hammergren
The Politics ofJustice and Justice Reform in Latin America 2004 and Domingo and
Sieder Rule ofLaw in Latin America: The International Promotion ofJudicial Reform
2001.
I4
" Comments suggesting this often appeared in the media: often, while demanding
thorough investigations of the abuses committed in the 1980s and 90s. individuals would
lament the reality that Peru s electoral democracy had not prevented such abuses. See
Gestion May 28. 2001
.
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Civil-military relations in Peru have indeed undergone profound transformations
since the fall of the Fujimori government, but in the area of human rights accountability,
the military maintains much of its capacity to block prosecutions of its officers. The
evolution of accountability efforts over the last five years demonstrates many of the
continuing challenges to consolidating democracy in Peru. Clearly, institutional factors
played a role in determining the means and capacity of the state to affect change in civil-
military relations. At first, the institutional damage to the armed forces resulting from
Fujimori s assertion of subjective control seem to explain their initial inability to block
human rights accountability measures threatening their members. Above all. the total co-
dependency of the military leadership with Montesinos and Fujimori rendered the aimed
forces highly vulnerable to aggressive action by the state. Submission to Montesinos and
Fujimori, the corruption of traditional military protocols and systems of meritocracy, and
outrage from some factions within the military over abusive behavior by death squads
and their own leadership, had already substantially fractured the unity of the armed forces
long before Fujimori tied the country.
Yet the political reality of Peru painfully demonstrates the fact that corruption and
individual self-interest often trump institutions ability to act as unitary bodies working to
maintain traditional institutional powers and prerogatives. In such cases, institutionalist
explanations are weak. While the armed forces enjoyed significant political protection
from the Fujimori regime and Congress in their continuation of traditional practices -
especially immunity from legal action against members of the military for human rights
violations in exchange individual members of the armed forces, most notably Heimoza
and his circle of associates, traded other key military prerogatives, like autonomous
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control of internal professional matters such as advancement and retirements of military
personnel. The interests of this small group did include important institutional concerns
(maintenance of sizeable budget, greater defense of the armed forces by the regime in the
face of international and civil society criticism, capacity to conduct counter-insurgency
campaigns without restrictions on military powers, etc.), but they were also deeply
individualistic (motivated by desires to gain power within the military hierarchy).
Catherine Conaghan goes so far as to argue that authoritarianism in Fujimori s
Peru was not a function of formal design. What made the political system authoritarian
were the people who inhabited the institutions and the extremes to which they were
willing to go in sendee to Fujimori. She argues that it was the absence of leadership
committed to democratic principles that resulted in the total failure of Congress and the
courts to check Fujimori s abuses of the system because they profited from the perverse
institutions of clientelism and corruption.
1MI
But does this analysis apply to civil-military
relations?
Contrary to popular (and even scholarly) ideas about military institutions. Peru s
armed forces tend towards factionalization nearly as much as its political party system
does. But if institutionalist and rationalist explanations of civil-military relations seem
complicated by the fact that the military behaved neither rationally nor as a unitary actor
under Fujimori, it remains nevertheless clear that institutional weaknesses within the state
represented major obstacles to reforming the civil-military relationship after the fall of
the Fujimori government. For. as discussed above, the armed forces continued to enjoy a
deep reservoir of public support and respect that allowed them to recover much of their
l
'° Conaghan Fujimori s Peru 2005. p. 66.
strategic bargaining strength in the years of the Toledo administration. The weakness of
state institutions and their inability to provide the physical, economic and psychological
security demanded by the public boosted the reputation of the armed forces as one
institution which, whatever its past failings, did operate with some degree of order,
effectiveness and dignity qualities sadly lacking in the political sphere.
Perhaps the biggest challenge to traditional rationalist explanations of civil-
military relations is that the sources of military power have changed so fundamentally
over the last twenty years. Though the threat of a military coup continued to be used by
Peruvian military leadership and by Montesinos. even by the late 1980s the armed forces
had recognized how empty such threats had become. As Marcel Rubio has written, a
coup is among the least likely of the potential weapons to be used by the military in
political conflicts. The lower credibility of military coup threats, however, does not
necessarily imply a major weakening of military power relative to their civilian
governments. The political influence enjoyed by the military’ today arises from other
sources; in place of the hard power the military enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s due to
their ability to threaten or carry out military overthrows of civilian governments, today s
military enjoys influence from a type of soft power. Under Fujimori, the military s
power derived not only from Fujimori s dependence on their support for his autogolpe.
but also on the military s monopoly on ideas in the area of counterinsurgency and on
the perception among the public and among many politicians that it was the only state
institution capable of guaranteeing order, security and progress for the country.
1 ' 1
11
Rubio Commentary 1 994. p. 130-13 1
.
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Virtually universal to civil-military experts in Peru is the recognition that the absence of
civilians in government with any understanding of military issues deeply problematizes
that government s assertion of authority over the military.
Given the greater public favorability attached to the armed forces, it did not take
long for Toledo and members of Congress to realize that they had more to lose by
continuing to challenge the military than they had to win. The fact that the most genuine
and decisive measures to combat military impunity in the area of human rights came from
the courts and that these measures were not translated into or backed by equally strong
steps from the legislature or executive should not entirely surprise us. Though the judicial
system suffered from the same low levels of public trust as the Congress and President 152
,
members of the legal system do not rely upon public approval for their positions. Their
much more secure position enabled them to take on the single most respected institution
in the state (the armed forces) repeatedly. The most powerful challenges were on matters
of the need to restrict the jurisdiction of the military justice system, the traditional tool fol-
dedvering members of the armed services effective impunity, but the TC also argued in
favor of more restrictive interpretations of the role of the armed forces in states of
exception or emergency status. 1
"
Barometro Estudio 255 Feb 2005. This poll indicated the following levels of
trust/ distrust for the institutions of the state: Military 54.6/41.3. Congress 7.8/89.4.
Judicial branch 14/83.1. central government 12.4/82.4. Constitutional Tribunal 24.7/60.7.
High levels of distrust extended to parts of civil society as well, with NGOs trusted by
37.3/distrusted by 43.4. Political parties: 6.3/92.2.
Lv
' David Lovaton Palacios Justicia militar y Estado de derecho: Empezando. por fin.
kieele. No. 166. Oct 2004. Though a new law was finally passed in Congress in 2005
stipulating new rules for military engagement in such cases, the wording of the legislation
was vague enough to provoke concern. For example, the legislation limits states of
emergency to cases in which real and eminent danger are present, but it does not clarify
However, the legal system remains in flux, with courts jurisdictions and their
rulings force highly dependent upon political decisions. As Chapter V indicates, when
court rulings demonstrate patterns contrary to the desires of the legislature or executive,
the default response is for those bodies to simply rearrange the power of the courts. The
result is a legislative and legal morass in which the rule of law slides further into decay.
Recently, both president and congress have sided with the military courts in their struggle
to reassert control of human rights accountability, further buttressing the tradition of
separate militaryfueros which had seemed to be at an end in 2001 . That special courts
continue to be created and dissolved, and that the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal
itself can be so easily voided by legislative and executive decisions points to how far
Peru has to travel before the rule of law will be consolidated.
Political culture clearly plays a role in the ongoing battle over human rights
accountability. Among many members and leaders of the armed forces, the culture of
autonomy and corporate identity, and a self-perception of the military as an institution
especially charged with overseeing the safety and stability of the state, persists.
1
^ 4
There
seems to be universal recognition that military leadership in the 1990s was corrupt and
controlled by Montesinos. but there is widespread resistance to the idea that the
institution itself has participated in large-scale w rongdoings and to accepting
responsibility outside the corrupt leadership. There is rejection of the truth of the CVR.
which institution has the pow er to determine whether this level of danger exists. En La
Mira Oct 2005.
I M
Hurtado Meza Una reflexion sobre la fuerza armada peruana a partir del informe
final de la Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliation 2005: Alegria Bases para un
modelo de relaciones entre el poder politico y el mando militar desde una perspectiva
democratica 2003: Serra El Estado: Papel de la Fuerza Armada y de la Seguridad.
Notas sobre su control democratico 2003.
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for a variety of reasons. Chief among these reasons is the fact that five of the twelve
commissioners (Tapia. Degregori. Ames. Macher. and Bernales) are politically oriented
to the Left, and the (in the military s eyes) exaggerated number of deaths reported by the
Commission. Current and former leaders of the armed forces have argued that the CVR
treats Sendero Luminoso as a political party, thereby lending it a more legitimate status
than deserved, and that the goal of the commission was to disparage the institution as a
whole based on isolated events for which only individuals directly involved should be
blamed.
The Peruvian armed forces see their counter-subversive experience as directly
opposite to that of other Latin American militaries accused of human rights violations,
not least because they were not the main aggressors. They suffered large numbers of
losses, operated under the command of a democratically elected civilian government, and
were ultimately victorious in defeating the genuine subversive threat.
1
" Large numbers
of Peruvians share in the perception of the armed forces as heroes of the anti-subversive
war and appear to be persuaded by the argument that members of the armed forces
deserve protection from prosecutions conducted by an illegitimate legal system and a
Left-dominated NGO community.
Hurtado Meza argues that the surprisingly high level of violations reported by the
CVR. rather than producing an open debate and genuine self-reflection, served to polarize
political debate about Peru s recent pass. The political parties of AP. PPC. APRA.
Fujimori s supporters, the military and conserv ative sectors of the Catholic Church
immediately and deeply rejected the findings of the CVR. Given the maze of lies
1 "" Hurtado Meza Una reflexion sobre la fuerza armada peruana a partir del informe
final de la Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliation 2005.
uncovered in the months after Fujimori s fall from grace, the public divided over the
varied interpretations of the truth offered up by the political class. A sense that, though
some members of the armed forces undoubtedly committed excesses during the
countersubversive campaign, the armed forces remained the most trustworthy institution
of the state ultimately prevailed as politicians and the courts continued to lose public
credibility. The public sense of insecurity strengthened the desire to see the armed forces
take on a central role in fighting ongoing threats to internal national security (both from
remnants of subversive groups and common criminality) and socioeconomic security.
While institutional weaknesses and political culture deeply shaped the debate over
human rights accountability, in the end it was the rational calculation of political actors
that determined its outcome. By 2006. it was only too obvious that politicians had little to
gain from identifying themselves with human rights causes. Valentin Paniagua s renewed
bid for the presidency quickly disintegrated, while Alan Garcia and Ollanta Humala were
propelled forward despite grave concerns about their own involvement in human rights
violations. Verbal assaults on the NGO community as serving foreign, subversive or
private interests once more became a popular form of political rhetoric, and public
interest in the question of military prosecutions had died out. President Toledo was all too
willing to deploy the military to distribute food and medicine across the countryside,
where the rest of the Peruvian state continues to have a weak presence.
Policy change is an end point in the Risse-Sikkink model, one followed by the
institutionalization of human rights norms into state behavior. But the political reality in
Peru indicates that questions as complicated as responsibility and accountability for
human rights violations are too contentious a question to be settled so easily. Institutions
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remain in flux, particularly in the legal system, where there is no clear prevailing norm in
favor of civilian trials for human rights violators at work. Though the Peruvian state took
concrete steps in 2001 and 2002 to institutionalize internationally-accepted norms
establishing the rule of law and human rights accountability such as the return to the
IACHR and the wholesale adoption of its decisions the failure to reform the civilian
court system lent the return of human rights cases to the military jurisdiction an
appearance of legitimacy and even justness. Politicians self-interests, for a time so tied
to the theme of truth and justice according to the TAN s conception, now ran contrary to
that campaign at numerous points.
Human rights accountability remains a sticking point in the reform of civil-
military relations in Latin America. Despite the impressive momentum that has built
across the region in favor of bringing those accused of human rights violations to trial in
civilian courts, obstacles exist. As scholars continue to explore the threats to democratic
consolidation, and to explore the possibilities of non- and quasi-democratic regime
consolidation, so too must we recognize that as transnational norms are adopted
nationally, they undergo deep change. In Peru, where state violence mirrored an even
more violent subversive movement, uncertainty as to the degree of accountability the
public should demand from the state remains. There, and throughout Latin .America,
corruption and ineptitude on the pan of democratic governments undermine the
development of the rule of law and the consolidation of democratic legitimacy and
norms. When the political leaders of these states calculate they have more to gain by
solidifying the foundations of effective governance and respecting the courts application
of the law to all citizens than from protecting the armed forces from accountability,
transitional justice becomes a reality. But this is far from a foregone conclusion.
Integrating an appreciation of the power of transnational activist networks to
precipitate such change with a realization of the institutional, cultural and rational sources
of resistance to such change brings us closer to explaining change in this area of civil-
military relations. Rather than treating adoption of human rights norms as the inevitable
outcome of TAN campaigns, the study I have offered favors treating TANs as a political
actor occasionally empowered to alter state behavior on even the most sensitive policy
issues but typically facing more powerful actors who do not share their interests.
Though such networks are not elected and cannot be removed from their positions, they
too derive influence in large part from public legitimacy. Networks enjoy the flexibility
and mobility to probe the state and interstate community to find the points at which they
can gain leverage over their target state government. And in moments when traditional
power relationships are upset, the}' can exert a powerful influence on policy. But once
this moment has passed, network members often find themselves receding from
decision-making circles.
Once the outcome of transitional justice becomes a legal question, a matter to be
determined in thousands of individual court cases, relevant human rights networks lose
control over the direction of the process. Where legislatures and executives remain
willing to intervene directly in the judicial sphere, interrupting its autonomy, they
maintain the capacity to impede human rights accountability there. Though few of the
TAN members discussed in the Peruvian case study would w ish to delay prosecutions
until judicial autonomy and effectiveness were fully institutionalized, in the long-term the
absence of that autonomy makes the judiciary a problematic mechanism of transitional
justice. For Peru and for the region, then, transitional justice remains a work in progress.
Empirical investigation into societal attitudes towards human rights prosecutions and
attitudinal change within the armed forces of the region might well help indicate what
legacy transitional justice will leave behind.
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